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Abstract 
Genetics is one sector in which there has been tremendous evolution and progress 
over the last few decades. While it is believed that genetics could offer tremendous 
opportunities for global health improvement, there is also a fear that existing global 
health inequalities will be amplified by the evolution of genetics. 
It thus appears necessary to analyse the way CUITent assumptions define what is just 
and acceptable with regard to global access and distribution of resources in this field. 
Indeed, given the importance of genetics to human health globaIly, this thesis will 
evaluate two principal legal regimes - intellectual property and international human 
rights - to determine to which extent they further the goal of distributing the benefits 
of these technologies equitably and globaIly. This evaluation is vital to ensure that 
legal regimes assist in ensuring that this promising field develops in a way that 
improves global health without leaving the most vulnerable outside of the process. 
This dissertation will undertake this complex task by employing and building upon 
cosmopolitan liberal theories developed over the few last decades as an extension of 
the work of Rawls and Daniels. 
A theoretical framework to justify engaging III a global and more equitable 
redistribution of benefits produced by genetics is required. Ultimately, our analysis 
will produce strong normative benchmarks based on justice considerations for 
engaging in a global and more equitable redistribution of the benefits likely to emerge 
from genetic science. Universal consideration of aIl human beings, importance of 
health needs, normal functioning and equality of opportunities are sorne of the 
notions that will be analysed to construct this framework. We will then attempt to 
determine how and if this theory of distribution translates into positive law and to 
identify and analyse the main obstacles to legal compliance with global distributive 
justice. We will assess two main international normative systems: intellectual 
property law and human rights law to determine if their underlying philosophy, 
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structure, and functioning take account of the princip les highlighted in our theoretical 
framework and how underlying politics and economics matter. 
This will set out a basis for further discussion on how we could work around sorne 
of the major obstacles identified throughout our analysis. It will also help us move 
from the vague and often symbolic ideal of bene fit sharing actually prevailing toward 
the establishment of a real, enforceable concept of global benefit sharing in health 
that would position genetics at the rank of essential tool for achieving global health. 
VIl 
Sommaire 
La génétique est une sCIence fort prometteuse en général et qUI pourrait 
vraisemblablement être très utile pour répondre aux besoins des pays en 
développement dans le futur si elle leur était accessible. Cependant, plusieurs 
craignent que les inégalités globales existant déjà en santé pourraient être amplifiées 
par l'évolution de la génétique. 
C'est pourquoi il est essentiel d'analyser ce qui apparaît juste et acceptable en termes 
d'accès et de distribution dans ce domaine. Cette thèse se veut une contribution au 
débat sur la division génétique (genetic divide). En effet, face à l'importance que 
pourrait prendre la génétique au niveau global, nous évaluons deux importants 
régimes légaux - le droit de la propriété intellectuelle et le droit international de la 
personne- afin de déterminer s'ils encouragent une distribution équitable des 
bénéfices émergeant de la génétique. En effet, face à l'influence énorme du marché 
sur les problématiques d'accès et de distribution et confrontée aux lacunes normatives 
du populaire concept de partage des bénéfices, il est crucial d'analyser ces 
problématiques différemment, dans une perspective qui vise à remédier aux injustices 
globales dans le domaine de la santé généralement et de la génétique plus 
particulièrement. Cette thèse entreprend cette tâche complexe en s'appuyant sur une 
théorie de justice distributive cosmopolitaine en santé, développée, en partie, par 
Rawls et Daniels. 
Pour ce faire, l'élaboration d'un cadre théorique qui justifie la redistribution globale 
et plus équitable des ressources produites par la génétique est essentielle. La 
considération universelle des êtres humains, l'importance spécifique de la santé et de 
la génétique comme éléments essentiels au fonctionnement normal des individus, 
l'égalité des opportunités sont quelques unes des notions que nous analyserons pour 
l'élaboration de ce cadre théorique. Nous évaluerons ensuite comment ces principes 
de justice distributive globale en santé sont transposés en droit positif, s'ils le sont, et 
quels sont les principaux obstacles à l'application globale des ces principes. Pour ce 
Vlll 
faire, nous évaluerons leur compatibilité avec deux importants systèmes normatifs 
internationaux: le droit de la propriété intellectuelle et les droits de la personne afin 
de déterminer si leur philosophie inhérente, leur structure et leur fonctionnement 
tiennent compte des principes fondamentaux de notre cadre théorique. Nous 
analyserons aussi le rôle des facteurs politiques et économiques dans ce contexte. 
Cette étude nous permettra d'établir les bases solides nécessaires pour entreprendre 
d'autres études, dans l'avenir, sur les stratégies politiques possibles pour contourner 
les obstacles identifiés à l'occasion de notre analyse. Nous serons aussi à même de 
rejeter la traditionnelle notion vague et symbolique de partage des bénéfices en santé 
pour la remplacer par un concept solide et complet qui élèvera la génétique au rang 
d'outil essentiel pour l'amélioration de la santé globale. 
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The Global Health Challenge 
Introduction 
Of ail forms of inequality, injustice in health 
care is the most shocking and inhumane. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 1 
Today's world is characterised by a disturbing reality: on one hand, there is 
remarkable and ongoing technological progress in various spheres of activity 
while, on the other, the substantial gap existing between the world's rich and its 
po or constantly deepens. Indeed, despite our impressive state of knowledge, 
innovation, and development, at least one billion individuals continue to fight for 
their daily survival and more than two billion others live in acute poverty, on less 
than $2 a day.2 Such extreme poverty engenders terrible consequences, such as 
widespread infant mortality and adult premature deaths, severe malnutrition, and 
lack of access to basic necessities such as drinkable water, basic sanitation, 
shelter, and health care.3 AlI UN Member States acknowledged the seriousness of 
1 Quoted in L. Sheremeta & B.M. Knoppers, "Beyond the Rhetoric: Population Genetics and Benefit-
Sharing" (AnnuaI2003) II Health Law Journal 89. 
2 S.R.Benatar, "A Perspective from Africa on Human Rights and Genetic Engineering" in R. Dawkins, 
The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 159; L. London, 
"Human Rights and Public Health: Dichotomies or Synergies in Developing Countries? Examining the 
Case of HIV in South Africa" (Winter 2002) 30:4 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 677; AJ. 
McMichael & R. Beaglehole, "The Changing Global Context of Public Health" (2000) 356 Lancet 
495; K. Heggenhoughen, "Are the Marginalised the Slag-Heap of Economic Growth and 
G1obalization? Disparity, HeaIth and Human Rights" (1999) 4 Health and Human Rights 205. 
3 Pogge reports that, every day, 50 000 people die from poverty-related causes such as starvation, 
tuberculosis, malaria, and diarrhoea, and that even if those conditions affect 20% of the world 
population, they receive only 0.3% of aIl research funds: T. W. Pogge, "Human Rights and Global 
Health: A Research Program" (2005) 36:1/2 Metaphilosophy 182, at 197; T.W. Pogge, "Recognized 
and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor" (2005) 18:4 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 717; see also UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2004 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), at 129-l30; S. Chen & M. RavaIIion, "How Have the 
World's Poorest Fared since the Early 1980s?" (2004) World Bank Research Observer 153; UNICEF, 
The State of the World's Children 2005 (New York: UNICEF, 2005). 
1 
the situation in September 2000 when they adopted the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration that included commitments to encourage development, decrease poverty, 
and improve people's living conditions and health by 2015.4 
One of the greatest enduring problems in the world is the major disease burden 
affecting a large portion of the world population. The most important and serious 
health variations between individuals are not, for the most part, associated with 
biological and genetic determinants but with patterns of resources distribution. 5 
Indeed, poverty is one of the main determinants of health deficits, and wealth and 
power often have a direct positive impact on health.6 Health is directly influenced by 
many factors including health research investment and availability of financial, 
material, and human resources, which differ greatly across socio-economic groups 
and countries.7 ln other words, access to essential medicines and medical knowledge, 
services, and technology is essential to human health but unfortunately remains out of 
reach for a majority of people, a situation that creates significant disparities in health.8 
The impact of economic inequality on people's health can be observed both within 
and between countries and depends on various factors including govemmental 
resources and priorities and the availability and affordability of universal or private 
health insurance coverage. Even if we acknowledge the importance and seriousness 
of health inequities arising at the national level, our dissertation will focus on the 
growing global health divide between populations of the nations of the North and 
4 UN General Assembly Resolution, United Nations Millennium Declaration, September 2000, 
A/RES/5512, online on the UN website, <http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pd1> 
(accessed May 20th, 2006). 
5 A. K. Acharya, "Toward Establishing a Universal Basic Health Norm" (2004) 18:3 Ethics and 
International Affairs 65; B. G. Link et al., "Social Epidemiology and the Fundamental Cause Concept: 
on the Structuring of Effective Cancer Screens by Socioeconomic Status" (1998) 76 Milbank 
Quarterly 375. 
6 D. Willison & S. M. Macleod, "Patenting of Genetic Material: are the Benefits to Society Being 
Realised?" (2006) 167:3 Canadian Medical Association Journal 259. 
7 Indeed, this reality has been called the 10/90 gap, where 90% of ail health research gets dedicated to 
the most affluent 10% of the world. For more on this, refer to E. Dowdeswell, A.S. Daar & P.A. 
Singer, "Bridging the Genomics Divide" (2003) 9 Global Governance 1. 
8 World Health Organization, World Health Report 1999: Making a Difference in People 's Lives: 
Achievements and Challenges, Geneva, 1999; T. Evans et al., Challenging Inequities in Health: 
From Ethics to Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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South9 and on the possibility that this divide will be aggravated by the introduction of 
genetic technologies aimed at health improvement. 
Genetics is one sector in which there has been tremendous evolution and progress 
over the last few decades. While it is believed that genetics could offer tremendous 
opportunities for global health improvement and play an important role in meeting 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as we will discuss below, there is 
also a fear that existing global health inequalities will be amplified by the evolution 
of genetics. Such a divide already exists in numerous vital health-related spheres such 
as nutrition, water, labour, and the environment. Genetics is only one among many 
spheres in which we are likely to continue being confronted with gross inequalities in 
health. lndeed, this dissertation follows the multi-causal conception of health under 
which health is influenced by biological, social, economic, psychological, 
environmental, and genetic factors. Therefore, biology and genetics are only a few 
among many determinants of health. In this sense, this dissertation does not provide 
a complete picture of global health problems and inequalities but instead focuses on 
one important sphere of activity and on how it can be harnessed and developed to 
improve global health: genetics in health care. 
Given the importance of genetics to human health globally (as discussed below), this 
thesis will evaluate two principal legal regimes - intellectual property and 
international human rights - to determine to which extent they further the goal of 
distributing the benefits ofthese technologies equitably and globally. This evaluation 
is vital to ensure that legal regimes assist in ensuring that this promising field 
9 We acknowledge that different developing countries are at varying stages of developrnent and that 
sorne of the issues they face might be different depending on the country. The Economic and Social 
Counci/ of the United Nations has identified sorne countries with the label "Ieast developed countries" 
based on different criteria such as low income, human resources weakness, and economic 
vulnerability. Other countries not part of this latter category are nevertheless characterised as 
developing countries given their level of development and a plethora of different socio-economic, 
demographic, and political factors. For the purposes ofthis dissertation, we adopt an inclusive notion 
of developing countries, taking different degrees of poverty, lack of resources, and health access 
problems as our general benchmark. Ali through our dissertation, the expression "developing nations" 
or "developing world" should therefore be read to include a range of countries, mostly southern, in 
need of more health resources, including the least developed ones as weil as those who are at a 
medium level of development. 
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develops in a way that improves global health without leaving the most vulnerable 
outside of the process. Such an investigation has not, so far, been developed at length 
with respect to the field of health and genetics. This dissertation will undertake this 
complex task by employing and building upon cosmopolitan liberal theories of 
distributive justice developed over the few last decades as an extension of the work of 
Rawls and Daniels. Our study will lead to the conclusion that, as presently 
implemented, neither intellectual property nor international human rights offer 
assurance that the benefits of health-related genetics research will be distributed 
equitably. 
To set the grounds for this analysis, we first need to say more on the science of 
genetics and to indicate how we intend to use and circumscribe this concept for the 
purpose of this dissertation. We will then say a few words on the potential of genetics 
for solving global health issues, discuss the widely used concept ofbenefit-sharing as 
applied to this area and present a brief structure of the dissertation. 
Specificity of Genetic Research and Information 
Few developments in science have had the 
impact on society, institutions, laws, and health 
care that genetics is having and, undoubtedly, 
·11 . h 10 Wl contmue to ave. 
In less than fifteen years, our understanding of genetics has evolved considerably in 
various are as such as agriculture, biodiversity, traditional knowledge, biomedical 
research, and medical applications. Il In the field of human genetics, we went from 
10 J. P. Hinojosa, "The Human Genome, Property of Ali: Opportunities Under the ALRC Inquiry into 
Gene Patenting and Human Health" (2004) 26 Syndey Law Review 447, at 448. 
Il Indeed, sorne genetic resources are already used for agriculture, medicine, and industrial 
development both in developed and developing countries. However, since this dissertation focusses on 
the global medical promises of human genetics and the distribution arising from the development of 
genetics at this level of activity, it is beyond its scope to address, in detail, the fields of agriculture, 
plant genetics, and traditional knowledge. We are, however, aware that many issues addressed here 
also find application in other genetics-related sectors of crucial importance for human health. 
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knowing very little of the parti cul ars of biological genetics to a situation where a 
tremendous amount of information about the structure of individual genes lS 
discovered daily.12 Three years ago, Nature and Science published two senes of 
articles highlighting the great potential of genetics and the need to do much more in 
terms of discovery and analysis of gene and prote in functions, interactions, and their 
role in diseases, conditions, and reactions. I3 If successful, these initiatives will 
provide the basis and the tools necessary for developing promising new therapeutic 
approaches and techniques with the potential to prevent, screen, and cure very serious 
diseases. Scientists thus face numerous and exciting challenges in this area. 14 
Genetic factors play sorne role in almost aIl human diseases. These factors either 
confer susceptibility, resistance or influence individuals' interactions with their 
environment. For many years, genetics has been critical in revealing the cause of 
certain monogenic diseases. 15 However, things bec orne more difficult when we try to 
establish connections between individual genotypes and complex diseases involving 
many genes and environmental factors like, for example, hypertension, cancer, or 
12The Human Genome Project (HGP) was launched in the early 1990s to "determine the complete 
sequence of the three billion DNA (molecules encoding genetic information) subunits (bases), identifY 
aIl human genes, and make them accessible for further biological study". It marked the beginning ofa 
new age in science. In June 2000, Francis Collins from the HGP and Craig Venter from Celera 
Genomics simultaneously announced the completion of a tirst working draft of the human genome 
sequence, and in February 2001, both groups published their initial draft map independently. This 
sequencing disclosed much information on the number of human genes (about 30000 instead of the 
tirst estimated 80000-100000) and their composition, and helped to identifY many other interesting 
biological mutations, including more than two million genetic variations (single nuc/eotide 
polymorphisms: SNPs). For a few references on the development of genetics see: L. Peltonen & V. A. 
Mckusick, "Dissecting Human Disease in the Postgenomic Era" (16 Feb. 2001) 291 :5507 Science 
1224; Human Genome Project Information, Frequently Asked Questions, on line on the HGP website 
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human Genome/fàq/faqs l.shtml> (accessed March 3rd, 2006); 
The White House, President Clinton Announces the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire 
Human Genome, 25 June 2000; J.C.Venter et al., "The Sequence of the Human Genome" (Feb. 16, 
2001) 291 :5507 Science 1304; International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, "Initial 
Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome" (Feb. 15,2001) 409 Nature 860. 
13 F.S. Collins, M. Morgan & A. Patrinos "The Human Genome Project: Lessons from Large-Scale 
Biology" (April 11,2003) 300: 5617 Science 286; M. E. Frazier et al., "Realizing the Potential of the 
Genome Revolution: The Genomes to Life Program" (Apr Il, 2003) 300: 5617 Science 290; F. S. 
Collins et al., "A Vision for the Future of Genomics Research" (April 24, 2003) 422 Nature 835; S. B. 
Carroll, "Genetics and the Making of Homo sapiens" (April 24, 2003) 422 Nature 849; J. Arnold & N. 
Hilton "Genome Sequencing: Revelations from a Bread Mould" (April 24, 2003) 422 Nature 821. 
14 B. Albert & A. Klug, "The Human Genome Itself Must be Freely A vailable to aIl Humankind" 
(March 23, 2000) 404 Nature 325. 
15 B. E. Bihai et al., "Génomique, Promesses et Réalités" (16 janvier 2000) 16:1 Médecine/Sciences 
17; A. D. Roses, «Pharmacogenetics and the Practice of Medicine», (15 June 2000) 405 Nature 857. 
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schizophrenia. 16 This is where genomics, the "study of genes and their function,,,17 
becomes extremely useful and important. It allows broad analysis of numerous genes 
simultaneously to obtain a better idea of how they interact with one another and 
become expressed in specific cell types. 18 Attention is increasingly focussed on using 
a combination of genetics, genomics and cutting edge software tools to develop 
"sophisticated microarray technologies" that could be used in the future to screen for 
complex diseases and achieve better cellular and molecular understanding of those 
conditions. 19 In this dissertation, we understand the science of genetics in a broad 
sense, as an entire field of activity that includes the interaction between functional 
genomics, new computational analytical methods, proteomics, traditional genetic 
testing and screening techniques, and the understanding and conversion of the data 
emerging from this research into practical and useful applications to improve global 
health. 
16 N.A. Holtzman & T.M. Marteau, "Will Genetics Revolutionize Medicine" (July 13,2000) 343:2 The 
New England Journal of Medicine 141. 
17 Human Genome Project Information, Genome Glossary, on line on the HGP website, 
<http://www .om I.gov/sci/techresources/H uman Genome/ glossary/glossary g.shtml> (accessed March 
3 rd, 2006) 
18 M.J. Khouri, "Genetics and Genomics in Practice: The Continuum From Genetic Disease to Genetic 
Information in Health and Disease" (July-August 2003) 5:4 Genetic Medicine 261; R. Service, 
"Genetics and Medicine: Recruiting Genes, Proteins for a Revolution in Diagnostics" (April 11,2003) 
300:5617 Science 236; A.E. Guttmacher & F.S.Collins "Genomic Medicine-a Primer" (November 7th 
2002) 347:19 New England Journal of Medicine 1512; M. Mowzoon, "Access Versus Incentive: 
Balancing Policies in Genetic Patents" (2003) 35 A riz. St. L.J. 1077. 
19 Up to now, numerous polymorphisms influencing how one responds to and metabolises certain 
drugs have been identified with novel sequencing and bioinformatics methods. Also, new vaccines 
arising from pathogen DNA are being developed and progress has been made in understanding cancer 
mechanisms with research in genetics. Indeed, the most important mutations have been identified in a 
family of "cellular oncogenes," and the next step is now to find the specific genes associated with the 
more common cancers with wide genomics investigations. WHO, Genetics, Genomics and the 
Patenting of DNA .' Review of Potential Implications for Health in Developing Countries, Geneva, 
2005, online on the WHO website, <http://www.who.int/genomics/FuIlReport.pdt> (accessed 
February 23 rd, 2006); B. R Bloom & D. D. Trach, "Genetics and Developing Countries" (April 28, 
2001) 322:7293 British Medical Journal 1006; J.A. Roberston, "The $1000 Genome: Ethical and 
Legal Issues in Whole Genome Sequencing of Individuals" (2003) 3:3 The American Journal of 
Bioethics W 35; W.E. Evans & J. A. Johnson, Pharmacogenomics: The Inherited basis for 
Interindividual Differences in Drug Response (2001) 2 Annu. Rev. Genomics Hum. Genet. 9; D.M. 
Livingston & R. Shivdasani, "Towards Mechanism-Based Cancer Care" (2001) 285 Journal of the 
American Medical Association 588. 
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A very simple definition of human genetics is the "study of inheritance patterns of 
specifie traits.,,20 It can be used for different purposes, broadly classified into two 
categories: enhancement, on the one hand, and prevention and treatment, on the other. 
In this dissertation, we focus on the application of genetics for the second aim. 
Indeed, for the purposes of this dissertation, we will concentrate on those aspects of 
health that are common to aIl individuals. This univers al perspective is therefore not 
adjustable to personal circumstances and does not vary with each individual' s 
perception and preferences. We will focus on universal and objective human health 
needs, leaving questions pertaining to the enhancement of otherwise normal traits to 
others.2I This definition of health thus relates to normal functioning as opposed to a 
perfectionist conception of healthy hum an beings, where normal functioning is the 
objective capacity of individuals to take advantage of a reasonable range of 
opportunities. For the purposes of this dissertation, genetics therefore represents one 
tool among many to satisfy essential medical needs and to help bring individuals to a 
universal minimal health level under which they can expect a "decent" life. 
The development of human genetics touches on many dimensions of human life, 
giving rise to a variety of normative concerns and provoking a number of reactions 
from decision-making authorities. In this thesis, we concentrate on the global human 
health and medical dimensions of genetic research.22 Because genetics is a relatively 
20 Human Genome Project Information, Genome Glossary, on line on the HGP website, 
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human Genome/glossarv/glossary g.shtml> (accessed March 
3rd, 2006) 
21 For more on the role of genetics in enhancement, we refer the reader to: J. Hudson, "What Kinds of 
People Should we Create?" (2000) 17:2 J Appl Philos 131; A. Newson & R. Williamson, "Should we 
Undertake Genetic Research on Intelligence?" (1999) 13:3/4 Bioethies 327; D. Shickle, "Are "Genetic 
Enhancements" Really Enhancements?" (2000) 9:3 Camb Q Healthe Ethies 342; L. B. Andrews, 
Future Perfeet (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); A. Buchanan et al" From Chance to 
Choiee: Geneties and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); D.S. David, Genetie 
Dilemmas (New York: Routledge, 2001); J. G. Palmer & W. LeRoy, The Ethies of Human Gene 
Therapy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); T. Peters, Playing God: Genetie Determinism 
and Human Freedom (New York: Routledge, 1997); P. Braude et al., "Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis" (Dec. 2002) 3:12 Nature Review Geneties 941; J. Tsien et al., "Genetic Enhancement of 
Learning and Memory in Mice" (September 2, 1999) 401 Nature 63. 
22 Other widely discussed characteristics of research and clinical applications of genetics relate to its 
potential for revealing important personal and familial health information. This raises important issues, 
including confidentiality of data, consent of patients and research subjects, access and disclosure of 
medical information to family members and third parties, and potential for discrimination. Although 
very interesting, those issues will not be addressed in our dissertation. For more on the pers on al 
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new and evolving field, it is important to examine its social implications globally 
and to lay the basis for developing preventive and corrective measures that address 
inequalities among countries, encourage efforts to reduce those inequalities, and build 
safeguards for investment and research. Moreover, the strong presence of the private 
sector in this area and its growing focus on profit-making call for special attention to 
the issues ofhealth priorities, benefit-sharing, and the distribution ofresources.23 
Influence of Genetics on Global Health 
Even if genetic innovation has mainly occurred in the developed world because the 
development of genetics requires high capital investment, cutting edge technology, 
and well-equipped infrastructure, this does not mean that genetics does not have the 
potential to help the less affluent. In 200 1, the former director general of the 
World Health Organisation, Gro Harlem Brundtland, stated: "[w]e have started 
to examine the implications of advances in genomics and other critical are as of 
biotechnology. They clearly have huge potential for improving human 
health.,,24 Recent studies also reveal that human genetics offers a number oftargetted 
possibilities for improving health in the developing world such as through the use of 
dimension of genetics refer to T. Lemke, "Beyond Genetic Discrimination. Problems and Perspectives 
of a Contested Notion" (2005) 1:3 Genomics, Society and Policy 22; J. Sorenson & J. Botkin, eds., 
"Genetic Testing and the Family" (2003) 119C American Journal of Medical Genetics Pan G 
Seminars in Medical Genetics 1; American Society of Human Genetics, "Professional Disclosure of 
Familial Genetic Information" (Feb. 1998) 62:2 American Journal of Human Genetics 474; E. 
Boetzkes, "Genetic Knowledge and Third-Party Interests" (Summer 1999) 8:4 Camb Q Healthc Ethics 
386; C. G. Thomas, Vulnerable Subjects: Ethics and Life Writing (lthaca: Come)) University Press, 
2004); R. Rhodes, "Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights and Responsibilities in the 
Face of Genetic Knowledge" (Feb. 1998) 23:1 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10. 
23 T. Caulfield, "Sustainability and the Balancing of the Health Care and Innovation Agendas: The 
Commercialization of Genetic Research" (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 629; D. Nelkin & L. Andrews, 
"Homo Economicus: Commercialization of Body Tissue in the Age of Biotechnology" (1998) 28:5 
Hastings Center Report 30; A. Persidis, "The Business of Pharmacogenomics" (February 1998) 16:2 
Nature Biotechnology 209. 
24Address by Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General to the Fifty-fourth World Health Assembly, 
Bridging the Health Divide: The Way Forward, May 14, 2001, online on the WHO website, 
<www.who.int/director-general/speechesI2001lenglish/200 1 0514 wha54.html> (accessed February 
26th, 2006). 
8 
molecular diagnosis for better management and screening of infectious, non-
infectious and parasitic diseases, and through new drug and vaccine development.25 
For example, genomics can be used in research to understand the variability in patient 
reactions to infectious diseases26 and to develop new approaches to treatment and 
vaccine development.27 A DNA-based AIDS vaccine designed specifically for Africa 
has already been developed and is being tested in clinical trials, while a candidate 
vaccine for the main malaria type found in India was recently identified through a 
collaborative research effort.28 There is also new evidence to suggest that the study, 
manipulation, and analysis of pathogen vectors and genomes can lead to crucial 
information for the establishment of preventive and therapeutic initiatives aimed at 
controlling significant diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS?9 For 
example, in October 2002, the sequence of the two parasites and the mosquito carrier 
25 University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics, Top 10 Biotechnologies for Improving Health in 
Developing Countries, Toronto, 2002; WHO, The Advisory Committee on Health Research of the 
World Health Organization, Genomics and World Health, Geneva, 2002, online on the WHO website, 
<http://www3.who.int/whosis/genomics/pdf/genomics report.pdt> (accessed March 4th, 2006), on 
concrete possibilities for the development of new vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutic tools, refer 
especially to section 2 and 3; A.S. Daar et al., "Top Ten Biotechnologies For Improving HeaIth In 
Developing Countries" (October 2002) 32 Nature Genetics 269 this study identifies the ten most 
promising biotechnologies for improving health in developing countries in the next decade. Out often, 
six are directly or indirectly related to genetics; see also T. Ogundiran, "Africa Must Come on Board 
the Genomics Bandwagon" (2005) 1:3 Genomics, Society and Policy 66; P. A Singer & A. S. Daar, 
"Hamessing Genomics and Biotechnology to Improve Global HeaIth Equity", (October 5, 2001) 294 
Science 87; A Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination, Moral Foundations for 
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) Chap 4, 191; I. Wickelgren, "Heart 
Disease: Gene Suggests Asthma Drugs may Ease Cardiovascular Inflammation" (February 13,2004) 
303 :5660 Science 941; V. Brower, "Tackling the most Difficult Diseases: Genetics and Genomics 
Open New Strategies to Fight Vector-Bome Diseases" (October 2001) 2: 10 EMBO Reports 875. 
26 For an example on the variability of patients' responses to HIV drugs in West Africa, see H. Jomaa, 
et al., "Inhibitors of the Nonmevalonate Pathway of Isoprenoid Biosynthesis as Antimalarial Drugs" 
(1999) 285 Science 1573. 
27 LM. Orme, D.N. McMurray & J.T. Belisle, "Tuberculosis Vaccine Development: Recent Progress" 
(2001) 9 Trends in Microbiology 115; K.A. Bojang et al., "Efficacy of RTS,S/AS02 Malaria Vaccine 
Against Plasmodium Falciparum Infection in Semi-Immune AduIt Men in The Gambia: a Randomised 
Trial" (2001) 358 Lancet 1927; WHO, supra note 25, at 5 I. 
28 For more details on those initiatives, refer to P. ASinger and A. S. Daar, supra note 25 
29 L. Stein, "Genome Annotation: from Sequence to Biology" (2001) 2 Nature Reviews Genetics 493; 
S. P. Verma, "Malaria Genome Project and its Impact on Disease" (March-June 2003) 40:1/2 Journal 
of Vector Borne Diseases 9; WHO, supra note 25; M. Enserink, "Two New Steps Towards a "Better 
Mosquito" (2000) 293 Science 2370; E. Dowdeswell, A.S. Daar and P.A Singer, supra note 7. 
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responsible for most cases of malaria was published as a first step toward developing 
a new class of anti-malarial drugs and vaccines.30 
Moreover, in the clinical setting, genetic testing can be used to address the specifie 
health needs of the developing world's populations. Genetic testing is performed by 
analysing information contained in an individual's DNA once that DNA has been 
isolated or copied. In general, genetic testing involves analysing individuals' DNA 
for various purposes such as screening for genetic abnormalities before birth, 
confirming a disease diagnosis, and identifying individuals more susceptible to 
diseases because of the genetic variations they carry.3l Numerous existing genetic 
servIces could be beneficial in the developing world where non-communicable 
diseases "are now the leading cause of death [ ... ] and their prevalence is expected to 
rise significantly in the next several decades.,,32 lndeed, a number of severe and life-
threatening non-communicable diseases with a strong genetic component could likely 
be prevented, recognised, diagnosed, and treated in the future if safe and efficient 
genetic-predisposition testing were made available.33 Such preventive strategies could 
30 H.Thorsteinsdottir et aIs. "Genomics-a Global Public Good?" (March 15, 2003) 361 :9361 The 
Lancet 891; M.J. Gardner et al., "Genome Sequence of the Human Malaria Parasite Plasmodium 
Falciparm" (2002) 419 Nature 498; J .M. Carlton et al., "Genome Sequence and Comparative Analysis 
of the Mode1 Rodent Malaria Parasite Plasmodium Yoelii Yoelii" (2002) 419 Nature 512; R.A. Holt et 
al. "The Genome Sequence of the Malaria Mosquito Anophe1es Gambiae" (2002) 298 Science 129; H. 
Jomaa, et al., Inhibitors of the Nonmevalonate Pathway of Isoprenoid Biosynthesis as Antimalarial 
Drugs (1999) 285 Science 1573. 
31 A. Alwan & B. ModeIl, "Opinion: Recommendations for Introducing Genetics Services in 
Developing Countries" (Jan. 2003) 4: 1 Nat Rev Genet. 61. 
32 University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics, supra note 25, at 59-60; D.G. Richards, 
lntellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism, The Political Economy of the TRIPS Agreement 
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004) c. 6, 141. 
33 For example, the application of diagnostic measures that use DNA analysis to identify genetic 
carriers or diseases could be very he1pfu1 to screen for red b100d cell disorders 1ike thalassaemia and 
sickle cell disorders (very common in developing countries) and inform carriers of the risk to their 
health and their offspring's health. Another example is prenatal diagnosis, which has been found to be 
useful in the identification of sickle cell anaemia, a very serious condition associated with a high 
level of mortality and morbidity. Access to this measure would be of particular interest to allow 
preventive action in West Africa where almost 25% of the population are sickle cell carriers. 
Early molecular diagnosis and neonatal screening for Cystic Fibrosis (CF) is a third example of 
preventive genetic medicine that could be of great value for the developing world. In Brazil, where 
there is ahigh incidence of CF, it is not rare that persons afflicted with the disease die undiagnosed. 
Therefore, basic genetic testing could be extremely useful in Brazil and other countries with similar 
rates of CF, especially for lower-income families. However, for now, those existing diagnostic tools do 
not reach the bulk of the world's population who need it the most, particularly those living in remote 
rural areas of developing countries. A. Alwan & B. ModelI, Community Control of Genetic and 
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be especially beneficial in addressing situations where neither individuals nor 
governments are able to pay for costly and lengthy treatments.34 
Nevertheless, the science of genetics has sorne limits. As stated above, most diseases, 
even sorne Mendelian "single gene disorders" are caused by a variety of factors and 
by complex interactions between genes and the environment. 35 In response to the 
growing enthusiasm for the genetic revolution, sorne observers suggest that the 
excitement surrounding genetics is, at times, over-stated and that excess of optimism 
should be moderated.36 There are still many technological and statistical obstacles to 
overcome in linking phenotypes to genetic markers, and sorne believe that progress 
will take significantly more time. 37 Further, clinical applications of genetic 
knowledge sometimes remain limited, even when much information is available.38 
Congenital Disorders, EMRO Technical Publications, Series 24, World Health Organization, Regional 
Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, Cairo, 1997; I.C. Verma et al., "Genetic Counselling and 
Prenatal Diagnosis in India - Experience at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital" (April 2003) 70:4 Indian J 
Pediatr 293.; WHO, Guidelines for Control of Haemoglobin Disorders. Geneva, 1994, 
WHO/HDP/HB/GL/94.1; WHO, supra note 25, at 81-84; T.A. Adewole et al. "Application of 
Polymerase Chain Reaction to the Prenatal Diagnosis of Sickle Cell Anaemia in Nigeria" (July-Sep 
1999) 18:3 West Afr J Med. 160; C. Streit et al., "CFTR gene: Molecular Analysis in Patients from 
South-Brazil' (2003) 78 Molecular Genetics and Metabolism 259; M. Petrou & B. Modell, "Prenatal 
Screening for Haemoglobin Disorders" (1995) 15 Prenat. Diagn 1275; B. R. Bloom & D. D. Trach, 
supra note 19, at 1008. 
33 C. Streit et al., "CFTR gene: Molecular Analysis in Patients from South-Brazil' (2003) 78 Molecular 
Genetics and Metabolism 259. 
34A. Alwan & B. Modell, supra note 31, at 62. 
35 J. Alper, "Genetic Complexity in Human Disease and Behavior" in J. Alper et al., eds., The Double-
Edged Helix: Social Implications of Genetics in a Diverse World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002) 17; E. T Juengst "FACE Facts: Why Human Genetics Will Always Provoke 
Bioethics" (Summer 2004) 32:2 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 26. 
36 T.M. Bubela & T. Caulfield, "Media Representations of Genetic Research" in E.F. Einsiedel & F. 
Timmermans, eds, Crossing Over. Genomics in the Public Arena. (Calgary: University of Calgary 
Press, 2005); T.M. Bubela & T. Caulfield, "Does the Print Media Hype Genetic Research?: A 
Comparison of Newspaper Stories and Peer Reviewed Research Papers" (2004) 170:9 Canadian 
Medical Association Journal 1399; S. Jones, Genetics in Medicine: Real Promises, Unreal 
Expectations: One Scientist's Advice to Policymakers in the United Kengdom and the United States 
(London: Milbank Memorial Fund, 2000); L. B. Andrews, "Past as Prologue: Sobering Thoughts on 
Genetic Enthusiasm" (1997) 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 893 
37 J. Altmuller et al., "Genomewide Scans ofComplex Human Diseases: True Linkage is Hard to Find" 
(2001) 69 American Journal of Human Genetics 936; D.S. Roos, "Bioinformatics - Trying to Swim in 
a Sea of Data" (2001) 291 Science 1260. 
38 B. R. Bloom & D. D. Trach, supra note 19, at 1008; N. Holtzman, "Will Genetics Revolutionize 
Medicine?" (2000) 343 New England Journal of Medicine 141. 
Il 
One must therefore come to this subject by realising that people working in genetics 
are still in the early phase of understanding the complexity of gene interactions. 
Nevertheless, significant progress has been made in a very short time. There are many 
signs that valuable technological development will continue to take place and that 
genetics will have an important preventive and therapeutic role to play in future 
health care and medical practice.39 Therefore, for the purposes ofthis dissertation, we 
will focus on the positive impact that genetics is likely to have on global health in the 
future. In other words, although we realise that it might take many more years and 
significant investment to get to a point where genetics can fully deliver on its 
promises, we will focuss on the progress already made, starting from the premise that 
it is only a matter of time before technical challenges are overcome and genetic 
research can create greater benefits for the delivery ofhealth care.40 
Consequently, given the fact that genetics is a very promising field for helping to 
improve global health-and considering that it has not, up to now, been developed 
with this focus but in the context of commercial and profit motivations-we consider 
it essential to discuss how the field's emerging benefits (knowledge, expertise, 
research tools, products and services, and profits) should be distributed on the global 
scene in the future. 41 There are a plethora of normative, socio-economic and political 
obstacles to more equitable distribution of health related benefits and we will address 
sorne of these in the course of this dissertation. However, before we go any further, it 
is important to say a few words on the concept of benefit sharing used more and more 
as a response to the widening global health divide, especially in the field of genetics. 
39 F.S. Collins et al., supra note 13 ; J.A. Robertson, supra note 19 ; A.E. Guttrnacher & F.S. Collins, 
supra note 18; H. Vannus, "Getting Ready for Gene-Based Medicine" (2002) 247 N Eng J Med 1526. 
40 WHO, The Advisory Cornrnittee on Health Research ofthe World Health Organization, Genomics 
and World Health, Geneva, 2002, online on the WHO website, 
<http://www3.who.int/whosis/genornics/pdf/genornics report.pdf> (accessed March 4th, 2006) 
41 B. R Bloorn & D. Duc Trach, "Genetics and Developing Countries" (ApriI28, 2001) 322 BMJ 1006. 
12 
Benefit sharing 
The expression benefit sharing is used broadly in relation to biodiversity, traditional 
knowledge, and human genetic research to indicate that sorne of the benefits 
(economic or social) arising from these fields should be shared with those from whom 
the goods or knowledge originated.42 For example, the Human Genome Organisation 
(HUGO) issued a statement in 2000 calling for the sharing of certain benefits arising 
from the commercialisation of genetic inventions with the populations or 
communities from which samples originated.43 GeneraIly, benefit-sharing obligations 
arise from two different situations: as a consequence of specific transactions with 
research participants and contributors, or as a result of a norm that the good in 
question ought to be used for the general benefit of aIl humanity.44 
The first and most popular application of this obligation involves sharing the benefits 
of research with the contributors of genetic resources based on a concem for justice. 
Increasingly, laws, regulations, and guidelines promote ethical standards requiring 
researchers to share benefits with research participants and resource contributors 
when using the latter's traditional knowledge, biodiversity resources, and human 
42For example, one of the main objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the knowledge deriving from biological diversity. The 
Bonn Guidelines on access to genetic resources and fair and equitable sharing adopted in April 2002 
provide a strategy for the access and benefit sharing process and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) Conference approved the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), which entered into force in June 2004 and by which contracting 
parties will provide easier access to identified genetic resources through a unique Multilateral Material 
Transfer Agreement. For reference to those legal documents, see: Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992, online: <http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf,> (accessed June 
4th, 2006); Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Decision V1/24, Access and Benefit-Sharing as related to genetic resources, April 2002, the Hague, 
online: <http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.asp?m=cop-06&d=24> (accessed June 4th, 2006); 
Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Decision 
VI/24 , Access and Benefit-Sharing as related to genetic resources, April 2002, the Hague, online: 
<http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.asp?m=cop-06&d=24> (accessed June 4th, 2006); FAO, 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resourcesfor Food and Agriculture, November 2001, 
online: <ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf>; For an interesting discussion on the concept of 
benefit sharing as applied to human genetics, see: K. Simm, "Benefit-Sharing Regarding the Meaning 
and Limits of the Concept in Human Genetic Research" (2005) 1:2 Genomics, Society and Policy 29. 
43 HUGO, Statement on Benefit Sharing, Vancouver, 2000, online: 
<http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uklhugo/benefit.html> (accessed June 4th, 2006). 
44 This dual aspect is cIearly highlighted and explained in this UNESCO report: UNESCO 
International Committee on Bioethics, Report of the IBC on Ethics, Intellectual Property and 
Genomics, 10 January 2002, SHS-503/01/CIB-8/2 Rev 
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biological tissues.45 There is an assumption that these people are entitled to share in 
the benefits.46 The actual justification put forward for this obligation varies depending 
on whether one is discussing human biological sampI es, biodiversity and plants, or 
traditional knowledge. We will not address each of these in detail as it is beyond the 
scope of our work. However, to get a better understanding of the compensatory 
argument, it is useful to say a few words on the rationale for sharing benefits arising 
from the use of biological tissues when they are provided by individuals and 
populations for human genetic research.47 
45 For example, HUGO, Statement on Benefit Sharing, supra note 43, E. Justice, 1) Compensatory 
justice: meaning that the individual, group, or community, should receive recompense in return for 
contribution ... ; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 42, art. 15 
46 Participant in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, "Fair 
Benefits for Research in Developing Countries" (13 December 2002) 298 Science 2133; UN 
Commission on human rights, High Commissioner, "The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights on Human Rights", Geneva, June 27,2001; 
47 For more on the justification for providing compensation (or not) when using biodiversity and plants 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge, we refer the reader to: L. Mansur, "Gene Discovery, 
Ownership and Access for Developing Countries in the Era of Molecular Genetics" (2002) 5: 1. 
Electronic Journal of Biotechnology online: 
<http://www.ejbiotechnology.info/contentlvoI5/issue 1 /issues/05/> (accessed May 16th, 2006); UK 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy, London, September 2002, at 84; Indian Government, WTO, Protection of Biodiversity and 
traditional knowledge. The Indian Experience, July 14, 2000, WT/CTE/W/156, International 
Convention of the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOY), Paris, 1961 and revised in Geneva 
in 1972, 1978 and 1991, online on the UPOY website, 
<http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/index.html> (accessed March 8th, 2006); World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Operational Terms and Definitions, Geneva, 
May 20, 2002, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9; WIPO, The Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expressions/Expressions of Folklore: Revised Objectives and Principles, Geneva, Jan. 2006, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/4, online on the WIPO website: 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo grtkf ic 9/wipo grtkf ic 9 4.pdt> (accessed March 
8th, 2006); WIPO "Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of traditional knowledge Holders ", 
Geneva, 1999, 768E, online on the WIPO website: 
<http://www.wipo.intlglobalissues/tk/report/final/index.html> (accessed March 8t\ 2006); D. Leskien 
& M. Flitner, "Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Genetic Resources: Options for a Sui Generis 
System", (June 1997) 6 Issues in Genetic Resources at 42 & 46; C. Correa, Traditional Knowledge and 
Intellectual Property, The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), Geneva, November 2001, online on 
the website ofnetamericas: 
<http://www.netamericas.net/ResearchpaperslDocuments/Ccorrea/Ccorrea2 . pdt> (accessed March 8 th, 
2006); WHO, Report of the Inter-Regional Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of 
Traditional Medicine, Bangkok, 6-8 December 2000 (WHOIEDM/TRM/2001.1); E.R. Gold & D. 
Castle, Traditional Knowledge and Benefit Sharing: From Compensation to Transation, paper 
presented at ICABR 8th International Conference on Agricultural Biotecc: International Trade and 
Domestic Production, Ravello, Italy, July 2004; C. Juma & K. Fang, "Bridging the Genetic Divide," in 
M. Ruse & D. CastIe, eds., Genetically Modified Foods: Debating Biotechnology (Amherst: 
Prometheus Press, 2002); UN Commission on Human Rights, High Commissioner, "The Impact of the 
14 
The prOVlSlon of biological material is regulated by the broad principle of non-
commercialisation of the human body and its components 48 illustrated by the 
prevalence of a "consent model" (under which individuals are entitled to give awayor 
abandon bodily materials), in contrast to a "property model" (under which individuals 
are entitled to sell their tissues).49 There is also a debate as to whether the current 
system should be revisited to allow property claims in sorne human body material. 50 
However, this thesis proceeds on the basis that, as argued by Gold, it is inappropriate 
to apply property discourse to human bodily materials since this discourse cannot 
appropriately deal with goods that are valuable chiefly for non-economic reasons. 
There are numerous different values that relate to health and human biological 
material (dignity, community, spirituality, etc.), many ofwhich cannot and should not 
be evaluated by the market. 51 This leads us to argue that we should not consider 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights", Geneva, June 
27,2001, at par 41. 
48 For example, see UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Paris, 
1997, artA; Department of Biotechnology - Govemment of India, Ethical Policies on the Human 
Genome, Genetic Research and Services, New Delhi, June 2001, online on the website of the 
Govemment ofIndia, <http://dbtindia.nic.in/policy/polimain.html> (accessed March 81\ 2006). 
49 For example, see the case Moore v. Regents of the University of California 794 P 2d 479 Cal SC 
1990, where a physician obtained a commercially valuable patent over a patient's cell and in which the 
Califomia Supreme Court found that the patient did not have property interest in his cells even if they 
contained his DNA. The Court instead awarded compensation for breach offiduciary dut y and lack of 
informed consent; for more on the "consent" model vs. the "property" model, refer to European Group 
on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), Opinion No. 16, Ethical Aspects of Patenting 
Inventions Involving Human Stem Cel/s, Brussels, May 7, 2002, sect. 1.20, at 12, online on the website 
of the European Parliament, <http://europa.eu.intlcomm/europeangroupethics/avis3en.htm> 
(accessed April 25, 2006); Medical Research Council, Human Tissue and Biological Samples for Use 
in Research- Operational and Ethical Guidelines, London: MRC Ethics Series, April 200 1, s. 2.2, 
online on the MRC website, <http://www.mrc.ac.uk/pdf-tissue guide fin.pdf> (accessed March 9, 
2006). 
50 E.R. Gold, Body Parts: From Property Rights to Human Biological Materials (Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 1996); Moore v. Regents of the University ofCalifornia 794 P 2d 479 
Cal SC 1990; J. Bovenberg, "Whose Tissues is it Anyways?" (2005) 23:8 Nature Biotechnology 929; 
A McCall Smith, Property, dignity and the human body" (1994) 2 (3) Hume Papers on Public Policy 
29; G. Laurie, Response to report Whose Hands on Your Genes Consultation of the Human Genetic 
Commission. London, January 2002, c. 8; K. Ma~on & G. Laurie, "Consent or Property? Dealing with 
the Body and its Parts in the Shadow of Bristol and AIder Hey" (September 2001) 64:5 The Modern 
Law Review 725; Davies J. L. "Property Interests in Human Reproductive Material" (Sept.-Oct. 2001) 
Genetic Law Monitor 6; W. Boulier, "Sperm, Spleens and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize 
Property Rights in Human Body Parts" (1995) 23 Hofstra L. Rev 705. 
51 Refer to Gold's book for a detailed analyse ofthose issues: E.R. Gold, supra note 50, c. 7, 8 and 9; 
see also Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (London: Nuffield 
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participants' biological tissues as commercial property, appropriately valuable, for 
which compensation should be awarded. 52 Therefore, even if sharing benefits with 
human genetic-resource contributors may seem intuitively right and equitable for 
many, it appears to lack a real normative basis with regards to compensatory justice 
and property law. 
On a more practicallevel, a compensatory system unequally rewards contributions to 
individuals and communities. Sorne populations and individuals, because of their 
geographical situations, special environment, employment, or genetic makeup will be 
more "interesting" than others for the purpose of specifie research on genetic 
diseases, variations, and polymorphisms. In these circumstances, compensatory 
benefit-sharing systems can be viewed as a kind of lottery where the luckiest 
individuals and populations participate and win a portion of the benefits and others, 
also in great need but without similar resources, are left out of the process 
completely. 
There are ongoing discussions about proposaIs to impose obligations of benefit 
sharing on scientists toward specifie resource contributors based on compensatory 
justice. This topic is fascinating, but given that the purpose of this dissertation is not 
to provide a deep analysis and critique of compensatory bene fit sharing mechanisms, 
we leave it aside. We note that the HUGO's ethics committee "[i]n view of the 
ethical and logistical difficulties of defining community, [ ... ] recommended that 
benefits be distributed broadly, perhaps to the health infrastructures of entire 
nations.,,53 This dissertation will thus focus, instead, on another, more global, aspect 
of bene fit sharing: as a tool to realise distributive justice in health. 
Council on Bioethics, April 1995), s. 9.14 and 13.25, online on the Nuffield Council website, 
<http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/human tissue.pdt> (accessed March 9, 2006). 
52 E.R. Gold & T.A. Caulfield, Human Genetic Inventions, Patenting and Human Rights, 2003, 
Canadian Ministry of Justice, at 47; K. Berg, "The Ethics of Benefit Sharing" (2001) 59 Clinicat 
Genetics 240 at 242 
53 HUGO Ethics Committee, "HUGO Urges Genetics Benefit-Sharing" (2000) 3 Community Genet 88, 
at 90. 
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Indeed, as this dissertation will suggest, benefit sharing can be better justified under a 
theory of global distributive justice. This understanding of benefit sharing involves 
sharing outcomes with individuals and groups more generally, without having to refer 
to compensatory principles. As we will see in more detail in the course of this 
dissertation, this obligation is based on the idea that justice requires us to protect the 
neediest and the most vulnerable and that mechanisms for ensuring transfer and 
assistance are required to further this goal on a global scale.54 The duties imposed by 
global justice demand that individuals become involved in developing just global 
institutions and in supporting just domestic policies that affect individuals within and 
outside a nation's borders. 55 Therefore, the benefits arising from genetics should be 
distributed in a way that contributes to everyone's equality of opportunity and 
benefits the least well-off.56 
We will also argue that the particularities of genetics also necessitate a global rather 
than individual perspective on bene fit sharing in this area of research. For example, 
the fact that the human genome has symbolically been qualified as the common 
heritage of humanity57 highlights its universal value for the human race and serves as 
a reminder that knowledge about the human genome should benefit humanity as a 
whole (inc1uding future generations) instead of serving narrow economic interests.58 
Moreover, the concept of common heritage associated with the humah genome 
54 C.Beitz, "Social and Cosmopolitanism Liberalism" (1999) 75:3 International AjJairs 515 at 518. 
55 C.R. Beitz, "International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought" (1999) 
51:2 World Politics 269, at 278 and 280; 
56 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971) at 7-8 (difference 
principle); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 20d ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 63, 72-73; 
C. Beitz, "Rawls's Law ofPeoples" (July 2000) Ethics 7; A. Buchanan, "Rawls's Law ofPeoples: 
Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World"(July 2000) Ethics 697. 
57 UNESCO Univers al Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome, Paris, 1997, article 1 
58 C. Joyner, "Legal Implications of the Concept of the Corn mon Heritage of Mankind" (January 1986) 
35: 1 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190; see also UNESCO, International 
Consultation on the outline of the Univers al Declaration on the Human Genome, Summary of the 
Response to the Questionnaire, 1997; S. Paquerot, Les Exigence de l'État de Droit dans le Concept de 
Patrimoine Commun de l'Humanité: Réflexions Autour de la Mise en Représentation de la Légitimité 
au Plan International, Acte de la journée d'études de l'équipe CEDIM/FCAR Mondialisation, 
Gouvernance et État de droit, Montréal, Juin 2000; HUGO, Statement on Benefit Sharing, supra note 
43, Common Heritage: "While not respected by ail nations, the concept of common heritage also 
resonates under internationallaw (e.g. the sea, the air, space, ... ). Applied to human genetics, it 
maintains that beyond the individual, the family, or the population, there is a common shared interest 
in the genetic heritage ofmankind." 
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involves a notion of solidarity based on the fact that we share our genetic makeup 
(99.9%) with aU other human beings, that it is "part of every individual and integral 
to the evolution of the human species." 59 However, the reality is that genetic 
applications remain inaccessible to many individuals aU over the world because they 
do not have access to sufficient financial, infrastructure, and human resources to 
make use of this precious knowledge. As Thorsteindottir et al. clearly state, 
"[g]enomics is only a public good to those countries that have the capacity to exploit 
genomics knowledge and to conduct genomics research. Because of the need for 
these "access goods", genomics becomes a "club good", accessible mainly to 
industrialised countries.,,60 
This is enough to be deeply concemed about the way CUITent assumptions define what 
is just and acceptable with regard to global access and distribution of resources in this 
field. It also highlights the need for a precise and enforceable concept of global 
bene fit sharing in health that would position genetics as an essential tool for 
achieving global health rather than as a luxury beyond the reach of the most 
vulnerable people. To this end, we need to establish a normative basis for undertaking 
benefit sharing with developing countries in the global health sphere. Global benefit-
sharing obligations can be built on theoretical and legal grounds but have not, up to 
now, been elaborated at length in the field of health and genetics. This will be the 
core of our thesis. We will flesh out the widely-used concept of benefit sharing to 
determine how we could ensure that it is used to further global health without leaving 
the most vulnerable out of the process. 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
The first purpose of this dissertation is thus to set out a grounding theory or 
theoretical framework to justify engaging in a global and more equitable 
redistribution of benefits produced by genetics. Ultimately, our analysis will produce 
59 C. Joyner, ibid., at 194. 
60 H.Thorsteinsdottir et al., supra note 30, at 892. 
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strong normative benchmarks based on justice considerations that take needs into 
account rather than market-based power when evaluating major social, political, and 
legal implications resulting from the commercialisation of genetics. 
The first chapter will set the contextual basis of our framework by providing 
justifications for a global application of distributive justice principles. To assess 
institutions and practices, we will propose a cosmopolitan methodology based on a 
global scheme of cooperation emerging from the idea of the univers al importance of 
every human being as a unit of moral concem. This exercise will give us a sense of 
how institutions involved in the distribution of genetic benefits should function and 
within which specifie parameters they should handle distribution. 
The second chapter of this first theoretical part will elaborate an ideal conception of 
distributive justice in health to justify global access to genetics. We will establish 
normative grounds as the basis for our scheme of global healthlhealth care justice, 
focussing on the special characteristics of health and on its crucial role in normal 
human functioning. After arguing that health is a crucial element of normal 
functioning, we will analyse the impact of normal functioning on the lives of 
individuals, using the criterion of the range of normal opportunities available to 
people. This will help us establish clear links between health problems, lack of access 
to the resources emerging from genetic research, and a diminution of the range of 
opportunities for which individuals of equal skill can build life plans. This discussion 
will highlight the specificity and universal importance of health. It will also flesh out 
our argument in favour of compensation for deviations from normal functioning and 
for the eradication of health inequities over which we can have sorne form of control 
through distributive justice mechanisms. 
After this first part, we will have established a global distributive justice framework 
as the basis of our argument for more equitable and global access to health and 
genetics. The second part of the dissertation will attempt to determine how and if our 
theory of distribution translates into positive law and to identify and analyse the main 
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obstacles to legal compliance with global distributive justice. Although the 
development of genetics can affect many areas of law including privacy, 
employment, insurance, and cri minai law, we will focus on two of the major 
international legal systems most concerned with distribution issues: intellectual 
property (lP) law (especially patent law) and human rights law. The first two chapters 
of the second part will be dedicated to the presentation and analysis of those 
international normative systems in order to determine if their underlying philosophy, 
structure, and functioning take account of the principles highlighted in our theoretical 
framework. 
Our analysis will conclude that these two legal frameworks regulating the distribution 
of benefits and resources arising from genetics are deficient, each in their own way, 
in the reach, operation, and substantive content of the standards they promote. Indeed, 
we will realise that, despite our argument for the universal special importance of 
health, this does not always receive the special and universal treatment it deserves in 
practice. The discussion will bring to light major power imbalances and a lack of 
focus on distributive justice issues mainly attributable to the political and economic 
contexts of application of the two systems and not to an irremediable incompatibility 
of the principles with diffusion and equitable access to knowledge. We will indeed 
realise that both systems, although very different in their nature and purposes, are 
driven mainly by market considerations either in their philosophy, principles, and/or 
application and that they do not give enough attention and importance to justice and 
solidarity issues. Our analysis will bring us to acknowledge that the international 
order under which IP and human rights evolve inspires power struggles that shift our 
attention away from justice principles standing at the source of a shared morality and 
a cosmopolitan perception of humanity. Our work will aim to highlight, analyse, and 
explain this reality. 
Following our discussion on the conceptual link existing both between IP law and 
access and human right law and access, our last chapter will focus on introducing 
practical examples to illustrate the intersection of IP and human rights law. Referring 
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to a few examples, this last chapter will seek to highlight the practical impact that 
those two systems have had on scientific data-sharing and on availability and 
affordability of genetics research tools, products, and services in developing 
countries. Following the presentation of those examples, we will conclude this 
last chapter with a brief analysis of the intersection between IP rights and human 
rights in health. This will allow us to address the effects of strong and broad IP 
rights on the realisation and implementation of human rights and the tension 
existing between the two systems, both in terms of philosophy and application. 
This will conclude the second and last part of our dissertation dedicated to the 
assessment of the two major systems-first, with justice benchmarks established in 
the first theoretical part and second, with practical examples. Coming back to the 
evidence presented at the beginning of our work on the real potential of genetic 
research to improve global health, and on our support for a notion of global 
distributive justice in health, we will be forced to realise that, as they currently 
function, the intellectual property and the human rights systems are not adequate to 
realise global bene fit sharing in the field of genetics. Without arguing for the 
abolition of these systems or establishing detailed solutions and practical policy 
options, we will conclude our dissertation with sorne suggestions of avenues that 
could be explored further to remedy this situation in order to further global 
distributive justice. This will set out a basis for further discussion on how we could 
work around sorne of the major obstacles identified throughout our analysis. It will 
also help us move from the vague and often symbolic ideal of bene fit sharing actually 
prevailing toward the establishment of a real, enforceable concept of global bene fit 
sharing in health that would position genetics at the rank of essential tool for 
achieving global health. 
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PART 1: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DISTRIBUTION IN 
HEALTH 
Building on the context established in the introduction, the thesis now moves to 
the theoretical basis for examining the global distribution of the benefits of 
genetic research and resulting products and services. The first part of our 
dissertation will therefore represent the grounding of our argument for engaging 
in a global and more equitable redistribution of the benefits likely to emerge 
from genetic science. 
The analysis performed in this first part will produce strong normative 
benchmarks useful for adopting justice considerations based on health needs in 
order to evaluate major social, political, and legal implications resulting from 
the commercialisation of genetics. This framework will represent an ideal 
conception of global justice in health, a standard for appraising institutions and 
for gui ding the overall direction of social change by providing a long-term goal 
of political endeavour and giving meaning to what we can do today in actual, 
existing conditions. 61 This analysis is very important because even if ideal 
principles of justice cannot always apply automatically and immediately to the 
practical reality, it is crucial to understand exactly what we are compromising by 
accepting non-ideal conditions, and to receive guidance as to what we should be 
aiming for with respect to future social and institutional reforms. As c1early put 
by Schrecker: "responsible ethical analysis must not regard crucial background 
elements of the social and economic context [ ... ] as too big to change". 62 
61 J.Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), at 128; C. 
Brown, Sovereignty, Rights and Justice, International Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002), at 180. 
62 T. Schrecker, "Benefit-Sharing in the New Genomic Marketplace: Expanding the Ethical Frame of 
Reference" in B.M.Knoppers, ed., Populations and Genetics: Legal and Socio-Ethical Perspectives 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003). 
22 
Thus, we believe that it is necessary to launch discussions and stir up debates on 
a common vision of the good and related univers al basic needs, rights, and 
duties in order to establish appropriate principles of distributive justice in health. 
A distinction must be made between something that is unfeasible and something 
that has been demonstrated to be impossible, since ideal principles are both 
relevant and useful when their implementation remains a possibility.63 To this 
end, a sense of moral responsibility for the actual state of the world must be 
developed and cultivated in order for reforms and changes to gradually take 
place when they are indeed possible. This first part will contribute to establish 
the analytical basis required to lay the foundation for this important process. 
We have split this first part into two main chapters. In the first one, we will 
present an argument for a global application of justice principles to justify 
global access to genetics, referring to a cosmopolitan approach that considers 
each human being with their basic health needs as a unit of consideration 
deserving equal attention. This global focus will give us the perspective we need 
to determine how institutions should work towards distribution of genetic-
research benefits and who should be entitled to profit from this distribution. 
The second chapter will establish an ideal scheme of global healthlhealth care justice. 
To this end, we will need to reflect on the special importance of health for every 
individual, on the role it has to play in ensuring normal functioning and in the pursuit 
of an ideal of equality of opportunity for aIl. In this moral scheme, every individual's 
health interests receive equal consideration and the benefits arising from genetics are 
distributed so as to prevent health standards' differences caused by socio-economic 
factors. Our analysis will highlight the importance of compensating for the 
divergence from normal functioning and health inequalities over which we have sorne 
power through distributive justice schemes. 
63 T.W. Pogge, "The Moral Demands of Global Justice" (Fall 2003) Dissent 37. 
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Chapter 1: Global Application of Distributive Justice: A 
Cosmopolitan Approach 
Introduction 
When choices are to be made regarding the 
ends and means of political action, or the 
structures and rules of institutions and 
practices, it is natural to ask by what principles 
such choices should be guided. 64 
As discussed in the introduction, though there will probably be a considerable delay 
between the identification of genetic dysfunctions and mutations and the 
positive interventions that can successfully alter, treat, or cure them, there is 
evidence that genetic research could, in the long run, have significant positive effects 
on the health and lives of people it may reach.65 However, for the moment, we can 
expect that most future genetic technologies will likely reach and bene fit a very 
limited number of people worldwide, the majority in developed countries. In fact, 
expensive innovations will probably be developed to address the needs ofthe affluent 
where there is a market for them and, in any case, will likely be accessible only to 
those people who have insurance coverage (public or private) or who can afford to 
purchase such technology with private funds. 66 Genetic discoveries could thus 
contribute to widen the health gap between rich and po or, both within and between 
64 C.R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999) at 5. 
65 Collins et al, A vision for the future of genomics research, (2003) 422 Nature 835; J. Bell, "The 
Double Helix in Clinical Practice" (2003) 421 Nature 414; R. Khoury et al. "Population Screening in 
the Age of Genomic Medicine"(2003) 348 England Journal of Medicine 50; Program in Applied 
Ethics and Biotechnology and Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health (University of 
Toronto Joint Center for Bioethics) Top 10 Biotechnologies for lmproving Health in Developing 
Countries Toronto, 2003; WHO, Genomics and World Health, Geneva, 2002. 
66 M.J. Mehlman & J.R. Botkin, Access to the Genome the Challenge to Equality (Washington D.C: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998). 
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countries, adding to the substantial inequalities that already characterise sorne health 
care systems and the global health agenda.67 
Building upon our initial remarks on bene fit sharing in the Introduction and in light of 
the concept's growing rhetorical importance in the field of genetics, it is now time to 
investigate its normative basis. In this chapter, we shall see that there exists a positive 
obligation to ensure equitable access to genetic advancements, that research priorities 
should be established accordingly, and that the benefits of genetic ( knowledge, 
expertise, research tools, products and services, and profits) should be distributed 
more equitably, based on actual needs rather than simply on market forces. As 
already mentioned, while there are already differences with respect to access to 
genetics applications within countries, and this situation will most likely persist, our 
main focus will instead be on the limited access to the benefits of this SCIence 
globally. It is in this context that we will develop the theoretical framework. 
This first chapter will therefore establish the theoretical basis for a global application 
of our equitable distributive normative framework. For the purpose ofthis theoretical 
analysis, we will contextualise our argument in order to explain why principles of 
distributive justice should be applied globally. To this end, we will marshal 
arguments for and against global distributive justice. Subsequently, we will 
investigate a form of cosmopolitanism as the basis to determining how to best justify 
institutions and practices and to as certain the most appropriate scale for distributive 
Issues. 
67 M. Leonard, "Just Genetics: A problem Agenda" in T.F. Murphy & M.A. Lappé, eds. Justice and 
the Human Genome Project (Califomia: University of Califomia Press, 1994) 133. 
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1.1 Distributive Justice 
What are the characteristics of a normative obligation ofbenefit sharing? 
This chapter establishes an ideal conception of justice to help us criticise, orient, and 
assess possibilities for global access to genetics as already mentioned. Even if an 
ideal theory can seem far removed from the imperfect reality of developing countries, 
such a theory is essential to establishing the basis for concrete changes though a 
global normative framework for engaging in the international redistribution of 
resources produced by genetic and genomic research. 68 Indeed, theorists have 
developed different theories of justice to justify how goods, welfare, and services 
should be divided in a society.69 
Sorne scholars and economists who believe in libertarianism favour the allocation of 
goods and services on the basis that a person's willingness to pay represents an 
effective measure of his or her desire to obtain a specific good or service. Following 
this approach, the pers on who values a good the most or who is inclined to pay the 
most for it would obtain it. Supporters of the free market have argued that a society's 
wealth will be increased most effectively if assets are privately owned and owners 
can trade them freely, so long as no one has the right to appropriate the property of 
others without their consent. Consequently, large differences in wealth among 
individuals have no moral significance and egalitarian redistribution of wealth is 
rejected.70 From the perspective of advocates of a libertarian conception of justice, 
such as Nozick and Engelhardt, the use of government's coercive authority to 
68 A. Kupler, "Debate: Global Poverty Relied, More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternative to the 
Singer Solution" (2002) 16:1 Ethics and International Affairs 107. 
69 For a good overview of the main theories of justice refer to: W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Po/itical 
Philosophy: An Introduction, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
70 T.H. Engelhardt Jr, The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 
342-343. 
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extract more resources 1S unfair and violates people's rights, liberties and self-
determination.71 
Utilitarianism is another way of envisioning justice. It requires the maximisation of 
overall welfare. Utilitarianism focuses on global welfare, which can sometimes be the 
result of equitable distribution but can also, in other circumstances, justify ignoring 
sorne members of a community for the benefit of the majority. In the process of 
bringing a society to its maximum health potential, utilitarians argue that we should 
not care if the health of the affluent is better and is afforded better treatment than the 
health of the poor, so long as the improvements have a positive impact on the overall 
population' s health.72 Another particularity of this view is that it is based on the idea 
that that income incentives (resulting in income inequalities) are needed to encourage 
innovation.73 
Liberalism is another theory widely applied to justice issues in political philosophy. 
One of the many components of liberals' ideal structure of society is justice in goods 
and services through distribution to create more equitable circumstances. This is 
71 Ibid. at c. 8; R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). One problem 
with the application of this argument to health is the determination of the extent to which health care 
systems and resources can be considered private property, since they have often been developed with 
a great deal of public funding. Even if private institutions play an important role in the development 
and delivery of sorne health resources, public funds have been, and are often still, the building blocks 
of hospital systems, fundamental research endeavours, dissemination of results, transfer of 
technologies, and most medical training.Another problem with applying libertarianism to health is that 
there are tremendous inequities with respect to both wealth and the availability of heaIth 
insurance among individuals and nations. Most importantly, those who have the greatest 
medical needs are not always the individuals who have the ability to pay for the corresponding 
treatments and medical technologies. In this sense, the point of libertarianism is not compatible with 
the principle of equality in health. For more on the critic of the application of libertarianism to health, 
see: L.M. Fleck, "Just Health Care (1): Is Beneficence Enough?" (1989) 1 0 Theoretical Medicine 167; 
R.A. Epstein, "Why is Health Care Special?" (1993) 40 U. Kan. L. Rev 307. 
72 F. Peter & T. Evans, "Ethical Dimensions of Health Equity" in T. Evans et al., eds., Challenging 
Inequities in Health,from Ethics to Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 25 at 28. 
73 This incentive aspect does not seem to work for health, as heaIth inequities do not encourage people 
to improve their health status at aIl. Since utilitarianism appears insensitive to issues of equality in 
health, we will not be using it to ground our argument. For more on utilitarianism and equality, see: S. 
Anand, The Concern for Equity in Health, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies 
(Feb. 2002) Working Paper Series, vol.12, no.l, online on the website ofHCPDS 
<http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hcpds/wpweb/Anand%20wp 120 I.pdt> (date accessed: May 30th, 
2006); B. Williams, "A Critique ofUtilitarianism" in J.J.C. Smart. ed., Utilitarianism: For and Against 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) 75. 
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called distributive justice. Distributive justice is another perspective from which to 
consider justice in health matters and will be our focus in the establishment of our 
theoretical framework for global health distribution. Distributive justice aims at 
determining the equitable allocation and access to benefits (resources, services, 
goods) and burdens produced by social cooperation.74 The most popular the ory of 
distributive justice in the last 50 years was established by John Rawls in his book A 
Theory of Justice. 75 Unlike utilitarianism, distributive justice maintains that 
individuals have rights that cannot be sacrificed simply to create more benefits for 
others. In this view, social primary goods like liberty, opportunity, income, and 
wealth are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution will advantage the 
least well-off. Rawls' principles are meant to apply only to the basic structure of 
isolated, well-ordered societies. 76 We will come back to Rawls' liberal the ory of 
justice at several occasions in the course of the first part of the dissertation. 
Similarly to libertarian and utilitarian standards, principles of distributive justice are 
designed to allocate goods, resources and services when needs are greater than 
availability. They are however very different because they require equity and 
consideration of the most vulnerable in distribution, which make their application to 
health resources and technologies very relevant. The principles of distributive justice 
can differ according to the subject of the distribution (income, wealth, opportunities 
to the good life, etc.), the beneficiaries of it (individuals, groups of persons, 
compatriots, foreigners etc.), the providers of the goods and services to be distributed 
(individuals, fellow citizens, governments, international organisations etc.), and the 
basis for the distribution (according to equality, to individual characteristics, to need, 
etc.).77 Within a theory of distributive justice, the role of luck, chance, and choice 
are also relevant when deciding distribution issues. 78 
74 C.R. Beitz, Po/itica/ Theory and International Relations, supra note 64 
75 J. Rawls, supra note 61. 
76 Ibid., at.7, 8 and 303. 
77 J. Lamont, "Distributive Justice" (Fall 2003 Edition)The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E.N. 
Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edularchives/fa1l2003/entries/justice-distributive> (date accessed: 
May 30th, 2006). 
78 C. Jones, Global Justice, Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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In this dissertation, we chose to focus on distributive justice considerations as applied 
to health needs. In fact, in contrast to libertarianism and utilitarianism, liberalism 
recognises the principle of equality in health and consequently allows us to consider 
health needs as a priority. Those elements are going to prove crucial for the 
examination of issues of global distribution of the benefits of genetic research. 
Before getting into the elements of our specific theory of distributive justice for 
global health- that is, the rationale for the distribution of specific benefits arising 
from genetic applications and the normative basis for such rationale-we need to 
present the context of distribution by providing a clear justification of the subject and 
scope of distribution. 
Global Distributive Justice 
Most theories of justice apply to domestic situations without dealing with the 
requirements of international distributive justice.79 Nevertheless, if the benefits and 
burdens arising from social cooperation are the basis of distributive justice, economic 
interdependence at the international level and direction needed to make choices that 
can influence the well-being of individuals located in other societies might justify 
standards of global distributive justice analogous to the principles applicable within 
domestic societies.80 
The first part of our theoretical analysis will contextualise our framework explaining 
why we argue that our principles of distributive justice should be applied on a global 
scale. This will lead us to adopt a form of cosmopolitanism as a basis for determining 
how institutions and practices should be justified and on what scale distributive issues 
should be handled. 
79 For example J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999) at. 106, 
114-119; J. Rawls, supra note 61; M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). However, 
more recently, philosophers like Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge have provided interesting arguments 
in favor of international distributive justice. 
80 C.R. Beitz, "International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Recent Thought" (1999) 
51:2 World Polities 269. 
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1.2 Cosmopolitanism: a Way of Envisioning Global Justice 
Current scientific developments that can help improve health and cure disease are 
universally essential and therefore should be accessible to aIl human beings who can 
physiologically benefit from them, by simple virtue of their humanity and needs. 
Cosmopolitanism provides a good starting point for the theoretical basis for such a 
premlse. 
There are two kinds of cosmopolitanism: institutional and moral. Institutional 
cosmopolitanism focuses on how political institutions should be established. It holds 
that states and other political institutions should be restructured and placed under the 
control of an organisation akin to a "world government" or other supranational 
political arrangement, so that we could see the world as a single entity in which 
individuals would be citizens of the world. 81 By contrast, this thesis shall take the 
perspective of moral cosmopolitanism, which focuses on the basis for the justification 
of institutions, practices, and interpersonal relations. Since it is widely argued that a 
realistic and plausible form of cosmopolitanism should take institutions rather 
than interpersonal transactions as its primary focal points, this thesis focuses on 
moral institutional cosmopolitanism, which asserts that the responsibility of 
ensuring that practices and rules are enacted in compliance with a cosmopolitan ideal 
falls on institutions. 
Moral cosmopolitanism is not associated with any specific political pro gram or 
philosophical theory, but is instead characterised by its perception of the moral basis 
upon which justice issues should be evaluated and of the proper scope of moral 
principles.82 It establishes conditions that any acceptable approach to justice ought to 
81 D. Laertius, Diogenes, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R.D. Hicks, Loeb Classical Library 
(London: William Heinemann, 1925) vol.2, vol. 6:63 
82 O. O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 172; O. 
O'Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) c.l O. 
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meet. Cosmopolitanism does not demand specific measures. Instead, measures would 
flow from a specific theory of justice like global distributive justice. 83 Once a 
cosmopolitan direction is established, specific justice measures focus on different 
aspects of importance to each individual, including subjective elements like 
happiness, well-being, desire, and preference, as well as objective factors like needs, 
abilities, and opportunities.84 We will return to those specific measures in the second 
part ofthis chapter. 
A moral cosmopolitan viewpoint is impartial, universal, individualist, and egalitarian 
in nature. 85 For cosmopolites, individuals are the fundamental entities of moral 
concem, as expressed by Thomas Pogge: "every human being has a global stature as 
the ultimate unit of moral concem.,,86 Cosmopolites envision the social world as 
composed of persons rather than collectives. 87 They insist that each and every human 
being affected by institutional arrangements-like, for example, policy choices about 
production and distribution of burdens and benefits, or choices regarding the 
establishment of a specific institution-should be respected and given equal and 
impartial consideration by everyone, wherever they may be. 88 This perspective is 
based on the premise that individuals are entitled to certain treatment and 
consideration due to their humanity as opposed to other particularities including 
culture, politics, religion, and citizenship. 
This individualistic vision of the self is the object of much criticism, especially from 
proponents of a communitarian approach to justice. Indeed, communitarians critique 
a universal vision of justice and needs, instead arguing for variable principles of 
83 C.R. Beitz, "Social and Cosmopolitanism liberalism" (1999) 75:3 International AjJairs 515 at.515; 
C.R. Beitz, supra note 55; A Kupler, "Rawlsian Global Justice, Beyond the Law ofPeoples to a 
Cosmopolitan law of Pers ons" (October 2000) 28:5 Po/itical Theory 640. 
84 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in 
Europe, Ethical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) 89. 
85 C. Jones, supra note 78. 
86 T. W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" (October 1992) 103 Ethics 49. 
87 C.R. Beitz, "Rawls's Law ofPeoples", supra note 56. 
88 O. O'Neill, "Hunger, Needs and Rights" in S. Luper-Foy ed., Problems of International Justice 
(London: Westview, 1988); A Kupler, supra note 83. 
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justice originating from societies' historical, institutional, and cultural particularities. 
They argue that distributive justice will only find logical application within restrained 
social groups who share subjective needs.89 In the field of health, efforts to apply a 
single common morality and to adopt a universal approach when dealing with issues 
arising with the production and applications of science and medicine are criticised. 
lndeed, such attitude is seen as an effort from the western world to export its 
conception of what is ethical into an area where moral meanings of the most basic 
concepts like disease and health can differ between countries and religions. 9o The 
communitarian perspective of justice deserves great consideration and can be of 
considerable help in approaching and resolving important justice debate in health-
related matters.9 ! 
Although we acknowledge and appreciate that different individuals and cultures can 
have different views of the definition and importance of health, in this dissertation we 
adopt a universal perspective on health. As we will see in the course of this chapter, 
ev en if different perceptions on sorne aspects of health coexist, we consider that 
health is something universally desirable, that it is a state of normal functioning 
89 One of the arguments often put forward to support this view is that human needs are socially relative 
and that arguing for universal standard of needs could give rise to attempts by the more powerful to 
impose their vision of needs and that this could result in cultural imperialism. For discussions on 
communitarianism and critique of the universal perspective of liberalism, see: M. Sandel, Liberalism 
and the Limits of Justice, 2d ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); C.Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985) ch. 1; M. Walzer, supra note 79; M. Walzer, Thick and Thin (Notre-Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994); W. Kimlicka, Contemporary Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), c. 6; P. Marshall and B. Koenig, "Accounting for Culture in a Globalised 
Bioethics" (2004) 32 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 252; A. Helier, The Theory of Hum an Need 
in Marx (London: Allison & Busby, 1976) at 96-97; G. Rist, "Basic Questions about Basic Human 
Needs" in K Lederer, ed., Human Needs (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980) 233; C. 
Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition" in C. Taylor & A. Gutman, eds., Multicu/turalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994); S. Scheffler, "Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism" (1999) Il Utilitas 
255, at 256. 
90 P. Marshall and B. Koenig, supra note 89 at 252 and 256; D. DeGrazia, "Common Morality, 
Coherence, and the Principles of Biomedical Ethics" (2003) 13:3 Kennedy Institute Journal ofEthics 
219; L. Turner, "Bioethics in a Multicultural World: Medicine and Morality in Pluralistic Settings" 
(2003) Il:2 Health Care Analysis 99. 
91 However, we have to be careful with any view that uses cultural differences to justiry inequities and 
tolerate suffering. For a very good analysis and critique of su ch approach refer to P. Farmer, "On 
Suffering and Social Violence: A View from Below" in A. Kleinman, V. Das & M. Lock, eds. Social 
SujJering (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 278; for an illustration of this opinion, see 
also J. Mukherjee, "HIV-l Care in Resource-Poor Settings: A View from Haiti" (2003) 362 Lancet 
994. 
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influenced by numerous biological, genetic, socio-economic, psychological and 
environmental factors and which allows people to accomplish and further important 
life goals. In other words, we consider that health is an objective basic human need 
and consequently that access to health and genetics (as previously defined) should be 
an issue of univers al importance for every human being no matter who they are, 
where they come from, or where they live.92 We, of course, acknowledge that sorne 
identified groups might have specific vulnerabilities to disease and additional health 
needs, and that they should be able to be treated accordingly when they are identified. 
However, this does not mean that the basic health needs of individuals from those 
groups should be considered any differently from those of any other individual. 93 
With this perspective in mind, we now leave the communitarian perspective aside and 
adopt a moral cosmopolitan viewpoint to address the issues at stake. This being said, 
we appreciate that a culture-specific strategy and sensitivity could be essential, in the 
long mn, to understand and address local and cultural specificities in the delivery of 
genetic products and services, and for an ethical provision of genetic counselling 
services, for example. However, this goes beyond the scope ofthis dissertation. 
The universalistic/individualistic focus of moral cosmopolitanism can be justified by 
the common characteristics shared by aIl individuals. Ideed, human beings share a 
similar genetic makeup and are physiologically alike.94 Our common genetic heritage 
thus transcends geopolitical borders. One might presume, therefore, that individuals, 
wherever they are, would be physically affected in similar ways by similar symptoms 
and diseases. However, this is not always the case. Not aIl people respond similarly to 
medical conditions, medication and illness. Indeed, human health often has a genetic 
component. A typical forms of a single gene or set of genes transmitted from one 
92 For more on the universal importance of certain needs, refer to the enlightening parallel established 
between the universality of basic needs and of suffering emerging from imperialism by Doyal, where 
he argues that, in both cases, victims' cultural background should not be used to assume that their 
suffering is qualitatively different. L. Doyal and 1. Gough, A Theory of Human Need (New York: The 
Guildford Press, 1991), at 29-30. 
93 Idem, at. 57. 
94 H uman Genome Project Information, supra note 12. 
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generation to another can cause inherited genetic diseases,95 and many genes coupled 
with environmental interactions can have an incidence on more common diseases like 
hypertension, diabetes, and various forms of cancer and infections. AIso, every 
individual carries numerous mutations in his or her genetic background, which are 
small changes in DNA that can contribute to human variation-sorne with, and others 
without, known incidence on health. Consequently, a number of genetic research 
projects that aim to identify significant genes and variations, and to determine who 
such variants affect, have been undertaken world-wide. Such studies generate 
important information for the screening of individuals, families, and populations 
more genetically at risk or susceptible to certain diseases and conditions.96 
Even if different individuals may end up being personally affected by genetic 
discoveries in very different ways, at present it is difficult to predict who may bene fit 
the most. Due to the similar characteristics we aIl share as hum an beings, it is safe to 
say that genetic developments carry a potential to benefit many individuals, world 
wide, both from a global community perspective and from a personal and familial 
perspective, regardless of the direct practical outcomes that might emerge from it, 
whether in the short or long term. 
Other health and genetic differences have less to do with individual genetic makeup, 
but are instead clearly associated with external socio-economic, environmental, or 
nutritional factors. For example, sorne medical conditions, like malaria and other 
tropical diseases, are only present in sorne parts of the world as they are associated 
with environmental factors and the underdevelopment of specific medical and genetic 
technology. Furthermore, even when people in different parts of the world can seem 
to be physiologically affected the same way by diseases, socio-economic factors 
create huge gaps between them in how they end up burdened by the same afflictions 
95 Alzheimer' s, sorne familial breast cancers, and cystic fibrosis are example of iIInesses caused by a 
single gene. 
96 AJ. F. Griffiths etaI., An Introduction ta Genetic Analysis (New York: WH Freeman & Co, 1999). 
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in reality. This brings us to another important characteristic of cosmopolitanism: 
universalism. 
Moral cosmopolitanism is not convinced that boundaries between territorial and 
political structures should have much moral importance. Principles of justice should 
apply to the global community of world citizens,97 those who live in different 
countries and with whom we can seem to share little in terms of culture, language, 
and customs, for example.98 The cosmopolitan perspective requires scepticism about 
strong nationalism and patriotism when they have the effect of prioritising only social 
and political affiliation in the provision and distribution of aid. It caUs instead for a 
sense of community among human beings in a universal comity of nations where 
borders are less significant.99 However, this does not mean that cosmopolitanism is 
indifferent to local povertY and deprivation, as sorne suggest. 100 Instead, 
cosmopolitanism holds that the state level should not be given absolute priority 
when considering justice. As such, we should care about the focus of our distributive 
justice obligations, such as deprivation and pain, wherever they exist. In fact, even if 
nations are an important part of the existing political picture (and cosmopolitans are 
not necessarily arguing for their abolition, as discussed below), the moral significance 
of boundaries should be justified in terms of the values and ethical principles that are 
chosen and the priorities such a choice represents for every individual affected. 1ol In 
other words, nationality-based special treatments and group loyalty are appropriate 
but are necessarily complemented by concurrent moral obligations to individuals 
beyond our border. The priority given to our fellow citizens for distributive justice is 
not absolute; other human beings who may not be citizens can also have legitimate 
97 w. Hinsch, "Global Distributive Justice" (January 2001) 32 (1/2) Methaphilosophy 58. 
98 W. Scheuerman, "Globalization" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (FaU 2002 Edition), 
E.N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/faIl2002/entries/globalization> (accessed May 
301\ 2006). 
99 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (1797), trans. J. Ladd, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1999). 
100 G. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Mora/ity of Relationships (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993) at 21. 
101 C.R. Beitz, "Cosmopolitan Liberalism and the States System" in C. Brown, ed., Po/itical 
Restructuring in Europe, Ethical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) c. 6, 123, at 124. 
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interests in distribution. The latter should be given important consideration in cases 
where the interests at stake are significant, as are, for example, daims for the 
protection of basic rights or vital interests. I02 
Human beings share a common sense of morality and common human interests in 
certain crucial spheres of universal importance. We agree with Buchanan when he 
says that: "we should expect sorne congruence of moral values across societies, 
given the roles that morality plays in hum an life [ ... ]"103. Those principles and 
values are the ones that play a role in preventing people from being exposed to 
serious harm and allowing them to pursue decent human lives through access to an 
appropriate range of opportunities. I04 As discussed in more detail in the second part 
of this chapter, access to health and genetic resources is an example where the 
interests at stake could be so universally crucial that extending the range of rights and 
obligations beyond the level of citizenship is justified. Genetics has an important 
collective aspect. In fact, we often refer to susceptible populations or at-risk groups; 
in sorne cases, reference has been made to the concept of genetic nationalism. 105 This 
group reference can have many different applications in genetics. Sometimes, the 
population aspect is not necessarily associated with specific diseases, conditions, or 
susceptibilities but is instead associated with existing boundaries as a practical, 
scientifically relevant, and sometimes economically advantageous way to create a 
fixed heterogeneous genetic pool for research. 106 
102 C. Jones, supra note78; P. Kleingeld, E. Brown, "Cosmopolitanism" The Stanford Encyc/opedia of 
Philosophy (Fal! 2003 Edition), E.N. ZaIta (ed.), 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/faIl2002/entries/cosmopolitanism> (accessed June 41\ 2006); A. 
Buchanan" supra note 25; S. Scheffler, supra note 89. 
103 A Buchanan, Ibid. at. 79. 
104 S. Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1989) at 
90. 
105 This attitude towards populations' genetic heritage has been observed namely in Iceland where the 
population has been presented with the idea that Icelanders are genetically special, that they might 
have sorne special genes and genetic conditions that can't be observed elsewhere. H. Rose, The 
Commodification of Bioinformation: The lcelandic Realth Sector Database (London: The We\come 
Trust, 2001) at 12, fin 29. 
106 Sorne of those genetic pools represent whole countries, for example, in Iceland where the 
govemment granted a 12-year license to the company deCode to construct and operate a national 
heaIth services database to link anonymous genotypes with medical records of consenting members of 
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In other cases, the group aspect of genetics is not at all clearly associated with 
existing political and geographical boundaries. In fact, susceptible populations will 
also be found in specific regions of the world, not necessarily clearly delimited, but 
more associated with ethnicity or types of communities such as indigenous and tribal 
groups.I07 By contrast, other genetically at-risk populations are dispersed aIl around 
the world. \08 
the population. Another national project is the UK Biobank project, a joint initiative from WeJcome 
Trust and Medical Research Council. This project aims to recruit up to 500,000 men and women aged 
45-69 from the general population across England, Scotland and Wales and use their blood samples, 
lifestyle details, and medical histories to create a national database to study the role of genetics and 
environmental factors in health and disease. Other initiatives are aimed at studying sm aller 
populations, sometimes more homogenous and isolated, Iike Sardinia and Israel. J. Kaiser, "Biobank: 
Population Databases Boom, from Iceland to the U.S." (Nov. 2002) 298:5596 Science 1158; A.F. 
Wright, A.D. Carothers & H. Campbell, "Gene-Environment Interactions: the BioBank UK Study" 
(2002) 2:2 Pharmacogenomics J. 75; UK Biobank official website: http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk; J.F. 
Merz, G.E. McGee and P. Sankar, "Iceland Inc.?: On the Ethics of Commercial Population Genomics" 
(March 2004) 58:6 Soc Sci Med 1201; A. Abott, "DNA Study Deepens Rift Over Iceland's Genetic 
Heritage" (Feb. 2003) 421: 6924 Nature 678; E. Amason, "Genetic Heterogeneity of Icelanders" 
(Janvier 2003) 67:1 Annals Human Genetics 5; S. Shifrnan & A. Darvasi, "The Value of Isolated 
Populations" (2001) 28 Nature Medicine 309; C. Bourgain et al., "Search for MuItifactorial Disease 
Suceptibility Genes in Founder Populations" (2000) 64 Annals Human Genetics 255; M.G. Marrosu et 
al., "Genetic Factors and the Founder Effect Explain Familial MS in Sardinia" (Jan.2002) 58:2 
Neurology 283; R. Lampis et al., "The Distribution of HLA Class Il Haplotypes Reveals that the 
Sardinian Population is Genetically Differentiated from the Other Caucasian Populations" (2000) 56 
Tissue Antigens 515; H. Lahat et al., "A Missense Mutation in a Highly Conserved Region of CASQ2 
is Associated with Autosomal Recessive Catecholamine-Induced Polymorphic Ventricular 
Tachycardia in Bedouin Families from Israel" (2001) 69 American J Human Genetics 1378. 
I07This was in fact the purpose of the Human Genome Diversity Project established in 1993 to describe 
and understand the 1 % difference and diversity in human genomes illustrated by many of individual 
and population level differences. It aimed to collect biological samples from different population 
groups throughout the world, with the intention ofbuilding a representative database ofhuman genetic 
diversity. It caused violent reactions from many of the indigenous groups targeted by the study, which 
gave rise to a project review by the US National Research Council in 1997. Since April, 2002 a 
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variation in response to environmental exposures and to drugs. The long-term goal of the International 
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common patterns of human DNA sequence variation. B.R. Winkelmann, "Pharmacogenomics, Genetic 
Testing and Ethnic Variability: Tackling the Ethical Questions" (Sep. 2003) 4:5 Pharmacogenomics 
531; L. Andrews & D. Nelkin, Body Bazaar; the Market for Human Tissue in the Biotechnology Age 
(Crown Publishers, New York, 2001); L.L.Dog, "Whose Genes Are They? The Human Genome 
Diversity Project" (1999) 1 0 Journal of Health & Social Policy 51; M. Dodson and R. Williamson 
"Indigenous Peoples and the Morality of the Human Genome Diversity Project" (1999) 25 Journal of 
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(1998) 27 Annual Review of Anthropology 473; H. Cunningham, "Colonial Encounters in Postcolonial 
Contexts: Patenting Indigenous DNA and the Human Genome Diversity Project" (1998) 18 Critique of 
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In any case, the majority of the potentially susceptible groups and populations still 
need to be identified. To do so, extensive genetic research must be undertaken and 
carried out globally, sometimes with no clear focus on specific populations and 
without restrictions based on borders. Indeed, even if the vital and obvious 
importance of the group and population aspect in genetics is acknowledged-
especially in research 109_for the equitable development and distribution of the 
benefits of genetic, we need to broaden our focus in taking the health needs of 
individuals into account. In fact, it is our contention that a clear focus on the needs of 
specific populations would be too narrow for the purpose of the global justice 
framework that is required for genetics. 110 Thus, the universalistic/individualistic 
approach is preferable as it is compatible with the cosmopolitan focus of the 
methodology of this thesis. 
Anthropology 205; M.H. Crawford, "Anthropological Genetics in the 21 st Century: Introduction", 
(2000) 72 Human Biology 3; M.W. Foster, "Integrating ethics and science in the International 
HapMap Project" (June 2004) 5:6 Nature Reviews Genetics 467. 
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hypertension are being investigated in many centers, ail around the world. D.H, Choi et al., "Incidence 
of BRCAI and BRCA2 Mutations in Young Korean Breast Cancer Patients" (May 2004) 22:9 J Clin 
Oncol. 638; S. Sherwin, "BRCA Testing: Ethics Lessons for the New Genetics" (Feb. 2004) 27: 1 Clin 
lnvest Med. 19; S. Malander, "One in 10 Ovarian Cancer Patients Carry Germ Line BRCA 1 or BRCA2 
Mutations: Results of a Prospective Study in Southern Sweden" (Feb. 2004) 40:3 Eur J Cancer 422; B. 
Gorski et al., "A High Proportion of Founder BRCAI Mutations in Polish Breast Cancer Families" 
(Jul. 2004) 110:5 lnt J Cancer 683; N. Kato, "Genetic Analysis in Human Hypertension" (May 2002) 
25:3 Hypertens Res. 319; H.C. Hendrie et al., "Alzheimer's Disease, Genes, and Environment: the 
Value of International Studies" (Feb. 2004) 49:2 Can J Psychiatry 92; R.T. Perry et al., "Investigation 
of Association of 13 polymorphisms in eight genes in southeastern African American Alzheimer 
disease patients as compared to age-Matched Controls" (May 2001) 105:4 American Journal of 
Medical Genetics 332; 
109 Especially for population studies where there is much debate on the necessity and relevance of 
group consent and protection from potential harm due to improper disclosure. For more details: 
National Research Council (Committee on Human Genome Diversity), Evaluating Human Genetic 
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Sorne characterise the existing world order as a structure that institutionalises rather 
than eradicates oppression, self-interest, and deception on a global scale.1\ 1 If valid, 
this c1early contradicts the univers al conception of justice promulgated here. If we 
start with a cosmopolitan model of moral reciprocity in which aH individuals are seen 
and treated as equals, we cannot adequately address the hierarchy and inequities 
present in the world. 112 Instead, the criteria of distributive justice actuaHy prevailing 
domestically should be applied to the world for the satisfaction of the just interests of 
aH individuals. 113 In practice, this should happen through the promotion of a 
cosmopolitan institutional reform that would directly influence the choice and design 
of the norms that regulate property and cooperation. Such an institutional approach to 
moral cosmopolitanism requires that the world as a whole provide the context for 
determinations of justice. 1 14 This certainly appears as a long-term goal in the actual 
global reality due to the limited enforcement capability of institutions on the 
international scene. However, this does not mean that we should not pursue such an 
ideal. As c1early stated by Buchanan, 
[a]lthough at present it is unrealistic to expect that the 
international legal order can do much directly to achieve 
distributive justice by formulating and implementing 
comprehensive principles of distributive justice, it is 
nonetheless an imRortant element of the ideal moral theory of 
internationallaw. 15 
This issue will be addressed aIl through this chapter as we assess the importance of 
an ideal theory. 
Now that we have presented our context of analysis and demonstrated its re1evance 
for our core question, sorne of the main objections to cosmopolitanism will be 
III O. O'Neill, Face of Hunger: An Essay in Poverty, Development and Justice (London: Allen and 
Un win, 1986) at 145; K-C Tan, "Kantian Ethics and Global Justice" (Spring 1997) 23: 1 Social Theory 
and Practice 53. 
112 K. Nielsen, "Global Justice, Capitalism, and the Third World" in J. Arthur & W. H. Shaw ed. 
Justice and Economic Distribution (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 2001) at 236. 
113 c.R. Beitz, supra note 87. 
114 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" supra note 84, at 97; R. Forst, "Toward a Critical 
Theory of Transnational Justice" (January 2001) 32: 1/2 Methaphilosophy 26. 
115 A. Buchanan, supra note 25, at 203. 
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addressed. The analysis and critique of the objections will be followed by the 
argument for global distribution in health and the proposaIs for the justice claims 
upon which such distribution should be based. 
1.2.1. Objections to cosmopolitanism 
As indicated in the previous section, a cosmopolitan view does not give absolute 
priority to compatriots for the distribution of certain goods and services; instead it 
focuses on equality of individual needs, regardless of nationality or geographic 
location. For sorne, envisioning distributive justice in such a manner overlooks 
important elements of state autonomy and the special relationship that prevails 
between people from the same community. The purpose of this section is thus to 
consider and refute these criticisms, arguing that the importance of access to health 
transcends boundaries and that the universal aspect of health is demonstrated by the 
fact of global interdependence. 
1.2.1.1. From the defenders of state sovereignty and 
autonomy 
A common critique of cosmopolitanism is that it fails to adequately acknowledge the 
concept of state sovereignty. Many consider states to represent the principal 
independent ethical institutions in the world. 116 They are autonomous bodies that 
have the power to exercise control and enforce rights over their territory and over 
their citizens. The sovereignty of states is a basic principle of international lawl17 
which provides that aIl states are juridical equals, despite important differences in 
political and economic power. Consequently, states have the autonomy to set up their 
own domestic rules and exercise political coercion, but may concede part of their 
116 M. Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) at 177-183; M. Frost, Ethics in International Relation: A Constitutive 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 150-155. 
117 This concept has been codified in the Charter of the United Nations, 892 u.N. r.s. 119, art. 2(1): 
"The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of aIl its Members." 
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sovereignty by voluntarily agreeing to comply with international norms. Thus, often 
stimulated by self-interest, states can freely decide whether and how they choose to 
participate in the establishment and preservation of international norms that deal with 
issues arising beyond national boundaries and jurisdictions. Such a perspective 
exemplifies the concept of political freedom that accentuates the role of the nation-
state and presupposes that every state is driven by its own national interests, such as 
preserving its political autonomy, its territorial integrity, and expanding its economic 
system. 
However, this so-called realist ViSIOn of the state only represents one way of 
envisioning the role of nations. As they exist today, states lack unlimited sovereignty, 
notwithstanding any desire they may have to pursue their own interests in the creation 
or support of international obligations and institutions. International treaty obligations 
and the new existing global order confine nation-states to a more limited conception 
of sovereignty, the limits of which are partially determined by their respective 
political and economic positions. For example, nation-states may be restricted with 
respect to how they deal with other states, how they respect human rights, and how 
they enforce their international obligations depending on their political situation, their 
economic power and on the strategies adopted by other very powerful non-state 
actors. 118 
Advocates of state sovereignty accord significant ethical and moral weight to state 
boundaries and autonomy despite the cosmopolitan argument that they are 
"historically determined but morally arbitrary features of the earth's political 
geography". 119 Sorne statists believe that each sovereign and autonomous state has a 
certain responsibility for any underdevelopment and poverty, arguing that such 
conditions are often directly related to internaI, structural, and political problems and 
traditions. They believe that the cosmopolitan ideal, which considers the global 
context as the basis for justice, is utopian and would violate the limited but important 
118 O. O'Neill, "Agents of Justice" (January 2001) 32: 1/2 Metaphilosophy 180. 
119 C. Beitz, "International Justice: Conflict" in L.C. Becker & c. Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of 
Ethics (London: Garland, 1992) at 623. 
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degree of domestic, institutionalised social cooperation that sorne states have 
reached. 120 This leads sorne to believe that only states' citizens are entitled to be 
compensated for deprivation with the application of principles of distributive justice 
and economic egalitarianism. These same criteria do not apply on the international 
scene where they think that only sorne sort of minimal threshold of absolute 
deprivation should be compensated. 121 However, those opponents of cosmopolitanism 
do not seem to acknowledge the increasing economic and political interdependence 
among states at present, which causes states to lose part of their sovereignty due to 
globalisation. 122 Indeed, this is giving rise to an entirely new and sophisticated global 
order. 
Another critique of cosmopolitanism originates from a sense of nationalism and is 
based on the idea that cosmopolitanism fails to recognise the value of individuals' 
rights and affiliations to their community as constituting a crucial part of the 
enjoyment and satisfaction of life. 123 Sorne, like Drahos, argue that even if we can 
observe interdependence between states in various sectors, it does not mean that those 
states are forming a system of mutual cooperation. 124 Indeed, various elements 
characterise nationality as compared to other sources of collective identity: the fact 
that nationality develops from a shared belief in its existence, distinct rules, cultural 
conceptions, and values; its origin in history; its connection to a specific geographic 
region; and its reflection in individuals' distinct and subjective identification. 125 
Nations are thus viewed as major sources of solidarity, crucial in circumscribing 
specifie duties of aid, assistance, and support to other citizens and therefore helpful 
for domestic justice. Nationalism thus allows individuals to forge bonds as they share 
120 C. Jones, supra note 78. 
121 M. Blake, "Distributive Justice, Sate Coercion and Autonomy" (2001) 3 Philosophy & Public 
A/fairs 257, at 264. 
1 2 E.R.Gold et al., "The Unexamined Assumptions of Intellectual Property: Adopting an Evaluative 
Approach to Patenting Biotechnology Innovation" (October 2004) Public Affairs Quarterly 299. 
123 C.R. Beitz, supra note 55, at 290-291. 
124 P. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Adelshot: Darmouth Publishing Company, 
1996) c.8, at 170-198. 
125 C. Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1993) c. 3; D. 
Miller, "The Nation-State: a Modest Defence" in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe, 
Ethical Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) c. 7,1367, at 141. 
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a similar sense of identity l26 and is also often perceived to be the guardian of distinct 
cultures that may not be recognised at the global level. I27 It therefore rejects the idea 
of a world group to which duties of distributive justice can be applied. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that cosmopolites do not necessarily argue for the abolition of 
states. What they oppose are boundaries that systematically inflict injustices on 
outsiders and the existence of restrictive domestic welfare schemes and citizenship 
rights "held by persons qua citizens rather than directly or exclusively qua human 
beings. ,,128 
A good illustration of an ideology that would counter cosmopolitanism is set forth by 
Rawls in his treatment of international relations and global justice obligations in his 
Law of People, which includes sorne of the critiques described above. 
1.2.1.2. Rawls' Law of People and international justice 
As discussed above, Rawls's Theory of Justice from 1970 is one of the most well-known 
treatments of justice in the last fifty years. His theory established the princip les of distributive 
justice, but they were applicable only to individual states, a circumscribed context where it 
would be possible to identify social cooperation from which rights and duties arise. In The 
Law of People, Rawls off ers an extension of his theory of justice beyond the individual state. 
Rawls changes his theoretical contract mechanism for the specific context of international 
justice and the parties become representatives of peoples, rather than individuals or persons, 
who make choices about terms of cooperation that are "fair to peoples and not to individual 
persons."129 Individuals are not the relevant, moral players in the global setting since their 
126 C. Brown, supra note 61, at 180; O. O'Neill, "Justice and Boundaries" in C. Brown, ed., Po/itica/ 
Restructuring in Europe: Ethica/ Perspectives (London: Routh1edge, 1994) at 85. 
127 J. Carens, "Migration and Morta1ity: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective" in B. Barry & R.E. Goodin, 
eds., Free Movement (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) at 23; R. Forst, supra note 116. 
128 D. Harris, Justifying State Welfare: the New Right Versus the O/d Left (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 
1987) at 147; S. Caney, "Cosmopolitan Justice and Equalising Opportunities" (January 2001) 32:112 
Metaphi/osophy 113. 
129 J. Rawls, supra note 81, at 17. 
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distributive justice c1aims have already been taken into account at the domestic level, where 
justice principles are constructed independently from princip les of global justice.130 
For Rawls, peoples are self-contained societies, but are not necessarily liberal 
democratic societies. l3l This me ans that hierarchical societies can be considered as 
people (qualifying as well-ordered societies) for the application of the law of people, 
a notion which is problematic. 132 Rawls views peoples rather than states as the 
primary agents of justice at the international level. He argues that peoples differ 
from states in three fundamental respects: peoples do not have the right to go to war 
to further their interests, they must meet certain minimal standards in their internaI 
affairs, and they are fully prepared to grant the very same respect and credit to other 
peoples as equals. 133 However, his description of peoples is very similar to the 
definition one would give of states: 
Liberal peoples do, however, have their fundamental interests as 
permitted by their conceptions of right and justice. They seek to 
prote ct their territory, to ensure the security and safety of their 
citizens, and to preserve their free political institutions and the 
liberties and free culture of their civil society. 134 
The equality project supported by Rawls on the global scene is a political equality of 
just or decent people s, mainly structured as states, not an equality of persons as 
typified by cosmopolitanism. The main objective of Rawls' theory of international 
justice is to push societies to the point where it becomes possible for them to support 
just and decent institutions. The focus is not on the material comfort and well-being 
of persons individually, but more on achieving a world of peaceful and decent 
societies. In such a world, justice issues are not triggered by inequities between 
130 A Kupler, supra note 83. 
131 For interesting discussions on Rawls's international theory of justice, refer to: F. Teson, "The 
Rawlsian Theory ofInternational Law" (1995) Ethics and International AjJairs 79; T. Pogge, "An 
Egalitarian Law of Peoples" (Summer 1994) 23 Philosophy and Public AjJairs 21 ] ; D. Moellendorf, 
"Constructing the Law ofPeoples" (June] 996) Pacifie Philosophical Quarterly 77. 
132 We will not analyse the sc ope of Rawls' definition of people here, but for an interesting discussion 
on this aspect, refer to F.R. Teson, Ibid and A Kupler, supra note 83. 
I33 J. Rawls, supra note 81, at 25, 26 and 35. 
134 Ibid .at 29. 
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individuals who live in different reglOns of the world. 135 The international 
redistribution Rawls caUs for is not a consequence of the principles of cosmopolitan 
global distributive justice. It deals instead with the global institutional structure and 
with the political and economic effects it can have on states and on their ability to 
continue implementing their principles of national justice.136 It arises from an ideal 
conception of an international order that would be composed of distinct and 
independent, decent and autonomous domestic societies that cooperate on the basis of 
a similar conception of international justice, which would include a dut y of mutual 
aid. 137 In fact, Rawls argues for a simple dut y of assistance toward burdened societies 
in cases of extreme emergency and to help them develop their economy and reach the 
minimum requisite standard of internaI organisation for their basic development and 
satisfaction of their populations' interests. 138 Rawls refuses to transpose his domestic 
"difference principle" (any inequities should be to the greatest advantage of the least 
weU offpersons) at the globallevel as he considers it unacceptable for certain peoples 
to bear the burden of decisions made by other peoples. 139 
As clearly explained by Buchanan, Rawls likely adopted such international principles 
instead of principles of global distributive justice due to the lack of institutions and 
resources to implement the latter principles at the global level and the insufficient 
consensus on the nature of ideal principles of justice that exist among different 
peoples. 140 AIso, Rawls believes that most obstacles to a society's sustainable 
economic and social advancement involve its own internaI structure, culture, and 
tradition rather than its natural resource endowments or position in the international 
political economy.141 Such arguments require prioritisation of national citizenship 
and a focus on individual societies as opposed to individuals who live in the global 
135 C.R. Beitz, supra note. 87 
136 P. Drahos, supra note 124, c. 8 
137 C.R. Beitz, "Social and Cosmopolitanism Liberalism" (1999) 75:3 International Affairs 515; W. 
Hinsch, supra note 137. 
138 J. Rawls, supra note 81, at 76. 
139 J. Rawls, Ibid. at 118-120; T.W. Pogge, "Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice" (2002) 
1: 1 Politics, Philosophy and Economics 29; O. O'Neill, supra note 82; W. Hinsch, supra note 137. 
140 A. Buchanan, "Rawls's Law ofPeoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World", supra note 56. 
1411. Rawls, supra note 79, at 74-77 and 105. 
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international order. More importantly, they also caU for a limited dut y of assistance 
to burdened societies with a clear starting and cut-off point. 
1.2.2. Reasons for envisioning distributive justice on a global scale: 
a response 
Certainly, once we accept the case for a 
rights-based "welfare state ", we are, [. . .] 
morally constrained to go "beyond the 
welfare state" to respect the same rights to 
optimum need-satisfaction on a global 
scale. 142 
The opposition to cosmopolitanism demands a focus on the domestic level and 
refuses to consider the global order as a superior context for distributive justice. In 
this next section, the limited statist focus of justice issues will be critiqued and 
compared to a scheme in which the principles of distributive justice are based upon 
global cooperation, which may emerge from increasing international globalisation 
and interdependence. 
1.2.2.1. The limits of boundaries and the reality of the 
global order 
A cosmopolitan account of justice requires the recognition of the limits of the existing 
global order and its failure to consider every individual's interest. If we believe that 
each human being is entitled to equal consideration, the prevalence of such great 
poverty in the world must be considered problematic. Therefore, the assumption 
that international justice necessarily presupposes the existence of states-and is 
simply an additional topic to justice issues arising within isolated weU-ordered 
societies that are delimited by clear boundaries-overlooks the actual state of the 
142 L Doyal & l Gough, supra note 92, at 142 quoting G. Myrdal, Beyond Ihe Welfare Slale (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960). 
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world. Instead of recognising each pers on as a unit of moral concern, rights and 
privileges are granted to people according to their citizenship and where they are 
geographically located. Nevertheless, the actual international socio-political situation 
clearly shows that many states are not only very ineffective at protecting justice 
within their boundaries, but often are also very unsuccessful at securing it outside of 
their territory. Hence, states are not necessarily the only or best actors to protect 
justice; indeed, it would be inaccurate to de scribe the current international 
environment as various states united by voluntary mutual-assistance endeavours that 
are promptly undertaken. If each hum an being has a right to be free from the 
suffering and indignities of poverty, it is unacceptable to contain redistribution 
within nation-state boundaries, as such limited view threatens to leave many 
individuals from very po or societies in great deprivation. 143 
Our increasingly interdependent world is characterised by intense de-territorialisation, 
the spread of social relations across borders, 144 global capital and commodity 
markets,145 and the rising power of multinational companies and other non-state 
authorities. 146 Therefore, foreigners are people with whom we do more and more 
business and trade in various sectors and with whom we collaborate and are involved 
in different economic, political, and cultural levels and settings. An unambiguous 
division between the national and international sectors becomes impossible and the 
vision of states as privileged actors in the realisation of normative ideals is also 
untenable. It is thus increasingly difficult to argue that considerations of distributive 
justice should be confined to existing state boundaries without referring to the 
broader context of their close connections with other foreign agents. 147 In other 
words, if we consider distant strangers as very involved in our politico-economic 
reality, we should not be entitled to adopt a different standard and ignore their 
presence when establishing a framework of distributive justice. Consequently, 
overemphasis on the importance of state sovereignty in considering justice issues may 
143 C. Jones, supra note 78, c.7, at 173 et ss. 
144 W. Scheuerman, supra note 98. 
145 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" supra note 84, at 108. 
146 A. Woods, Hegel's Ethical Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) at 30. 
147 S. Scheffier, supra note 89. 
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obscure the reality of our interconnected and heterogonous world: "compatriots, 
intimates and kin, with whom we may share much, do not form an 'ideal' united 
community that pre-empts plurality and the need for justice.,,148 
As Kant has indicated, increasing international economic cooperation created, even 
200 years ago, a new basis for international morality.149 Indeed, the international 
picture is characterised by a basic global structure represented by various political 
and socio-economic rules and institutions involved in distributing burdens and 
benefits. This needs to be recognised in order to establish a theoretical framework 
for global distributive justice. The growing global disparity between rich and poor, 
increasing external control over domestic societies, and increasing global regulation 
and governance comprise a world that cannot be adequately restricted to the political 
theory of the nation-state. 150 States are active participants in this global structure, 
through the various international organisations and the states' respective influence 
over enforcement. As such, international organisations are responsible for the 
elaboration of various regional and international normative agreements, such as 
declarations and treaties on trade, human rights, and intellectual property and are 
at the centre of important collective initiatives, like international financial 
systems. Indeed, such organisations represent an important context for justice 
since their structural and normative characteristics influence the well-being of 
individuals and groups. 
The elements of this international order play a crucial role in modeling the ways 
in which burdens and benefits of the existing international cooperation scheme are 
distributed between countries and individuals. 151 There is an economic debate as to 
whether the international interdependence caused by globalisation has overall 
negative effects on the economic situation of the poor. Sorne have argued that 
148 O. O'Neill, "Justice and Boundaries" in C. Brown, ed., Political restructuring in Europe, Ethical 
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) 69, at 74-82. 
149 1 Kant, supra note 99, at 124-129. 
150 C.R. Beitz, supra note 87, at 518. 
151 For example, section 28 of the Universals Declaration of Human Rights states that: "everyone is 
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration 
can be fully realized. " 
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globalisation widens the revenue and welfare gap between rich and po or countries 
and individuals of the world and, consequently, that the living conditions of the poor 
have deteriorated. 152 Others believe that global economic integration and the 
openness to international trade contribute to better income distribution, which 
decreases poverty rates and global inequality.153 ln both cases, there seems to be 
agreement that globalisation could only improve such conditions if complemented by 
distinct institutional and policy reforms. Therefore, it seems that the distributional 
consequences arising from growing interdependence and justness of international 
social, political, and economic arrangements must be assessed morally by a 
distinct theory of justice. Indeed, as explained by Buchanan, 
[ ... ] because the workings of the global basic structure have 
such profound and enduring effects on individuals and 
groups-and because these effects are for the most part neither 
chosen nor consented to by those affected-the global basic 
structure is subject to assessment from the standpoint of 
justice. 154 
A theory of global distributive justice should be concerned with the basic 
organisation of international society-that is, the basic structure of political and 
economic power relations that influence the global distribution of burdens and 
benefits. While voluntary international transfer and assistance measures might be of 
sorne help in redressing certain inequities, as discussed above, they are theoretically 
152 J.E. Stigliz, Globalisation and ils Discontents (New York, W.W. Norton, 2002); M. Weisbroth, 
"Growth May Be Good for the Poor - But are IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth?" 
Centre for Economic and Policy Research, May Il, 200 l, online CEPR 
<http://www.cepr.netiglobalizationiGrowthMayBeGoodforthePoor.htm> (accessed June 4th, 
2006); C. R. Beitz, supra note 87; B. Ehrenreich & A. Russell Hochschild, Global Woman: Nannies, 
Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy (London: Granta Books, 2002) at 8; S. Anderson, J. 
Cavanagh & L. Thea, Field Guide to the Global Economy (New York: New Press, 2000). 
153D. Dollar, "The Poor Like G1obalization but Institutions and Policies are Needed to Deliver the 
Hoped for Results" (June 23, 2003) YaleGlobal, online: 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1934> (accessed June 4th 2006); D. Dollar & K. Aart, 
"Growth ls Good for the Poor", The World Bank Development Research Group, March 2000; M. 
Wolf, "Kicking Down Growth's Ladder: Protesters Against the Word Bank and the IMF are in Effect 
Seeking to Deny the Po or the Benefits ofa Liberal World Economy" (April 12,2000) Financial Times 
at 23; World Bank, "Global Poverty Down By HalfSince 1981 But Progress Uneven As Economic 
Growth Eludes Many Countries" News Release 2004/309/S, April 23 2004. 
154 A. Buchanan, Justice, supra note 25, c.2, at 76. 
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un justifiable, unreliable, and unsupportive in terms of sustainable change. 155 What is 
required globaUy is a direct application of justice principles to the basic structure of 
the global regime to assess the moral character of international institutions. 156 This 
implies that justice might best be served by recognising that important institutions 
regulating human action do not aU need to be territoriaUy delimited. 157 lndeed, 
sovereignty should not be concentrated only at one level and may be differently 
envisioned, for example, as associated with functional tasks and non-territorial 
spheres of interaction. 158 In his article "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" and his 
book "World Poverty and Human Rights," Thomas Pogge attempts to reconstruct the 
notion of sovereignty so that it may be compatible with a cosmopolitan vision and the 
existing global order. 159 He suggests a multi-Iayered institutional scheme in which 
govemment authority is "vertically dispersed" rather than concentrated almost 
completely within states 160 and where we find a number of political units governing 
individuals without hierarchy. This type of system would allow a shi ft from a 
domestic focus on justice to a global one, an essential step for moral 
cosmopolitanism. This is an interesting avenue for re-engineering the global political 
structure and it should be explored further. 
Together with the problems encountered by the application of strict concepts of 
sovereignty and territorial boundaries, another reason for envisioning justice at the 
global level is the lack of logical justification for adopting a double standard of 
justice. We discuss this next. 
155 For example, see C. Jones, supra note 78; S. Scheffler, supra note 89. 
156 c.R. Beitz, supra note 87; C. Jones, Ibid. 
157 O. O'Neill, supra note 148. 
158 Idem; A Kupler, supra note 83. 
159 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" supra note 84, at 61 et ss; T.W. Pogge, Wor/d 
Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopo/itan Responsibi/ities and Re/orms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2002), at 168-195. 
160 Ibid. at 58; A. Kupler, supra note 83. 
50 
1.2.2.2. The problern of a double standard of justice 
Many injustices and inequities arise from the existing global order. If we rely on 
theories like Rawls' approach to international justice, it is possible for unjust 
international conditions to be neglected as international society is not held to the same 
standards of justice as domestic societies. How can this be justified? How can we, at 
the same time, qualify the major national inequalities as injustices, yet find analogous 
inequalities morally acceptable in the global order? 
The previous section posited the existence of a basic global structure shaped by 
complex international economic, political, and cultural relationships. This constitutes 
a global context for cooperation, analogous to its domestic counterpart and 
characterised by institutional inequities and justice violations. Such considerations are 
not acknowledged at all by Rawls, who clearly endorses two separate and distinct 
standards of justice at the domestic and the global levels. For example, in Law of 
People, he assumes that people will negotiate international free trade agreements 
without inquiring as to the fairness of the background institutions involved in those 
transactions. However, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls specifically requests the 
presence of a fair domestic background organisation as a prior condition for 
individuals to reach just agreements. 161 
Another example of Rawls' application of different morality to the same reality can 
be found in his assessment of the distributional effects of a basic structure. At the 
national level, Rawls establishes that princip les of distributive justice are vital to 
redressing inequalities created by basic national structures. At the global level, where 
an analogous basic structure exists, Rawls' theory does not transpose the difference 
principle, as he caBs for a principle of charity in the form of an arbitrary dut y to help 
burdened societies build decent political and social regimes, rather than establishing 
similar enforceable principles of justice. 162 He justifies this position on the ground 
that it is unacceptable for people to bear the burden of decisions made by other 
161 A. Buchanan, "Rawls's Law ofPeoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World" supra note 56. 
162 Idem; J. Rawls, supra note 79, at 37. 
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people. 163 What he does not say is why it is different when one province, township, 
family, or person bears the burden of decisions made by another at the national 
level. 164 If we follow this reasoning, the imposition of a global economic order that 
generates great international inequality can be justified so long as the societies 
impoverished by this structure are charitably assisted to the extent of raising them 
above a certain minimum level. 165 
Rawls also argues that the great cultural differences between nations justify the 
different treatment of individuals from different nations and the establishment of 
domestic benchmarks of justice instead of global ones. 166 Even if different 
conceptions of domestic justice can lead to complex negotiations at the global level, 
sorne principles, such as equality in opportunities and democratic participation in the 
institutions of global governance, seem likely to receive a great deal of support from a 
majority of states. Furthermore, in practice, most countries' cultural and political 
traditions would likely not preclude preventive and curative genetic products and 
services from reaching their peoples. Indeed, in countries and communities where 
genetic testing and analysis are already used, there is evidence that they are widely 
accepted practices. 167 
163 J. Rawls, ibid. atlI8-120. 
164 T.W. Pogge, Realising Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) at 253-253; T.W. Pogge, "An 
Egalitarian Law of Peoples" (l994) 23 Philosophy and Public AjJairs 195, at 211-213; T.W. Pogge, 
"Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice" (2002) 1: 1 Politics, Philosophy and Economics 
29. 
165 T.W. Pogge, "Rawls on International Justice" (2001) 21 Philosophical Quarterly 246. 
166 J. Rawls, supra note 79, at 105. 
167 Indeed, as reported by Marshall and Koenig, it appears to be a common practice within sorne 
orthodox Jewish communities to use early preconception genetic testing to restrain partners' selection 
and marri age options. Another example can be observed in Cyprus, where broad prenatal testing for 
thalasemia is imposed and subsidized by the go vern ment and very weil accepted by the members of 
the Cypriot community. P. Marshall & B. Koenig, "Accounting for Culture in a GIobalized Bioethics" 
(Summer 2004) 32:2 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 252, at 256; S. Beck, "Genetic 
Transparency and Social Unpredictability: Remarks on a Genetic Screening Program in Cyprus" paper 
presented at the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics. Program in Genomics, Ethics, and Society, 
December 19,2000; A. Alwan & B. Modell, Community Control of Genetic and Congenital Disorders. 
EMRO Technical Publications Series 24, World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern 
Mediterranean, Cairo, 1997; I.e. Verma et al. "Genetic Counselling and Prenatal Diagnosis in India--
Experience at Sir Ganga Ram Hospital" (April 2003) 70:4 lndian J Pediatr 293; Guidelines for 
Control of Haemoglobin Disorders. Geneva, World Health Organization, 1994 
(WHOIHDP/HB/GL/94.1 ). 
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It is crucial to reiterate that the ability of a society to reach a higher stage of 
development and address national inequalities at different levels is not only a result of 
domestic economic and political factors, but is also a direct consequence of structures 
and events beyond its borders. 168 Indeed, a society's participation in global political 
and economic relations can wreak havoc at the domestic level, on its social, 
economic, and political situation. In fact, rather than representing voluntary mutual-
bene fit schemes, the basic global structure is characterised by unequal bargaining 
power, mainly driven by a few powerful state actors seeking to advance their own 
economic interests. 169 When economically advantageous for them, such powerful 
actors of the global economic order may recognise a corrupt or coercive government 
as the legitimate authority over a territory, or may do nothing while weak and 
powerless governments favour foreign interests over those of their own people. 170 
Thus, the more powerful actors dictate terms that appear inescapable to those who are 
incapable of changing them. This conduct clearly influences how benefits and 
burdens are distributed globally and domestically. The growmg global 
interconnectedness requires a critique of the faimess of the present global structure. If 
the global environment is one of justice, as argued here, domestic justice cannot take 
priority over global justice; both must be established in tandem. 171 
Applying lower moral standards to the basic global order involves arbitrary 
discrimination in favour of wealthy societies and against the global pOOr. I72 ln fact, 
168 A. Kuper, "Debate: Global Poverty Relied, More than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternative to the 
"Singer Solution" (2002) 16 (1) Ethics and International Affairs 107. 
169 This can be observed among the states participating in international trade negotiations under the 
auspices of the WTO: J. M. Finger and P. Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: 
The development challenge, 1999, World Bank,Geneva; C. Beitz, supra note 80, at 279-280; T. W. 
Pogge (2002) supra note 139. 
170 For example, many of the provisions of TRIPs, a document that has to be ratified by every member 
state of the World Trade Organization, retlect the views and demands of countries with powerful 
industrial lobbies for high levels of intellectual property protection. We will be coming back to this 
specific issue later in the dissertation. Also refer to: T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" 
supra note 84, at 108. 
171 H. Shue, "The Burden of Justice" (1983) 80 Journal of Philosophy 600, at 603; R. Frost, supra note 
116. 
172 Needless to say, the location of the world's valuable natural, wealth-creating resources is a matter 
of sheer luck. It therefore seems unfair that sorne people, because of a different control over resources, 
would prosper more and be less subject to discrimination than others. T. W. Pogge (2002) supra note 
139; C Jones, supra note 78, at 73. 
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such global oppression by certain countries on the rest of the world does not meet 
minimum domestic standards of justice. Thus, rich and powerful countries impose a 
global economic order under which millions die each year due to poverty, and in 
which the gap between the rich and poor continually increases. 173 Since this would 
not be acceptable domestically, it therefore gives rise to a double standard for which 
there is no reasonable justification. 
1.2.2.3 The place and role of States in the application of a 
theoretical framework of global distributive justice 
Who owes justice to whomever if is justice is owed? 
Notwithstanding our shift in emphasis with respect to the role of states in evaluating 
justice, the rationale for envisioning distributive justice globally still allows states the 
possibility to remain vital actors in such distribution. One of the crucial elements of 
the argument presented here is that equality between individuals should be 
considered the moral standard that would justify equitable access to genetic 
innovations when required. Can states have a role to play in this framework? What 
is a possible role for them within our cosmopolitan framework of global distributive 
justice? 
To understand cosmopolitanism, the difference between moral and political structures 
must be clearlY delineated. As demonstrated above, the main objective of our moral 
conception of justice is to attain sorne form of equality with regard to normal 
functioning and opportunity of every individual affected by institutional distributive 
arrangements. This does not mean that justice demands a total abrogation of 
sovereignty or the elimination of states. It instead requires an interpretation of 
sovereignty that does not constitute an arbitrary limit to the scope of justice. 174 
Cosmopolitanism does not propose a best institutional structure for doing 
international politics. Indeed, principles of justice can continue to impose obligations 
173 T. W. Pogge (2002) supra note 139. 
174 O. O'Neill, "Justice and Boundaries" in C. Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe, Ethical 
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) at 69. 
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for the satisfaction of individuals' rights on states and other institutional actors that 
may also be viewed as agents of international justice obligations. 175 Cosmopolitan 
justice does not rule out the importance of communities, as they may cultivate special 
bonds of sentiment, identity, and obligation among individuals. Thus, the fact that 
loyalties and connections are often associated with membership in a community is 
very important for sorne individuals and may still be taken into account under a 
cosmopolitan view of distributive justice. Special internaI responsibilities can be 
significant if they do not take our attention away from the people who stand outside 
of the special relationship.176 In this sense, a state-based world order may better serve 
human interests, with a perspective that includes everyone and can include special 
responsibilities for others' needs, insofar as the global theoretical basis of justice is 
acknowledged and respected. l77 
In attempts to draw connections between the moral aspects of cosmopolitanism and 
the political reality in which states are major actors, different propositions for more 
porous boundaries have been promulgated. For example, Charles Jones proposes 
qualified sovereigntism, in which states and organisations of states maintain elements 
oftheir authority and sovereignty, but higher powers may supersede such authority if 
it does not meet the requirements of cosmopolitanism. 178 Wilfried Hinsch, by 
contrast, presents an international order with more or less independent states, united 
by contracts and mutual agreements that are governed by principles of global 
distributive justice and which apply directly to citizens of the world rather than to 
states. 179 As mentioned above, another proposition cornes from Thomas Pogge, who 
suggests a form of vertical sovereignty in which govemmental functions and areas of 
competence would be reallocated by their division and distribution to various 
coordinated political units. A form of centralisation would thus be established, but 
m C.R. Beitz, supra note 55, at 271. 
176 C.R. Beitz, supra note lOI, c. 6 123, at 130-131; C Jones, supra note 78; S. Scheffler, "Liberalism, 
Nationalism, and Egalitarianism" in R. McKim & J. McMahan, eds., The Morality of Nationalism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); S. Scheftler "Relationships and Responsibilities" 
(Summer 1997) Philosophy and Public Affairs 26; A. Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots" 
(1997) Ethics 107. 
177 C.R. Beitz, supra note 80, at 285. 
178 C. Jones, supra note 78, c.8, at 225 et ss. 
179 Hinsh, "Global distributive Justice", supra note 97 
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this structure could, at the same time, lead to the scattering of political allegiances 
and loyalties over both the new and the traditional groupings such as neighbourhoods, 
towns, counties, provinces, states, regions, and the world at large. 180 
Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any contradiction in holding both that the 
ultimate moral focus for the analysis of international justice should be the interests of 
individuals and that justice development may take place within the basic structure of 
a decentralised order like the state system rather than a world government. As 
suggested by Andrew Kupler, normative cosmopolitan principles should consider 
"individuals to be the normative epicentre of a system of functionally plural 
sovereignty.,,181 
In our specific context of analysis, states remain very important actors. In fact, in the 
field of genetics, once products and services are available, further complex 
diagnostic testing steps will often be required to identify needs, genes, 
susceptibility to diseases, and to target treatment. This type of procedure will 
likely be undertaken at a population level, so states' health care representatives, in 
their role as the existing present authority, will be important players in the 
distribution and allocation of genetic benefits to individuals in need. Moreover, 
the significant involvement of the private sector in genetics, especially from 
multinational pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, calls for effective 
national intervention. In fact, the possibilities, in certain cases, for state to impose 
sorne sort of control over corporate conduct (for example, through price fixing, 
technology transfer, and corporate taxation policies) could have dramatic effects 
on the international distribution of the gains arising from genetic research. As such, 
states remain significant for our theoretical framework. Indeed, they would, at least 
in the actual world order, provide the agency required to perform obligations of 
international justice, whereas individuals, not just citizens, would represent the 
standard for consideration in determining how states ought to act. 
180 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty", supra note 84, at 99-108. 
181 A Kupler, supra note 83. 
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Conclusion 
To conclude, we have now set forth the methodology and context for the theoretical 
analysis undertaken in this thesis. As such, we made the argument for considering the 
global environment as the context of application for our framework of distributive 
justice. We analysed and adopted a cosmopolitan perspective that justifies the focus 
on individual human beings as the ultimate determinative basis, a standpoint 
particularly relevant for dealing with our specific issues of concem. Analysing sorne 
critiques of the global perspective on justice and refuting them with evidences on the 
limits of strict sovereignty and boundaries in today's rising global order have been 
very informative for us. Indeed, it gave us the perspective we needed to determine 
how institutions involved in the distribution of the benefits of genetic research should 
operate and on what scale distribution should be handled. 
We are now ready to approach our second chapter which presents a specific argument 
for global distribution in health and genetics by setting up a scheme of healthlhealth 
care justice at the globallevel. 
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Chapter II: An Argument for Global Distribution in Health 
Introduction 
What are the reasons for intervention in health (in the 
pro cess of accessing the good life)? 
After presenting sorne justification for our global contextual focus in the first chapter, 
the second chapter of this first theoretical part is dedicated to elaborating an ideal 
conception of distributive justice in health as a way to justify global access to 
genetics. Having established our global contextual focus for the application of 
distributive justice principles in health and genetic technology, we are now ready to 
analyse the specific reasons why genetic research benefits should be distributed and 
the normative basis for such a determination. This argument relies on the prernise that 
health is a basic and essential good and that any reasonable account of justice must 
address the distribution of health care, resources, and services in the global order. 
We will begin by presenting the rationale for a special treatrnent of health, referring 
to sorne unique characteristics of health and to the direct link existing between health, 
avoidance of harm, well-being, and range of opportunities. More specifically, this 
analysis will highlight the need for equitable access to genetic advancernents based 
on its potential for irnproving hurnan normal functioning and accessibility to normal 
range of opportunities. Then, we will ex tend our discussion to the global perspective 
on health required by our conception of cosrnopolitan justice as a way to propose 
sorne normative grounds for global distribution in health and genetic innovation. 
This thorough analysis will provide us with the needed rationalisation for an equal 
treatrnent of everyone's health, for using our global distributive justice framework to 
resolve health inequalities over which we can have sorne control, and for fostering 
equitable access to the benefits of genetics. 
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2.1 Conception of Healtb Justice 
Sorne have argued that the pursuit of health should be embedded in social justice' s 
broader quest to provide it with a stronger focus and a better understanding of the 
underlying social processes of health, and their fairness. 182 This view is based on 
the argument that social inequalities in health essentially find their source in the basic 
structure of social, political, and economic institutions, as weIl as from consequent 
inequalities in poverty, income, and opportunity.183 As demonstrated below, a theory 
of health justice remains linked in many ways to a more general all-purpose theory of 
justice. Nevertheless, health and, more specificaIly, genetics, raise unique issues that 
should be approached within a specifie sphere of justice. 
One very broad and idealised vision of health is "a state of complete physical, mental, 
and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.,,184 This 
definition is problematic in that it is so broad as to encompass many subjective 
conceptions of well-being and leads to a perfectionist conception of healthy human 
being. Like Daniels and Borse, we agree to define health as the absence of disease in 
a broad sense, which inc1udes disabilities, 185 loss of abilities due to trauma and 
environmental harms, as weIl as other functional deficits. 186 In that sense, disease 
means any deviation from the normal functional organisation of a typical member of 
182 F Peters & T Evans, "Ethical Dimensions of Health Equity" in T Evans et al., eds., Challenging 
Inequities in Health: From Ethics to Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 24-33; S. R. 
Benatar, A. S. Daar & P. Singer, "Global Health Ethics: The Rationale for Mutual Caring" (2003) 79:1 
International AjJairs 107, at 122; N. Kriege & A-E. Birn, "A Vision of Social Justice as the 
Foundation of Public Health: Commemorating 150 Years of the Spirit of 1848" (1998) 88: Il 
American Journal of Public Health 1603. 
183 O. O'Neill, "Justice Gender and International Boundaries" in: M.C.Nussbaum & A. Sen, eds, 
Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) 303, 315. 
184 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization. Adopted by the International 
Health Conference held in New York, 19 June-22 July 1946, and signed on 22 July 1946. Official 
Record ofWorld Health Organization 2, no. 100. 
185 Which, in Doyal and Gough's terms, mean the "consequent restriction or lack of ability to 
perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for human beings" L. 
Doyal and 1. Gough, supra note 92, at 172. 
186 N. Daniels, Just Health, Forthcoming, c. 2, at 12. 
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a species which comprises aIl impairment of functions. 187 Health therefore closely 
relates to normal functioning, a notion that will be analysed in greater details in the 
next subsection. 
Health is unlikely to ever be uniformly distributed among individuals. It can be 
influenced by various factors like individual biological variations, adequate nutrition, 
sanitary hygienic living and working conditions, chance, free and informed consent, 
and availability of preventive, curative, and rehabilitative medical resources and 
services. 188 Even if health and diseases are often thought to be beyond individual 
responsibility as the result of a natural lottery, namely environmental and socio-
economic factors, sorne argue that the determinants of health over which we have 
control should be taken into consideration for distribution. 189 This argument calls for 
the elimination of only random inequalities that are not subject to choice, and has 
been called the level playing-field ideal. 190 Advocates of such a vision, luck 
egalitarians, con si der responsibility to be at the centre of moral concems, arguing 
that distribution should apply only to things over which individuals lack control and 
that are unrelated to free and informed choices. This position is controversial and 
does not always present the full picture. Indeed, ostensibly voluntary health-related 
behaviours are often driven by other socio-economic factors over which people 
frequently lack control. In fact, studies show that detrimental health habits do not 
187 N. Daniels, "Health Care Needs and Distributive Justice" (1981) 10 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 146; N. Daniels, "Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities?" (Autumn 1990) 50 
(supplement) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 273, at 280; C. Boorse, "Health as a 
Theoretical Concept" (1977) 44 Philosophy of Science 542; C. Boorse, "On the Distinction between 
Disease and Illness" (Fall 1975) 5:1 Philosophy & Public Affairs 49. 
188 N. Daniels, Justice and Justification Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) c. 9, at 179. 
189 L. M. Fleck, supra note 71; D. Wikler, "Personal and Social Responsibility for Health" (2002) 16:2 
Ethics and International Affairs 47. 
190 J. Roemer, Equality of Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); R. Ameson, 
"Equality and Equality of Opportunity for Welfare" in L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland, eds., Equality: 
Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); E. Rakowski, Equal Justice (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991); R. Ameson, "Equality of Opportunity" The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2002 Edition), E.N. Zalta, ed., online: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/eguaI-opportunity> (accessed: May 30th, 2006). 
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necessarily always arise from free and informed will, but are often foreseeable results 
of poverty in childhood and beyond. 191 
This is why, even if personal responsibility for health and genetic characteristics can, 
in certain cases, be an interesting and complex argument, we will leave it out of our 
moral focus for the purposes of this dissertation. Indeed, we argue for health equity as 
a way to achieve equality in opportunities, regardless of the cause of disease and how 
responsibly ill individuals can handle available opportunities. Our vision of the 
international and national orders is more compatible with a system of cooperation that 
guarantees, in certain crucial areas, a "saJety net thraugh which even the imprudents 
are ne ver Jarced ta Jal!." 192 This secures a range of basis needs which allows 
individuals to function in a community and choose from available opportunities. 
It has been suggested that health inequalities may be considered inequities when they 
are unavoidable, unnecessary, and unfair. 193 Social inequalities in health can be 
perceived as a responsive indicator of the fairness of the basic social order. 
Unavoidable individual health variations rooted in biological differences could be 
seen as acceptable if they were indiscriminately spread between social and 
geographical groupings and had nothing to do with education, income, or economic 
factors. 194 However, this is clearly not the case. Wealth and health disparities are 
constantly expanding within and between nations, both in terms of access to health 
care for individuals and of development and availability of adequate and population-
specific treatments. 195 Health differences among individuals within different 
populations of the world are great and are often related to socio-economic factors 
such as income and education levels, the gap between rich and poor, public health 
measures, and access to health care and technologies. Since health is not a good that 
191 J.W. Lynch, G.A. CapIan & J.T. Salonen, "Why Do Poor People Behave Po orly? Variation of Adult 
Health Behaviours and Characteristics by Stages of the Socioeconomic Life course" (1997) 44:6 Social 
Science and Medicine 809. 
192 E. Anderson, "What is the Point of Equality?" (Jan. 1999) 109:2 Ethics 287, at 325. 
193 G. Dahlgren & M. Whitehead, Po/icies and Strategies to Promote Social Equality in Health 
(Stockholm: lnstitute of Future Studies, 1991). 
194 F. Peter & T. Evans, "Ethical Dimensions of Health Equity", supra note 182, at 28. 
195 J. Sach, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibi/ities for Our Time (New York : Penguin 
Press, 2005) 
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can be directly transferred or allocated by distributive measures, the normative 
framework here will focus on the factors that have a direct influence on individual 
health inequalities.196 
In the introductory part of this dissertation, we demonstrated how human genetic 
research is a very promising field for improving health globally. Many new products, 
including vaccines and drugs for common diseases, may eventually be based on 
genetic research. The human genome undeniably offers exceptional opportunities for 
understanding mechanisms of disease and developing new drugs and vaccines. 
Indeed, it is believed by sorne that advances in genomics and genome-related 
biotechnology could, if applied correctly197, instigate important changes in the field of 
medicine and health care in the near future. 198 However, new technology and health 
care innovations are simply beyond the financial reach of much of the world's 
population and could end up benefiting only a privileged minority, thereby increasing 
inequities in global health, as has been the experience thus far with certain drugs and 
vaccmes. 
Furthermore, in the field of genetics, the limits of what is unavoidable are unclear. 
Enduring biological/genetic characteristics can be directly caused by socio-economic 
factors. In fact, it would be unfair to acknowledge that individual members of a 
population are affected with unavoidable biological differences and diseases when the 
technology to prevent or cure those genetic predispositions and conditions exists, but 
196 D. M. Hausman, Y. Asada & T. Hedemann, "Health Inequalities and Why They Matter" (2002) 10 
Health Care Analysis 177; S. R. Benatar, A. S. Daar & P. Singer, supra note 182. 
197 Many fear that genetics could also give rise to rampant abuses, like eugenics, and undesirable 
perspectives, like genetic determinism. Because of the many possible excesses and serious 
consequences they can have, a strict normative tramework is needed to regulate genetic research and 
applications. These fascinating issues are not addressed in this dissertation as we are starting trom the 
premise that the benefits arising trom genetics and relevant for global health will be the result of good 
quality scientific research undertaken and applied in strict compliance with appropriate legal and 
ethical princip les. 
198 As we have seen earlier, sorne, on the other hand, consider that this is an overstatement and that 
excess of optimism towards genetics should be moderated. For our part, we decided to focus on the 
positive impact that genetics is likely to have on global health in the future. For arguments in favor of 
this position, see: P. A.Singer & A. S. Daar, "Hamessing Genomics and Biotechnology to Improve 
Global Health Equity" (October 5, 2001) 294 Science 87; S. R. Benatar, A. S. Daar & P. Singer, supra 
note 182. For arguments calling for moderate enthusiasm, see: T.M. Bubela & T. Caulfield, supra note 
36 L. 8. Andrews, supra note 36. 
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is neither available nor affordable. Genetics is one field in which it has become vital 
to develop measures that will acknowledge the inequalities existing between 
individuals living in different countries of the world in terms of access and 
availability of the technology, undertake efforts to reduce them, and build safeguards 
for investment and research. To justify such distributive actions, we argue for a form 
of egalitarianism that asks for equal treatment of every individual in terms of bringing 
them to a level of normal functioning. In this framework, genetic benefits that can 
play a role in normal functioning should therefore be developed and made available 
to every individual in need, in line with a cosmopolitan vision insisting on equal 
consideration of individuals in the pursuit of global health. 
2.1.1 Importance of health for avoiding serions harm/cruciallink 
with normal fnnctioning 
The elaboration of this framework for global distribution in health reqmres an 
examination of the rationale for the special treatment of health. In his Discourses on 
Method, Descartes wrote that the preservation of health was no doubt the chief of aB 
goods and the foundation of aB other goods of life. 199 The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), adopted at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 
September 2000, caB for dramatic improvements in the health of the poor. Indeed, 
health is central to the MDGs: three of the eight objectives, eight of the eighteen 
targets, and eighteen of the forty-eight indicators are health-related.2oo Furthermore, 
in a recent global consultation undertaken by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
people around the world consistently indicated that good health was what they most 
desired201 Health's unique importance is acknowledged by many societies through 
199 R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, L. Latleur, trans., (New York: Macmillan, 1960) at 85. 
200 UN General Assembly Resolution, United Nations Millennium Declaration, September 2000, 
A/RES/55/2, online: UN <http://www.un.org/millennium/decIaration/ares552e.pdi> (date accessed: 
May 30th, 2006); 
Executive Board Members, Millennium Development Goals and Health Targets, 
EBlRetreatl03/Discussion Paper 1, November 11,2003, online: UN 
<http://www.who.int/gb/ebmr/PDF/E/Millenium%20development%20goals%20and%20health%20tar 
gets.pdi> (date accessed May 30th, 2006). 
201 Commission on Macroeconomies and Health, Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for 
Economic Development, Dec. 2001, at 21, online on the WHO website: 
63 
special institutions and systems that ensure a more equitable distribution of health-
related goods in comparison with other goodS.202 
Before saying more on the importance of health as a basic need, it is crucial to place 
it in a broader context where the avoidance of harm is the primary goal. In this 
context, the satisfaction of basic needs is an essential precondition to ensuring that 
serious harm is avoided. To qualify as serious harm, something has to prevent the 
pursuit of important individual goals. In Doyal' s words, serious harm can be defined 
as "the fundamental and sustained impairment of social participation and of 
basic needs for physical health and autonomy [ ... ] which block new 
achievements which would otherwise have been real possibilities for the 
individual concerned." 203 In this section, we argue that when serious health 
impairments can be avoided or prevented with existing products and services like, for 
example, vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic tests, refusing or neglecting to provide them 
to individuals in need, wherever they are, is equivalent to inflicting serious harm. 
Health needs sometimes vary between countries and geographical regions of the 
world because of environmental, nutritional, housing, and other socio-economic 
factors (as opposed to natural misfortune) and because the perception of health and 
illness can differ from one culture to another. In that way, therapeutic and preventive 
measures necessary to meet health needs can vary.204 However, health as a basic 
human need can nevertheless be viewed as having a unique univers al and objective 
significance.205 In fact, as mentioned above, humans share similar genetic makeup 
and are physiologically alike although minor genetic variations can also entai 1 
important differences between individuals which may require specific medical 
attention. This makes us aIl vulnerable to disease and health problems to different 
<http://www3 . wh o. int/whos i si cmhl cmh report/report.cfm ?path=cmh.cmh report&lan guage=en glish> 
(accessed, May 30th, 2006); M. Johri & C. Barry, "Health and Global Justice" (2002) 16:2 Health 
and International AjJairs 33. 
202 N. Daniels, supra note 188~ 
203 L. Doyal & 1. Gough, supra note 92, at 50-51. 
204 K. Lederer, Human Needs (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1980). 
205 That is why health is enshrined as basic human right in internationallaw, for example in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, art.25 and in the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, art. 12. 
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degrees, but because of the common characteristics we share with other human 
beings, we can say that "universal and objective human needs do exist.,,206 In 
others words, even if each individual' s unique genetic makeup might influence his 
precise health condition and his response to treatment in certain cases, in most cases, 
existing preventive and therapeutic methods will have similar effects on sick 
individuals and different degrees of health and disease will have comparable 
significance for almost everyone, anywhere. 207 As explained by Acharya, 
"[ e ]mpirically we are not likely to observe dramatic differences in the assessment of 
health in terms of what can be achieved with particular physical conditions across 
cultures.,,208 The objectivity of health-needs satisfiers can be demonstrated in genetic 
applications, with reliable diagnostic tests, for example; they could prove to be 
univers aIl y appropriate to test for the presence of a specific disease gene in 
susceptible populations anywhere. Another example of universality in health relates 
to physical pain, which, at a certain level, is objectively considered by almost 
everyone as something negative to be avoided. 
Therefore, there seems to be a strong moral objection to the prevalence of different 
standards for health between different populations, particularly when these 
differences arise from socio-economic factors. As a result, sorne argue for universal 
agreement on sorne principles of justice and specific egalitarianism in the distribution 
of basic and universally important goods and services like those related to health. 
Basic needs like health care, food, water and shelter, aIl directly related to health, 
should therefore be regulated by special standards of egalitarian justice, different 
from those used to regulate the distribution of income and wealth. 209 Indeed, 
206 L. Doyal & I. Gough, supra note 92, at 2. 
207 There are sorne exceptions to this, as ifwe take, for example, sorne physically impaired people who 
leam to develop amazing artistic skills and sensitivity, and for whom being iII probably does not have 
the same meaning and negative effects that it would have for a majority of people. 
208 A. K. Acharya, supra note 5, at 74. 
209 It is important to mention here that since we are establishing an ideal theory of justice, we can 
consider ail ofthose needs as universally basic and crucial. However, when we transpose this at the 
intermediate level ofthe non-ideal world, the lack ofresources requires rationing the different basic 
needs like health, subsistence, education, etc. Fried cIearly explains this dilemma and argues that 
focusing only on health care needs-satisfaction would prevent societies from pursuing other crucial 
social goals in C. Fried, Rights and Wrongs, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) c. 5; see 
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following this position, inequalities in health should be repaired without taking 
individuals' ability to pay for health care and services into consideration.210 
But how and why is health a special good with an intrinsic value? Health is viewed 
as essential because it has a direct affect on every individual's normal functioning. 
"Normal functioning" is a very broad concept and it is somewhat challenging to try to 
establish precise criteria for it. We cannot use this notion as a basis for global 
distribution if we consider it a subjective concept, adjustable to individuals' personal 
circumstances and variable depending on each individual's perception. For the 
purposes of this framework, we need a narrow standard of normal functioning, 
abstracted from personal choices and preferences. Aiming to define normal human 
functioning, Anderson says that: 
[t]o be able of functioning as a human being requires effective access 
to the means of sustaining one's biological existence, food, shelter, 
clothing, medical care and access to the basic conditions of human 
agency, knowledge of one's circumstances and options, the ability to 
deliberate about means and ends, the psychological conditions of 
autonomy including the self confidence to think and judge for oneself, 
freedom ofthought and movement.211 
As it appears from this quote and as clearly explained by Daniels in his forthcoming 
book,212 a thorough analysis of the concept of normal functioning requires that we 
look through a broader lens, not just referring to biomedical determinants but also 
also AJ.Culyer & A. Wagstaff, "Equity and Equality in Health and Health Care" (1993) 12 Journal of 
Health Economics 431; D. Braybrooke, Studies in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968). 
210 However, again, in front of the limited resources available in the non-ideal world, rationing within 
the broad field of health is also unavoidable. Although it is not the focus of this dissertation, we will 
come back to how distribution of genetics' benefits could be undertaken to respect, as much as 
possible, our ideals of justice under section 2.3.2.4. ofthis chapter. J. Tobin, "On Limiting the Domain 
of Inequality" (1970) 13:2 The Journal of Law and Economics 263; S. Marchand, D. Wikler & B. 
Landesman, "Class, Health and Justice" (1998) 76:3 Milkbank Quarterly 449; on rationing criteria in 
health: R. Plant & N. Barry, Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher's Britain: Two Views (London: IEA 
Health and Welfare Unit, 1992) at 27-30; T.W. Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Comell University 
Press, 1989) at 178-188; J. Sabin & N. Daniels, Setting Limits F airly: Can We Learn to Share Medical 
Resources? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); N. Daniels & J. Sabin, "Limits to Health Care: 
Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers" (1997) 26:4 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 303. 
211 E. Anderson, supra note 192, at 317. 
212 N. Daniels, supra note 186. 
66 
interpreting it in the context of the different social, environmental, and genetic 
determinants of health distribution. However, for the needs of this dissertation, we 
focus primarily on a form of egalitarianism that links biomedical and genetic 
resources with human beings' normal functioning to justify global distributive justice 
principles. 
Being totally objective in defining normal functioning appears very difficult. In fact, 
as clearly explained by Boorse, values inevitably get involved when deciding which 
diseases impede normal function the most and therefore require more care and 
resources. There are many criteria that can be used to assess the priority of health care 
measures in pursuit of normal functioning as, for example, a treatment' s potential for 
pain alleviation or death postponement. Our objective measure of individuals' normal 
functioning is directly related to the decent range of opportunities that are actually 
available to them. We argue that individuals should have access to the genetic 
products and services they objectively need to get to a level of normal functioning, 
which will allow them to take advantage of a decent range of opportunity (a concept 
to be analysed further in the next subsection). 
Hence, health directly contributes to a person's basic ability to function in society, to 
interact in meaningful ways with other agents, and to live a life in which the pursuit 
of significant objectives and projects can occupy an important place.213 Good health 
enables people to become educated, work, be productive, earn a salary, pursue 
personal and familial goals, and gain a certain degree of economic security, when 
possible in a given economic context. As indicated by Amartya Sen, health and 
education are constituents of development and are among the basic capabilities that 
give value to human life. 214 As it is not rare to see life plans compromised or 
considerably reduced by disease and poor health, good health is considered 
essential to a good life, one that is somewhat adequate in length and activity.215 
Good population health is also very important for poverty reduction and sustainable 
213 S. Anand, supra note 73. 
214 A. Sen, Deve/opment as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999) Introduction and c. 1. 
215 L. M., supra note 70; A. K. Acharya, supra note 5, at 73. 
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econOIlllc development, as societies affected by senous disease also expenence 
considerable economic struggles and obstacles. 216 Therefore, since health can be 
characterised as a condition for normal species functioning,217 it can be considered 
an objective need rather than a subjective preference or desire. 
With respect to distributive justice, therefore, an objective criterion for health 
requires a standard independent from an individual's own evaluation, which might 
otherwise be representative of desires and preferences.218 As such, ifwe consider that 
health is an objective need, vital to normal functioning, we could argue that many 
existing and future genetic technologies are equally necessary. Indeed, if genetics 
lives up to its great potential and proves useful in overcoming many serious and 
life-threatening health problems, those without access to genetic services and 
technologies might be denied health benefits crucial for normal functioning. In 
fact, without access to genetic testing and screening technologies, individuals in 
deprived populations could lack the ability to prevent, cure, or reduce the severity 
of their conditions. Therefore, the more scientific developments in genetics lead to 
genetic testing and therapies for global health improvement, 219 the more 
disparities between the health condition of individuals with and without access to 
such technology will increase. 220 This will also likely create differences in the 
range of opportunities effectively available to individuals from those different 
groups. 
216 Commission on Macroeconomies and Health"supra note 201 at 22 & table 5 at 23. 
217 D. Braybrooke, Let Needs Diminish the Preferences May Prosper in Studies in Moral Philosophy, 
American Philosophy Quarterly Monograph Series, NO.l (Oxford: BlackweIls, 1968) at 90. 
218 N. Daniels, supra note 188, c. 9 (health-care needs and distributive justice) at 179. 
219 As it is planned in this report, which presents 4 top genetic biotechnologies that could improve 
health in developing countries: Program in Applied Ethics and Biotechnology and Canadian Program 
on Genomics and Global Health (University of Toronto Joint Center for Bioethics) supra note 25. 
220 M.J. Mehlman & J.R. Botkin, Access to the Genome: The Challenge to Equality (Washington D.C: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998). 
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2.1.2. Avoidance of harm and normal functioning: crucial aspects 
of equality of opportunities 
Having established that health is a central aspect of nonnal functioning, the argument 
now shifts to the role of wellness and nonnal functioning in the lives of individuals as 
a basis for distributive justice in health. The equality of fair opportunity has been 
popularised in Rawls' theory of justice as one of the main three principles, 
specifically that of "justice as fairness.,,221 In short, it requires that persons with 
similar skills, talents, and ambitions have equal access to equivalent professional 
positions.222 This concept does not require that opportunities be equal for aIl persons. 
In fact, unequal talents and skills among individuals are supposed to be covered by 
the application of the difference principle (inequalities have to be most advantageous 
to the least weIl-off). Rawls' theory of justice assumes a completely healthy 
population. It is therefore not designed to deal specifically with issues of health 
inequalities and health care distribution, and sets as ide individual differences 
resulting from disease.223 Rawls only requires a fair distribution of basic liberties, 
opportunities, and economic resources. One's health, positive freedom, and actual 
capacity to convert such factors into nonnal functioning and well-being (professional 
advantages, well-being, wealth, etc.) do not figure directly into his view.224 It can be 
understood as setting up the justice framework for regulating distribution of key 
health detenninants that are subject to social control, such as the structure of social 
organisation, government policies, wealth distribution, income inequality, poverty, 
and so on. Sorne also argue for the application of Rawls' difference principle to 
221 Indeed, Rawls argues that rational individuals who would not know their position in a society 
would desire, after ensuring equal distribution ofbasic liberties, that two basic principles govem 
distribution in their institutions: equality of opportunity (professional) and the difference principle (that 
ail inequalities in the remaining social goods be to the greatest advantage of the least weil-off). J. 
Rawls, supra note 75; J.Rawls, supra note 61, at 63, 72-73; J. Rawls, supra note 79, at 115. 
222 N. Daniels, B. Kennedy & 1. Kawachi, "Justice is Good for Our Health: How Greater Economic 
Equality would Promote Public Health" (February/March 2000) 25 Boston Review, online:Boston 
Review <http://www.bostonreview.net/BR25.lIdaniels.html> (accessed May 30th, 2006). 
223 Ibid. 
224 He has been criticized on this point by Amartya Sen, who argues that Rawls' focus obscures the 
difference between sick and healthy individuals in terms of capability offunctioning. For more details 
refer to: A. Sen, The Standard of Living, The Tanner Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987); A. Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (New York: Elvier Science Pub., 1985); A. Sen, 
supra note 214. 
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health concems, which would require granting priority to the least-favoured groups in 
society with respect to health matters and to improve the health of the poorest in 
society in order to justify health inequalities.225 
However, the pursuit of the kind of distributive justice promulgated here requires a 
system of distribution that meets health needs fairly at the "point of delivery.,,226 This 
vision is that of Norman Daniels, who extends the theory and notion of equality of 
opportunity to coyer health care and adapt it to the reality of disease and disability.227 
He believes that health care should be something to which we should have equal 
access in order to improve our health status and attain a level of normal functioning 
that allows access to a normal range of opportunities in other spheres of activities; or, 
in other words, to become efficient "converters of primary goodS.,,228 For Daniels, 
opportunity not only refers to the professional area but should also be considered as 
the portion of an individual' s autonomy and liberty available for the achievement of 
various goals and undertakings, plans of life, and conceptions of the good.229 In fact, 
when we argue for the moral equality of individuals, it means that we believe that 
everyone should have equal prospects to plan for a good life, should be entitled to 
participate and take part in their community's life and develop their individuality,230 
and that disparities in possibilities over which we have control should be eradicated. 
Many extemal factors like lack ofwater and food, severe poverty, political and socio-
economic instability, and lack of access to health care goods and services can 
influence opportunities. Taking the example of health, if people with equal skills, 
talents, and ambitions are entitled to fair, equal opportunities and yet different 
degrees of access to health-care technologies and resources are tolerated, sorne 
individuals will accordingly lack the same advantages with respect to those 
225 S. Marchand, Daniel Wilker & B. Landesman, supra note 210. 
226 N. Daniels, B. Kennedy & 1. Kawachi, supra note 222. 
227 N. Daniels, Just Health Care (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) at 36-48; N. Daniels, 
supra note 188. 
228 N. Daniels (1990), supra note 187, at 279. 
229 N. Daniels (1990), supra note 187; see also A. Sen, The Standard of Living, supra note 224. 
230 L. Doyal and 1. Gough, supra note 92, at 91. 
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opportunities, SlllCe disease can considerably diminish one's capacity to take 
advantage of available opportunities.231 
Even if health problems will not always impact negatively on individuals' goals, 
projects, and level of happiness, it appears that individuals must possess a certain 
degree of physical health to participate in life, and accomplish projects in a cultural, 
personal, or professional context. They therefore ought to have an equal chance to 
obtain health care/genetic technologies and services to attain a level of objective 
normal functioning that will then allow them to profit from a decent range of 
opportunities, given their skills and talents. Indeed, even when societies establish 
measures to help and include people with disabilities, serious health impairments can 
still mean major limits on the range of opportunities that would otherwise have been 
available to someone with particular talents and skills.232 Daniels' view follows from 
Rawls' theory of justice but does not depend upon it. Instead, Daniels adopts a 
notion of opportunity that is far broader than Rawls'. Rawls is interested only in 
access to professional positions and careers. Daniels goes one step further and 
associates the right to health care resources with the personal and social factors 
required for a good life.233 
ln the context of this analysis, the expreSSIOn health care includes genetic 
technologies, tests, drugs, vaccines, and services available for preventing diseases and 
providing early diagnosis and treatments to improve the health status of individuals 
affected with specific diseases. Health care can have many functions for sick 
individuals, such as improving life expectancy, decreasing pain and suffering 
associated with their conditions, and providing tools for the prevention and treatment 
of diseases. In other words, "it maintains, restores or compensates for the loss of 
231 N. Daniels (1990), supra note 187. 
232 A. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) c.7. 
233 Idem; L.M. F1eck, "Just Health Care (Il): Is Equality Too Much?" (1989) 1 0 Theoretical Medicine 
301. 
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functioning that is normal for a member of our species.,,234 If our vision of justice 
requires the protection of fair equality of opportunity in health, it follows that every 
individual should have a fairly equal opportunity to access health care resources, 
technologies, and services that would allow for normal species-typical functioning, a 
central element required for equal prospects for a good life.235 Therefore, health care 
should be distributed on a more equal basis rather than according to an individual' s 
motivation and ability to pay. 
Unlike preferences, tastes or desires, health relates to objective needs, the fulfillment 
of which allow an individual to access a normal opportunity range, to build up life 
plans for which he is suited, to establish relationships with others, and to develop 
different interests. As such, the crucial difference between treatment and 
enhancement in genetics is important. In referring to equality of opportunity in the 
framework of justice required for this thesis, it is not intended that genetic research 
should bring everyone to the same wellness and happiness level since medicine does 
not exist to make everyone happy and equal in terms of their skills and talents. 
Instead, it means equality in terms of access to genetic services and technologies that 
can be used for treatment of those who have an objective medical need, or in other 
words access to what is needed to attain normal functioning as an objective measure 
of health. This way, genetic technologies and services can be employed to bring 
individuals as close to the normality level (being healthy) as possible by removing 
obstacles in the way of access to a normal opportunity range. 236 One example of 
genetic intervention that has been proposed to ensure fair access to a normal 
opportunity range is germ-line and somatic genetic engineering in embryos to correct 
serious genetic defects before birth. 237 Notwithstanding the numerous ethical and 
234 N. Daniels, "The Genome Project: Individual Differences and Just Health Care" in: T.F. Murphy & 
Marc A. Lappé, eds., Justice and the Human Genome Project (California: University of California 
Press, 1994) c. 7, at 110. 
235 Abstracting from individuals' subjective idea of what should be their normal opportunities in terms 
of Iife plans, careers, etc. N. Daniels, supra note 186. 
236 N. Daniels (1981), supra note 188; M. Leonard, supra note 677. 
237 M. Leonard, ibid. at 133. 
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scientific problems that could arise with this technology,238 it may have considerable 
potential for the protection of fair equality of opportunities in our global structure if 
made available to everyone in cases where there is absolutely no doubt that the 
defective genetic makeup would lead to serious disease. 
To conclude this section, in order to support the foundation for a specific theoretical 
framework for global distributive justice in health and, more specifically, in genetics, 
it has been established that health, as a vital element for normal functioning, greatly 
influences the range of normal opportunities available to individuals. Indeed, the 
impairment of normal species functioning reduces the range of opportunity in which 
we may construct our life plans. Therefore, the needs associated with normal species 
functioning can be qualified as objectively important since they correspond to the 
great interest people have in maintaining a normal range of opportunities. Attaining 
normal functioning to be in a position to bene fit from equality of opportunity is thus 
crucial and is supposed to be protected against interferences from persisting 
inequalities. Having presented the reasons why health warrants special treatment, we 
now need to expand our discussion to the global aspect of health, in accordance with 
the concept of cosmopolitan justice supported in this dissertation. 
2.1.3. Global perspective on health 
The argument presented above in regards to equality of opportunity and its 
application to health had originally been developed to apply only to citizens of a 
given society. As such, it depended on the idea that opportunities available to 
individuals are unique to a given society since they depend on specific characteristics 
ofthat society, su ch as its level ofmaterial wealth, its economic and technological 
development, its cultural particularities, its conception and shared understanding 
of justice, its administrative and institutional structures and regulations, and so 
238 Arising problems cou Id, for example, be related to the fact that the technology is not at alI yet safe 
and usable, that it would be extremely expensive (read impossible) to make it available to everyone, 
that it could lead to eugenic applications, etc. 
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on.239 Therefore, it is argued that the same disease in two different societies will 
likely reduce opportunities in different ways, with the result that their significance 
would be differently assessed. 
However, to support the argument that equality of opportunity should prevail within 
states but not at a global level would be to attribute certain rights to members of a 
society while denying them to others who are not part of a national system of 
cooperation. As discussed at length in the previous chapter, we do not agree with 
such view that prioritise a domestic conception of distributive justice where states are 
the primary agents of justice and where members of a political community are 
entitled to special rights by virtue only of their membership in this society,z40 This 
argument provides a good basis for domestic equality of opportunities, but how does 
it justify rejecting a similar concept at the global level? Those in favour of a 
domestic application of this principle to health often argue that the major financial 
contribution of societies' members to support their health system (programs, 
services, therapeutic products, etc.) justifies limiting equality of opportunity to the 
national level. However, potential holders of a right to equality of opportunities 
within a society have not necessarily begun to participate in the system of mutual 
cooperation. In fact, like non-citizens, children and teenagers often did not engage 
in the economic system that allowed the creation of the goods and services that 
would be subject to equality of opportunities.241 Moreover, if the enforcement of 
domestic equality of opportunity would oppose situations where people have fewer 
prospects due to their c1ass or income, it would seem to follow that analogous 
situations in which people have fewer prospects according to their nationality, 
citizenship, or geographic location should also be opposed.242 
23~. Daniels (1981), supra note 188; N. Daniel, supra note 187, at 33; M. Walzer, supra note 79. 
240 D. Harris, supra note 128, at 56-57,86, 103-104; M. Walzer, ibid, at 314. 
241 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty", supra note 84. 
242 S. Caney, supra note 128; S. Anand, supra note 73. 
74 
The cosmopolitan perspective of justice proposed in the first chapter is very relevant 
in the health sector, where different societies interact within a rich global structure of 
political and economic institutions that considerably affect health prospects for 
everyone. Therefore, the moral reasons to take responsibility for non-citizens' health 
problems caused by the global economic order are of similar importance when 
compared to co-citizens' health problems resulting from the domestic economic 
order.243 This argument derives from the principle defended in the first chapter, that 
individuals, wherever they are, should be the most important standard of concem in 
establishing basic principles of justice. Therefore, it follows that we should not 
determine the significance of disease and lost opportunities on a society-based model. 
This application of the cosmopolitain perspective to global health and justice is one 
important contribution of this dissertation. 
The normal opportunity range can vary between countries in terms of the nature of 
the actual opportunities, which include the types of careers available, the most 
rewarded physical and intellectuai talents and skills, and the nature of possible 
undertakings and life plans in a given environment. Consequently, sorne, like Daniels, 
argue that since different societies calI for different health care measures, the normal 
opportunity spectrum is relative to each society.244 However, like the ability to 
function normalIy, the general types of opportunities to pursue life and career 
undertakings, to use sorne form of language and basic social ability, or to engage in 
sorne form oflabour, should be the same for everyone regardless oftheir nation, state, 
or ethnic group.245 The evaluation of the range of opportunities at the globallevel, as 
at the national level, may be generalised from an examination of the variety of 
possible prospects and from a subjective perspective regarding such opportunities. As 
Martha Nussbaum indicates, certain objectively important needs, like health, are 
valued by everyone since they relate to universally shared priorities. This can allow 
243 Refer to Pogge's interesting discussion on this point: T.W. Pogge, Justice in Health Care: 
Reflexions on the Foundations of Health Equity, Working Paper Series, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
Center for Population and Development Studies, 1999. 
244 N. Daniels, supra note 187. 
245 H Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) at 59-60, 159 et ss; L. Doyal & 1. Gough, supra note 92, at 181. 
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the creation of an international standard for evaluating opportunities on a global 
scale. 246 Consequently, the rationale for accepting the princip le of equality of 
opportunity within the state also requires that we endorse a principle of global 
equality of opportunity, the whole of which contributes to the framework for global 
distributive justice. Indeed, the goal of global equality of opportunity in health is 
becoming increasingly essential, especially in light of the critical health problems 
affecting individuals who live in poorer countries where genetic technologies and 
services may not be adapted, available, or affordable. This leaves millions of 
individuals with reduced access to a normal range of opportunities in many spheres. 
This quote from Acharya summarises our position on the importance of the global 
aspect in equality of opportunities: 
It will be most likely agreed that children should be afforded the same 
chances for aIl possible future jobs, political offices, and 
opportunities. Nearly aIl children should be given an equal chance of 
survival conditional on their congenital status. A child should be 
considered to be especially disadvantaged if he or she, as an adult, 
will not be capable of qualifying for most types of employment in a 
given region when another child in a different region with a similar 
condition could obtain employment.247 
However, it is important to mention that although we should ensure that, on the 
global scene, every individual of comparable skill and talent should be healthy 
enough to access similar sorts of opportunities, it does not mean that they should aIl 
be provided with identical medical attention and health care. Indeed, since 
uniformly broad categories of opportunities will actually give rise to different 
opportunities in different settings and environments, adapted health care standards 
will be required to bring individuals to a level of normal functioning in different 
societies. For example, if we consider the opportunity to pursue career undertakings 
or, even more generally, to engage in sorne form of labour, it appears that bringing 
people to a level of normal functioning will require different types of health care 
246 M. Naussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice: in Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism" 
(May 2nd 1992) 20 Political Theory 202, at 216-223. 
247 A. K. Acharya, supra note 5, at 74. 
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measures depending on the context of their respective societies. Indeed, a normal 
functioning standard in career and labour opportunities could mean something 
different in an industrialised context with established resources and infrastructure to 
treat people with disabilities than in a poorer, more rurallagricultural reality that 
lacks those same resources, and where the same diseases consequently lead to 
considerable burdens. Although the basic framework for distribution remains the 
same, genetic technologies could be hamessed in specific ways to respond to 
different countries' health needs and to bring individuals to the level of normal 
functioning they need in order to be able to take advantage of given opportunities 
and be functional in the environment in which they live. 
2.2. Normative Grounds to Operate Distribution and Premises Upon 
which to Claim Health Equity and Fairness. 
What can cons train distribution in health? What kinds of responsibilities do 
the afJluent of the world have towards the global disadvantaged? 
The concept of global equality of opportunity as applied to health is an essential stand 
point for analysing the global distribution of health care, technologies, and services 
within a framework of justice. Having established an argument for the rationale of the 
global distributive theory, the normative grounds upon which distribution in health 
and genetic innovation should be operated will be presented. The role of the 
principles of distributive justice is to determine the fair distribution of genetic 
benefits that may be produced by global cooperation. Having established a rationale 
for fair distribution in this specific area, we will now address how it should be 
undertaken. To this end, various normative tools are available, such as right- and 
duty-based theories and the global application of Rawls' difference principle.248 This 
needs to be discussed to resolve the ambiguity that prevails with regard to the moral 
grounds of any requirement to assure global health.249 
248 C. Jones, supra note 78. 
249 L.M. Fleck, supra note 71. 
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2.2.1. Rights (to equality in opportunities) 
According to Feinberg: 
Legal claim-rights are indispensably valuable possessions. A 
world without claim-rights, no matter how full of benevolence 
and devotion to dut y , would suffer an immense moral 
impoverishment ... A world with claim-rights is one in which aIl 
persons, as actual or potential claimants, are dignified objects of 
respect, both in their own eyes and in the view of others.250 
From a theoretical point of view, the nature and the underlying justification of the 
concept of rights have undergone considerable changes.251 During the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the notion of rights as described by Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, and many other 
philosophers was strongly criticised, both from the right and the left, reducing the 
concept of rights to social constructs.252 Consequently, rights had been absent from 
the vocabulary of political philosophy for decades before coming back into political, 
legal, and philosophical discourse just after the Second World War.253 The human 
misery and atrocities exposed by the media during and following the War were a 
turning point leading to the re-introduction of the language ofrights.254 Then, welfare 
liberalism developed into the dominant ideology and became increasingly associated 
with the new, developing body of international human rights, including social and 
economic rights. 255 Still, many scholars denounce the use of rights as a way to 
structure and regulate a society, arguing that it creates entitlements without 
envisioning them within the context created by the society's structures and 
250J. Feinberg, Social Philosophy (New-Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1973) at 58-59. 
251 For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the concept ofright, see G.B. Herbert, A 
Philosophical History of Rights (New-Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002). 
252 J. Bentham, Rights, Representation, and Reform : Nonsense Upon Stilts and Other Writings on the 
French Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); K. Marx, "Capital", in F. Engels, ed., 
Manisfesto of the Communist Party, Trans. from the 3d German ed. by S. Moore & E. Aveling. Rev. 
(Chicago: Encyclopredia Britannica, 1955); G.B. Hebert, A Philosophical History of Rights (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002) at 277. 
253 G.B. Hebert, ibid at 286. 
254 Ibid, at 287; T. Bali & R. Dagger, Ideals and Ideologies: a Reader (New York: Pearson Longman, 
2004). 
255 T. Bali & R. Dagger, ibid., at 11-23 & 74-80. 
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institutions.256 The purpose of this section is not to present a comprehensive analysis 
of the notion and desirability of rights, but to refer to a framework in which rights can 
be conceived as a potential basis for the requirements of our theory of global justice 
in health. We will return to rights discourse later in the dissertation, when we analyse 
the legal framework and system of international socio-economic human rights. 
The acknowledgement of rights is an important aspect of a theory of justice. It is, in 
fact, what often justifies the restrictions on action or the imposition of duties to act in 
certain ways. If we consider rights an important factor in a global distributive justice 
theory, they will accordingly impose restrictions on distributive arrangements (social, 
political, and economic) supported by the global order. In fact, we can consider that a 
just distribution is one in which each individual obtains what he or she can claim by 
right. When rights are established and recognised, they shift the burden of proof onto 
those who decide not to respect them. Indeed, as indicated by Will Kymlicka, justice 
can be considered the system of entitlements upon which people can base their 
demand for recognition oflegitimate claims for resources and opportunities.257 
The need to rectify injustice created by inequitable distributions can find its source in 
rights. Rights must be based on property or on something of crucial importance for its 
possessors. 258 They are often envisioned as a basis for justifying demands and 
imposing obligations. A right-holder can require that the content of his or her right be 
guaranteed. Rights are recognised and understood as being grounded in the basic 
interests that individuals have in the content of those rights. An argument for a right 
"is an argument showing that an individual interest considered in itself is sufficiently 
important from a moral point of view to justify holding people to be under a dut y to 
promote it.,,259 Sorne argue for the protection of basic rights associated with the 
256 For a comprehensive exposé on the criticism of the character and the desirability ofrights refer to: 
M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); A. 
Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45 The Advocale 857, at 860. 
257 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), at 234; C. 
Jones, supra note 78. 
258 C. Jones, ibid. 
259 J. Waldron, The Right 10 Private Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 3; On the 
interest notion see also: J. Waldron, Liberal Rights: Col/ected Papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: 
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primary necessities and preservation of human life. Such basic rights can emerge 
from needs shared by every human, like food, water, shelter, and health care. 260 
Rights allow us to associate human well-being and related obligations. They can be 
ranked according to the nature of the interest they help to defend, as well as by their 
normative weight.261 We will return to the related duties and obligations in the next 
part of this chapter. 
As discussed above, health is critically important for individuals and represents a 
basic hum an interest. As we will see in more details in the fourth chapter of this 
dissertation, the right to health is controversial but is recognised as a human right in 
international law treaties262 and requires positive actions in terms of resources or 
actions. Interpreted broadly, the right to health can include the right to health care and 
the right to genetic technologies, especially if we consider that they could become the 
new standard of care needed to achieve acceptable standards of health and a broader 
and universal right to equality of opportunity. In fact, in the field of health, it is 
inadequate to refer only to a basic right to emergency health care and subsistence if 
access to adequate and adapted health care remains reserved for a privileged few. 263 
The very concept of rights is not accepted by everyone and is, in fact, often criticised. 
One reason for this is that rights remain meaningless in cases where taking advantage 
Cambridge University Press, 1993) at Il & 212; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986) at 166; N. MacCormick, "Rights in Legislation" in P. M. S. Flacker & J. 
Raz, eds., Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982). 
260 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245; O. O'Neill, supra note 82, at 155 et ss. 
261 O. O'Neill, "Hunger, Needs and Rights", supra note 88; P. Jones, Rights (London: MacMillan, 
1994) at 13-15. 
262 For example, the right to health has been codified in: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 
25; International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXII, 
UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966) art.12; (find exact ref.); 
Convention on the Elimination of ail Forms of Discrimination against women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, art.12; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into foree Sept. 2 1990, art.24; See also, African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), entered intoforee Oct. 21,1986 art. 16; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988, art. 10.1. 
263 S. Caney, supra note 128. 
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of them is not a real option for the right holders.264 This objection seems to apply 
more to civil and political rights. In fact, even if it appears easy to grant rights such as 
the right to vote, the right to freedom and to security, or the right to free speech, if 
personal health, material, and economic conditions of the right holders are such that 
they cannot take advantage of them, these rights lose much of their value. While 
sorne argue that the strong socio-economic component of many traditional civil and 
political rights justify their extensive protection,265 it may make more sense to 
eliminate what is now a clear separation between civil and political rights and 
economic, social, and cultural rights. 266 In fact, since poverty and ill-health are 
considerable obstacles to a satisfying human existence, economic and social rights 
should rank alongside civil and political rights,267 and all of these rights should 
therefore be envisioned as required values for a better world.268 This has a critical 
importance with respect to health issues since it seems essential to ensure that each 
individual have equal access to appropriate health care, technology, and resources in 
order to achieve a normal range of opportunities in other spheres and therefore be 
able to take advantage of other civil and political rights. 
Another objection to rights discourse relates to the notion of solidarity, which holds 
that granting rights to people can have the effect of isolating them from each other.269 
In fact, proponents of this view argue that a focus on individual rights allows neglect 
of collective responsibilities-for example, in allowing sorne individuals to control 
the majority of wealth while many others, though possessing rights, end up with a lot 
264 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls recognizes that the value ofliberty is directly linked with the material 
conditions necessary to experience it. 
265 J. Waldron, supra note 259 at.7-8; M. Jackman, "Poor Rights: Using the Charter to Support Social 
Welfare Claims" (1993) 19 Queen's Law Journal 65. 
266 The strong connection between the two categories ofrights and the fact that there is no hierarchy 
between them has been specifically emphasized by the UN: United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural and Economie Rights, General Comment No. 3(1), 2002, online: UN 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cescr.htm> (date accessed: May 301\ 2006) 
267 B. Terence & R. Dagger, Political Ideologies and the Democratie Ideal, 5th. ed. (New York: 
Addison Wesley, 2004) 
268 J. Waldron, supra note 259 at 7-8; G.B. Herbert, A Philosophical History of Rights (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 2002). 
269 J. Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London: 
Methuen, 1987); R. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) part 1; A. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism vs Relativism 
(Newbury Park: Sage, 1990). 
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less than they need. This creates social division that can prevent the establishment of 
a truly solid community. In response to this argument, others assert that any 
defensible account of rights demands a strong social framework that would facilitate 
mutual sharing of the benefits of rights and burdens of duties. For advocates of 
this view, rights are part of a "reciprocal universality" and thus it is impossible to 
see right-holding as a totally selfish and individual experience. 270 As Bowles and 
Gintis maintain, "the discourse of rights has served as a source of bonding and a 
framework for the expression of group demands, rather than reflecting a social 
philosophy or a political ideology. 271 The cosmopolitan perspective holds that 
where the importance of vital interests of each individual should be acknowledged, 
regardless of his or her location, nationality, or citizenship, rights are essential to 
achieving the moral distributive ideal. In fact, when they are recognised, integrated 
within a society's functioning structure, and taken seriously, they can provide a basis 
for impartial and equal individual recognition, as weIl as for community solidarity 
and cohesion. As such, from the cosmopolitan perspective, rights cannot remain 
based on individual experiences, but must be integrated in a collective framework 
where the structure in place imposes global respect and recognition. This aspect will 
be treated later in the dissertation when we discuss the existing human rights 
framework. 
AIso, the enforcement aspect of rights gives rise to scepticism about the concept of a 
right to health care, genetic technologies, and resources. Critics emphasise the 
material obstacles to supporting and implementing welfare claims, that mainly relate 
to the scarcity of resources and the identification of accountable actors and 
institutions.272 They maintain that rights should not only coyer the essence of what 
should be granted, but should also talk about what would be necessary to achieve 
them and by whom they should be respected. By focussing on enforcement, such 
critiques emphasise the abstract aspect of rights. Onora O'Neill for example, argues 
270 For example refer to: C. Jones, supra note 78, at 80-83; A. Gerwirth, "Rights", in L.e. Becker & c. 
Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics (London: Garland, 1992) at 1108. 
271 S. Bowles & H Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions 
of Modern Social Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1986) at 170. 
272 R. Nozick, supra note 71, at 112-114. 
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that "if the claimants of supposed 'rights' to food or development cannot find where 
to lodge their claims, these are empty "manifesto' rights' which would be 
equivalent to having no right at all.,,273 She argues that rights-talk is rhetorically 
powerful, but is not ethically founded because it does not deal with the powerful 
actors who could do something about international injustice. 
However, with this type of argument about legal enforcement, the inherent normative 
importance of a focus on welfare rights is often ignored as it assumes a strict legalist 
Hohfeldian vision of rights. In the early twenties, Hohfeld published a very influential 
text in the field of rights, Fundamental Legal Conceptions,274 in which he approaches 
diverse theoretical differences informing rights discourse. According to Hohfeld, the 
concept of 'rights' gives rise to correlated duties and is thus best defined as claim-
rights against another party who, as a consequence, becomes legally obligated.275 
However, this is not the only way to envi sion rights, especially not human welfare 
rights, the substance of which should not be subject to the same restrictive juridical 
conceptualisation.276 
The types of rights on which we could establish our justice framework (rights to 
health and health care, to genetic technologies and resources, to opportunities) relate 
to human values that are essential to people's welfare. Rights can give rise to 
different types of duties, sorne positive (like, for example, to perform actions, to 
assist) and others negative (like to refrain from performing certain actions). 277 
Therefore, a restrictive conceptualisation of rights, with required correlative positive 
duties, is not necessarily al ways applicable to health, health care and technologies, or 
to the right to equality of opportunities in practice. Indeed, they can exist without the 
actual claim of specific positive duties against identifiable actors as they are 
associated with the justice values and principles to which we aspire globally. 
273 O. O'Neill, (2000), supra note 82, c.7, at Ils et ss; O. O'Neill, supra note 82, at 117-120. 
274 W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923 and 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
275 Ibid at 38 & 46. 
276 G.B. Herbert, supra note 253, at 280. 
277 J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) at 57; R. Cruft, 
"Human Rights and Positive Duties" (Spring 2005) 19: 1 Ethics and International AjJairs 29, at 30. 
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However, sorne argue that human rights, like the right to health, certainly give rise to 
negative duties not to harm, and these commentators refuse to endorse an institutional 
order that entails avoidable and foreseeable violation of those rightS.278 The rights to 
health/health care, technologies, and resources are inherently important to protecting 
individuals' welfare and vital interests; this alone justifies their recognition as 
normative grounds for justice in a just global structure. The fact that the related 
positive duties associated with these rights are sometimes contested (or not yet 
allocated to particular actors or institutions) does not mean that those rights do not 
exist and cannot be an important part of our ideal justice theory. As Gewirth puts it, 
"[i]t is not enough to say that rights-enforcement incurs costs; there is the prior 
question ofwhat there is about rights that makes them worth the COSt.,,279 
This being said, in order for the distributive justice theory for health care to have 
political significance, it needs to have an institutional component. Justified rights 
must be adequately protected by required duties and obligations to refrain to harm, 
defend the interests of rights-holders, and facilitate the enforcement of their rights 
against particular agents.280 
2.2.2. Obligations /Duties (to redress distributive injustice) 
Who owes justice to whomever if is justice is owed? 
The practical and institutional aspects of obligations require examination, particularly 
in connection with the concept of obligation and duties in relation to justice. We have 
seen that Daniels' theory allows us to consider health care access as directly related to 
the normal range of opportunities. Health care and genetic resources and services 
should thus be distributed in a way that allows normal functioning and consequently 
278T. w. Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties" (Spring 2005) ] 9:] Ethics and 
international AjJairs 55, at 66-68. 
279 A. Gewirth, "Are AlI Rights Positive?" (200]) 30:3 Philosophy and Public AjJairs 321, at 330. 
280 J. Feinberg, supra note 250, at 59; J.W. Nickel, "How Human Rights Generate Duties to Protect 
and Provide" (1993) ]5 Human Rights Quarterly 77. 
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ensures equality of opportunities. This may glve nse to a right to equality of 
opportunities and to correlative obligations. 
2.2.2.1. What dut y/obligation? 
Following Henry Shue's classification, obligations can arise from three different 
kinds of duties, which are either positive or negative: the negative dut y of avoidance, 
the positive dut y of protection and the positive dut y of aid.28J The global distributive 
justice theory would include several related duties such as avoidance of harm to 
global health, institutional protection against harm, provision of relief, provision of 
aid development, and redistribution of genetic resources. The aim, purpose and 
responsibility of the different actors involved will determine the nature of the duties 
that will be assigned to them. For example, as multinational corporations are not 
designed to protect human rights, but to make profits and gain power in their sphere 
of activity, they may merely have to act so as to avoid violating human rights 
(negative dut y of avoidance) without necessarily having to promote human rights, as 
other actors might be otherwise compelled to do. 
Health deprivation and aggravation may be caused by many actors because of a 
variety of factors. This is why it can be tempting to say that since health deficiencies 
are the responsibility of so many agents, they are not specifically anyone's 
responsibility. There are different arguments as to how we should allocate duties in 
health-related spheres. Shue's response is to propose prioritising rights' protection. 
He gives the fulfillment of basic rights priority over aIl other non-basic rights, which 
he, in tum, gives priority over satisfaction of preferences and cultural 
advancement.282 Ifwe apply this priority principle to the access to health, health care, 
technologies, services, and resources, duty-bearers could find themselves obligated to 
fulfill those rights before anything else. As discussed above, equitable access to good 
health is a prerequisite to equality of opportunities in many crucial spheres of life. It 
281 H. Shue, Basic Rights supra note 245, at 52. 
282 Ibid., at 118. 
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is critical to every individual's complete personal development; as such, the actual 
level of inequality in this area contributes to the preserving a degrading and unfair 
level of inequality. Other important factors to consider in determining the scope of 
justice obligations are the urgency of the condition and the cost to deliver the required 
assistance. In other words, Shue makes special responsibilities for health depend on 
emergency and seriousness of interests without necessarily taking responsibility for 
health into account. This demands positive distributive duties even in cases where no 
responsibility can be attributed. This is particularly relevant for global health since 
the actual situation has become worse for so many years for so many different 
political, environmental, and socio-economic reasons-a context that makes it very 
hard to attribute direct responsibility to specific actors. Where the more fortunate can 
do something about serious diseases and suffering without unduly burdensome costs, 
they should do SO.283 
Another way to envi sion dut y allocation is to focus on responsibility for deprivation, 
giving rise to a dut y to avoid causing harm to others. This can be considered in many 
different ways, one being that everyone who supports an unjust global structure is 
responsible for the injustice it creates,284 and another being that a failure to secure 
universal and basic needs (health-related needs for example) implies failing in 
meeting one' s dut y to refrain from harm.285 We can cause harm by exposing others to 
extreme poverty and health deficits, and failing to intervene when, for example, life-
saving knowledge and products are available but inaccessible for structural reasons. 
In such cases, the negative dut y to avoid harm can require positive obligations, i.e., 
that we take positive steps to ensure that the legal structure we support is not 
283 H. Shue, Basic Rights supra note 245 at 17, 59-60, 159-161, 164-166, 168-180; T.Pogge, 
"Eradication Systematic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources Dividend" (2001) 2 Journal of Human 
Development 59; T. W. Pogge, "Responsibilities for Poverty-Related III Health" (2002) 16:2 Ethics 
and International Affairs 71, at 73; C.R. Beitz, supra note 55. C. Jones, supra note 78 
284 T. W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, "Symposium on World Poverty and Human 
Rights" (2005) 19: 1 Ethics & International Affairs 1; N. E. Kass, "Public Health Ethics: From 
Foundations and Frameworks to Justice and Global Public Health" (2004) 32 Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics 232, at 238-239; T.Pogge, "Eradication Systematic Poverty: Brief for a Global 
Resources Dividend" (2001) 2 Journal of Hum an Development 59; T. W. Pogge, "Responsibilities for 
Poverty-Related III HeaIth" supra note 283, at 73; C.R. Beitz, supra note 80; C. Jones, supra note 78. 
285 L. Doyal & 1. Gough, supra note 92 
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encouraging these health gaps. Individuals can also be hanned if others fail to 
recognise the importance, objectivity, and universality of their crucial health needs, 
and consequently restrict them in the pursuit of his life goals, as discussed above. 
Again, the dut y not to hann extends to agents and implies that individuals should 
participate in creating and supporting institutions that can help meet basic needs and 
relieve major suffering.286 The ideal just global structure we argue for must adhere to 
global distributive mechanisms to avoid such harm. 
ln addition to the basic need and to the responsibility views, a third way to allocate 
duties for health improvement is Buchanan's natural dut y of justice, which requires 
the creation of mechanisms to provide universal access to just institutions, even 
outside established schemes of cooperation.287 This idea is based on a cosmopolitan 
vision that treats all human beings with equal consideration by respecting and 
protecting their most basic needs and helping to create a global context where 
individuals will have access to institutions that secure their fundamental rights. It is 
similar to the dut y not to hann, but requires positive duties to establish institutions 
and legal principles to regulate the global structure and ensure that everyone's needs 
are given consideration. 
This discussion on duties and obligations calls into question the very system of 
exclusive property rights which allows extensive control over knowledge, goods and 
technology that, if otherwise available, would be crucial in meeting individuals' basic 
needs and rights. With respect to property rights, individuals generally have the right 
to dispose of their own property as they wish.288 Under what conditions would it be 
fair to violate property rights? Should bringing people to a common health standard, 
by which they could have access to equal opportunities, be a reasonable threshold? If 
property rights increase health innovation, promising discoveries, and ultimately the 
production of therapeutic products and services in certain cases, would it be fair to 
286 Ibid., at 104. 
287 A. Buchanan, supra note 25, c. 2, at 73-85. 
288 H.T. Engelhardt Jr. The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 
342-343. 
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restrict those rights? Could it lead to greater harm? Should researchers wanting to do 
research to advance the health of deprived people be entitled to use other people's 
property to further their goals? Should property enforcement institutions be 
responsible for guaranteeing other important rights as weIl? If yes, to what extent? It 
seems that the theoretical foundation of the legal property rights needs to be 
questioned in our process to establish a dut y to global distributive justice. This 
will be addressed later in the dissertation, in chapter three, when we analyse the 
existing intellectuai property system and its compatibility with distributive justice 
ideals. 
Duties are part of an institutional strategy to ensure that people around the world 
receive their basic health entitlements and profit from global equality of 
opportunities. Thus, a c1ear distinction must be made between duties of justice and 
acts of benevolence or charity. O'Neill sets forth an interesting perspective using the 
Kantian univers al maxim289 to de fend far-reaching justice obligations to individuals 
and to state that actions, policies, and institutions not be based on fundamental 
principles of coercion or deception within states and across borders. O'Neill asserts 
that there is an obligation to help, but denies that this obligation corresponds to a 
human right to be helped.29o This approach fails to generate any positive duties to 
help those whose fundamental interests need protection through positive action. 
According to this approach, only non-deception and non-coercion would qualify 
as required conditions for justice, since positive obligations to assist others 
would seem to faH into the realm of beneficence rather th an justice. 291 
Moreover O'Neill's approach presents only a limited perspective on obligations. 
In fact, as argued above, the ideal of global distributive justice involves direct 
help to the individuals in need of health care, resources, and technologies to bring 
them to a level where they can enjoy equality of opportunities. Duties of 
289 Kant's categorical imperative asks to "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the 
same time will that it should become a universallaw" 1. Kant, Foundations 0/ the Metaphysics of 
Morais, 2nd ed., tr. Lewis White Beck (London: Collier Macmillan, 1990) at 39. 
290 O. O'Neill, supra note 88, at 70; O. O'Neill, supra note 82, at 164. 
291 0. O'Neill, supra note 144, at 119-120. 
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benevolence or charity are often proposed as forms of positive obligations but are 
not sufficient. In fact, the obligations of justice proposed here are more 
demanding: they require more sustained efforts, greater sacrifices, enforceable 
commitments from the identified duty-bearers, and the reorganisation of global 
institutions. Such obligations were proposed more than thirty years ago in the UN 
General Assembly's Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order,292 which required developed countries to work toward eliminating 
the ever-widening gap between rich and poor countries, and to restructure the 
world's economic system in order to promote the economic advancement and social 
progress of all people. As we know, those obligations have not been fulfilled, but 
sorne actors have instead attempted to propose random and sporadic philanthropic 
initiatives to replace them. For example, we have seen several multinational 
companies offering free medication to specific countries: sometimes as an act of 
charity in cases of extreme health crisis, sometimes more as a result of negotiations to 
avoid the production of generics with the system of compulsory licenses, and other 
similar initiatives. Besides their sometimes doubtful safety and long-term 
effectiveness293 such initiatives are not a sustainable solution, and their theoretical 
foundations are open to criticism. In fact, the initiatives described above can 
contribute to the tlawed characterisation of the nature of the responsibilities of the 
more privileged, dis guise their abusive behaviours, and obstruct in-depth institutional 
reforms.294 Since they are freely and voluntarily performed, no one can daim a right 
to such acts as a consequence of justice. AIso, no one can be forced to perform such 
charitable actions as generosity is voluntary and property rights over resources give 
owners total freedom over their management and disposition. Acts of charity that 
292 GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), 2229th p1enary meeting, 1974. 
293 P. Berckmans et al., "Inappropriate Drug Donations in Bosnia and Hezergovina, 1992-1996" 
(1997)1842:5 New England Journal of Medicine 337; WHO, Essential Drugs and Medicine Policy, 
Guidelinesfor Drug Donation, Interagency Guidelines, revised in 1999, WHO/EDMIPAR/99.4, 
Geneva, 1999; K. Godfrey, "Charity Aims to Distribute Donated Drugs to Developing Countries" (20 
November 2004) 1206 BMJ 329. 
294 Oxfam, Patent irljustice: How the World Trade Rules Threaten the Health of Poor People (Oxfam 
briefing paper London, 2001, online on the website of oxfam 
<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we do/issueslhealth/downloads/patentinjustice.pdt> (accessed: May 
18th, 2006); C. Barry & K. Raworth, "Access to Medicines and the Rhetoric of Responsibility" (2002) 
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result from sorne sense of kindness and compassion are thus not the appropriate 
vehicle for achieving justice. They can be defined as moral obligations, but should 
not be invoked to replace legal positive obligations and duties. In fact, beneficence 
allows agents to withdraw from discretionary charity endeavours at any time; they 
can also help very limited number of individuals globally, which would leave many 
people in need of health care and resources. From a global distributive justice 
perspective, this would be unacceptable, whereas from a beneficence perspective, 
such inequalities between individuals are simply unfortunate. 295 Indeed, Thomas 
Nagel makes a similar point when he indicates that "aid should not be regarded as a 
voluntary contribution of a portion of a state's own wealth, but rather as a transfer 
of wealth required to redress distributive injustice" .296 
2.2.2.2. Who should act? 
Another important aspect of obligations and duties is the identification of dut y-
bearers and agents of justice. After the recognition of clear obligations, the next step 
is to identify who should be required to act. The purpose of this section is not to 
proceed in the identification of specific obligation-holders, but rather to propose 
generally what kinds of actors or groups should be handling such duties. Individuals, 
states, and other institutions and organisations may thus aIl be responsible for 
performing given duties. However, it is safe to say that, in general, collective 
coordination of duties will often provide better and more effective rights protection 
and aid provision than individuals acting alone in a disorganised manner. Tangible 
and definite obligations have to be supported by institutions and cultures that embody 
coherent and effective allocations of obligations.297 This is not to say that citizens of 
powerful developed countries cannot be found directly accountable for the 
production of poverty and health deficits for which the governments they elected 
295L.M. Fleck, supra note 71. 
296 T. Nagel, "Poverty and Food: Why Charity Is Not Enough" in P.G. Brown & H. Shue, eds., 
Food Policy (New-York: The Free Press, 1977) 54, at 57. 
297 O. O'Neill, "Public Health or Clinical Ethics: Thinking beyond Borders" (2002) 16:2 Ethics & 
International AjJairs 35, at 39. 
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are often responsible as a result of their democratic self-interested choices in the 
fields of international politic and trade. As "participants" to injustice, we aU have a 
responsibility to people affected by such injustice. This leads us to say that 
inequalities in health are unjust if they are the result of unjust (international) social 
arrangements. 298 Therefore, individuals, as participants of the existing global 
institutional system, could have the responsibility of not cooperating in the 
imposition of unjust institutional schemes and of instead promoting reforms and 
establishing just institutional arrangements. The institutions thereby created 
would be accountable for granting efficient protection to individuals' interests 
and hum an rights. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, as things stand 
now, states may weIl be the main agents for fulfiIling duties regarding equality 
between individuals in the field of health and genetics. In fact, as we have seen, in 
the face of the actual institutional inability of the international structure to 
perform distributive justice duties, states are major representatives of political 
reality; as such, they can foster special bonds of sentiment, identity, and obligation. 
Such characteristics can be taken into account if the individualistic theoretical basis 
of justice is acknowledged and respected and the needs and interests of the others 
affected by those distributive mechanisms are also considered.299 As c1early put by 
Pogge, we believe that: "[ ... ] radical inequality can be avoided and economic human 
rights securely maintained within a global system of states.,,300 
Many different actors are involved in the production and distribution of genetic 
knowledge, technology, and resources. Of course, not aU states are in a position to 
fui fi Il obligations and duties generated by individuals' interests in better access to 
health for equality of opportunities. Charles Jones responds to this problem by 
suggesting that states with more than enough resources, wealth, and technology could 
298 This affirmation is rooted in Rawlsian justice and based on the idea that, in justice as fairness, 
the society is formed by afair system of cooperation between free and equal persons (at the 
national level). For a more detailed discussion of this notion: J. Rawls, supra note 61, at 311 et 
ss.; F. Peter and T. Evans, supra note 72, at 28; T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty", 
supra note 84. 
299 C.R. Beitz, supra note 83. T. Christiano, "Democracy and Distributive Justice" (1995) 37 Arizona 
Law Review 65-72. 
300T. W. Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties", supra note 278. at 59. 
91 
have a dut y to redistribute such goods to more deprived states to help them me et basic 
and important needs with distributive justice.30) This could be accompli shed through 
the establishment of institutional arrangements integrating other non-state agents 
involved in genetics, like multinational companies, universities, and everyone who 
elects governrnents at the head of states, who are unlikely to self-regulate toward this 
end. Shue identifies those who have a primary dut y to aid (the affluent) as the ones 
who spend a lot in the satisfaction of preferences as compared to rights fulfilment.302 
Nonetheless, exploring the details of the potential political actions for the assignrnent 
of duties to the affluent in this context would be outside the scope of this chapter. 
The next two subsections introduce two types of obligation that have been suggested 
as normative grounds for a global distribution ofbenefits and resources. 
2.2.2.3. Rawls' duty of assistance 
As discussed above, Rawls' theory of justice as faimess establishes principles of 
distributive and egalitarian justice that apply only within individual states, which 
represents a circumscribed context of social cooperation from which rights and duties 
arise. Even though we already provided a critique of this aspect of Rawls' theory of 
justice earlier, it appears important to retum to it here as one of the main proposition 
for distributive actions. Rawls' ideal of justice requires fair equality of professional 
opportunities between individuals with similar skills and talent and accepts 
inequalities as long as they are to the greatest advantage of the least well-offmembers 
of society. However, Rawls does not subscribe to the same standards of justice in the 
global context. Instead, he argues for a dut y of assistance toward burdened societies, 
as stated in principle 8 of the Law of People: "peoples have a dut Y to assist other 
peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political and social regime.,,303 This system of transfers and mutual aid aims at 
301 C. Jones, supra note 78, at 70. 
302 H. Shue, Base Rights, supra note 245, at 119. 
303 J. Raw1s, supra note 82, at 107,115-119. 
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bringing those societies above a minimal threshold where it becomes possible for 
them to satisfy their people' s needs with just and decent domestic institutions. It does 
not, however, impose any restriction on the distribution schemes that should govern 
the global structure of internally well-ordered societies. According to this view, 
global inequalities in distribution, poverty, and wealth are meant to be dealt with 
internally by each domestic structure, which leaves the global level unaddressed. 
Those who oppose endorsing a global distributive mechanism toward the least 
fortunate indicate that it would ask too much on the part of those countries that are 
more organised, careful, and productive and that behave and invest more responsibly 
and reasonably.304 This is why they call for a well-circumscribed dut y of assistance, 
with a clear objective and cut-off point instead of the establishment of international 
institutional mechanisms for distribution. The dut y of assistance seems to derive from 
the importance of expanding the Society of People to include every society in the 
world; in so doing, Rawls completely avoids the notion of global distributive justice. 
Such dut y of assistance does not entail the obligation to reduce inequalities among 
individuals living in societies with different endowments of natural or hum an 
resources, different histories, or different cultures.305 
Rawls' dut y of assistance is not sufficient and can be criticised on various grounds. 
This dut y to aid is not qualified as a collective responsibility of well-off societies and 
there is no mention of a right of the less-advantaged to receive any benefits. Rawls 
does not provide much detail on the scope ofthis potential dut y, making it seem more 
like a vague "dut y of charity" than an obligation of justice as described earlier.306 By 
not endorsing global distributive principles for the reason that it would result in sorne 
states bearing sorne costs that arise from decisions made by others,307 it emphasises 
the negative aspects of the internaI structure, culture, and tradition of less-
advantaged countries. As discussed above, and bears repeating, the ability of a 
society to reach a higher stage of development and address internaI inequities is not 
304 A. Buchanan, supra note 25; W. Hinsch, supra note 137. 
305 C.R. Beitz, supra note 83. 
306 A. Buchanan, supra note 25 
307 J Rawls, supra note 82, at 74-77 and 105. 
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only a result of voluntary economic and political choices at the domestic level, but is 
also a direct consequence of its natural resource endowments and situation in the 
international political economy.308 lndeed, Rawls' dut y of assistance does not protect 
poor societies from the international terms of cooperation imposed through 
negotiations that are greatly affected by the unbalanced bargaining power that marks 
the basic global structure. His account is misleading since it emphasises lack of 
assistance to the deprived rather than questioning the justness of the global order that 
is imposed by the most wealthy and powerfu1.309 Rawls seems to recognise this issue 
as he mentions that the "unjustified distributive effects" of cooperative organisations 
need to be corrected, but he does not go further, instead endorsing a dut y of assistance 
that does not allow such correction.310 Rawls' fear over "open-ended" redistributive 
initiatives should not prevent any sort of distributive commitment, since limited 
egalitarian principles can be adopted to constrain inequalities in specific spheres of 
importance, such as health and basic needs.311 
Furthermore, the cosmopolitan focus of this thesis demands that we consider each 
individual as a standard of moral con cern, but Rawls' dut y of assistance does not 
permit such consideration. It instead allows the major health and welfare gap between 
individuals living in different countries of the world to persist. By emphasising the 
responsibility of burdened societies as a rationale for a limited and simple dut y of 
assistance, Rawls does not acknowledge that most individuals living in those societies 
have no power whatsoever over poor investments. In fact, the conduct of an 
irresponsible country is often dictated by a few elites who act alone, without their 
population's assent or participation. It is therefore difficult to conceive how previous, 
current, and future generations could be held responsible for those choices.312 As we 
clearly cannot rely on Rawls' dut y of assistance to support our moral framework of 
global distributive justice, sorne have instead proposed to extend Rawls's difference 
principle to the global context as a basis for obligations of justice. 
308 A. Kuper, supra note 168. 
309 T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty", supra note 84 
310 J. Rawls, supra note, 83, at 43 and 115. 
311 For example, refer to A. Buchanan, supra note 25. 
312 C.R. Beitz, supra note 87. 
94 
2.2.2.4. Rawls Difference principle applied globally 
Sorne argue for a global application of Rawls' difference principle as a normative tool 
for a theory of global distributive justice. In his Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that 
rational individuals who would position themselves behind a "veil of ignorance,,313, 
after ensuring equal distribution of basic liberties, would choose two basic principles 
to govem distribution in their institutions: equality of opportunity (professional) in 
priority and the difference principle (difference in social primary goods such as 
wealth, power, income, and the social base of self-respect are to be justified only if 
they make everyone better off and are to the greatest advantage of the least weIl-off). 
This test aims at identifying principles that will promote the good of individuals as 
equal moral entities. Rawls uses this contractual test to develop our traditional notions 
of moral obligation, express the inherent moral standing of persons, and negate 
differences in bargaining power.314 
Unlike a dut y of assistance, the difference principle gives rise to a dut y to eliminate 
existing inequalities in order to comply with an egalitarian principle of justice as 
opposed to satisfying claims of need to reach certain limits, beyond which limits no 
more equalisation would be required. The difference principle calls for transfers on 
purely egalitarian grounds. Endeavours of high importance and the realisation of 
special values and the meeting of basic needs are not taken into consideration by the 
application of the difference principle. Its aim is mainly to minimise unjustified 
inequalities. 
Rawls developed the difference principle in the context of his theory of domestic 
justice as faimess and, in his opinion, it should only apply to the distribution of 
wealth and income within societies. However, as demonstrated at the beginning of 
313 A fictional position where they would know neither what type of society they would live in nor 
their place and position in this society 
314 W. Kimlicka, supra note 89. 
95 
this chapter, in the actual global structure, boundaries do not establish and limit the 
scope of social cooperation; they should therefore not restrict associated social 
obligations. We believe that the statist perspective of the world has lost its normative 
significance due to the rise of global economic interdependence. Consequently, sorne 
argue that the distributive responsibility of states should simply represent a 
continuation of our general dut y of justice at the globallevel. According to this view, 
the difference principle adopted in the domestic context would also be selected as a 
standard of justice in the global context where, due to an extended veil of ignorance, 
issues of citizenship would not be taken into account.315 As a result, a just global 
distribution of social primary goods that could be distributed by social institutions 
(like income, wealth, powers) would have to maximise the absolute position of the 
least privileged individuals and societies of the global order. 
As discussed above, in Rawls' view, the less advantaged position is determined in 
terms of individuals' possession of primary social goods, as opposed to natural 
primary goods like health, opportunities, and natural talents. Health should therefore 
be regulated by the baseline principle of equality and equality of opportunity as 
discussed above. Sorne have suggested instead that inequalities in health that are 
influenced by wealth should also be justified by the difference principle; others 
endorse the premise that natural primary goods and endowments should also be taken 
into consideration in the definition of the least-privileged.316 If we take those views 
and consider that health inequalities should not just be analysed with the principle of 
equality of opportunity but also pass the difference principle test, an application of 
Rawls' maximin difference principle to health concems would therefore require the 
prioritisation of the least-favoured groups in society in terms of health conditions or 
the improvement, with social policies, of the health of the poorest members in 
society. To determine if a difference principle applying to natural goods would 
provide an appropriate solution to health inequalities created by the application and 
distribution of new genetic applications, we need to identify the least weil-off. With 
315 C.R. Beitz, supra note 55; C. Jones, supra note 78; W. Hinsch, supra note 137. 
316 S. Marchand, Daniel Wilker & B. Landesman, supra note 210; W. Kimlicka, supra note 89. 
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Rawls' theory, health is not a criterion for determining the position of an individual, 
but wealth and income are. The application of this reasoning might lead to a desirable 
outcome in our process of aiming at a global distribution of the genetic-innovation 
benefits. If we take the criterion for the identification of the least privileged globally 
to be po or health due to class inequality, this group would likely comprise a majority 
of individuals from developing countries. It would thus mean that global inequalities 
in the distribution of the genetics-research benefits and the investment of research 
funds could be justified under the difference principle if they would improve, even 
very slightly, the situation of those living in developing countries. Is this really what 
we are aiming at? Would this kind of solution allow every individual' s genetic needs 
to be met globally? 
The scope of the underlying elements of the difference principle remains very 
unclear. It gives no precise indication of the conditions to meet in order to be part of 
the least-privileged group and does not detail what is required to attain the greatest 
benefit for the least-advantaged group threshold. Therefore, in the case under study, 
it appears that the application of the difference principle could allow leaving many 
sick individuals (for whom access to genetic innovations could make a difference) 
outside of the redistribution scheme depending on the interpretation of the difference 
principle. In fact, the reason transfers to the least privileged are required is not to 
enable them to realise specific values or to me et specific crucial needs, but to 
minimise unjust inequalities.317 For example, individuals affected by health problems 
in a difficult socio-economic context, but not necessarily falling within the world's 
least privileged group (for example, people living in middle income countries), could 
be left out of the distribution process. 318 In fact, a maximin principle like the 
difference principle could justify giving priority only to the least privileged as 
opposed to a focus on all class inequalities in health.319 AIso, the "worse off group" 
317 W.Hinsch, supra note 137. 
318 T. Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) at 122-130; A. D. 
Williams, "The Revisionist Difference Princip le" (June 1995) 25:2 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
257, at 280. 
319 S. Marchand, D. Wilker & B. Landesman, supra note 210, at 461. 
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could be interpreted as those who have the most urgent and serious health conditions 
without any reference to socio-economic conditions. Such an interpretation could also 
leave many individuals in need of the benefits of genetic therapies outside of the 
realm of distribution. 
The application of the difference principle could also allow major differences in 
access to genetic services and technology to persist. In fact, the standard of the 
difference principle does not require equality, but only an absolute improvement of 
the situation of the least weIl-off to justify inequalities. It does not ensure that the 
basic needs of the least weIl-off will be met and that they will be able to flourish as 
human beings. Therefore, major global inequalities in access to genetics could be 
tolerated given the observation of an absolute improvement of the situation of the 
giobally less-privileged group. In fact, the application of the difference principle can 
result in the reward of productivity and wealth and the endorsement of a hierarchy 
between individuals and societies, provided only that the less-privileged agents also 
receive sorne benefits. For example, limited access to available genetic technologies 
by sorne very poor populations in need could be seen as sufficient improvement in the 
actual situation of the global least-privileged, which could consequently justify 
unequal distribution and access to genetic benefits more generally by the affluent. As 
Shue demonstrates, this aspect of Rawls' theory does not provide everyone the means 
to keep their heads above water; what it does is merely allow people to "continue to 
drown but with less and less water over their heads.,,320 It is thus safe to say that the 
economic order created by Rawls' theory is characterised by free bargaining and the 
improvement of the wealthier societies' position. As such, it is open to criticism for 
the above mentioned reasons, ev en if it prevents the most disadvantaged from falling 
below a certain minimum threshold. 
Since a number of global inequalities in health could be left unaddressed by the 
application of the distributive duties generated by the difference principle, it is not 
part of our ideal approach as it stands now. This takes us back to our concept of 
320 H. Shue, Basic Rights supra note 245, at 128. 
98 
justice in health and to the right to equality of opportunities. As argued above, the 
right to equality of opportunities and the corresponding duties of the affluent to give 
aid provide a better rationale for distribution as compared to a dut y of assistance, 
charity, or beneficence. Moreover, Rawls gives priority to this notion before 
addressing acceptable inequalities with the difference principle. This means that 
ensuring individuals are brought to an appropriate level of normal functioning, to 
make sure they can profit from available opportunities, should not be compromised 
by inequalities permitted by the difference principle. In other words, attaining normal 
functioning to be in a position to benefit from equality of opportunities is a priority, 
and is therefore supposed to be protected against interferences from inequalities 
persisting with the application of the difference principle. 
However, as mentioned earlier, since a just system involves many requirements in 
various areas and because of the reality of limited health resources for unlimited 
health needs, real and universal equality of opportunity remains out of reach (for 
now) at the non-ideal level. Although we focus on an ideal framework of justice, we 
can say that intermediate standards will be needed at first, to allocate scarce resources 
to our health justice ideals. As health can be influenced by social primary goods like 
wealth and income, an intermediate distributive standard could take the form of a 
modified difference principle with a special focus on basic needs, as proposed by 
Doyal: "Rawls's difference principle should be expanded to state that inequalities 
will only be tolerated to the extent that they benefit the least well-off through 
leading to the provision of those goods and services necessary for the optimisation 
of basic need-satisfaction.,,321 Similarly, others have proposed, instead of focusing 
on the least well-off, that health-resource distribution should favour individuals 
who are below a threshold level of health. This system would not require 
achieving equality in health, something that appears impossible given the current 
high level of health in industrialised countries, but would require that no one 
remain below this acceptable minimum level of health. This global threshold 
321 L. Doyal & ] Gough, supra note 92, at 132. 
99 
would be defined in light of existing medical technology.322 These propositions 
avoid the troubling possibility of having to trace a line between the absolute 
worst-off and others who are not part of the least-healthy category but should 
nevertheless have their basic health needs taken into account when undertaking 
distribution of health and genetic resources. In referring to a basic need for health 
and a threshold level of health, these new versions of the difference principle would 
secure, in priority, a distribution of health and genetic resources for the people who 
need them to meet their basic needs. 
As our basic claim is to argue for more equitable distribution of resources to 
vulnerable populations globally, taking need and normal functioning into account, 
these propositions are a good starting point to meet our goal. Ideally, however, we 
believe that just distribution should go one step further and consider needs and 
normal functioning in their broader context, as influencing the fair range of 
opportunities that should be available to every individual. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we provided an analysis of the specificity of health as the central part 
of our framework of distributive justice. We first emphasised the importance ofhealth 
and genetics in normal functioning and then the role of normal functioning in 
allowing individuals to profit from equality of opportunity. After having established 
that fair distribution was required in this field, we addressed if and how it should be 
undertaken, analysing correlative rights and obligations. As a result, we were able to 
build a solid argument for the use of distributive justice mechanisms to solve 
avoidable health inequalities and foster equitable access to the benefits arising from 
genetics. 
322 A. K. Acharya, supra note 5; T. Nagel, supra note 318, at 125. 
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More generally, we dedicated the first part ofthis dissertation to the construction of a 
global distributive justice framework to serve as a basis for more equitable access to 
health and genetic care, benefits, and resources. In this ideal moral scheme, 
individual's health interests receive equal consideration for the pursuit of equal 
opportunities. 
This ideal conception of justice could be criticised on the ground that it demands 
unrealistic health standards that cannot be incorporated into the CUITent global order. 
This critique emerges from an institutional conception of justice that starts from the 
actual world structure, characterised by existing states, territorial boundaries, and 
strong power differences. It does not try to change or eliminate it, but instead aims to 
discover how we can continue to support it with a different focus, one that takes 
principles of justice into account.323 To justify their focus on the national structure, 
proponents of this view argue that the institutional arrangements that can help 
develop the basis for cooperation, that can allow political coercion and initiate shifts 
in the distribution of wealth and power, are often provisional and insufficient at the 
international level. Sorne are even talking about democratic deficits and lack of 
accountability on the global scene, due, in part, to state differences and mostly to 
the growing presence of powerful non-state actors. The existing state system and 
international order, their capacity to integrate structural changes and interact 
together, and the main actors in charge of shaping and controlling them are 
important aspects of the actual political reality that need to be considered. 
Moreover, they believe that enforcement mechanisms for compliance with 
minimal international redistributive policies are lacking. For example, the United 
Nations has failed to convince the affluent to supply as little as 0.75% of their 
gross national products for international development initiatives.324 For them, it is 
323 Such view has been qualified as an institutional form of an ideal theory since it does not take non-
ideal conditions for granted, but instead aims to find justifications for existing institutions, taking ideal 
circumstances into account. lt is different from the ideal theOJ"y we argue for. In fact, our primary goal 
is not to justifY the existing institutions, but to determine how best to meet our global distributive 
justice ideals in health, preferably but not necessarily within the actual institutional structure. M. 
Blake, supra note 121, at 262-264. 
324 C.R. Beitz, supra note 55; Towards Accelerated Development--Proposals for the Second United 
Nations Development Decade (United Nations Publication, E.70.lI.A.2, 1970); UN Committee for 
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therefore important to understand that in order for the concept of ideal justice to 
have sorne practical application, it will inevitably be constrained by the 
institutional reality of the world.325 Indeed, those who express scepticism about an 
ideal account of justice believe that it might be incompatible with reality, more 
specifically with the political account of how the present system of international 
economic inequality came into existence, whose interests it serves, and how it can 
effectively be adapted or changed to serve the interests of the poor and deprived.326 
As Onora O'Neill states, "knowing that sorne distribution (equal, maximin, or what-
ever) of resources, or of health care, would be ideally just do es not take us far toward 
knowing who should do what for whom in order to work toward that distribution.,,327 
We believe in the relevance of an ideal theory of justice. As mentioned at the very 
beginning of this first part, we consider that it is of the utmost importance to get a 
sense of first, what we are setting aside when agreeing to non-ideal conditions and 
second, how we can envi sion social reforms. To this effect, Thomas Pogge states: 
Realism hardly requires that the principles of justice conform 
themselves to the prevailing sordid realities. We don't fee 1 
justified to give up our ideals of domestic justice or personal 
honesty just because we despair of achieving them fully. We 
cannot reasonably demand of moral principles that they 
vindicate the status quo. AlI we may ask is that a conception of 
justice provides a criterion for assessing our global order that 
allows us to choose from among the feasible [ ... ] avenues of 
Development Policy, The role of the Committee for Development Planning (CDP) in the formulation 
of the United Nations International Development Strategies (for the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s) and a 
Summary of CDP's Main Recommendations for those Strategies, CDP/2000IPLEN/10, 20 March, 
2000, online on the UN website: <http://www.un.org/esa/policy/devplan/cdpOOp10.pdt> (accessed: 
May 17th, 2006). 
325 For example, the structure and functioning of TRIPS is a reality of the global order and could have 
negative impact on developing countries' welfare and development. We will be coming back to this 
specific system later in the dissertation, but for a discussion on this point refer to: J.H. Reichman, 
Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated 
World Market, UNCTAD Discussion Papers no. 73 (UNCTAD/OSG/DPI73, November 1993); A.S. 
Oddi, "TRIPS: Natural Rights and a Polite Form of Economic Imperialism" (May 1996) Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 29 
326 C. Brown, supra note 61, at 180. 
327 O.O'neill, supra note 1. 
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institutional change and thus specifies our moral task-
gradually to improve the justice ofthis order.328 
By focussing on establishing ideal principles of justice in health, we acknowledge 
that the existing order is not completely static and unalterable. Indeed, the global 
order paradigm is less than 60 years old, and this might mean that "changes can be 
achieved through human agency in response to changing times.,,329 This is especially 
true in the sphere of health, where it has become quite clear that individual and 
isolated actions and initiatives for improving human health are not providing the 
sustainable changes required at the global level. As such, one of the biggest 
challenges is a shift in perspective from economic self-interest to growing solidarity 
and a shared spirit of mutual caring.330 There is no reason to think that such changes 
of perspective would be impossible. Indeed, it is interesting to observe how much 
institutional change has been achieved over a relatively short period of time. Many of 
the most influential institutions in the world have appeared in the last 50 years. In 
fact, most trans-national corporations, international organisations, banks, and 
development agencies are new types of actors in the ever-changing global picture. 
However, the type of transformation we are aiming for is unlikely to take place 
automatically and voluntarily in a world mainly driven by market powers and self-
interest.331 This is one of the reasons why we do not argue for starting from scratch 
328 T. Pogge, Realising Rawls (Ithaca: NY: Comell University Press, 1989), at 260. 
329 M. MecGwire, "The paradigm that Lost its Way" (2001) 77:4 International AjJairs 777, at 793; M. 
MccGwire, "Shifting the paradigm" (2001) 77: 1 International AjJairs 1. 
330 R Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); S.R. 
Benatar, A.S. Daar & P. Singer, supra note 182, at 122. 
331 Many have proposed practical initiatives to reunite the ideal theory with the non-ideal reality. We 
will come back to sorne of them in the thesis conclusion, to set the basis for further discussion. For 
example, sorne have proposed a very egalitarian solution to the issue of access to health care resources 
and genetic services and technologies, arguing that their use should be banned unless they can be made 
available to everyone who needs them. This argument is based on the fundamental equality of persons 
that should entail equal opportunity, respect and treatment. Such position has been endorsed by the 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Opinions of the American Medical Association with regard to the 
availability of genetic enhancement of foetuses and embryos. A. Gutmann, For and Against Equal 
Access to Health Care, in Securing Access to Health Care, ed. President's Commissionfor the Study of 
Ethical Prob/ems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research (Washington, D.C: U.S 
Govemment Printing Office, 1983) at. 53; American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs, "Ethical Issues Related to Prenatal Genetic Testing" (1994) 3 Archives of F amily 
Medicine 633, at 640-641; S. R. Benatar, A. S. Daar & P. Singer, ibid at 119. Others suggest a 
multilayered institutional scheme in which govemment authority, instead of being concentrated at the 
state institutional level, would be dispersed among different political units, and not necessarily 
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and ignoring the existing institutional order, agreeing instead to work with sorne of 
the institutions already in place when major changes can be undertaken to reflect the 
health equity concerns that constitute our argument. 
The purpose of the second part of this dissertation is to present two existing 
international normative systems and to determine whether their structure and 
functioning adequately account for, and balance, the many values of the global 
distributive justice framework in facilitating a future redistribution of potential 
benefits in the field of genetics. If need be, distributive justice will guide the critique 
of the actual framework and the reconstitution of the ground rules that should regulate 
property, cooperation and exchange, as weIl as conditions of production and 
distribution.332 
constrained by existing historical borders. Therefore, spreading authority over different units could 
reduce the incidence of poverty and oppression, factors that to often shape the actual state of the world 
order. In a sense, the adoption of political agencies that properly control different spheres of human 
action, not ail territorially-based, is an alternative to both a world state and a state-dominated system. 
T.W. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty", supra note 84; A. Kupler, supra note 83. Thomas 
Pogge also proposes a transfer of one percent of the affluent c1ass' gross domestic product to worse-off 
states, as weil as a global resource tax-two options that have been criticised and which in any case 
would be interesting to investigate further. T.Pogge, "Eradication Systematic Poverty: Brief for a 
Global Resources Dividend" (2001) 2 Journal of Human Development 59; T.Pogge, "A Global 
Resources Dividend" in D.A. Crocker & T. Linden, eds., Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, 
Justice, and Global Stewardship (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997); G. Screenivasan, 
"International Justice and Health: A Proposai" (2002) 16:2 Ethics and International Affairs 81. 
332 T.W. Pogge, supra note 84, at 97. 
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PART II: SOME NORMATIVE TOOLS FOR DISTRIBUTION IN HEALTH 
How does our normative theory of distribution translate into positive law now? 
The cases of intellectual property and international human rights law 
The first part of this dissertation established clear normative landmarks to assess how 
equitably the world distributes health and genetic benefits. It set out an approach that 
gives equal consideration to everyone's basic health needs, adopting a cosmopolitan 
approach where individuals are treated with the same consideration regardless of their 
citizenship or geographicallocation. We then reflected on the universal importance of 
health, its vital role in normal functioning and in the pursuit of equal opportunity for 
all. This analysis led us to establish a global distributive justice framework in health 
which supports our argument for equitable access to the benefits arising from genetic 
advances, taking basic health needs and opportunities into account. This framework 
represents the theoretical basis that was needed to justify our interest in every 
individual's basic health needs and our focus on equality of opportunity for aIl. 
Now that we have built those foundations, we can begin discussing how this 
normative approach to distribution translates (or not) into positive law. To this end, 
we will identify and analyse the main obstacles to legal compliance with global 
distributive justice in health and genetic research. This will be the main goal of the 
second part of this dissertation. 
Although many spheres of law can be applicable and useful when dealing with the 
different issues emerging from the development of genetic science, we decided to 
concentrate on the two that appeared most relevant and important to addressing 
distributive justice issues in health: intellectual property law and human rights law. 
Not only are these two legal systems discussed extensively in the literature, they are 
also very important in the global normative picture in their own different ways-
especially in terms of access and equity issues. Therefore, the next two chapters will 
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aim to present and analyse the international intellectual property and human rights 
systems, assessing their underlying philosophy, construction, and application with the 
precise benchmarks of justice established in our theoretical framework. In other 
words, we will assess wh ether these legal systems help or hinder access to health and 
resulting equality of opportunities using different lenses of analysis, such as the 
global aspect of access and different units of measure, like availability and 
affordability. 
This analysis will help us identify important weaknesses of these legal frameworks 
and to realise that, although of very different nature, they are both greatly influenced 
by powerful agents and market factors which undermine their focus on justice and 
equity issues. Following the analysis of the conceptuallinks existing between the two 
legal systems and real access to health, the third and last chapter of this second part 
will introduce practical examples to better understand how the systems interact, how 
they perform together and how the conceptual weaknesses identified in the two 
previous chapters translate into real-life situations. 
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Chapter III: International Intellectual Property Law: A First Tool? 
Introduction 
In the last section, we set the theoretical basis of our argument in constructing a 
global distributive justice framework that can serve as a foundation for equitable 
access to health and genetic research benefits and resources. In this context, we 
argued for the equal consideration of everyone's health needs for the purpose of 
securing equal opportunity for all on the global scene. 
The aim of this chapter is to determine whether the foundation, structure, and purpose 
of the existing intellectual property law system, and especially patent law, assists or 
hinders the realisation of global distributive justice in health and genetics. More 
specifically, an analysis of the IP system will be provided in order to determine 
whether it adequately considers and accounts for the moral principles underlined by 
our global distributive justice framework. 
We will commence with a brief introduction to intellectual property rights, in 
particular, patent law and its application to genetics. The second part of this chapter 
aims to present and provide a succinct analysis of sorne of the main theoretical 
foundations brought forward for justifying property rights on intellectual inventions. 
The third section assesses the patent system in referring to considerations of 
distribution, equality, and justice. An evaluation of the patent system by reference to 
the standard of access (global access to resources, availability and affordability of 
products and services) shaH be provided in order to establish whether the 
international patent system can serve the purpose of global distributive justice. 
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Introduction to Intellectual Property 
Property rights are used as legal and political tools to help ensure social order, 
structure, and harmony in communities. They translate the connection between 
property holders and non-holders into enforceable legal rights. Through this system, 
objects of property can be viewed as articles that can be traded in the market, 
providing property owners with sorne degree of economic power.333 In this sense, 
property institutions fundamentally shape a society. 334 Property rights can he 
associated both with tangible and intangible and intellectual objects. These are 
referred to as intellectual property rights (IPRs), and can be defined as rights in 
original ideas included in tangible products of cognitive effort, which give IP 
holders a legal right to exclude people from making use of their property in 
ex change for a public disclosure of the object oftheir right.335 
Intellectual property has increasingly become a prevalent form of ownership and 
signifies a very valuable asset for many IP holders worldwide. In fact, the economic 
significance of IP in the global market represents hundreds of billions of dollars and 
is constantly growing.336 
Although intellectual property refers to different forms of legal protection (patents, 
copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, etc.), sorne general features are common to aIl 
forms of IP. For example, the object of intellectual property is intangible, and is 
therefore non-exclusive; that is, it does not disappear after it has been used or shared. 
In other words, the possession or use of any intellectual object by one pers on does not 
333 C. May, "Unacceptable Costs: The Consequences ofMaking Knowledge Property in a Global 
Society" (2002) 16:2 Global Society 123; A. McEvoy, "Market and Ethics in United States Property 
Law" in H.M. Jacobs, ed., Who Owns America? Social Conflict Over Property Rights (Madison 
: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998) 94, at 99. 
334 E.C. Hettinger, "JustifYing Intellectual Property", in A.D. Moore, ed., lntellectual Property: Moral, 
Legal, and International Dilemmas (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1997) 17, at 27; J. 
Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society 
(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
335 J. Hugues, "The Philosophy ofIntellectual Property" (1988) 77: I3 Geo. L. J. 287, at 294-296. 
336 J. Boyle, supra note 334, at 121; L. G Thurow, "Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property 
Rights" (Sept-Oct 1997) Harv. Bus. Rev. 95, at 96-97. 
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prevent others using or possessing it concurrently. Hence, in order to enhance the 
dissemination of ideas (copyrights and patents) or to encourage the creation of 
proprietary information (trade secrets), IP artificially creates scarcity. In fact, it 
allows holders to exclude people from using their intellectual objects even if 
simultaneous uses by a multitude of individuals would be possible without additional 
cost or risk of overexploitation. 337 Another particularity of intellectual property 
that differentiates it from material property is the temporallimits associated with 
the rights awarded. In most cases, IPRs are granted by states for a fixed period, 
after which the objects of IP become freely available to the community as part of 
the public domain. 
The protection awarded to intellectual property in the field of human genetics is 
mainly established in patent, trade secrets, and copyright systems. Before addressing 
patent issues, which will be the focus of this chapter, it is necessary to briefly discuss 
the application of copyright and trade secrets to genetics. 
A copyright is a right granted to the author of sorne original work (literature, 
films, songs, etc.) on the expression of his ideas (and not the ideas per se). A 
copyright allows its owner to reproduce the work, distribute copies of it, display 
it, and inhibit others from copying it in whole or in part for a limited period of 
time, which varies between 50-70 years following the death of the author. 
Copyrights arise automatically without registration procedure or fees. There is 
considerable copyrightable material involved in the field of genetics. Indeed, 
since the outcomes of DNA sequencing are often used as an information storage 
base for future breakthroughs, and require substantial and lengthy further 
analysis, it is safe to say that there is a great informational potential and value in 
sorne unique collection of DNA sequences. Copyright law can be used to protect 
the value of sorne original compilations of results arising from genetic research 
including and not limited to a gene sequences database, a list of single 
337 E.C. Hettinger, "JustifYing Intellectual Property" in P. Drahos, ed., lntellectual Property (England: 
Darmouth Publishing, 1999) 117. 
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nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), a diagram of the order of the fragments on 
sorne molecules, etc. 338 Since most genetic research data is collected in 
databases of different forms, many genetic and genomic compilations qualify for 
copyright protection and can therefore be subject to access and subscription 
fees. 339 However, as numerous other aspects of genetic research do not give rise 
to copyrightable material, we must turn to other IP protection regimes. 
A trade secret is used to prote ct the confidentiality of important and valuable 
business information. Trade secrets should not be known within the industry, 
since the exc1usivity of the information is what provides considerable advantage 
to the secret holder over competitors. Moreover, trade secrets encourage the 
production of proprietary information by offering protection against its 
misappropriation. 340 The same subject matter protected by trade secrets could 
instead be patented or copyrighted; the choice of one protection regime over another 
is a matter of business strategy. Trade secrets do not have to be publicly disclosed 
(they must remain secret), and they can last as long as they stay confidential. One 
problem with trade secrets, however, is that once the object of the secret is revealed, 
disclosed, or figured out, anyone can use, reproduce and sell the invention or 
process without any restrictions from the trade-secret holder. For example, if a 
computer hacker deciphers how to access the secret and then steals it; or if there is a 
leak from inside and the secret is revealed; or if someone invents, discovers, or 
creates the equivalent of the secret's subject matter independently, the system of 
trade secrets could be invoked to claim reparation from the thief for breach of 
security, or the employee for breach of trust and confidentiality. Nothing, however, 
could prevent the public from freely making use of the revealed secret.341 This is 
probably one of the reasons why the use of trade secrets is not widespread in the 
338 H. Haker, R. Heam & K. Steigleder, Ethics of the Human Genome Analysis (Germany: Attempto 
Verlag Tubingen, 1993) at 112. 
339 R. S. Eisenberg, "Re-Examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value ofDNA 
Sequences" (2000) 49 Emory L. 1. 783. 
340 T. A. Lipinski & J. Britz, "Rethinking the Ownership ofInformation in the 21 st century: Ethical 
Implications" (2000) 2:1 Ethics and Information Technology 49. 
341 R. Merlin-Bennett, Knowledge Power, Intellectual Property, Information and Privacy (London: 
Lynn Riender Publishers, 2004). 
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field of biotechnology and genetics, where keeping secrets can prove quite difficult. 
Since a great de al of genetic research involves the use of similar technologies, and 
aim to isolate and identify the same biological functions of the same genetic 
elements, chances are that different research teams could, at a certain point, 
independently and accidentally produce identical results. Unless the object of the 
secret is completely novel and original in the sense that it has no equivalent in the 
natural world, researchers will often be capable, over time, of finding out the 
subject matter of a trade secret by replicating it from material existing in nature.342 
Therefore, given that genetic research and innovation often involve huge 
investments in terms oftime and capital, it is unlikely that the majority of inventors 
and authors would risk protecting their ideas through the trade secret regime. 
This leads us to a third system of IP protection: patents. In the field of genetics, this 
is certainly the preferred legal system for protecting genetic inventions, 
investments, and benefits, due to the broad scope of application and the important 
financial returns associated with patents. The following section will present the 
patent system as applied to the field of genetic development, addressing sorne 
ethical debates raised by gene patents and discussing the national and international 
aspects of the patent system. 
3.1 The Patent System 
Genetic research and development is a field giving rise to substantial ethical and legal 
debates, among which patents are one of the most litigious issues.343 A patent is a 
third form of IP right granted to an inventor over his invention, which qualifies as 
patentable under certain conditions. The patent gives him the right to exc1ude other 
people from using, making, importing, or selling his inventions for the duration of the 
342 D. B. Resnik, Owning the Genome: a Moral analysis of DNA Patenting (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2003). 
343 A. Finlay, "Gene Patenting: Seeking Benefits for AlI" (2003) 82 Reform 52. at 53; J. P. Hinojosa, 
"The Human Genome, Property of AlI: Opportunities Under the ALRC lnquiry into Gene 
Patenting and Human Health" (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 447. 
111 
patent, in exchange for wide disc10sure and publication of a detailed description of 
his invention. In this sense, patent rights reveal a natural tension between dual roles: 
protection and dissemination. 344 To be patentable, an invention (products or 
processes) must be new (not previously patented or published), involve an inventive 
step (non-obvious improvement of what already exists), and be capable of industrial 
application (useful). 
The mam purpose of awarding exc1usionary rights to someone for an eligible 
invention is to allow the patent-holder to recoup the time and funds invested in 
developing the invention and, subsequently, to encourage more innovation.345 Patents 
raise the issue of monopoly power, as they allow patent owners to have sorne control 
over prices and productivity.346 Patent rights thus create an exception to the principle 
of free enterprise, competition, and availability of information on the basis that they 
are meant to promote further technological progress and innovation.347 In addition, 
they could prevent significant profit losses by restricting imitation.348 In other words, 
sorne believe that the patent system, by imposing temporary restrictions on 
widespread use and access to knowledge, information, and ideas, has an important 
role to play in boosting the production of crucial knowledge and innovation in 
biotechnology, genetics, and health.349 In the field of genetics, translating scientific 
344 J. Boyle, "A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading" 
(1992) 80 California Law Review 1415, at 1440. 
345 The amount of money invested in the development of an invention can be very high in certain fields 
of activity. These funds can be used to coyer the costs of R&D, make up for ineffective trials, and get 
the necessary regulatory approvals. The exact amount invested varies depending on the sector and the 
companies, and can be as high as several hundred million dollars to develop and market a single drug. 
For more on R&D investments refer to: M. Mowzoon, supra note 18; J. C. McGlynn & G. Heidrich, 
"Biotech Financing Remains a Tough Row to Hoe" (1995) 13 BIO/TECH 638; G. Carr, "A Survey of 
the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Alchemists" (Feb. 21, 1998) The Economist 4; F. S. Kieff "IP 
Transactions: On The Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation" (2005) 42:3 Houston Law 
Review 727. 
346 M. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (New York: Routledge, 
1995) at 249. 
347 E. R. Gold, "Finding Common Cause in the Patent Debate" (2000) 18 Nature Biotechnology 1217; 
M. Mowzoon, supra note 18; M. Trebilcock & R. Howse. The Regulation of International Trade 
(New York: RoutIedge, 1995), at 249. 
348 H. Grabowski, "Patent, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals" (2002) J. of Int '1. Eco L. 
849, at 850; M. Trebilcock & R. Howse, supra note 346, at 250. 
349 For proponents ofthis position, the benefits of patents vis-à-vis innovation and development prevail 
over the cost of exclusivity for society. To illustrate this point, one author refers to the example of 
granting patent rights over the cure of cancer, arguing that while it may sound outrageous that a 
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discoveries into useful therapeutic products and services can be a long, complex, and 
expensive process. Additionally, the economic value of patents awarded in this field 
can be very high.350 Thus, many acknowledge the potential advantages of granting 
patent protection in this field to stimulate investment and encourage further 
developments in an area with tremendous promise for global health.351 One reason 
given to justify the importance of patents in genetics and biotechnology is the major 
difference between the costs of innovation and of imitation in these specific fields of 
scientific activity.352 It is important to mention, however, that others still consider 
there to be very little empirical evidence sustaining this incentive theory, which 
furthermore refers only to a small subset of the whole of innovation.353 We will return 
to this specific point throughout this chapter. 
Even after more than 20 years of existence, patents on genetic material are still at the 
center of a number of social policy dilemmas, particularly on the very nature of genes 
and their capacity to quai if y as patentable material in relation to the basic patenting 
rules. Nevertheless, the CUITent international legal consensus is that isolated human 
genetic material is patentable. In fact, claiming strong proprietary rights in genetic 
material has been a widespread practice since the early 1980s354 and, in the majority 
of countries, none of the ethical and social concerns voiced by various stakeholders 
have changed this permissive approach. Instead, we have witnessed an explosion of 
human genetic patent applications in terms of quantity and diversity in the major 
company could gain exclusive rights over such a crucial matter for 20 years, without a patent 
inducement, it could take hundreds of years longer to find the same treatment for cancer. D. L. Burk & 
M. A. Lemley, "Policy Levers in Patent Law" (2003) 89 Vanderbilt Law Review 1575, at 1581; M. 
Mowzoon, supra note 18. 
350 For example, the value of the patent right awarded on the gene involved in producing a hormone 
used in kidney disease treatment (erythropoietin) is about $1.5 billion a year. L. B. Andrews, "The 
Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial 1ncentives with Health Needs" (2002) 2 Hous. 
J. Health & Pol 'Y 65 
351 UNESCO International Committee on Bioethics, Report of the IBe on Ethics, Inte/lectual Property 
and Genomics, 10 January 2002, SHS-503/0 IICIB-8/2 Rev. 
352 R. M. Cook-Deegan & S. J. McCormack, "Patent Secrecy and DNA" (2001) 293 Science 217, at 
217; B. A. Caulfield, "Why we Hate Gene Patents" (January 2003) American Lawyer 51. 
353 E.R.Gold et al., supra note 122; S. Macdonald, "Exploring the Hidden Costs of Patents" in P. 
Drahos & R. Mayne, eds., Global Inte/lectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and Development 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 13. 
354 D. B. Resnik, "The Human Genome: Common Resource but not Common Heritage" in 
Proceedingsfrom a Frontis Workshop on Ethics In the Life Sciences, Wageningen University, 2004, c. 
13,197, at203. 
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industrialised countries.355 As of September 2004, over three million genome-related 
patent applications had been filed worldwide.356 
Awarding patents in human genetics and especially gene patenting have nevertheless 
given rise to numerous ethical debates. 357 The main ethical issues generated by 
patents in genetics will be analysed and re-examined at more length and detail 
throughout this chapter. For the moment, we can say that many ethical issues arise 
from the very dichotomy of patent rights that are meant to promote a balance between 
appropriation/protection (the inventor's rights) and dissemination (the community's 
rights). Sorne important issues arising from genetic patents relate to human dignity; 
access to research, products, and services; 358 and to the suitability of granting 
exclusive property rights over material embodying essential information for building 
our common knowledge of human genetics and genomics. 359 Therefore, granting 
exclusive property rights over genetic material is, for sorne, equivalent to allowing 
355 Indeed, in the field of human genetics, it is possible to patent processes like methods for isolating, 
purifYing, cloning, multiplying, changing, examining, and manufacturing DNA. In addition, genetics 
patents can also be granted on resources e.g. DNA sequences, genes and their end point markers, 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs) isolated and purified, spliced into recombinant vectors, or introduced 
into recombinant cells under laboratory conditions. Since DNA sequences are both molecules and 
information, it is important to determine what is actually covered by exclusive patent rights. Patent 
rights over genetic composition of matter should give the patent-holder temporary exclusive rights 
over the material substance of the molecule. However, the very nature of the patent bargain imposes, in 
exchange for this exclusive right, the disclosure of the invention itself and of information about the 
nature, functioning, and properties of the invention. The patent system th us allows the public to get 
access to, use, and analyse this genetic information, with the correlated obligation to respect the 
inventor's conditions, which can sometimes be very restrictive, onerous, and demanding. For more 
details, refer to D.B. Resnik, "DNA patents and human dignity" (2001) 29:2 The Journal of Law, 
Medicine, and Ethics 152; W. Cornish, Intellectual Property: Omnipresent, Distracting, Irrelevant? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); B.A. Caulfield, supra note 352; J. P. Hinojosa, "The 
Human Genome, Property of Ali: Opportunities Under the ALRC Inquiry into Gene Patenting 
and Human Health" (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 447; R. S. Eisenberg, "Re-Examining the Role 
of Patents in Appropriating the Value ofDNA Sequences", supra note 339. 
356 Human Genome Project Information, online HGPI: 
<http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human Genome/elsi/patents.shtml> (date accessed: 20 April 
2006) "Genetics and patenting, what are patents, and how do they work?" 
357 T. Caulfield, E. R. Gold & M. K. Cho, "Patenting Human Genetic Material: Refocussing the 
Debate" (2000) 1 Nature Reviews Genetics 227; B. M. Knoppers, "Status, Sale and Patenting of 
Human Genetic Material: An International Survey" (1999) 22 Nature Genetics 23. 
358 M. A. Helier & R. S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research" (1998) 280 Science 698; M. R. Henry et al., "DNA Patenting and Licensing" (2003) 297 
Science 1279; J. P. Walsh, A. Arora & W. M. Cohen, "Working through the Patent Problem" (2003) 
299 Science 1 021; UNESCO International Committee on Bioethics, supra note 351. 
359 S. Sell & C. May, "Moments in Law: Contestation and Settlement in the History of Intellectual 
Property" (Autumn 2001) 8:3 Review of International Po/itical Economy 467, at 474. 
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the commodification and graduaI drain of sorne common asset of humanity and 
keeping it out of access for subsequent basic research and important screening and 
therapeutic purposes.360 Consequently, endorsing private exclusionary rights in such 
material for a few select, wealthy corporations and countries can lead to substantial 
health inequalities based on economic considerations. Others defend the view that 
temporary appropriation of such material is essential to foster subsequent scientific 
innovation, and that preventing genetic patents would be equivalent to promoting 
unreasonable use of those resources.361 Let us examine a few of the major ethical 
debates arising from patents in genetics. 
Human Genetic Material: Patentable Substance? 
Gene patents can be awarded in the fields of agriculture, plant breeding, and animal 
research, as weIl as human genetics. As previously mentioned, however, our 
discussion will be limited to patents conceming human genes, genetic sequences, and 
related genetic material, in addition to patents on technology, tests, and processes 
relating to human genetics and health. We have stated that, to qualify as patentable, 
an invention must be new, non-obvious, and useful. There has been an ongoing 
debate as to whether genetic material should qualify more as discovery or 
invention. 362 Today, patents are generally conferred on sorne isolated and purified 
360 D. Butler, "Drive for Patent-Free Innovation Gathers Pace" (July 10, 2003) 18 Nature 424; 
B.A.Caulfield, supra note 352. 
361 .Gennan National Ethics Council, Opinion on the Patenting of Biotechnological Inventions 
Involving the Use of Biological Material of Human Origin, October 2004, Berlin. The dual function of 
patent law and its effect on distribution and justice in health will be discussed in section 3.3 ofthis 
chapter. 
362 Initially, the main issue in gene patenting was wh ether genetic material that had been manipulated 
or isolated from its natural environment and purified would be considered patentable material or a 
product of nature. Sorne opponents to gene patenting believe that no amount of manipulation is enough 
to label such material with the title of invention. For example, see: UNESCO International Committee 
on Bioethics, Report of the IBC on Ethics, Intellectual Property and Genomics, 10 January 2002, SHS-
503/0IlCIB-8/2 Rev; Gennan National Ethics Council, Ibid. However, since the US Supreme Court 
case of Diamond v. Chakrabarry 447 U.S. 303, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980) which decided that a 
genetically-engineered bacterium was patentable because it was human-made and that "anything 
under the sun that was made by man" was patentable, very little has not been considered patentable 
subject matter in the field of biotechnology and genetics. It is now settled as a matter of positive law. 
For more on this point, see: M. Mowzoon, supra note 18, at 1082; T. Caulfield, "Sustainability and the 
Balancing of the Health",supra note 23. Care and Innovation Agendas: The Commercialization of 
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genetic material, on the basis that human intervention was required to take it from its 
natural stage and bring it to its new stage. The rule for novelty and non-obviousness 
in genetic patenting is thus quite broad. Something can be characterised as new and 
non-obvious when it constitutes a real advancement and its existence was not 
previously documented in terms of constitution, structure (provided by genetic 
sequencing), process by which it is obtained, or other relevant criteria.363 
The main contentious patenting criterion in genetics is nevertheless usefulness or 
utility. There is an important distinction to make between simple isolation and 
sequencing of genetic material and going a step further, identifying its practical 
application and functions. In the fast-growing field of biotechnology and genetics, 
scientists and institutions are racing to be the first to identify and secure exclusive 
(and valuable) patent rights over genetic material of interest. Since the human 
genome is composed of only about 30 000 genes goveming millions of other 
biological substances and proteins, it is likely that most of these genes and gene 
sequences have multiple functions and interactions that will, with time and effort, 
gradually be discovered.364 When exclusive rights are granted over a whole genetic 
substance in ex change for sorne limited and incomplete information on its roles, 
functions, and applications, the patent-holder achieves substantial control over this 
material at a minor cost. In this sense, broad and vague genetic patents do not fully 
meet the utility criteria, lead to overcompensation and possible obstruction of 
research, and can therefore create sorne inequitable bargain between society and 
patent-holders. This is why things have changed gradually. We went from a trend of 
Genetic Research" (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 629, at 636; F. S. Kieff, "Property Rights and Property 
Rules for Commercializing Inventions" (2001) 85 Minn L. Rev. 697. 
363 O. Liivak, "The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents" 
(2005) 85:4 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 261; R. S. Crespi, "Patenting and Ethics-
A Dubious Connection" (January 2003) 85 Journal of Patent and Trademark Office Society 31, at 36. 
364 For example, in 2002, scientists announced that they had decoded the genetic sequence of the 
one-ce lied parasite that causes most human malaria. The scientists discovered that malaria could 
involve interactions among 500 of the 5 300 genes identified in the parasite. M. J. Gardner et al., 
"Genome sequence of the human malaria parasite Plasmodium Falciparum" (2002) 419 Nature 498; 
B. A. Caulfield, supra note 352. 
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early patent application on genetic material of very vague and incomplete present and 
future implications to much more narrow and precise patent c1aims.365 
Following this general presentation of the patent system and of the various ethical and 
legal issues triggered by its application to genetics, it is essential to conc1ude this 
section with a few words on the territorial reach of patents, particularly on the 
international IP system. 
National and international patent rights 
Patents are territorial rights in the sense that they give the patent-holder a proprietary 
right over his invention within a given country where he can exc1ude people from 
using, selling, and importing his invention. Every country can set up its own patent 
norms, subject to other conflicting national norms and international rules. Patents are 
widely enforced in industrialised countries and used more and more in developing 
nations under constant pressure to develop stronger IP standards. However, this is to 
sorne extent a new reality. Most of today's industrialised countries strongly resisted 
providing and respecting patent rights at the beginning of their economic 
development. Indeed, over the last century, most were focussed on copying patented 
365 This c1early appears from the United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) 2001 guidelines 
stipulating that any viable genetic patent c1aim should disc10se specific, substantial, and credible 
utility. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines Federal Register vol. 66 No 4 January 5, 2001 online 
on the USPTO website: <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdt> 
(accessed: May 30th, 2006). These criteria have also been applied by the European Patent Office and 
sorne developing countries' patent offices; see also M. Enserink, "Patent Office May Raise the Bar on 
Gene Claims" (2000) 287 Science 1196. Moreover, in September 2005, the US Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit applied those guidelines in an important case on the patentability of expressed 
sequence tags (ESTs). In this case, the majority decided that, although the c1aimed ESTs were 
contributing to biotechnology research, they did not meet the appropriate utility requirement because 
the c1aimant did not identifY the "function for the underlying protein-encoding genes". In re Dane K. 
Fisher and Raghynath v. Lalgudi, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 04-1465 
(SeriaI No. 09/619,643), September i h, 2005. Judge Rader, however, enounced a dissenting opinion to 
the effect that the ESTs should be patentable as research tools, because they are useful for isolating and 
studying other molecules. There is still an ongoing debate about patents on ESTs found in a gene to 
determine whether they can block the use of the full patentable gene, For more on this debate, see A. 
K. Rai, "Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff' (2001) 95:2 
Northwestern University Law Review 707. (F. S. Kieff, "Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Norms of Science-A Response to Rai & Eisenberg" (2001) 95:2 
Northwestern University Law Review 691; J. DolI, "The Patenting ofDNA" (1998) 280 Science 689. 
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inventions without paying IP owners. 366 This practice ended very recently, in the 
1980s, when the new industrialised countries reached a satisfactory level of social and 
economic growth, which put them in a position to enforce IP rights nationally. 
Modem developing countries have not had the same options. Even if they are far 
behind in terms of development, and if most believe that strong patent rights are not 
the best solution for their particular economic and social circumstances,367 both 
developing and developed countries have to comply with the same standards 
according to the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS).368 
Traditionally, patents were exc1usively a matter of national law resulting in 
substantial differences between countries in terms of level of protection and 
enforcement processes. In the course of the 1980s, newly industrialised countries 
began to prote st against the weak IP protection system prevailing in developing 
countries, and to push for increased protection with the creation of a uniform 
international IP system. Consequently, in 1995 the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
was created to strengthen the international trade regime. TRIPS was adopted as part 
of the multilateral trade agreements signed as the final act of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Negotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
366 On this topic see G. Dutfield, "Turning Knowledge into Power: Intellectual Property and the World 
Trade System" (2005) 59:4 Australian Journal of International AjJairs 533, at 544-545; G. Dutfield & 
U. Suthersanen, "Harmonisation or Differentiation in Intellectual Property Protection? The Lessons of 
History" (2005) 23:2 Prometheus 131; C. May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property 
Rights, The New Enclosures? (London: Routhledge, 2000) at 22-44 and K. Maskus, Inte/lectual 
Property Rights in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economies, 2000) 
at 143. More specifically, for an example ofwhat happened in Japan, refer to C. Chien, "Cheap Drugs 
at What Priee to Innovation? Does Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?" 
(2003) 18 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 853, at 863-864. 
367 A large part of most of developing countries' economies is based on imitation, something that 
patent law does not allow: K. A. Czub, "Argentina's Emerging Standard of Intellectual Property 
Protection: A Case Study of Underlying Conflicts Between Developing Countries, TRIPS standards 
and the United States" (2001) 33 Case W. Res. J. Int '1. L. 191, at 191; K. Maskus, Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economies, 2000) at 148. 
368 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 C, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31,33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); W. Pretorius, "TRIPS and Developing 
Countries: How Level is the Playing Field?" in P. Drahos & R. Mayne, eds., Global Intellectual 
Property Rights, Knowledge, A ccess and Development (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 2002) 183. 
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and Trade (GATT). 369 While one role of the WTO is to deal with TRIPS 
implementation, enforcement, and related dispute settlement, there is another 
specialised international organisation established in 1970, the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO), that focuses on administering other existing 
normative intellectual property documents and on providing technical and legal 
assistance to countries that need it. 
TRIPS' main purpose is to create an international legal structure supporting a set of 
minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property. All WTO member 
states have to comply with these legally binding principles as part of the general 
institutional framework set up under the WTO. This is meant to reinforce the global 
nature ofthis single intellectual property system. With its mandatory ratification and 
its strong and effective enforcement and compliance system, TRIPS creates a 
unique framework at the internationallevel. 
TRIPS supplements the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of lndustrial 
Property and the 1886 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, creating new minimum requirements relating to subject matter, 
scope, and enforcement of IP by all WTO states.370 In fact, TRIPS requires all WTO 
member states to prote ct patent rights in all fields of technology for a period of 
twenty years from the application. This does not mean that TRIPS creates one static 
uniform law for everyone. Instead, TRIPS is meant to establish general minimum 
principles while leaving flexibility for national differentiated application, 
depending on specifie needs and levels of development.37J However, the effective 
369 T. Kongolo, "Morocco's Patent System and its International Connection" (2002) 42 IDEA: The 
Journal of Law and Technology 181; S. K. Sell, Private Power, Public Law: Globalisation of 
fntellectual Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 150-163; C. May, supra note 
366, at 33. 
370D.G Richards, fntellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism,supra note 32, at 123-126. 
371 To this effect, par. 6 of TRIPS' preamble mentions that Member State recognise: "the special needs 
of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base." Examples of such freedom can be found under sections 7 and 8 of TRIPS, which 
provide member states with a cIear legal basis for taking measures that may diverge from generally 
accepted applications of the agreement by promoting social and economic welfare, public health, 
nutrition, and public interest in sectors of vital importance with the important restriction that those 
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ability of countries to take advantage (or not) of this freedom depends on various 
factors including external economic and political pressure, internaI politics, local 
capacities, and limitations in terms of science and technology development, 
expertise, and infrastructures.372 Following TRIPS' entry into force in 1995, there 
have been growing concerns and scepticism from many developing countries that it 
was not at aIl adapted to their needs and does not allow them enough latitude to 
pursue crucial public health goals. 
It is in this context that the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health (Doha Declaration) was proposed by a group of eighty countries led by the 
Africa Group, Brazil, and India. It raised considerable opposition from more affluent 
states but was finally adopted in November 2001. 373 The main purpose of this 
document is to clarify that TRIPS' dispositions should be applied in a way that allows 
public heath protection and encourage global access to health, especially access to 
affordable generic medicines for aIl. It also recognises that, even if intellectual 
property may have a positive impact on health innovation, countries need flexibility 
to address of their domestic health needs.374 Sorne believe that the Doha Declaration 
represents a first step in looking at TRIPS with a public interest perspective. 375 
However, despite the special attention awarded to public health in the Doha 
Declaration, TRIPS remains an international agreement applied mainly to foster the 
interests of intellectual pro pert y owners and promote international trade. In fact, there 
measures be consistent with the provisions of TRIPS itself. Moreover, art. 27 (2) stipulates that states 
may exclude inventions trom patentability in order to protect ordre public or morality, including to 
protect human, animal, or plant life or health, or avoid serious prejudice to the environment. WTO 
members may also exclude diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans 
or animaIs (27 (3) a» and award compulsory licences (authorising a third party to work the patent 
without the authorisation of the patent-holder) in limited cases and if they meet very strict criteria (art 
31). 
372 K. Balasubramaniam, "Access to Medicine: Patents, Price and Public Policy- Consumer 
Perspective" in P. Drahos & R. Mayne, eds., Global intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, 
Access and Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 87. 
373 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, November 14,2001, WT/MIN(OI)/DEC/l. 
374 This Declaration addresses issues of compulsory li censes in situations of health emergency, 
exhaustion of rights, real and applicable differentiation in patent rules to protect public health, 
technology transfer, extension of the grace period for integrating TRIPS' standards for the least 
developed countries, etc. 
375 C. M. Correa, implications on the Doha Declaration on the TRiPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WHO Health Economics and Drugs, EDM Series no. 12, June 2002. 
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lS growmg evidence of socio-economic problems originating from TRIPS 
enforcement in many developing countries.376 
In order to measure the importance of the different interests at stake in the application 
of IP and, more specifically, patent rights, the next section of this chapter will study 
the theoretical foundations of patent protection. 
3.2 Sorne Theoretical Justification for the Institution of Patents 
What purpase this system (as if exists taday) is designed ta achieve? 
In the previous chapter, this dissertation set out a theoretical framework to help us 
address issues of access and distribution in genetics and health. After presenting the 
basics of IP and patents, and briefly assessing their importance and the issues they 
raise in genetics, this section aims to review and analyse the main theoretical 
arguments put forward to justify the existence of patents.377 This is an important step 
376 For example, in Brazil, the enactment of a new TRIPS-compliant patent act in 1996 has had 
detrimental effects on availability and affordability of medicines. In fact, new patent applications have 
almost aIl been filed by non-Brazilians, medicine imports have greatly increased without similar 
growth in exports, and the price of drugs has increased considerably because of the lack of satisfactory 
anti-trust regulatory authorities. Also, in lndia, since TRIPS has put a stop to reverse engineering 
(coming up with a new process to create the same chemical entity), the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry has been experiencing major difficulties and has failed to secure access to important drugs for 
the lndian population. Moreover, price increases of 5 to 67 per cent for patented drugs have been 
observed, and the associated welfare loss is being transferred to foreign stakeholders who recently 
recorded profits ranging between US$IO to 839 million. For more on the effects that TRIPS have had 
on the Brazilian and lndian economies, refer to: T. E. DeMasi & J .D. Garretson, "PERSPECTIVE: 
Willful Patent lnfringement Law Needs Reform" (July 28,2003) 230 New York Law Journal 5 (coU); 
J.A.Z. Bermudez, R. Epsztein, M.A. Oliveira & L. Hasenclever, The WTO Trips Agreement and Patent 
Protection in Brazil: Recent Changes and implications for local production and access to medicines. 
WHO/PAHO Collaborating Center for Pharmaceutical Policies, Rio de Janeiro, 2002; K. 
Balasubramaniam, supra note 372; D.G. Richards, supra note 370; J. Watal, "Pharmaceutical 
patents, prices and welfare losses: Policy options for lndia under the WTO TRIPS agreement" (May 
2000) 23:5 World Economy 733; R. Gerster, "How WTO/TRIPS Threatens the lndian Pharmaceutical 
lndustry" Third World Network, 2000, online on the TWN website: 
<www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr120h.htm> (accessed June 3rd, 2006). 
377 We do not aim to present an exhaustive overview of patent theory. We simply brietly introduce 
sorne of the main arguments of the major patent theories. For a deeper analysis, we encourage the 
reader to consult the literature on the topic, namely: J. Hughes, "The Philosophy of lntellectual 
Property" (1988) 77 Geo. L. J. 287; B. Sherman & L. Bently, The Making of Modern Intellectual 
Property Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); E. Hettinger, "Justifying Intellectual 
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in understanding the reasons put forward to justify relying on such system. Indeed, it 
will help us identify sorne of the primary objectives of the patent system, for the 
purpose of our further assessment. 
Let us begin this subsection with a troubling quote from Edith Penrose from 1951: 
"[i]f national patent laws did not exist, it would be difficult to make a conclusive 
case for introducing them; but the fact that they do exist shifts the burden of proof 
and it is equally difficult to make a really conclusive case for abolishing them".378 
This highlights what many have described as the lack of clear grounds and agreed 
upon explanation for awarding legal protection to intellectual objects, and the 
"formidable task" of justifying IP. 379 For sorne, intellectual property is not 
something that can be theoretically justified because it is dependant on constantly 
evolving historical and cultural variables and does not have solid foundations.38o 
For others, since patentable inventions are non-exclusive (they can be used by many 
people concurrently) and impose limits on the circulation of ideas, the burden of 
presenting theoretical foundations for patents falls to those who favour them.38I 
IP justification often refers to property more generally.382 There are two main ways 
of rationalising institutions like property in moral philosophy: deontological and 
consequentialist. Deontological rationalisation refers to rights-based theories aiming 
at protecting what people are entitled to. It demands that decision be made balancing 
the duties of sorne and the rights of others, determined in relation to principles that do 
Property" (1989) 18 Philosophy & Public Affairs 32; D. Vaver, "Intellectual Property Today: Of 
Myths and Paradoxes" (1990) 69 La Revue du Barreau Canadien 98. 
378 E. Penrose, The Economies of the International Patent System (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1951) at. 40 quoted in D. Vaver, "Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes" in P. 
Drahos, ed., Intelleetual Property (England: Darmouth Publishing, 1999) 485, at 495. 
379 For example, see E. Hettinger, supra note 377, at 52; R. L. Ostergard, Jr., "Intellectual 
Property: A Universal Human Right?" (1999) 21: 1 Human Rights Quarterly 156. 
380 Drahos refers to this position as post-modemist scepticism in his book: P. Drahos, A Philosophy of 
Intelleetual Property (Adelshot: Darmouth Publishing Company, 1996), c. 9, at 200. 
381 B. Martin, "Against Intellectual Property" in P. Drahos, ed., Intelleetual Property (England: 
Darmouth Publishing, 1999) 517. 
382 L. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophie Foundations (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1977); 1. 
Waldron, The Right to Private Property, supra note 259; S.Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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not change according to a change in circumstances.383 Consequentialist justification 
refers to the resulting positive consequences (like incentive, for example), without 
worrying about their underlying morality.384 According to Nance, these two analytical 
tools should be used simultaneously, since "[o]ur trust in institutions like property 
should depend upon the existence and convergence of coherent deontological and 
consequentialist theories that support the rights in question and cohere with our 
respective views toward tangible private property and govemment supported private 
monopolies,,385. 
While the philosophical foundations for awarding patents are uncertain, it remains 
that theorists of different views have identified sorne moral and economic grounds 
to justify awarding exclusive protection to inventions. These can generally be 
categorised as follows: 1) respect for the inventions arising from the work of the 
inventor (Locke's labour theory); 2) importance of the ownership of intellectual 
objects in an inventor's personal development (Hegel's theory of the self); 3) 
significance of awarding exclusive proprietary rights on inventions in promoting 
inventive endeavours and innovation, their diffusion and commercialisation 
(utilitarian incentive theory); and 4) importance of patents in serving an established 
economic system driven by powerful agents aiming to achieve specific social and 
economic outcomes (Drahos' economic power theory). Each of these four general 
categories is addressed in the next subsections, with a special focus on the two more 
relevant for our analysis: the consequentialist utilitarian the ory and power theory. 
383 Wikifedia, the Free Encyclopedia, online: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontological> (accessed 
May 191 , 2006). 
384 H. M Spector, "An outline of a Theory Justifying Intellectual and Industrial Property Rights" in 
P. Drahos, ed., Intellectual Property (England: Darmouth Publishing, 1999) 535, at 536; J. Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) c. 1; G. Davies, Copyright and the Public 
Interest, Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994) 
at 13. 
385 D.A. Nance, "Foreword: Owning Ideas" (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 757, 
at 767. 
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3.2.1 Locke's labour theory 
With his labour theory of proprietary rights, John Locke elaborated one of the most 
famous deontological justifications of the institution of private property more than 
300 years ago. Locke's first principle is that everyone has property over his own 
person (what one decides to do with himselt) and is consequently entitled to property 
rights over the products of his labour.386 Hence, what is generated with the help of a 
person' s efforts, aptitudes, and talents should be his, even if his or her labour was 
mixed with resources already existing in the commons. 387 Another reason for 
justifying property through labour is that property plays an important role in society 
by encouraging people to work, something people would otherwise naturally wish to 
avoid.388 Therefore, when one's labour results in valuable goods and in a society's 
prosperity, he should be compensated.389 Locke also limits the possible acquisition of 
proprietary rights over the product of one's labour with two provisos. The first 
condition is that property rights can only be awarded if there is "enough and as good 
left in common for others,,,390 while the second condition is that one must not get 
property rights on more than what he or she can use before it spoils.39 \ 
386 J. Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment (Cambridge: Laslett, 1988) (1690). 
387 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Cambridge: Laslett, 1988) c. 5. It is important to 
highlight the difference between two labour theories: one based on natural rights to property (where 
property rights are owed, such as with Locke's version) and the other based on desert to property 
(where property rights are deserved).387 Under the desert labour theory, the efforts invested in 
labour, the risk assumed, and ethical concems are evaluated to determine if they justify awarding 
property rights.387 This version excludes luck, inteIIigence and natural talents from the equation, as 
they are clearly not appropriate variables to assess desert.387 This distinction is not possible with a 
natural rights property theory like Locke's. For a discussion ofthis point, see J. Feinberg, supra note 
250, at 16; L.C. Becker, Property Rights: Philosophie Foundations (Boston: Routledge, 1977) at. 
46; E. Hettinger, supra note 377, at 42. 
388 L. Becker, "The Labour Theory of Property Acquisition" (1976) Journal of Philosophy 653; C. 
May, "Unacceptable Costs: The Consequences of Making Knowledge Property in a Global Society" 
(2002) 16:2 Global Society 123; J. Bentham, "The Theory of Legislation" in C.B. Macpherson, ed., 
Property, Mainstream and Critieal Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) at 53. 
389 Locke's theory is derived somewhat trom natural law in that he suggests that property exists 
naturaIIy in the principle of self-ownership and does not require the intervention of the law, state, or 
institutions to be created. However, it can be seen as a weak version ofnaturallaw, since govemments 
have nonetheless the authority to regulate it with positive law. D. G Richards, Intelleetual Property 
Rights and Global Capitalism, supra note 32, at 26-33; P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 54. 
390This means that exclusive property rights can be awarded as long as no one is made worse off. For a 
discussion on that specific clause, see R. L. Ostergard, Jr., "InteIIectual Property: A Universal Human 
Right?" supra note 379. 
391 J. Locke, supra note 387, c. 5, sect. 27 and 31. 
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Although Locke was actually sceptical of the application of his theory to intellectuai 
property, many have argued for its application to IP and patents. 392 Indeed, the 
production of inventions through creative effort and ideas is a type of labour that 
should be encouraged and patents can be essential to reward efforts and investment in 
research, innovation, and development. 393 However, many critiques can be 
formulated of Locke's theory as a philosophical foundation of patents. First, it is not 
always clear whether the compensation awarded by patents is proportional and 
justified by the efforts of the patent-holder. For example, in genetics, the fruits of 
one's labour will often be the result of a mix of work, highly specialised 
computerised research tools (e.g., for sequencing and decrypting human genetic 
material), and a fair amount of luck. In science, moreover, it is not uncommon for 
several scientists to come up with the same invention almost simuItaneously and 
totally independently.394 It is thus hard to justify why, with the application of Locke's 
theory of labour, the fastest and luckiest inventors should receive aIl of the benefit 
when so many others have laboured and probably invested as much time, effort, and 
money in the same research endeavours. 
Moreover, Locke allows property rights over anything with which one mixes his 
labour, suggesting that the actual labour is responsible for the quasi-total value of the 
fruits of labour. 395 This cumulative inventive process can create serious problems, 
especially in genetic research, where inventors have to build on existing knowledge 
and ideas, and on previous valuable inventions created and constructed over the years 
by many different agents within a broad social process.396 Once the research team 
identifies sorne new, non-obvious and useful subject matter, Locke's theory allows 
them to obtain exclusive property rights over it and its entire market value, as if it had 
been developed in a social vacuum, in isolation from the broader social context.397 In 
392 For example, see B. G. Damstedt, "Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use 
Doctrine" (Feb. 2003) 112:5 Yale Law Journal 1179; J. Hughes, supra 378, at 320. 
393 C. May, supra note 366. 
394 D. Vaver, supra note 377. 
395 Locke believes that things have very little importance until they are being worked on. He even 
proposes that 99% of objects' value is created by labour. J. Locke, supra note 387, par. 5, sec. 40. 
396 B. Martin, supra note 381. 
397 D.G Richards, supra note 380, c.2, at 25-52. 
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this case, awarding exclusive proprietary rights over an invention and its market value 
can be unfair to society and to other stakeholders, and does not demonstrate an 
appreciation of the importance of the numerous independent variables involved in the 
establishment of the actual market value of goodS.398 
AIso, in aiming to reward labour, Locke seems to assume that the inventor and the 
patent-holder will necessarily always be the same person. This is not compatible with 
the patent system structure, which rewards the patent-holder with exclusive 
proprietary rights over sorne invention without worrying about the identity of the 
actual inventor.399 In the fields of genetics and biotechnology, though most inventions 
originate from the work of sorne individual researchers or groups of scientists, most 
patents are awarded to multinational corporations and private and public research labs 
that employ those inventors. 
Our last critique of Locke relates to his emphasis on the importance of one' s ability to 
accomplish labour work. Locke does not talk about property redistribution, and his 
theory do es not allow taking individuals' natural capacity differences into account. 
His libertarian vision brings him to focus only on capacity to generate property rights 
and not on compensating the less fortunate for their lack of capacity in terms of 
labour productivity. 
Overall, Locke's vision is consistent with a libertarian theory of justice that we chose 
to set aside at the beginning of this dissertation to focus on a liberal theory of 
distributive justice. Indeed, for us, the main concern is not the compensation for 
labour, but more the protection and access to health. Allowing redistribution towards 
this end is therefore crucial to giving people more control over their lives and to 
target a goal of equality of opportunities. We will come back to this point in greater 
detail in section 3.3.2.2 ofthis chapter. 
398 For Hettinger, a product's market value is influenced by the productivity of competitors, the 
demand for the product, and the type ofproperty institutions prevailing in a given country-ail things 
over which the labourer does not have influence: E.C. Hettinger, supra note 337, at 227-230. 
399 C. May, supra note 366, c. 4, at 115-117. 
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3.2.2 Hegel's theory of the self 
A second important deontological theory of property cornes from Hegel, who says 
that "property is the embodiment of personality.,,4oo BasicaIly, Hegel's argument is 
based on the idea that property, both in material and intellectuai objects, plays a 
crucial role in assuring individuals' social and biological survival, as weIl as in the 
construction of their personality. For Hegel, property is not a natural entitlement 
arising from labour work and it can be transgressed and ignored only in situations of 
extreme need, as when, for example, someone could be denied life and freedom of 
will as a result of property rights' enforcement.401 Property rights are important to 
secure individual freedom from intrusion and interference by society and other 
individuals. According to Hegel, people can only be free if they have property over 
what characterises and supports the development of their personalities and their most 
important needs.402 In that sense, the very principle of individual freedom justifies 
property rights.403 
In his discussion on property in knowledge and ideas, Hegel recognises the 
incentive role of property protection in innovation, and at the same time, 
emphasises the importance of creating, improving, and maintaining a 
society' s knowledge platform. This is why, in allowing intellectual property 
rights over such crucial information, astate also ought to ensure that the 
normative structure simultaneously allows the protection of the knowledge 
commons. 
Although Hegel does not believe that the state should be in charge of creating 
property privileges, he nevertheless recognises the role of the legal system in 
institutionalising the protection of citizens' property rights. Hegel admits that 
400 G.W. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, Ist ed., 
1967 reprint) at 51. 
401 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 252-253. 
402 C. May, supra note 366, at 100. 
403 D.G Richards, supra note 370, at 33. 
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property systems can produce poverty by asslgnmg exclusive rights in 
necessary elements of people's development, and in awarding property rights 
through contracts often characterised by unequal bargaining power. 404 In this 
sense, property rights influence opportunities. Hegel does not propose any 
solutions to this problem, but believes that government should have a role to 
play in controlling sorne market forces to provide the minimal necessities to 
those without property. 
One problem with Hegel's theory is that even though he argues for the protection of 
the knowledge commons, he does not present an analysis of the connection between 
the institution of property and the protection of the commons. He focusses on the 
influence of property on the personal development of individuals and, in so doing, 
neglects the broader role of property institutions for knowledge diffusion. 405 
Another problem with Hegel' s theory of the self is the strong link it makes between 
property and personality, and the fact that it presupposes that the object of pro pert y 
has to remain within the control of the property owner in order to influence the 
construction of his own personality. When applied to IP, Hegel's self-development 
theory does not seem compatible with the way the actual international intellectual 
property system operates, characterised by a strong trade component which requires 
total alienability of both IP rights and intellectual objects affected by IPRs.406 
Additionally, in aiming to link property with personality and self, Hegel, like Locke, 
presumes that the property holder will have a personal and intimate interest in the 
object ofhis property. This does not translate weIl in the field of patent law where the 
personality of the inventor is not at aIl considered and only the patent owner, 
regardless of who it is, gets the benefits. 407 In genetics and biotechnology, most 
inventors do not turn out to be patent owners, and this title almost always falls under 
404 C. May, "Cosmopolitan Legalism Meets Thin Community: Problems in the Global Govemance of 
IP" (2004) Government and Opposition 393, at 396 et ss; D. G Richards, supra note 380, c.2; J. 
Hughes, supra note 335. 
405 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 250-275. 
406 C. May, supra note 366, c. 4, at 98-103. 
407 Ibid, c. 4, at 115-117. 
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the control of wealthy and powerful multinational corporations and private and public 
research labs. 
Moreover, by drawing a direct connection between property and the expression of the 
self, Hegel's property theory accepts that inequalities between individuals will 
persist. Even if he proposes that governments should help those without much 
property meet their basic needs for survival, Hegel still believes that owning property 
rights is an absolutely requirement to achieve personality. This leaves those who 
cannot afford property rights out of the definition of personality. Furthermore, in 
making a direct association between inequalities in wealth and inequalities in positive 
personal characteristics, Hegel does not propose anything to improve the situation of 
those who have been less fortunate in terms of abilities, talents, wealth, health, etc. 
He simply notices those differences, associates them with personality and property, 
and seems to accept that different people will continue to have different 
opportunities.408 This clearly sanctions the very principle of self-ownership that has 
been rejected by Rawls on the basis that disadvantaged people who suffer from 
undeserved conditions should have a right to compensation for those inequalities.409 
Applying a simplified version of Hegel's theory of the self to property in genetics 
could mean, for example, that sick people of different countries who would need to 
access genetic products and services for meeting sorne of their important health needs 
would necessarily have to acquire property rights over them.4lO This would allow 
those who can afford it to go one step further in developing their personality toward 
practical freedom while leaving those who cannot out of the process.411 This result is 
clearly contrary to the principles of distributive justice in health developed in our 
theoretical framework, something we will address at greater length when we assess 
the IP system in the next section ofthis chapter. 
408 D.G Richards, supra note 380, c. 2, at 30-40. 
409 This directly refers to the application of Rawls' difference principle analysed in length in the last 
chapter. 
410 This could be by paying for them or having sorne kind ofprivate or public mechanisms in place that 
would allow property transfer. 
411 For the purposes ofthis example, we are assuming that the genetic products and services are not 
absolutely necessary for one's survival and freedom of will. Therefore, one cannot transgress property 
rights over them even ifthey can play an important role in improving one's health condition. 
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This brief overview of Hegel' s theory allows us to conclude that it is also inconsistent 
with the liberal theory of distributive justice we adopt in this dissertation. 
3.2.3. The utilitarian justification of property 
The most common and popular justification of property is the utilitarian argument 
arising from the consequentialist tradition. Property theory begins with the idea that 
knowledge should remain freely available and unappropriated unless there is a good 
Il ' .. 412 reason to a ow lts apprOprIatIOn. 
Basically, the idea underlying this argument is that inventions are good for 
maximising societal benefits and that intellectual property protection is required to 
encourage innovative activities, production and dissemination of valuable knowledge, 
scientific and technological progress, and fair competition in the creation of new 
intellectual objects.413 Another aspect of the utilitarian scheme is that the scarcity of 
ideas promotes innovation and encourages the production of more knowledge.414 This 
ideology is anchored in a Western tradition that endorses a positive role for private 
property in economic development and does not consider inventions differently than 
other types of production. 415 For utilitarians, the positive effects of patents are 
measured in terrns of their consequences on human preferences satisfaction, without 
taking the nature of these preferences into consideration. 416 Thus, the effects of 
patents on progress are positive when they play a role in improving economic 
412 E.C. Hettinger, "Justifying Intellectual Property", supra note 377, at 35-36 cited in E. R. Gold & T. 
Caulfield Patents and Human Rights, paper prepared for Justice Canada, April 2003, online on the 
CIPP website: <http://www.cipp.rncgill.caldataipublications/00000006.pdt> (access April 20th, 
2006), at 46. 
413 In fact, as previously explained, the arnount ofrnoney that needs to be invested in the developrnent 
of an invention can be very high, particularly in sorne specialised fields of activities like biotechnology 
and genetics. This is one reason why rnany argue that incentives in the form of patents are needed to 
foster innovation. D.B. Resnik, "DNA patents and scientific discovery and innovation: assessing 
benefits and risks" (2001) 7:1 Science and Engineering Ethics 29; J. Hughes, supra note 378; M. 
Mowzoon, supra note 18. D.G Richards, supra note 380, c. 6, at. 147-151. 
414 C. May, supra note 333, at. 127. 
415 R. L. Ostergard, Jr., supra note 379, at 165, D.G Richards, supra note 380, chap. 2, at. 30-35 
416 D. Nance, supra note 385 at. 764-767. 
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development and in contributing to progress in medicine, health, agriculture, 
biotechnology, etc. The utilitarian justification of patents is also intended to balance 
their dual role, which is meant to encourage the dissemination of knowledge for long-
term advancement and further development of ideas, and concurrently reward 
inventors with temporary exclusive proprietary rights. 
There are different types of utilitarian justifications for IP relating mainly to on the 
one hand, its role as an incentive for innovation, dissemination, and development, and 
on the other hand, its role in commercialisation of inventions. We will say few words 
on each of these paradigms. 
IP and innovation, dissemination, and development 
The most popular utilitarian justification is to argue that IP protection creates the 
artificial scarcities necessary to ensure that potential inventors have sufficient 
financial incentive to invest in a given sector and disseminate their results.417 As we 
know, when an inventor is granted a patent over an invention, he can use this right to 
prevent others from using the invention, recover the amount invested in developing it, 
disclose it to the public, and fund other research projects.418 Proponents of this view 
argue that, without intellectual property rights, progress toward prevention, treatment, 
and cures for important health issues could be compromised or delayed.419 Innovation 
and dissemination are viewed as a way to increase social welfare and inventors' 
reward as a mechanism to attain this goal. 420 The positive impact of patents on 
417 F-K Beier & J. Straus, "The Patent System and its Informational Function--Yesterday and Today" 
(1977) 8 In!'l Rev. Int. Prop. & C'right L. 387; K. Arrow, "The Economics ofinformation: An 
Exposition'" (1996) 23:2 Empirica 125. 
418 S. A. Singham, "Competition Policy and the Stimulation ofInnovation: TRIPS and the Interface 
Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry" (2000) 26 Brook. J. In!'l 
L. 363, at 367-372. 
419 M. F. Grady & J. 1. Alexander, "Patent Law and Rent Dissipation" (1992) 78 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 305; A.S. Oddi, "Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents - the Not- Quite-Holy Grail" 
(1996) 7] Notre Dame L. Rev. 267 
420 E. R. Gold, "The Reach of Patent Law and Institutional Competence" (2003-2004) ] VOLTJ 263; 
D. L. Burk & M. A. Lemley, "Policy Levers in Patent Law", supra note 349; Apotex Inc. v. Wel/come 
Foundation Ltd. 2002 SCC 77 (December 5, 2002), Justice Binnie, at par. 37. 
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innovation was established in the economic literature a while ag0421 and is enshrined 
in the western judicial interpretation of patents' positive implications. 422 In 
biotechnology and genetics, this argument is said to be especially relevant because of 
the high costs of Research & Development (R&D) and the often lengthy process of 
market approva1.423 Increased dissemination is meant to happen as patents are granted 
in exchange for the disclosure, in the patent application, of the information necessary 
to use and manufacture the invention. This is meant to encourage inventors to 
disclose what they would otherwise keep confidentia1.424 However, depending on the 
strategy adopted by patent-holders, patents will not always play an important role in 
knowledge dissemination.425 
Another argument in favour of this utilitarian justification of patent protection relates 
to its role as a mechanism to foster development. Indeed, in addition to increasing 
R&D and innovation, it is argued that patents are necessary to insure industry growth 
and national development through improved foreign direct investment and technology 
transfers.426 
421 These studies determined that patents were responsible for 15 to 25% of aIl innovation. For more 
details and reference to those studies refer to E.R. Gold et al., supra note 353, at 303. 
422 For sorne examples on how the Courts have interpreted and justified IP, see Fogerty v. Fantasy 
Ine., 510 U.S. 517(1994) and Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) cited in A. K. Rai, 
"Regulating Scientific Research: Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research" (1999) 
94 Northwestern University Law Review 77. 
423 This argument is incomplete, as c1early explained in E. R. Gold & T. Caulfield, supra note 412. 
424 However, secrecy does not protect from independent innovations and might not always be an 
efficient means to protect inventions. R. S. Eisenberg, "Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive 
Rights and Experimental Use" (1989) 56 V. Chi. L. Rev. 1017. 
425 For example, patent-holders could decide to disaggregate their invention into different components 
and c1aim patent rights on each ofthem. For more on this point, see: E.R. Gold et al, supra note 353, at 
303; on the disclosure role of patents, see also J. Hughes, supra note 378; Cadbury Sehweppes Ine. v. 
FBI Foods Ltd. 1999, 1 S.C.R. 142; F. Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, 
Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of The Senate Comm. on The Judiciary, Study No. 
15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (GPO, 1958) at 21. 
426 J.P Walsh, C. Cho & W.M. Cohen, "Science and Law; View from the Bench: Patents and Material 
Transfers" (2005) 309:5743 Science 2002; E. Mansfield, "Intellectual Property Protection, Direct 
Investment and Technology Transfer" (International Finance Corporation Discussion Paper No. 27, 
1995, at Il; S. Crespi, "Models of Intellectual Property" (2002) 20 Trends in Biotechnology 451; J. 
Reichman, "Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS 
Component of the WTO Agreement" (1996) 29 Int'l L. 345; UK Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Integrating Intelleetual Property Rights in Development Policy, London, September 2002, 
online on the website of CIPR, 
<http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfslfinal reportiCIPRfuIlfinal.pdt> (date accessed: Il May 
2005), at 18 & 22-26 (already cited in introduction); K. Maskus, Intelleetual Property Rights in the 
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Another important aspect of the utilitarian theory of IP relates to its role in welfare 
maximisation. Utilitarianism requires the allocation of objects of property to those 
who value them the most in economic terms for the maximisation of societal benefits. 
In other words, utilitarianism requires the maximisation of overall welfare rather than 
equality in its distribution, on the basis that patents create incentives to encourage 
innovation. Because innovation is deemed to be good for society, allocation of patent 
rights should be encouraged in a utilitarian solution. Following this reasoning, 
property will preferably be allocated to those who can make the most productive and 
efficient use of it in a competitive context, allowing society to recover a maximum of 
benefits from those rights.427 
IP and Commercialisation 
A second important utilitarian justification for IP has to do with its role in 
commercialisation in terms of contribution to the manufacturing and distribution of 
innovations. In other words, sorne argue that patents are necessary for encouraging 
investment and coordination of the "complex, costly and risky" commercialisation 
process required for taking interesting ideas and promising inventions and 
transforming them into useful products available in a given market. 428 This theory 
emphasises the importance of commercialising inventions as rapidly and efficiently 
as possible for the bene fit of different stakeholders. For this purpose, many things 
must be accompli shed, such as fundraising, setting up facilities to produce and 
manufacture the invention, establishing distribution networks, and raising public 
Global Economy (Washington DC: Institute for National Economy, 2000); S. A. Singham, supra 
note 418, at 375-385. 
427 C. May, supra note 366, c. 4, at. 122-123. 
428 Kieff articulates the commercialisation theory in F. S. Kieff, "Property Rights and Property Rules 
for Commercializing Inventions" (2001) 85 Minn. L. Re\!. 101; S.F. Kieff, "Perusing Property Rights 
in DNA" in S.F. Kieff, ed., Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project (Califomia: 
Elsevier, 2003) c.7, 125; for more on the commercialisation theory of patent see also G. S. Rich, "The 
Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti- Monopoly Laws" (1942) 24 J. Pat.Off. Soc 'Y 85; D. 
S. Chisum et al., Principles of Patent Law: Cases and Material, (New York: Foundation Press, 2004). 
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awareness about the patented prodUCt.429 These steps come with a price, and patents 
are meant to exclude those who have not shared in the costs from the benefit of 
commercialisation. In this sense, patents can represent an important tool for securing 
further investment, fostering countries' competitiveness in certain areas of research, 
and making useful inventions available to communities.430 Publicly recorded patents 
play a crucial role in helping different users of the inventions (such as developers, 
manufacturers, labourers, managers, investors, advertisers, and marketers) get in 
contact with one another and coordinate their activities around a specific invention to 
bring it to a stage where it can be useful to people and profitable for the patent-
holder.431 This theory is particularly adapted to the biotechnology and genetic sectors, 
where commercialisation costs and risks offailure are very high.432 
Critique 
There are problems with the way different aspects of the utilitarian justification for 
patents work today. In fact, they justify temporarily restricting access to the object of 
patents on the basis that this will encourage more production and better access to 
inventions in the future. This reasoning finds its origins in the idea that patents should 
balance both the interest of inventors in the protection of their invention, and that of 
society in the diffusion of new inventions. However, such balance is not easy to 
reach. Indeed, as Hettinger states: "IP laws have been used more recently not as part 
of a social contract between creators and society, but as a tool for securing market 
share in an increasingly competitive global economy.,,433 For now, dissemination is 
constrained by the willingness and capacity to pay for accessing patented inventions. 
429 F. S. Kieff, supra note 346 
430 R. Adler, "Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations for Knowledge and 
Commercialization" (1992) 257 Science 908. 
431 H. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights JI: The Competition Between Private and 
Collective Ownership (2002) 31 J.Legal Stud. S.653; F. S. Kieff, "The Case for Registering Patents 
and the Law and Economicsof Present Patent-Obtaining Rules" (2003) 45 B.C L. Rev. 55 
432 For a enlightening and weil referenced discussion on this point, refer to F. S. Kieff, "IP 
Transactions: On The TheOly & Practice of Commercializing Innovation" (2005) 42:3 Houston Law 
Review 727. 
433 E.C. Hettinger, supra note 377, at. 50. 
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Consequently, the importance of the free flow of ideas and knowledge for societal 
development finds itself diluted by the application of a too strong and often 
unbalanced utilitarian justification of IP. 
One critique of the utilitarian VISIOn of patents arIses from the fact that the 
encouragement of innovation is often compromised by the growing importance of 
patents in stimulating legal monopolies. As we will explain in more depth with 
examples in the last chapter of this thesis, sorne suggest that biotechnology and 
genetic patents often do not act as incentives for socially valuable research and 
innovation, especially in developing countries-but more as tools used by large 
corporations to advance their economic agendas, gain access to more markets, and 
prevent other firms from penetrating specifie fields of activity.434 Indeed, the system 
is at the origin of inefficient "races" between potential patent-holders who want to 
secure their patents first. Because only one patent ends up being granted for a single 
invention, this creates unnecessary duplication of research and investment in very 
specifie, potentially profitable spheres of research.435 Therefore, the positive impact 
of patent on innovation first established with economic studies is now being 
questioned. Recent comparative economic studies looking at different countries' 
patent systems and empirical research in the specifie area of genetic testing suggest 
that there might not always be a positive link between patent rights and innovation 
434 F. Machlup, Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United-States (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962) at. 164-175; J-C St-Onge, L'envers de la PiIIule (Montréal: Ecosociété, 2004 
(on the massive production of non-innovative, "me-too" drugs); S. Joseph, "Pharmaceutical 
Corporations and Access to Drugs: The Fourth Wave ofCorporate Human Rights Scrutin y" (2003) 25 
Human Rights Quarterly 425 (on concems about the type of innovation that patents foster); D. Noble, 
America by Design (New York: Knopf, 1982) c.6; R. L. Ostergard, Jr., supra note 379, at 165-166; E. 
R. Gold, supra note 420; M. Sakakibara & L. Branstetter, "Do Stronger Patents Induce More 
Innovation? Evidence From the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms" (2001) 32 RAND Journal of 
Economics 77; P. J. Smith, "Patent Rights and Trade: Analysis of Biological Products, Medicinals and 
Botanicals, and Pharmaceuticals" (2002) 84 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 495; P. J. Smith, "Are Weak Patent 
Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?" (1999) 48 Journal of International Economics 151; R. S. Eisenberg, 
"Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Govemment-
Sponsored Research" (1996) 82 Vanderbilt Law Review 1663. 
435 P. David, "Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade 
Secrets in Economic Theory and History" in M. B. Wallerstein, M. E. Mogee & R.A. Schoen, eds., 
National Research Council, Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights ln Science and 
Technology (New York: National Academy Press, 1993) 19; K.W. Dam, "The Economic 
Underpinnings of Patent Law" (1994) 23 J. Legal Stud. 247. 
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development and access.436 To this day, however, there lS insufficient evidence to 
extend this conclusion to other sectors of research.437 
Moreover, conceming the effect of IP on development, it is not clear yet from the 
literature, if we can establish or not a clear relationship between strong IPRs on the 
one hand, and foreign direct investment, foreign and local research into developing 
countries' diseases and technology transfer on the other hand. In other words, more 
empirical evidences are needed to determine if strong IPRs are, in themselves, 
sufficient incentive or not to attract massive foreign investment to developing 
countries, or to encourage technology transfer and investment in research.438 Most 
436 E. R. Gold et al., "Needed: Models of Biotechnology Intellectual Property" (August 2002) 20:8 
Trends in Biotechnology 327; R.K. Burch, P.J.D. Smith & W.P. Wheatley, "Divergent Incentives to 
Protect Intellectual Property: A Political Economy Analysis of North-South Welfare" (2000) 3 Journal 
of World Intellectual Property 169; A. J. Glass, "Costly R&D and Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection" (2000) 19 International Journal of Technology Management 179; E.R. Gold et al., supra 
note 122. Specifically on the effect of patents on genetic testing: J. F. Merz et al., "Diagnostic Testing 
Fails the Test: The Pitfalls of Patents Are Illustrated by the Case of Haemochromatosis" (2002) 415 
Nature 577; J.F. Merz & M.K. Cho, "What are Gene Patents and Why are People Worried about 
Them?" (2005) 8:4 Community Genetics 203; M. K. Cho et al., "Effects of Patents and Licenses on the 
Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services" (2003) 5: 1 Journal of Molecular Diagnostics 3. 
437 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Genetic Inventions, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies (OECD, Paris: 2002), online on the 
website of OECD, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf>(accessedMay20th.2006).at 
18 and 68. 
438 Those who argue that IPRs are not determinant in development often refer to the example of the 
flourishing pharmaceutical industry in India, Brazil, and Argentina-nations with very weak IP norms. 
Most development issues must be resolved principally with the help other international normative, 
economic, and political mechanisms, and many other factors need to be taken into consideration, 
including nations' education level, natural resources, co st of domestic labour, etc. Others, to the 
contrary, believe that there is a clear link between IPRs and FDI, research and technology transfer. As 
these issues are not the focus of this chapter, we encourage the reader to refer to the following 
references for a more detailed analysis of the link between intellectual property rights and countries' 
level of development: K. Balasubramaniam,supra note 372: P. Drahos, "The Rights to Food and 
Health and Intellectual Property in the Era of "Biogopolies" in S. Bottomley & D. Kinley, eds., 
Commercial Law and Human Rights (Ashgate Dartmouth: Aldershot, 2002) 227; Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, supra note 201 at 56; H. E. Kettler & c. Collins, "Using Innovative 
Action to Meet Global Health Needs through Existing Intellectual Property Regimes", UK 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Study Paper 2b, London, 2002; Gold et al., supra note 
122; C. Primo Braga & C. Fink, "The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign 
Direct Investment" (1998-1999) 9 Duke 1. Comp. & Int'l L. 163, at 163; C. Correa, Intellectual 
Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries (London: Zed Books, 2000); S. A. Singham, 
"Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface Between Competition 
and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceuticalindustry" (2000) 26 Brook. J. Int'l L. 363.; D.G. Richards, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism,supra note 32; Arguing for a strong link between 
IP and development: UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights in Development Policy,supra note 426 at 22-26; K. Maskus, Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Global Economy (Washington DC: Institute for National Economy, 2000); B. M. 
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development issues have to be resolved principally with the help of other 
international normative, economic, and political mechanisms, and many other factors 
need to be taken into consideration (including nations' education levels, natural 
resources, and cost of domestic labour).439 This only reveals that, before we can use 
this type of utilitarian argument as a reliable foundation for patent law, more 
empirical evidence will be needed as to the incentive function of patents when 
compared to other economic factors, and as to the proportionality between the means 
used in granting exclusive proprietary rights and the end of promoting innovative 
activities in genetic research.440 As Gold and Caulfield note, the lack of economic 
evidence of the role of patent is symptomatic of a larger problem in patent policy: "its 
reliance onfaith and anecdotal evidence rather than on careful study and data.,,441 
In reaction to the commercialisation theory of patents, sorne argue that patents can 
interfere with commercialisation, especially in the area of fundamental research, 
where the patent-holders can decide to enforce their rights restrictively, potentially 
reducing creative activities.442 Such an attitude toward patents can generate additional 
transaction costs and limit the transfer of patented products and services to the public 
through commercial channels. This is what has been called the tragedy of the anti-
commons, which occurs when too many people have the right to exc1ude others from 
Hoekman, K. E. Maskus & K.Saggi, Technology Transfer to Developing Countries: Unilateral and 
Multilateral Policy Options (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3332, 2004); E. Mansfield, 
Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, International Finance 
Corporation Discussion Paper No. 27, 1995; H. Grabowski, "Patent, Innovation and Access to New 
Pharmaceuticals" (2002) 1. of Int '/. Eco L. 849, at 850. 
439 As those issues are not the focus ofthis chapter, we encourage the reader to consuIt the following 
for a more detailed analysis of the link between IPRs and nations' levels of development: K. 
Balasubramaniam, supra note 372. Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, supra note 201 at 
56; H. E. Kettler & C. Collins, ibid. "; Gold et al., supra note 122, at 301-309; C. Primo Braga & c. 
Fink, ibid, at 163; C. Correa, ibid.; D.G. Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global 
Capitalism, supra note 32. 
440 D. Vaver, supra note 377; E. Mackaay, "Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and 
Innovation" (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 867. 
441 E. R. Gold & T. Caulfield, supra note 412, at 27; see also, S. Crespi, supra note 426. 
442M. A. Holman & S. R. Munzer, "Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A 
Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags" (2000) 85 Iowa L. Rev. 735; A. K. Rai, supra 
note 422; R. S. Eisenberg, "Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental 
Use", supra note 424; A. K. Rai, "Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A 
Reply to Kieff", supra note 365.' 
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using resources from the commons, gi ving rise to their underutilisation.443 Even if we 
are not in a position to conc1ude, one way or another with regards to the general effect 
of patent on preventive research at present, we can conc1ude that in sorne very 
specific fields -such as c1inical genetics- patents appear to restrict research.444 This is 
why sorne argue that commercialisation should not occur through complete 
privatisation, but should also leave sorne space for the public domain.445 
Most importantly, the utilitarian arguments presented in favour of IP mainly relate to 
the positive effects that IP can have on the competitiveness of states and companies, 
and on the commercialisation and availability of products in a given market. 
Although individuals could, in theory, benefit from IP in the long term if its incentive 
role were to be confirmed, the most important question this thesis examines is 
whether products emerging from innovation are truly accessible to the people who 
need them. The economic incentive aspect of the utilitarian theory focusses on a 
limited set of stakeholders, on those who value patented products the most in 
economic terms rather than considering the needs of aIl agents, inc1uding the less 
powerful. In fact, the only need that seems important is the need for efficiency, 
443 We will come back on the practical application ofthis concept when we discuss availability issues 
under sub-section 3.3.2.1. M. A. Helier, "The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
trom Marx ta Markets" (1998) 11 Harv. L. Rev. 621, at 624; M. A. Helier & R. S Eisenberg, supra 
358; G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
444 ln fact, it is argued that innovation in drug disco very has not been seriously affected by patents on 
research tools, except in the area of genetic diagnostics, where sorne negative effects have been 
observed on research. Sorne like Keiff, sceptical about the negative effect ofresearch tools' patents on 
further innovations, suggests that more empirieal research should be undertaken to obtain evidence 
about the process of exchange failure in specific area of research. S.F. Kieff, "Perusing Property Rights 
in DNA" in S.F. Kieff, ed., Perspectives on Properties of the Human Genome Project (Califomia: 
Elsevier, 2003) c.7, 125; J.P. Walsh, A. Arora & W.M. Cohen, "Effects of Research Tool Patents and 
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation" in W.M. Cohen & A. Merrill, eds, Patents in the Knowledge-
Based Economy (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003) 285, at 297-305, online on 
the NAP website: 
<http://books.nap.edulbooks/0309086361/htmI/297.html#pagetop> (accessed: May 261\ 2006); On 
the negative effect of patents on genetic diagnostic tools, see J.F. Merz et al., supra note 436; J.F. Merz 
& M.K. Cho, supra note 436; B. Martin, supra note 381: Organisation for Economie Development 
and Cooperation (OECD), Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: 
Evidence and Policies, Paris, 2002, at 50. 
445 A. K. Rai, supra note 422 .. 
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while the link between IP and other social needs remains unaddressed.446 Both 
the incentive and the commercialisation utilitarian justifications allow us to ignore 
members of a community or entire nations when they do not fit into the welfare 
maximisation calculus. For example, utilitarianism can accept health differences 
between poor and wealthy individuals if the latter value sorne health-related products 
the most economically, as long as such allocation does not make sorne people worse 
of('47 and results in a positive impact on the overall population's health.448 In other 
words, utilitarianism in health can result in awarding access and control of genetic 
knowledge, products and services to those who can invest in their development and 
commercialisation and who can pay for them, on the grounds that their activities will 
likely result in overall maximisation of benefits for society (in terms of further 
innovation, for example).449 However, as bluntly put by May: 
By individualising creation, by disembedding it from the social milieu 
from which aIl knowledge is drawn, IPRs deny the importance of the 
public realm, and by doing so reward only a small group of rights 
holders rather than the carriers of social knowledge, and, more 
importantly, ignoring the social welfare benefits of those excluded from 
use, not by ignorance or lack of interest, but by their poverty.450 
446 C. May, supra note 333; P. Steidlmeier, "The Moral Legitimacy ofIntellectual Property Claims: 
American Business and Developing Country Perspectives" (1993) 12:3 Journal of Business Ethics 
162. 
447 Again, the evaluation of the notion ofbeing worse offis problematic. As we mentioned previously, 
we agree with the view that being worse off can be interpreted in a relative sense, for example when 
something that could improve one's condition exists and this person cannot have access to it because 
ofstrong patent rights. To this effect, see: R. L. Ostergard, Jr., supra note 379, at. 169. On the opposite 
view, refer to A.D. Moore "Toward a Lockean Theory ofInteIlectual Property" in A. D Moore, 
Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 
Lanham, 1997) 81, at. 85 and 98; J. W. Child, "The Moral Foundations of Intangible Property" in A. 
D Moore, Intellectual Property: Moral, Legal, and International Dilemmas (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, Lanham, 1997) 57. 
448 F. Peter & T. Evans, "Ethical Dimensions of Health Equity" in T. Evans et al., eds., Challenging 
Inequities in Health,from Ethics to Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 25, at 28. 
449 This explains why, for example, only a very sm aIl fraction of aIl new chemicals developed between 
1975 and 1996 were for the treatment of tropical diseases. For more on the effect ofIP on innovation 
for the poor, refer to P. CuIlet, "Patent and medicines: the Relationship Between TRIPS and the 
Human Right to Health", (2003) 79:1 International AjJairs 1391; J. H. Barton, "Intellectual Property 
Rights and Innovation" in N. Imparato, ed., Capital for Our rime: the Economie, Legal, and 
Management Challenges of Intellectual Capital (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1999) 123; 
UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 47, at 33. 
450 C. May, supra note 388, at 139. 
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Therefore, in allowing health and wealth differences, utilitarianism appears 
insensitive to issues of equality and distributive justice,451 two critical concems for 
equitable access to global health. 
This brief overview of the utilitarian justification of IP brings us to conclude that, 
once again, we are not in the presence of a balanced, reliable, and complete 
theoretical foundation for IP. Although we are not contesting the efficiency of the IP 
system for serving economic and commercial purposes, it does not allow us to 
address our equity, access, and need issues. As it stands now, the main focus of the 
incentive and the commercialisation utilitarian theories remains economics, and it is 
imperative to balance it with other important social goals if we wish to ensure that IP 
Can be justified in terms of distributive justice.452 
After presenting three of the most commonly-used normative justifications of IP, we 
are forced to admit that none satisfactorily meets the requirements of a liberal 
cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice. Sorne arguments are either not adapted to 
the context of IP, or are based on unconfirmed assumptions about a hypothetical 
strong link between IP and innovation. Most importantly, none of the justifications 
considers the potential negative effects IP can have on those who are not in a position 
to own such rights. 
Facing this apparent lack of a single and strong normative justification of IP, Nance 
proposes combining components of different theories to get a general explanation of 
the widespread use of, and reliance on, IP rights in today's world. 453 However, it is 
doubtful that any of the theories presented in the last section, taken together or 
separately, supply a complete justification of IP that balances deontological and 
consequentialist arguments in the interest of both inventors and society. To quote 
Nance, one should be "sceptical of a justification of intellectual property in its 
451 B. Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism" in J.J.c. Smart. ed., Utilitarianism: For and Against 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) 75. 
452 E.C. Hettinger, supra note 335, at 134-137. 
45" 
, D. A. Nance, supra note 385, at 766 & 772. 
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present forms un der any of the theories that present themselves as obvious 
candidates, and more sceptical of a convergence of those theories in support of 
intellectual property. ,,454 
This leads us to the analysis of a fourth and last approach in our exercise of 
establishing sorne theoretical foundations for IP protection. 
3.2.4. Drahos' economic power theory of IP 
Drahos' philosophy essentially rests on guarding society against the excess and 
normative risks associated with the dynamic nature and changing boundaries of IP. 
In an ideal world, Drahos believes in an instrumentalist approach to intellectual 
property rights where property is considered as a tool rather than a right. The 
peculiarity of Drahos' vision is that, unlike other proponents of instrumentalism, he 
believes that we should not focus on using IP as a tool for meeting economic ends, 
but instead for serving already existing moral values and distributive goals. However, 
Drahos' evaluation of the CUITent IP system highlights important divergences between 
his ideal philosophy of IP and what he describes as an inescapable political power 
theory of IP. 
In studying the development and evolution of IP law, Drahos focusses on the real 
importance of proprietarianism, a concept he uses to explain how IP holders are 
always awarded special treatment. Because property rights permit exc1uding and 
preventing others from using, selling, and producing the object of property, they 
allow increased private property over intellectual objects and concentration of power 
and sovereignty over key as sets of global dependence. The effect of property rights 
on scarcity in knowledge essentially serves the interests of specific groups. Since 
IPRs are valuable as sets upon which people and companies can build more 
possibilities, they can be defined as a form of capital, and capital is among the most 
important sources of power. In a way, we can say that intellectual property govems 
454 Ibid, at 772. 
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the relationship between vanous stakeholders, and has a direct effect on the 
distribution of goods and relations of dependency between IP owners and non-
owners. Following this reasoning, Drahos argues that IPRs have a precarious inner 
logic since they are more likely to be awarded to powerful stakeholders.455 
For Drahos, knowledge is power, and power is created by law and spread among 
intellectual property holders. When the law allows broadening the scope of what can 
be patented, society can expect that threat power arising from dependency 
relationships will end up under the control of a few. As Gold states, "[t]he purposeful 
omission of broader social considerations, coupled with a blind acceptance of the 
desirability of patents, belies a hidden libertarian agenda that favours existing 
distributions of wealth.,,456 In fact, obtaining ownership over intellectual objects, 
especially in specialised fields of activity, often requires prior scientific competence 
and monetary investment from patent-holders. In retum, when the patent is awarded, 
it can generate more capital for this group of powerful agents through licensing 
agreements and strict control on access. For example, when lawmakers decide to 
extend patent protection to genes and gene-related products and services, it creates 
more opportunity for small elites of powerful stakeholders, who already work or may 
be capable and interested in investing in genetics and biotechnology. 
In this particular field of activity, we deal with universally important resources such 
as health knowledge and scientific progress. According to the logic of collective 
action, powerful agents are likely to team up in small groups to foster their common 
and well-defined economic interests by working on maintaining a rationalisation for 
the IP system.457 In fact, the gains made by one member of the team will often benefit 
the rest of the group, who also share common values and interests. On the other hand, 
this 10gic does not apply in the same way to larger groups who might have a common 
interest in protecting the intellectual commons, such as, for example, African AIDS 
455 P. Drahos, supra note 380, c. 7, at 145-169. 
456 E. R. Gold, supra note 420, at par. 40. 
457 M. Oslon, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965); C. May, 
supra note 366, at. 22-44. 
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patients in need of cheap drugs, but for which putting up a structure and organisation 
to support collective action might be too much of a burden in terms of dissuasive 
costs. These obstacles directly influence the type of knowledge created and how it is 
produced and distributed. 
Drahos also refers to a Rawlsian theory of justice to argue for the distribution of 
information instead of the excessive accumulation to which IP can give rise. Property 
should be treated not as the foundation of justice, but more as an instrument for 
achieving well-established principles of justice; it is not a right with a fixed status, but 
a privilege subject to specific duties. 458 For example, in our analytical context, 
property in genetic therapeutic products and services is a very powerful instrument, as 
it can affect other people in critical aspects of their lives. Following Drahos' 
distributive ideals, IPRs should therefore be used responsibly, so as to allow better 
access to genetics for global health improvement. Rights and property, however, form 
a dominant alliance in the actual IP system, and IP owners' obligations are not 
specified, and are often non-existent. 459 Intellectual property rights foster the 
interests of rights-holders without considering the associated social costs, the 
inequalities they can create, and the effects they can have on individuals and 
democratic institutions.460 Drahos' ideal vision ofIP would require the replacement 
of the proprietarianist view by an instrumentalist attitude supporting a different 
social role for IP. In fact, as Drahos mentions, 
[i]nstrumentalism would require strongly articulated 
conception of the public purpose and role of 
intellectual property. Under instrumentalism IP 
would be located in the context of sorne broader 
moral theory and set of values. Property ri~hts would 
be morality's servants and not its drivers. 46 
458 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 195. 
459 M. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights" (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363. 
460 P. Drahos, supra note 360, at 197-198. 
461 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 224. 
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One criticism of Drahos' vision is that it overemphasises the instrumental aspect ofIP 
and treats knowledge and information as pre-existing collections from which 
individuals and companies steal for their pers on al bene fit. Sorne argue that Drahos 
does not consider that patent-holders do not only draw from a pre-existing and static 
commons, but also participate in enriching it by adding to it through innovative and 
creative activities. This utilitarian critique of Drahos also suggests that the temporary 
restriction awarded by IP rights is probably the best solution to increase the bulk of 
information and knowledge through innovation.462 
Drahos responds by arguing that a proprietarianist approach to IP does not necessarily 
encourage valuable innovation able to enrich the commons for the bene fit of society 
as a whole. It instead contributes to creating powerful elites of property holders who 
participate in maintaining distributive inequalities among individuals. In fact, the IP 
system in its current state is often used to prevent competition and help the system's 
winners increase their control over more and more innovation. 463 The same legal 
construction that was supposed to promote the diffusion of information as a common 
good for society is being used to restrict knowledge access by focussing almost 
exc1usively on its economic value.464 Because the market of ideas and knowledge is 
characterised by major social and economic inequalities, and since it inspires an 
artificial construction established to foster the interests of the more powerful property 
owners, the assumed utilitarian incentive theory of intellectual property seems 
unfounded.465 Drahos therefore describes IPRs as special and invasive privileges that 
encourage power and wealth concentration in the hands of small elites, something 
that creates c1ear socio-economic and ethical struggle for the most vulnerable. 
Moreover, since IPRs' inner logic does not require any form of redistribution to the 
less powerful, Drahos argues for limited scope of IPRs without suggesting a total 
abolition of inventors' rewards. 
462 W. Van Caenegem, Book Review of A Philosophy of lntellectual Property by P. Drahos (1996) 8 
Bond L. R. 217. 
463 M. Goldhaber, Reinventing Technology (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) c. JO 
464 T. A. Lipinski & J. Britz, supra note 338. 
465 In fact, the tinancial incentive for innovation is supposed to come from the market, which is flawed 
by major economic inequalities. B. Martin, supra note 381. 
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The overview of the different theoretical approaches to IP presented in this section 
was not meant to be a comprehensive discussion of all of the different theories of 
property. However, it clearly demonstrates how challenging it is to try to justify 
property and IP. In this section, we have covered different and contradictory 
positions, somehow representative of the inherent contradictions present in the IP 
system, namely between its dual purpose of diffusion and protection.466 Indeed, sorne 
economists in favour of maintaining an IP system (but simultaneously disturbed by 
sorne of its inbuilt and functional inconsistencies) have acknowledged that "[i]t is 
almost impossible to conceive of any existing social institution so faulty in so 
many ways. It survives only because there seems to be nothing better.,,467 
It thus appears difficult to justify patent protection with the traditional theories, 
particularly in the context of genetic development. For example, it is not rare in 
genetics to see strong public governmental participation in basic research with 
no strong commercial motivation; patent-holders are often private corporations 
and public institutions rather than actual inventors. AIso, inventors are often 
motivated by non-commercial incentives to innovate; passion, recognition by 
peers, and contribution to science.468 Moreover, hum an genetic resources appear 
to be of very special nature, and should be considered a crucial part of the 
commons to be distributed following justice, need and equity considerations. In 
this context, Drahos' critique offers a very relevant and adapted perspective on 
the flaws of the existing IP system as it functions and is justified today. He 
addresses crucial questions regarding power imbalances created by IP and its 
insufficient focus on distributive justice issues. 
466 T. A. Lipinski & J. Britz, supra note 338 at. 58. 
467 J. Jewkes, D. Sawers & R. Stillerman, The Sources of Invention, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1969) at 187-188. 
468 J. Walsh, C. Cho & W.M. Cohen, Patents, Material Transfers and Access to Research Inputs in 
Biomedical Research (Final Report to the National Academy of Sciences' Committee [on] Intellectual 
Property Rights in Genomic and Protein-Related Research Inventions), September 20,2005, online on 
the website of the University of Illinois, 
<http://tigger.uic.eduHwalsh/WalshChoCohenFinaI050922.pdf> (accessed May 6th, 2006). 
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These issues lay the foundation for our next section, where we will assess the IP 
system by highlighting the main values and principles underlined by this normative 
system and measure its compatibility with the theory of global distributive justice in 
health developed in the tirst part. 
3.3 Global Distribution, Justice, and the Patent System: an Assessment 
This section aims to assess the patent system with precise benchmarks of justice. In 
fact, its purpose is to identify, through the lens of a global distributive justice 
theoretical framework, the ideal relationship that should prevail between property, 
genetic information, and knowledge, and assess the compatibility of the results with 
reality. 
In the first part of this dissertation, we established principles of global distributive 
justice to guide us toward our goal of global distribution of genetic research benefits. 
As explained in previous sections, IPRs are of considerable commercial value, and 
are often held by private corporations both in developed and developing countries. 
Although they allow patent-holders to temporarily exclude others from using, selling, 
or producing the object of their property right, IPRs also encourage public disclosure 
of new knowledge and information in exchange for exclusive rights over it. Despite 
the theoretical dual role of the patent system, only one seems to prevail; it thus 
appears important to determine whether the system truly accomplishes its societal 
goal of knowledge disclosure for the common goOd.469 The extensive use of patents 
can give rise to important dilemmas in terms of equitable access to the object of 
patents, particularly when they are useful for meeting basic human needs. Indeed, 
although the inner logic of patents calls both for innovation protection and knowledge 
diffusion, it does not necessarily call for fostering equality among individuals. To 
examine these issues, it is relevant to test the IP system against the analytical tools 
developed in our theoretical framework. Our benchmark for assessing the IP system 
469 T. A. Lipinski & J. Britz, supra note 338, at 55-56. 
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is access to genetic technologies to support health, in order to further the goal of 
equality of opportunities. Access is a broad concept that we will analyse through 
different lenses. We will begin with the evaluation of the relationship between IPRs 
and global access to genetic resources. We will then address the existing link between 
IPRs and access, in terms of availability and affordability of genetic products and 
services. 
3.3.1. Global access to genetic resources and international 
intellectual property rights 
With a global and international focus, we will first examine the compatibility of the 
IP system with the notion of public good often associated with the human genome. 
Following that, we will assess whether appropriation of health resources from the 
commons and global distributive justice in health are consistent. Finally, we will look 
at the possibility of equal consideration of every human being in the international IP 
system. 
3.3.1.1. Genetic common heritage vs. private appropriation 
of human genetic resources 
The interest for genetics arises mainly from the value of emerging knowledge, which 
is often considered a public good. Knowledge arising from genetics and genomics can 
be viewed as global public goods 470 because their invention, production, and 
utilisation are not limited by territorial considerations (they can be used by everyone 
concurrently without losing value for subsequent use), and because research funding 
and publication in these fields are, in large part, undertaken by the public sector.471 As 
things currently stand, however, the public-good nature of genetic knowledge can 
470 Which are defined as "goods with benefits that extend to ail countries, people and generations" in 1. 
Kaul, Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003) at 23. 
471 H. Thorsteinsdottir et al., supra note 30, at 892; P.P. Kayhan & E.A. Egan, "Patent: The Public 
Interest Versus the Private Privilege" (2005) 2:3 American Journal of Bioethics 45; J.M. Mueller, 
"Public Access Versus Proprietary Rights in Genemic Information What is the Proper Role ofIP 
Rights" (2003) 6:2 Journal of Health Care Law and Policy 222. 
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only benefit countries who have technology and resources to transform, apply, and 
use it for products development, further research, and therapeutic purposes. 
The principles emerging from article 1 of the Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights are a good starting point for our reflection on global 
access to genetics and IPRs: 
The human genome underlies the fundamental unit y of 
aH members of the human family, as weH as the 
recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a 
symbolic sense, it is the heritage ofhumanity.472 
While this later expression has been used and supported by many,473 its scope and 
practical application remain unclear. As briefly mentioned earlier, even if in fact, 
patenting of genetic material is possible and accepted under positive law, sorne 
people remain completely opposed to any appropriation of parts of the genome with 
patent rights. 474 To support their position, they argue that genetic material is very 
special, that it was not created by human beings, and that since we aH possess copies 
of the human genome, it should not be possible for one to acquire exclusive property 
rights over what we aH carry.475 Others, on the contrary, reject the notion of common 
472 UNESCO, Univers al Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome, Paris, 1997, art. 1. 
473 For example, refer to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation No 1425: 
Biotechnology and 1ntellectual Property, September 23, 1999, rec. 10; HUGO, Statement On The 
Principled Conduct of Genetics Research, March 21, 1996, online: 
<http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/conduct.htm> (accessed May 28th, 2006); Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: a Discussion Paper (Nuffield Council on Bioethics: London), 
2002, online on the website of the Nuffield Council: 
<http://www.nuffieldbioethics.orgifileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf> (accessed May 30th, 
2006), at 22-23. 
474 German National Ethics Council, supra note 361; C Lawson, "Patenting Genetic Diversity, Old 
Rules May be Restricting the Exploration of a New Technology" (1999) 6 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 373, at 391; B. Looney, "Should Genes be Patented? The Gene Patenting Controversy: 
Legal, Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement" (1994) 26 Law and Policy in 
International Business 231; M.L. Sturges, "Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? 
An Application of the Common Heritage of Mankind" (1997) 13:1 American University International 
Law Review 219. 
475 J. Sulston, "IP and the Human Genome" in P. Drahos and R. Mayne, eds., Global Intellectual 
Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 61; 
C. Joyner, "Legal Implications of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind" (January 1986) 
35:1 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 190; see also UNESCO, International 
Consultation on the outline of the Univers al Declaration on the Human Genome, Summary of the 
response to the questionnaire, Paris, 1997; S. Paquerot, supra note 58. 
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heritage and believe that property rights over the human genome are acceptable 
because they encourage the production of additional health and economic benefits for 
society.476 A third group ofthinkers rejects the concept of heritage ofhumanity for its 
difficult practical application, instead proposing the notion of common resource, 
which supports a form of transfer of benefits to humankind.477 This last vision does 
not prevent patents over parts of the hum an genome if moral duties of justice and 
stewardship to the genome are respected.478 In other words, the ethics and legitimacy 
of patents on human genetics depends on their effects on the human gene pool and on 
CUITent and future generations, who aIl share an interest in protecting the human 
genome.479 The value of the human genome for humankind is enormous. In most 
cases, this value is evaluated only in terms of the benefits that can be derived from 
resources, products, and services arising from genetic research. One fundamental 
challenge is thus to ensure that emerging knowledge about the human genome will 
benefit the entire human community. 
The CUITent IP system does not necessarily always prioritise the public domain. As 
previously mentioned, there was, until very recently, a strong tendency to apply very 
broad patentability criteria in the fields of biotechnology and genetics but things are 
changing gradually. 480 However, it remains that, as Drahos taught us, 
proprietarianism has had a crucial role in the development and evolution of IP law by 
increasing the scope of private property in intellectual objects. Our actual IP system 
thus represents a tacit acceptance of a negative community where nobody owns the 
elements of the public domain, and where aIl states and stakeholders are free to 
476 J. P. Hinojosa, supra note 341; .M. Spectar, "The Fruit of The Human Genome Tree: Cautionary 
Tales about Technology, Investment, and the Heritage ofMankind" (2001) 23: 1 Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review 1. 
477 J. P. Hinojosa, supra note 343; M. Kirby, "Genomics and Democracy, A Global Challenge" 
(February 2003) 31: 1 UWA Law Review 1 at 18; D. B. Resnik, supra note 354; E.T. Juengst, "Should 
we Treat the Human Germ-line as a Global Human Resource?" in E. Agius & S. Busuttil, eds., Germ-
fine Intervention and our Responsibi/ities to Future Generations (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press, 
1998) 85. 
478 These notions have been borrowed from the field of environmental protection. H. Rolston, 
Conserving natural value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); D. B. Resnik, supra note 
354, at 198. 
479 D. B. Resnik, ibid. at 201-202. 
480 Refer to footnote 365 for a discussion and references on this point. 
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appropriate those resources (depending on their actual economlC and innovative 
capacities), in opposition to a positive community, where every agent automatically 
has joint ownership over the same elements of the commons,481 which often results in 
over-consumption of the resources of the commons. 482 Those notions are directly 
applicable to the extensive privatisation of the human genome, made possible through 
the preservation of a negative community where no one opposes the privatisation of 
the commons, and where governments do not seem to intervene to prevent it because 
of its reported positive effects on innovation and related commercialisation. 
In fact, even if one goal of IPRs is more knowledge diffusion for the bene fit of 
society, the whole structure of the system of intellectual property tends to 
underestimate the value of the commons by "failing to make actors and society as a 
whole intemalise the losses caused by the extension and exercise of intellectual 
property rightS.,,483 Those who critique the functioning of the CUITent system believe in 
improved access to the human genome as a common resource. This could lead to a new 
egalitarian way forward in thinking about the global knowledge commons, for 
example, by limiting monopoly rights to encourage increased knowledge diffusion 
in furtherance of our goal of global distribution of genetic technologies. 484 
However, sorne important obstacles remain, especially with regard to the growing 
importance, value, and protection of property rights in society, with the 
concomitant power relationships to which property rights often give rise, and the 
technical incapacity of developing countries to exploit genomics knowledge for 
their particular needs.485 
481 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 48-49. 
482 G. Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) 162 Science 1243. 
483 J. Boyle, "A Politics ifIntellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?" (1997-1998) 47 Duke 
L. J. 87, at 111. 
484 K. Aoki, "Neo-colonialism, Anticommons Property and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New 
World Order ofIntemational Intellectual Property Protection" (1998) 6Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. Il, at 
29-35; S. Picciotto, "Defending the Public Interest in TRIPS and WTO" in P. Drahos & R. Mayne, 
eds., Global lntellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and Development (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 224; C. May, supra note 333. 
485 C. May, ibid. at 134-137; C. Wellman, The Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty 
Rhetoric (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). 
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The reduction of the knowledge commons for the bene fit of individual appropriation is 
more and more pronounced486 and, as explained by Lange, it has to do with courts' and 
legislators' perception of the public domain as "an unexplored abstraction instead of a 
field of individual rights fully as important as any of the new property rights.,,487 
3.3.1.2. Universal importance of health vs. private 
appropriation of human genetic resources 
As we saw earlier with Drahos, certain fields of activity, like genetics, have given rise 
to a serious concentration of power in the hands of those who have scientific and 
economic resources to obtain patent rights over resources upon which there is 
universal reliance. For example, disease-gene patenting can grant patent-holders 
considerable control over resources that could otherwise play an important role in 
improving people's health. Patentees are free to exercise their exclusive rights as they 
see fit for the duration of the patent,488 without the burden of any distributive justice 
obligation. Therefore, ev en if the existence of patents is not unfair per se, the fact that 
property rights often take precedence over other competing rights, entitlements, and 
interests requires care and vigilance in their application. 
Exclusive IPRs simultaneously grant economlC advantage to those who have 
economic, knowledge, and innovative power, and often increase access costs for non-
IP owners.489 Distribution of the costs and benefits arising from IPRs is not driven by 
distributive justice principles, but more by power relationships exacerbated by 
exclusive property rights of small elites. 49o These effects can be observed within 
countries, but are often more serious between countries. In fact, most people from 
486 And that, even though sorne steps have been taken in terms offree accessibility, for example, to the 
human genome draft sequence and the SNPs database. These initiatives remain the exception. 
487 D. Lange, "Recognising the Public Domain" (1981) 44:4 Law and Contemporary Problems 
147, at 178; C. May, supra note 333. 
488 subject to existing legislation. 
489 This will be discussed later in this chapter 
490 J. W. Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes ofProperty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 
at 68. 
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developing nations are being left out of the IPRs system in innovative fields like 
genetics, as they often do not have the necessary scientific and technical power to get 
involved, innovate, and apply for IP protection. With TRIPS, however, they must still 
bear the costs associated with compulsory protection of intellectual objects mostly 
coming from abroad. In this sense, the international system of IPRs does not ensure 
that people from developing countries have their health needs satisfied; in sorne 
cases, it even contributes to engendering health gaps within and between nations. We 
will come back to this specific topic with examples in the last chapter of the 
dissertation. 
The principles established in the first part for global equitable distribution of genetic 
benefits recognise the univers al importance of health for every human being, no 
matter where they live. Our theoretical analysis led us to conc1ude that since health is 
a crucial human need, securing it is necessary to avoid serious harm and to develop a 
normal range of opportunities. This is what inspired our argument in favour of 
genetic-benefit distribution in an effort to compensate for global health inequalities 
and deviations from normal functioning, two important elements for equality of 
opportunity. This global distributive justice framework for equitable access to health 
should encourage the establishment of international principles and institutions. 
However, the se values are not TRIPS' primary focus. 
3.3.1.3 Universal consideration of every human being in the 
international IP system 
In the last two subsections, we briefly discussed the compatibility of the values 
underlined by the global IP system with obligations of distributive justice in health. 
We also have to address another important aspect of our theoretical framework in 
relation to IP: the cosmopolitan focus of our approach to justice. To this end, we will 
assess the global structure supporting the international IP system to determine 
whether it conforms to the principle of universal consideration of every hum an being 
required by moral cosmopolitanism. To aid us in this task, we will determine whether 
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the international IP system can qualify as a just global basic structure and whether it 
responds to shared hum an interests in equality of opportunity. 
Does the international IP system correspond to a Just global basic structure? 
Sorne who are opposed to a global application of principles of distributive justice 
argue that the existence of a coercive network of law is absolutely essential to engage 
in redistribution, and that this type of network does not exist on the global scene.49 1 
This argument does not stand, especially when applied to the international IP system, 
which easily qualifies as a coercive legal network.492 
In our theoretical framework, we supported a distribution of benefits arising from the 
commercialisation of a common resource (the human genome) extended to the global 
scene, arguing that boundaries and citizenship should not limit the scope of social 
cooperation, loyalty, and obligations. We therefore adopted a cosmopolitan focus 
referring to each individual as a unit of moral concern, and concluded that everyone 
affected by institutional distributive arrangements should be given the chance to 
secure a normal range of opportunities for himself, in order to have access to a de cent 
life. 493 We also adopted the cosmopolitan idea that the state should not be given 
absolute priority when discussing issues of distributive justice in areas of crucial 
importance for every human being. We addressed the limits of boundaries in arguing 
that states were not necessarily the best actors to prote ct justice within and outside 
their territories, but we did not reject the existence and relevance of states aIl 
together. In fact, national regulatory interventions can be important in biotechnology 
and genetics, by providing the agency required to perform distribution of the private 
491 For example, refer to M. Blake, supra note 121, at 291-292. 
492 lndeed, every WTO member state is required to adhere to and comply with TRIPS, which is 
complemented by a unique and effective enforcement mechanism. 
493 We TefeT the TeadeT to the theOl-Y chapter for a comprehensive discussion on cosmopolitanism. 
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gains ansmg from these fields. AlI that cosmopolitanism requires IS a VISIOn of 
sovereignty that does not constitute an arbitrary limit on the scope ofjustice.494 
lndeed, principles of distributive justice can continue to impose obligations for the 
satisfaction of individual rights both on states (which, for now, remain the primary 
agents of distributive justice), and on other institutional actors (who may also be 
viewed as potential agents of international justice obligations). A significant 
challenge is to find a balance between the order supported by sovereignty and the 
pursuit of justice through moral universalism. Sorne propose that state and non-state 
agents should work toward an agreement on general ethical principles, values, and 
duties that international society should internalise and promote as a group. It would 
extend the frontiers of communities, despite the different cultural and community 
allegiances.495 In fact, these principles would serve as a basis for the establishment of 
a broad political community outside the boundaries of states. It is relevant to mention 
that we can actually observe a proliferation of transnational advocacy networks 
driven by common values and aiming to reconstruct the scope and limits of state 
sovereignty on the international scene by denouncing inequities.496 
Therefore, even if there is, to this day, an institutional inability to implement 
principles of distributive justice at the international level, these principles have an 
important role to play in identifying future courses of action to develop institutional 
capacity and governance in an emerging global society.497 This could result in the 
expansion of democracy beyond the state structure and help challenge the 
494 O. O'Neill, "Justice and Boundaries" in C. Brown, ed., Po/itical Restructuring in Europe: Ethical 
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) at 69. 
495 A. Linklater, Transformation of Po/itical Community (London: Polity Press, 1998) at 167; R. A. 
Payne & N. H. Samhat, Democratizing Global Po/ities, Diseourse Norms, International Regimes and 
Political Community (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004); J. Thompson, 
"Community, Identity and World Citizenship", in D. Archibugi, D. Held & M. Kbhler, Re-imagining 
Po/itical Community: Studies in Cosmopo/itan Demoeracy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998) 179, at 191. 
496M.E. Keck & K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Po/itics 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998) c. 6. 
497 C.R. Beitz, supra note 55 at 271; B. Barry, "International Society from a Cosmopolitan 
Perspective" in D. Maple & T. Nardin, eds., International Society: Diverse Ethieal Perspectives 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1998) 146; T. Christiano, "Democracy and Distributive 
Justice" (1995) 37 Arizona Law Review 65; A. Buchanan, supra note 25, c. 4, at 191-230. 
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mechanisms of non-democratic globalisation from above which are supported by the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation.498 
This brings us to the notion of global basic structure, a concept referring to the 
existing, well-established global scheme, characterised by internationallegal systems 
mostly controlled by private property and trade regimes. 499 Sorne, like Beitz and 
Barry, argue that this global basic structure creates a pattern of global 
interdependence between participating states, and that this system implies mutual 
cooperation required by global distributive justice.500 Drahos is more sceptical; he 
does not automatically link states' economic interdependency and their involvement 
in a scheme of mutual cooperation. He believes that the global structure is very 
heterogeneous in terms of group beliefs, moral codes, and cultural practices, and that 
it is therefore difficult to identify global principles of justice for mutual cooperation. 
He does not rule out global distributive justice theory, but decides not to pursue it 
because of the problems he anticipates with its application. sol 
Whatever qualification we apply to the existing global structure, whether we believe 
it is a site of interdependence or of mutual cooperation, there is no reason why it 
should not also be a subject of justice.S02 Unfortunately, justice, as we envision it, 
does not seem to direct the existing global structure. Indeed, for sorne, the global 
community emerging from this structure mirrors the economic inequalities and gives 
rise to the same concentration of power observed at state levels. This makes this 
498 R. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) at 125; R. A. Payne & N. H. Samhat, supra note 495. 
499 The basic global structure is composed of regional and international economic agreements like 
NAFT A and TRIPS, international monetary schemes like The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, and international human rights standards. 
500 C.R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, supra note 64 at 145; B. Barry, The 
Liberal Theory of Justice: Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines ln A Theory of Justice by 
John Rawls (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) at 129. 
501 P. Drahos, supra note 380, c. 8, at 170-198. We have already analysed similar critiques of global 
distributive justice in the theory chapter, basing our argument on the special character and universality 
of health as something that transcends countries' cultural differences, special beliefs, and moral 
codes. For that reason, we decided to reject a communitarianist approach to justice. We refer to 
reader to section xxx of the previous chapter for a more complete discussion on the topic. 
502 A. Buchanan, supra note 25, c.2, at 73-74. 
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international structure unsuitable to further global community interests. 503 Other 
scholars, including Cox and Richards, believe that it is not a few states which 
dominate the world order, but more a dominant ideology with a central mode of 
production and distribution intiltrating every state. 504 This new elite occupies a 
privileged space on the international scene, without representing individual interests 
and without being democratically accountable. As explained by Hymer, the power of 
multinational corporations as principal agents of globalisation is replacing the 
traditional authority of the state: "[ w ]hen a corporation invests abroad it not only 
sends capital and management out but also establishes a system for drawing foreign 
capital and labor into an integrated world network.,,505 
One issue that is not debated is that the shared global order currently in place is 
established by the most fortunate and imposed on the worst-off. As it represents an 
important part of the global order, we here subject the international IP system to 
assessment from a global distributive justice perspective. It should contain 
mechanisms to ensure that everyone has access to a certain level of health (influenced 
by access to genetic knowledge and products), in order to be able to secure a normal 
range of opportunities. This dut y of justice in health originates from different 
theoretical sources already discussed in the tirst part of the thesis.506 Regardless of 
503 C. May, "Cosmopolitan Legalism Meets Thin Community: Problems in the Global Governance of 
IP", supra note 404, at 410. 
504 R. Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); D.G 
Richards, supra note 380. 
505 S. Hymer, The Multinational Corporation: a Radical Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979) at 76; D.G Richards, supra note 380, c. 4, at 79-111. 
506 Here is a brief reminder of what we studied in the last chapter with regards to duties of justice. The 
tirst one is the general moral duty to avoid causing harm to others, an obligation that can be met by 
avoiding participation in an unjust global structure. Our ideal, just global structure requires that we 
denounce the actual IP structure and adhere to global distributive mechanisms to avoid such harm. 
However, the actual international intellectual property system does not appear to work this way. T. W. 
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 284; T.W. Pogge, "Symposium on World 
Poverty and Human Rights", supra note 284. A second foundation for global distributive mechanisms 
in health does not relate to responsibility for harm, but instead to the urgency and seriousness of the 
problems of the less affluent. Basically, this argument requires that the most affluent take action to 
improve global health if it is of substantial signiticance for the recipient and it does not impose too 
much of a burden on the donors. As we know, TRIPS has been established by the most affluent, mostly 
multinational pharmaceutical and software companies, in order to further their particular interests. As a 
result, exclusive property rights are granted on many health-related products, technology, and services 
that can play a major role in saving lives and providing therapeutic solutions for serious and life-
threatening diseases. In this context, one could argue that patent-holders could renounce their exclusive 
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which theoretical reason we choose to justify justice obligations (we argued for a dut y 
to avoid hann in our theoretical framework), the economic disparity between 
different countries and regions of the world makes it impossible to address issues of 
distributive justice and property rights over the human genome without polarising the 
world into two large groups: developed and developing countries. 507 In fact, even if 
we an share our genetic background with everybody else on the planet, the 
technology for unlocking the value of these human genetic resources is patented 
mostly in developed countries and sometimes in developing countries, for the most 
part by stakeholders from the developed world. This factor, among many others, can 
influence access to genetic benefits by individuals of different regions of the world. 508 
This dichotomy is illustrated in the application of TRIPS, which was created 
primarily to secure benefits for the IP owners, encourage international trade, and 
establish a system that fosters minimal standards of IP for every WTO member state. 
In fact, the global scheme broadens patentability criteria for a minimum 20-year 
period and has a general negative effect on developing countries, and people from 
those countries, in tenns of access to health and genetics. The basic mission of the 
rights in the most serious and urgent cases without serious economic consequences. H. Shue, Basic 
Rights, supra note 245, at 159-180; J. Arthur, "Rights and the Dut Y to Bring Aid" in W. Aiken & H. 
LaFolette, World Hunger and Morality, 2nd ed, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1996) 39, at 49. A third 
justification for global distributive mechanisms is Buchanan's duty of justice, which requires the 
creation of mechanisms to provide everyone with access to just institutions. This idea is based on a 
cosmopolitan vision that treats ail human beings with equal consideration by respecting and protecting 
their basic rights. Because the international intellectual property system mainly prioritises trade and 
affluent countries' patent-holders, it does not correspond to a just institution and should be regulated 
and reformed for the sake of justice. A. Buchanan, supra note 25, c. 2, at 73-117; Drahos provides a 
fourth perspective in referring to Rawls' law of people to justify obligations of justice, and what parties 
in the original position would choose as just property mechanisms. As we know, Rawls argued that 
people under the veil of ignorance would choose to comply with equality of opportunity and with the 
difference principles. Following Rawls, Drahos believes that since property plays a big role in trade, 
parties who do not know what states the y represent would choose to award a minimal level of 
protection. They would surely reject protectionist mechanisms such as rigid, long, extensive, and broad 
IP rights, because they would be incompatible with principles of equity and justice, and would tolerate 
huge differences in people's socio-economic status and access to genetics. As we know, this is not 
what is happening with TRIPS, as extensive protectionist patenting measures equally apply to both less 
affluent and developed states. 
507 P. Kameri-Mbote, Property Rights and Biodiversity Management in Kenya (Act Press: Kenya, 
2002). 
508 For statistics on this point, refer to World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, Geneva, 
2005, online on the website of the WB, <http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/index2.htm> 
(accessed May 2nd, 2006), table 5.12. 
157 
WTO is to foster a unifonn system of liberalised trade at the global level. 509 In this 
sense, TRIPS is a tool to encourage international capitalism and strengthen existing 
global inequalities. This obviously creates tensions between exporters and importers 
of IP goods. Sorne scholars and numerous reports argue that, in prioritising protection 
instead of diffusion, this system mainly targets the needs of wealthy inventors and IP 
owners, and results in shrinking the bulk of public knowledge. They also believe that 
the global standardisation and proliferation of IP nonns fostered by TRIPS does not 
encourage more and better knowledge diffusion and dissemination as a single patent 
application in one country only is sufficient to ensure diffusion.510 TRIPS can thus 
harm poorer producers and the public at large by not taking egalitarian grounds into 
consideration and not fostering public welfare goals. 511 The proponents of this 
position highlight that IP globalisation can be very costly for po or countries and have 
disastrous effects on global welfare with very little bene fit for the majority in 
return. 512 However, as we know, others argue instead that increasing IP protection 
globally can result in positive welfare effects for developing countries by encouraging 
innovation, foreign direct investment, and technology transfer. 513 We will come back 
to those opposing views in the last chapter of this dissertation, when we discuss the 
effect of gene patents on access to health in developing countries. 
Regardless of the Vlew we adopt on the practical short- and long-tenn effects of 
patents on innovation in developed and developing countries-something to be 
discussed later in this chapter-the fact that TRIPS emerged from negotiations 
509 As very weIl explained by D. Moellendorf, "The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian Justice" 
(January 2005) 36:1/2 Methaphilosophy 145, at 150-152. 
510 P. McCalman, "Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent 
Harmonization" (2001) 55 Journal of International Economics 161. 
511 And that, even though sorne dispositions aim to find sorne balance between innovation and 
diffusion with exceptions to patent protection. This will be discussed further in the last section of this 
chapter. 
512 For example, refer to: UNCT AD, The TRIPS Agreement and Developing Countries, UNCT AD, 
Geneva, 1996; UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, Geneva, 2001; UK Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights in Development Policy,supra note 
426, at 5; D.G Richards, supra note 380; K. Maskus, "Normative Concerns in the International 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights" (1991) 14 World Economy 403; J. Ordover, "A Patent 
System for both Diffusion and Exclusion" (Winter 1991) 5: 1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 43. 
513 For example, refer to E.Su, "The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries" (2000) 23 Hous. J. 
Int'l L. 169; Gold et al., supra note 353, at 328. 
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undertaken under the auspices of the WTO explains most of its effects on global 
access and distribution of health and genetics. Sorne argue that since the Uruguay 
Round Agreements (inc1uding the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, and TRIPS) were voluntarily signed by 
various countries-both from the developed and the developing world-it must have 
been satisfactory and beneficial to everyone. 514 This reasoning implies that those 
agreements leave everybody in a better position and that consent is sufficient to infer 
legitimacy. However, what the proponents ofthis view seem to ignore is that TRIPS' 
negotiations occurred within a global scheme and under an international organisation 
characterised by numerous power inequalities.515 As explained by Buchanan, "unless 
the background institutions of the basic structure are just, injustices may be 
perpetuated by voluntary agreements.,,516 In this case, developing countries were 
made to realise that they did not really have any other choice but to accept TRIPS' 
conditions negotiated in a context of economic oppression and power imbalance. 
Consequently, in reply to the question ofwhether the international IP system qualifies 
as a just global basic structure, we can say that TRIPS is part of a global scheme 
imposed by the most affluent on the less fortunate, a structure that does not qualify as 
just when assessed from our global distributive justice perspective. Indeed, global 
distribution of health benefits is a crucial element of our ideal theory of justice, and it 
does not seem to be central to TRIPS, which was designed by a few stakeholders to 
further their own private interests in a global structure they run. Undeniably, the 
international political system and, more specifically, TRIPS, as they work now, give 
rise to power struggles that almost always take our attention away from the univers al 
principles and values standing at the basis of a cosmopolitan vision ofhumanity. 
514 Following a complex process of negotiations, developing countries agreed to TRIPS in exchange 
for concessions in others trade related sectors like agriculture and textile. Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annexes lA, Band C, 33 l.L.R. 1197 (1993) 
515 For an enlightening discussion on this point, refer to K. Raustiala, "Compliance and effectiveness in 
international regulatory cooperation" (Summer 2000) 32:3 Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 387; P. Gerhart, "Reflections: beyond compliance theory - TRIPS as a substantive 
issue" (Summer 2000) 32:3 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 357, at 371. 
516A. Buchanan, "Rawls's law ofpeoples: Rules for a vanished Westphalian World" supra note 56, at 
705. 
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Does the international IP system offer a response to shared human interests in 
equality of opportunities? 
Our normative cosmopolitan principles reqmre that individuals be considered the 
"normative epicentre of a system of functionally plural sovereignty."SI7 Sorne could 
argue that since the international IP system was established in an agreement between 
soverelgn states for minimum standards of protection for both inventors and the 
public, it is therefore compatible with a cosmopolitan ideal, since it considers 
everyone. An analysis of the historical and political context of TRIPS' adoption, 
however, leads us to conclude that its creation, adoption, and enforcement have not 
been driven by shared morality but by the interests of the more powerful. SI8 Overall, 
in increasing the scope and reach of intellectual property at the international level, 
TRIPS strengthened the property power of the most affluent stakeholders of the 
world. SI9 As May describes, "the legal rules encapsulated within the TRIPS 
represent the triumph of the knowledge structure' s agenda of the metaphorical links 
between knowledge and property". S20 
This clearly demonstrates that TRIPS did not result from negotiations undertaken in 
conditions of voluntary mutual assistance. Each state that had a minimum amount of 
power took care of advancing its own interests and advantages as much as it could.521 
Moreover, the WTO is an organisation which has no democratic features and is 
subject to the same economic inequalities we find at the state level, something which 
greatly limits democracy at the international level because of the lack of central 
517 A Kupler, supra note 83 
518 For a detailed analysis of TRIPS' context of adoption and operation, we suggest that the reader refer 
to: S. K. Sell, supra note 369. The author even questions the legitimacy of the agreement because of 
its coercive negotiation context and absence ofmutual benefits. See also D. Dufield & U. Suthersanen, 
supra note 366. 
519 C. Arup, "Competition over Competition Policy for International Trade and Intellectual Property" 
(1998) 16:3 Prometheus 367, at 376. 
520 C. May, supra note 366, at 34. 
521 For Buchanan, "the state is nothing more than a discretionary association for the mutual advantage 
of its citizens" A. Buchanan, "The Internai Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention" (1999) 7 Journal 
of Political Philosophy 71. 
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authority.522 In a way, it is "extra-governmental" and beyond the direct reach of the 
electorate. 
In response to this situation, sorne argue for increased decentralisation and 
prioritisation of national interests, both on the international and the national scenes, 
instead of trying to agree on global shared interests. One argument to support this 
view is that different cultures call for different actions, and attempts by sorne states to 
establish international moral standards could lead to moral imperialism.523 There are a 
few problems with this national interest view. One is that, in reality, the national 
interest is often the expression of the interests of small number of elites who have 
enough power to neutralise the interests of other groups. This is clearly illustrated by 
the outcome of TRIPS' negotiations. The strong multinational lobby of the 
pharmaceutical industry, represented in different industrialised countries, vigorously 
promoted its own interest in a univers al minimal coverage of patent protection.524 In 
so doing, these multinational corporations had a large impact on the adoption of the 
TRIPS agreement as it now stands.525 They were very efficient in convincing state 
policymakers to promote their interests. By letting the pharmaceutical lobby 
implicitly lead the negotiations and further their economic agenda in the name of 
whole nations, developed countries like the US and Japan, as well as the EU, agreed 
to translate private interests into matters of public interest. This concurrently left out 
the concerns of other national interest groups like patient groups, NGOs, and 
citizens.526 
522 J. S. Dryzek, "Transnational Democracy" (March 1999) 7:1 Journal ofPolitical Philosophy 30, at 
33. 
523 H.J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1985); c. Rice, "Campaign 2000, Promoting the National Interest" (Jan-Feb 2000) 
79 Foreign Affairs 45 
524 ln fact, large pharmaceutical companies believe that patent protection is the most important tool to 
uphold their investment in R&D and innovation, in addition to furthering their corporate strategies as 
explained in F.M. Scherer, "Le Système de Brevet et l'Innovation dans le Secteur Pharmaceutique/ 
The Patent System and Innovation in Pharmaceuticals" (2000) 1 Revue Internationale de Droit 
Economique 1 10, at 112. 
525 M. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and the Politics of Intellectual Property 
(Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1998) at. 67-72; S.K. Sell, supra note 369, at 23-25. 
526 Many interest groups who stand on diametrically opposed grounds to pharmas exist everywhere in 
the world. There is, for example, Oxfam, Greepeace, Médecins sans Frontières, Canadian HIV-AIDS 
Legal Network, the Consumer Project on Technology, etc. Refer to the following document for an 
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Another difficulty arising from a focus on national interest is that it assumes that state 
officiaIs will necessarily act to promote their populations' interests. It thereby ignores 
the fact that many poor countries are very poorly governed. In fact, many of them are 
run by corrupt officiaIs, not always democratically elected and often more concerned 
about advancing their own interests than those of their populations. It is thus fair to 
say that individuals forming the populations of such unstable states cannot count on 
their govemments to represent them adequately, and would therefore derive great 
advantage from the application of global principles of shared morality. Moreover, we 
cannot ignore the global institutional context's role in maintaining sorne of these 
corrupt, undemocratic, and unstable govemments. As long as affluent states recognise 
the effective political and trade power of unstable govemments and will design global 
normative instruments like the international intellectuai property scherne hand-in-
hand with them, global inequities and poverty will persist. 527 
The liberal cosmopolitan distributive justice theory adopted in this thesis calls for a 
shared morality between aIl societies and humans to meet basic and univers al needs 
and values. Stuart Hampshire de fines basic ethical principles as "those that if 
followed, help avert the worst harms to which aIl hum an beings are vulnerable, 
those principles to which adherence is necessary for people being able to lead 
decent human lives." 528 It is important to identify spheres of cornmon and 
univers al interest that can forge a sense of global identity necessary to find a 
consensus on common ethical principles relating to univers al concerns for the 
well-being of every individual. Such an exercise has been successfully 
completed in the field of research ethics, where a broad agreement on 
cornrnon ethical principles has been reached for a minimal protection of human 
example of joint action in opposition to the economic agenda of big pharmas: The Interagency 
Coalition on AIDS and Development, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, and Canadian 
Treatment Action Council, An Open Letter 10 Ail Members of Parliamenl, October 25th, 200 1, online 
on the website of MSF: 
<www.msf.ca/access/pics/msf letter par e.pdf> (accessed: May 30th, 2006). 
527 T. W. Pogge (2005), supra note 506, at 7. 
528 S. Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989) at 90; see also A. Linklater, supra note 495, at 167-170. 
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research participants at the international level by medical researchers under the 
auspices of the World Medical Association (WMA)529 and by regulators and 
representatives of pharmaceutical companies in the field of clinical trials with 
the Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice (GCP) adopted through the 
International Conference on Harmonisation (lCH).530 Global health improvement 
is another one of those fields that should be of common and universal concern, 
for reasons already analysed earlier. 
In the broad area of international law, this shared morality should be served by 
integrating distributive justice standards in trade relations, labour and 
environmental law, and in the global intellectual property rights scheme for a 
more equitable international allocation of the health benefits arising from 
biotechnology and genetics. For now, however, the social utility function of IP is 
interpreted quite narrowly as we witness the acquisition of property rights on 
products which make use of elements of the public commons by a small group of 
corporate stakeholders. Unfortunately, the international IP system can be viewed as 
a foil designed to benefit the owners and managers of multinational capital invested 
in funding, creating, and supplying the knowledge-based inventions in different 
markets worldwide. 531 TRIPS has the status of public international law and 
functions mostly without having to take health and welfare needs of the world's poor 
majorities into great consideration. TRIPS contains sorne exceptions and flexibility, 
but as it will be discussed in more detail in the next section, these are often given 
minimum consideration in practice. In this sense, TRIPS is compatible with the neo-
liberal ideology that supports a fundamental civil right of freedom of trade for every 
529 This international exercise has been fruitful, as most states now act in accordance with a 
common set of moral principles wh en conducting biomedical research. For an overview of this 
globally shared morality in the ethics of biomedical research, refer to: World Medical Association, 
Declaration of Helsinki, Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (5th rev), 
Edinburgh, Scotland, 2000, online on the website of the WMA: 
<http://www.wma.netle/policy/b3.htm> (accessed: May 30th, 2006). 
530 International Conference on Harmonisation, Good Clinical Practice : Consolidated Guideline, 
E6-R], June] 0, ] 996, On]ine on the ICH website: <http://www.ich.orgiLOB/media/MEDlA482.pdt> 
(accessed May 2nd, 2006). 
531 R. A. Payne & N. H. Samhat, supra note 495 c. 5, at 135-]40. 
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individua1.532 In awarding precedence to property rights and freedom of trade, this 
view concurrently legitimises inequalities in heaIth and differences in 
opportunities. 
This tendency needs to be corrected at the normative level if we want to hope for 
global distributive justice and social welfare. Actions have already been taken in 
this direction, with NGO campaigns denouncing the effects of TRIPS on access 
to essential drugs, yet much more needs to be do ne for the global IP system to 
mirror a shared human interest in health and to promote equality of opportunity 
through distributive justice mechanisms. 
This section aimed at assessmg one aspect of IP: the globalised perspective 
implanted in the system of international IPRs with a standard of global access. 
To do so, we used the cosmopolitan focus adopted in our theoretical framework 
and refered to the global nature of our distributive justice obligation in health 
and genetics. Our analysis highlights various challenging issues related to the 
political economy, philosophy, and functioning of the international IP system. 
First, in relation to the protection of the public domain, we realised that the 
CUITent IP system does not priori tise the protection of the commons, but instead 
encourages patent claims on a broad range of resources and products. This is 
particularly relevant in the area of genetics, where we detect increasing and 
extensive privatisation of the human genome, contributing to the erosion of the 
commons. This can be detrimental to genetic research and innovation. Second, we 
observed that the system of international IPRs does not work to allow for a 
recognition of the universal importance of health for every human being. In fact, 
although it has clear legislative potential to this end, TRIPS, as it works, does not do 
much about the fact that most people from developing countries are being left out of 
the system's application, especially in innovative fields like genetics, as they often 
532 E.-U. Petersmann, "National Constitutions and International Economic Law" in M. Hilf & E.-U. 
Petersmann, eds., National Constitutions and International Economic Law (Deventer: Kluwer. 
1993) 3; E-U. Petersmann, "The WTO Constitution and Human Rights" (2000) 3:1 Journal of 
International Economic Law 19, at 21-23. 
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do not have the necessary scientific and technical power to get involved. This can 
have a negative impact on health, as we will see in more detail in the next part ofthis 
chapter. A third problem with the international IPR system is that it does not ensure 
universal consideration of every human being. This is due in part to its protectionist 
nature, the interests it prioritises, and the economic gap it fosters between 
countries that innovate and those that cannot. 
Having assessed the international dimension of the IPR system with different 
aspects of global access to genetic resources, we will now evaluate the compatibility 
of IPRs with other facets of access: availability and affordability of genetic research 
tools, products, and services as mechanisms to further equality of opportunities. 
3.3.2. Patents and access in terms of availability and affordability 
The philosophy of article 19 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights is a good starting point for our reflection on access to genetics in terms 
of availability and affordability: 
a) In the framework of international co-operation with 
developing countries, States should seek to encourage 
measures enabling: 
i) assessment of the risks and benefits 
pertaining to research on the human genome to 
be carried out and abuse to be prevented; 
ii) the capacity of developing countries to carry 
out research on human biology and genetics, 
taking into consideration their specific 
problems, to be developed and strengthened; 
iii) developing countries to bene fit from the 
achievements of scientific and technological 
research so that their use in favour of economic 
and social progress can be to the benefit of aIl; 
iv) the free ex change of scientific knowledge 
and information in the areas of biology, 
genetics and medicine to be promoted. 
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b) Relevant international organizations should support 
and promote the initiatives taken by States for the 
above mentioned purposes. 
The main goal of this section is to determine how the need for access to genetics 
is realised in relation to availability and affordability, and whether the actual IP 
scheme is designed to meet and prioritise this need. After a brief presentation of 
different spheres of access affected by patents, we will assess the compatibility 
of IP rights with securing equality of opportunities and distributive justice In 
relation to genetic knowledge and related innovations. 
3.3.2.1. Spheres of genetic access affected by patents 
One particularity of genetics is that access to what has already been discovered 
is necessary to push the science further and discover alternative applications. As 
Sulston notes, "it is not possible to reinvent a human gene,,,S33 and since the 
most important gene applications are often discovered following many years of 
cumulative research, access to prior work is of critical importance for the 
scientific survival of the whole field. Property rights in intellectual objects can 
have an impact on different spheres of genetic access. For example, patents can 
influence availability of research tools in placing a temporary embargo on 
crucial elements necessary for the advancement of genetic research. Patents can 
also affect the availability of genetic tests and services in vulnerable 
communities and populations as they can influence affordability of products and 
servIces. 
533 J. Sulston, supra note 475, at 86. 
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Availability of research tools 
In genetics, research tools are the input needed to develop, discover, or invent 
innovative heath-related products. For example, these tools include DNA, genes, 
sequencing techniques, genetic bio banks, stem cells, cell lines, single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), genetic knowledge, etc. 534 In the course of their research 
projects, investigators will often need to access, analyse, and duplicate many 
research tools. When they are patented, their use will increase the cost of 
research if, for example, patent-holders impose high licensing fees, or if the use 
of many patented tools is needed for the same project and sorne patent holders 
are reluctant to license their rights. This latter concern is especially relevant in 
genetic research, where it is not uncommon to see multiple (patented) genes and 
gene sequences involved in the expression of one single disease. As discussed 
earlier, this has been referred to as the tragedy of the anti-commons, occurring when 
too many holders of property rights are in positions to exclude others from using 
resources from the commons.535 Sorne, like Kieff, respond to such concern arguing 
that patents on research tools will instead encourage their commercialisation and 
accessibility and that many patent-holders will naturally be inclined to widely license 
their right in useful research tools in order to become more famous and receive 
academic recognition from their peers. 536 As briefly mentioned earlier, there is not 
enough data for now to conclude that patents are at the origin of a tragedy of the anti-
commons, but there are sorne indications that patents, at least in certain cases, can 
negatively impact the conduct of genetic research and inhibit science. 537 This is 
534 WHO, Genetics, Genomics and the Patenting of DNA: Review of Potential Implications for Health 
in Developing Countries, supra note 19, at 39; J.P. Walsh, A. Arora & W.M. Cohen, supra note 444. 
535 This can happen with the ongoing race taking place in genetics and genomics. Various companies 
have taken out patents on multiple DNA sequences in a race to control entire genes, and they could use 
their rights in these sequences to pre vent other scientists from using or studying them. Indeed, they 
could refuse to license their rights or charge high prices for their use. For example, M. A. Helier, supra 
note 443, at 624; M.A. Helier & R.S. Eisenberg, supra note 358; D. G. Richards, supra note 370, c. 2, 
at 36-38. 
536 For more on this argument, see: F. S. Kieff, "Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property 
Rights and the Norms of Science- A response to Rai and Eisenberg", supra note 365; J. Walsh, C. Cho 
& W.M. Cohen, supra note 426; J. Walsh, C. Cho & W.M. Cohen, "View from the Bench: Patents and 
Material Transfers" (Sept. 23, 2005) 309:5743 Science 2002. 
537 Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), Genetic Inventions, 
Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence and Policies, Paris, 2002, at 50; J.P. 
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especially true for research undertaken by research bodies operating with limited 
capital and interested in areas of research that are likely to be less profitable. Because 
of high license costs, sorne might not be able to use patented, expensive tools to 
progress in their research and to further their efforts towards commercialisation, in 
contrast to those who are able to afford these instruments to further their own 
research and commercialisation agendas, mostly in profitable research areas. As 
bluntly put by Drahos and Mayne, "[i]f the poor want more patent based R&D for 
malaria they will have to hope that is overtakes obesity and impotence as a problem 
in western societies. ,,538 In the same vein, sorne even go as far as to argue that 
market forces and property rights contribute to establish new standards of health, 
normality, and disease. 539 
Availability of genetics products and services 
Another availability issue concerns the development and distribution of genetic 
tests and services to people living in countries representing non-lucrative 
markets. As just mentioned, patents on research tools can, in sorne cases, slow 
progress in areas of special relevance to developing countries, which therefore 
have to rely on what is being produced and patented in more affluent 
countries. 540 Patent protection might not always encourage availability of 
products and services in either developed and developing countries. In fact, as 
already mentioned, there is an ongoing debate as to whether patents encourage 
innovation or not, and there is a lack of empirical evidence to support any 
position. One exception to this might be the field of diagnostic genetic tests, 
Walsh, A. Arora & W.M. Cohen, supra note 444, at. 297-305; J.F. Merz et al., "Diagnostic Testing 
Fails the Test", supra note 436; B. Martin, supra note 381. 
538 P. Drahos & R. Mayne, eds., Global lntellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and 
Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) Introduction, at 7. 
539 For a detailed explanation ofthis theoretical view, we refer the reader to: M. Martone "The Ethics 
of the Economics of Patenting the Human Genome" (1998) 17 J. Bus. Ethics 1679, at 1679 and T. 
Caulfield, supra note 362. 
540 Developing countries are also often technologically unable to develop tests, products, and 
services, as we will see in the last section ofthis chapter. 
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where the prospect of patent rights has not been an incentive to development.541 
In fact, there is evidence that patents have encouraged early release of genetic 
products that might not have been of the best quality and reliability. 542 
Moreover, depending on the scope of the patent granted, patent-holders can 
control how the product will be used in clinical and research settings, its cost, 
and the mode of analysis to use with the product. 543 This could greatly influence 
availability of health related products, especially to the most vulnerable 
populations and individuals. In response to such important concerns, in February 
2006, members of the OECD adopted guidelines for governing the licensing of 
genetic inventions used in health care settings. Those guidelines are meant to 
encourage both innovation in genetics and fair economic returns, rapid 
dissemination, and access to diagnostic and therapeutic products and services. 544 
It will be interesting to follow how those non binding guidelines will changes 
licensing behaviours in OECD countries. 
Another factor influencing availability, and which is not patent-related, is the lack of 
infrastructure within developing nations. Genetic compounds, products, and 
serVIces will usually not be patented in developing countries because of the 
absence of a market and the lack of possible financial return and profits. 
Theoretically, this would mean that those countries could use the technology, 
products, and services without restriction. However, in these cases, availability of 
genetic services is not influenced by patent rights, but instead by a country' s research, 
medical, and manufacturing infrastructure, and by its lack of trained professionals. As 
we will briefly explain in the next section, it is important to realise that although 
541 ln fact, the following article reports evidence that the development and the use ofmany genetic tests 
were undertaken by laboratories other than those planning to apply for patent protection: J.F. Merz et 
al., "Diagnostic Testing Fails", supra note 437; J.F. Merz et al., "Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: 
The Pitfalls of Patents are IIIustrated by the Case of Haemochromatosis", supra note 436. 
542 T.A. Caulfield & E.R. Gold, "Genetic Testing, Ethical Concems, and the Role of Patent Law" 
(2000) 57 Clinical Genetics 370; E.R. Gold, "From Theory to Practice: Health Care and the Patent 
System" (Sept. 2003) Health Law Journal, Special Edition 2003: Precedent & Innovation: Health Law 
in the 21 st Century. 
543 Subject to market forces, competition and existing legal norms. 
rd 
5440ECD Council, Recommendation on the Licensing of Genetic Inventions, February 23 2006. C 
(2005)149/Revl, online on the OECD website: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/38/36198812.pdf> 
(accessed May 2nd, 2006). 
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patents might have a role to play in availability issues in developing countries, it is 
only one issue to consider and must not be blamed for everything. It is thus crucial to 
highlight the importance of developing appropriate infrastructures and training 
programs for availability of genetics in these countries. 
Affordability of genetics products and services 
Affordability of products and services is another important sphere of access in 
genetics. Patents awarded in developed countries can have a direct effect on the 
price of genetic products and services both in developed and developing nations. 
In fact, since most developing countries do not have the necessary infrastructure 
to develop and manufacture health-related products, they have to rely on more 
affluent countries for the supplies they need. 545 Thus, the effect of patents on the 
cost of genetic technology and services will also be transferred to importing, 
developing countries. We know that awarding patent rights over intellectual 
objects allows patent-holders to license their rights under conditions they set or sell 
patented objects at a price they unilaterally fix. 546 This is meant to help patent-holders 
recoup the capital invested in research and development, but also often implies that 
these fees are transferred to the licensees and to genetic products and technology 
users. This temporary monopoly over the cost of products can generate access 
barri ers for those who are unable to pay. Needs which are not voiced by purchasing 
power on the market are not taken into consideration by the patent system. 
Therefore, the capacity to pay (or not) can contribute to generate health gaps within 
and between countries. 547 
545 Of course, sorne developing countries have manufacturing capacity and can produce goods 
domestically. However, with the universal standards established in TRIPS, those countries have to 
comply and award national protection to patent-holders, often to the detriment oftheir national generic 
industry. We will come back to the effect of patents on those countries in the last chapter. 
546 Again, patent-holders' actions are obviously constrained by market forces, competition, and trade 
legislation. 
547 This ability will depend on various factors. For example, sorne countries, like Canada, provide 
universal health insurance for certain products and services; many countries do not. Depending on 
whether the patented product is covered by an insurance program or not, it can be each individual's 
business to assume their pers on al heaIth care costs. D.G Richards, supra note 380, c. 2, at 25-38. 
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These last paragraphs briefly presented us with indications on how patents can 
influence availability and affordability in the field of genetics. We will now 
discuss if and how this is compatible with our principles of equality of 
opportunities and distributive justice in health. 
3.3.2.2. Patents and distributive justice in health for 
equality of opportunities 
We have seen that intellectual property rights allow holders to exclude others 
from using, selling, and producing the object of their right for 20 years. In other 
words, in granting IP rights, a government creates artificial scarcity in non-
exclusive intellectual objects and institutes a system where the public has to pay 
for accessing and using information and knowledge assets. IPRs also have other 
roles including one in diffusion of knowledge and innovation and one in 
commercialisation in terms of contribution to the manufacturing and distribution of 
innovations. As we saw with the actual system, however, dissemination is often 
constrained by the willingness and capacity to pay for access and improved 
commercialisation of invention does not guarantee equitable access. This limitation 
on diffusion, access and utilisation of ideas can impact individuals' self-realisation 
and the progress of scientific innovation. Moreover, another problem with the way 
the actual system works is that the public is seen as a vague entity rather than a 
group of individuals who may have legitimate claims on patented knowledge and 
intellectual objects. 548 
Our global distributive justice theory demands that we do not harm global health; that 
institutional protection, relief, and aid development be provided against harm; and 
that genetic resources be redistributed to this end. These values and duties are not 
especially taken into consideration in the IP system, which allows retention of 
property rights and control over inventions that, if otherwise accessible, could be 
548 C. May, supra note 333. 
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crucial in meeting individuals' basic health needs. As Palmer notes, "intellectual 
property rights, however, do not arise from scarcity, but are its cause.,,549 
In fact, property owners have the right to control access and decide how the object of 
their right will be used, produced, and exploited.550 This necessarily influences the 
distribution of intellectual goods, but this alone does not say much about the quality 
of the distribution or its consequences for justice. We thus need to go one step further 
in enquiring about the compatibility of IPRs with global distributive justice. We 
already made our point on why we reject distribution undertaken by the free market 
or any efficient distribution that maximises the total amount of knowledge when it 
does not care about how this knowledge is distributed among individuals. 551 We 
instead argue for a mechanism that asses ses distribution from a social welfare angle 
and grants direct help to individuals in need of health-related resources, technology, 
and services in order to bring them to a level where they can bene fit from equality of 
opportunities. To this end, isolated charitable actions like temporary suspension of 
one company's drug patent in a particular country or drug donations in a few 
countries, are not sufficient to address the most vulnerable health needs. In fact, 
obligations of distributive justice demand rethinking IPRs and global institutions 
from a theoretical point of view, and require constant action and commitment from 
the agents in charge of establishing and enforcing IPRs both at the national and the 
global levels. Distributive justice also demands rejecting the protectionist scheme of 
IP and avoiding artificial shortage in intellectual objects that does not allow 
prioritising the neediest. 552 We have seen that Rawls' view on distributive justice 
suggests that inequality in distribution can be justified if it advantages the least well-
off. We critiqued this justification because it still allows major disparities in access to 
genetic services and technology and is not concerned with equality, but with absolute 
improvement of the situation of the least weIl-off, even if it can be consistent with an 
549 T.G. Palmer, "Are patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights 
and Ideal Objects" (1990) 13 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 860, at 861. 
550 H.T. Engelhardt Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 
342-343. 
551 These views represent the libertarian and utilitarian perspectives on knowledge distribution, two 
philosophies discussed and critiqued in the theory chapter. 
552 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 194-198. 
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important health divide.553 Therefore, we instead focussed on justifying distribution 
in terms of its effect on existing health needs and equality of opportunities. 
Equality of opportunities in genetics implies that everyone should have access to 
a certain level of health in order to be in a position to take advantage of different 
opportunities available in crucial spheres of life, and therefore be capable of 
achieving their full potential. As discussed in the tirst part, health is something 
of very special importance and universal signiticance for individuals of the 
world. We argued that, because of this, access to health requires particular 
standards of egalitarianism. In other words, as health is a vital element for every 
individual's personal development, the actual level of inequality in this area 
contributes to the preservation of a degrading and unfair level of inequality. This led 
us to conc1ude that inequalities in health should be repaired without taking 
individuals' personal tinancial situations into consideration. Hence, genetic 
knowledge, products, and services should be available and affordable to 
individuals in order to allow them to benetit from the different opportunities 
available. As more and more knowledge is produced, the amount of what is 
needed to be comfortable and capable of seizing opportunities increases as weIl. 
As discussed in the tirst part, even if the nature of opportunities is likely to vary 
between countries, the types of opportunities, such as the opportunity to pursue life 
and career undertakings, should be the same for everyone regardless of their nation, 
state, or ethnic group.554 Taking this into account, property rights should be used as 
tools to maximise access to health and genetic-related knowledge, products, and 
services to ensure true equality in opportunities.555 
However, this is not necessarily how the IPR system operates. In fact, patents 
can be awarded on genes, DNA sequences, tools, sequencing techniques, and 
553 D. Fallis, Social Epistemology and the Digital Divide, presented at the Computing and Philosophy 
Conference, Canberra, 2004, online on the website of the CRPIT: 
<hrtp://crpit.com/contPapers/CRPITV37Fallis.pdf> (accessed: May 20th, 2006); H. Shue, Basic Rights 
supra note 245, at 128. 
554 H Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, at 59-60 & 159 et ss. 
555 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 178. 
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many other important resources for moving genetic science ahead. Nevertheless, 
multiple overlapping patents can oblige researchers to pay high prices for 
several licenses just to be allowed to conduct research projects, without any 
guarantee that they will result in positive outcomes. This is called "royalty 
stacking" and it can influence availability in discouraging the use of patented 
genetic knowledge in further research and innovation. As discussed earlier, this 
is particularly true in areas of specific interest for people living in less profitable 
markets because of excessive research costs and small possibility of financial 
returns. Furthermore, patent-holders are free to charge licensing fees and high 
prices to licensees and users of genetics technology and products, mostly 
because of their need to earn back the capital invested in developing those 
products, and also to engage in further innovation endeavours. This means that 
people's capacity to afford available patented products and services determines 
access to genetic advances. Thus, IPRs awarded in genetics are especially 
important because they can have direct influence on individual health by 
creating or worsening differences in people' s health within and among nations. 
Therefore, in influencing individuals' health status and constraints, IPRs play an 
important role in shaping the opportunity package from which individuals can 
choose. 
Because health is an important prerequisite for taking advantage of available 
opportunities, property rights in genetics can play a large role in shaping the 
actual access to opportunities available to individuals. The intellectual property 
system leaves much latitude to private IP owners who can control how and by 
whom patented products and services will be used and, consequently, whose 
health level will improve the most. In the genetic sector, strong enforcement of 
IPRs can delay the availability of crucial health-related products and services, 
which can be evaluated though the death and diseases of the less affluent. 556 
Hence, IP owners have sorne power over health status, and this influence can be 
positive or negative, depending on the philosophy and the licensing strategy they 
556 C. May, supra note 366, c. 4. 
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choose to adopt. In other words, the actual system gives IP owners the freedom 
either to help individuals around the world meet their health needs (by 
contributing to developing affordable innovative technology) or making it more 
difficult (or impossible) for the less affluent to access the technology they 
develop. With this perspective in mind, it can be hard to justify IP when sorne people 
are made worse offby not getting the same chances to improve their health. Indeed, 
when they cannot access patented products, people are not made worse off in the 
absolute sense, as nothing really changes: they did not have access to those products 
before they were invented and they still do not get access to them after. They are 
however worse off in a relative sense, since something that could improve their 
condition exists and they cannot access it because of strong patent rights. They are 
thus worse than they could actually be.557 
Even if the IPR scheme generally tends to treat all intellectual goods the same 
without taking their role and importance in meeting basic needs into account, there 
are sorne broad flexibilities and health equity safeguards built into the international IP 
system, both in TRIPS and in the Doha Declaration.558 A few examples: art. 7 of 
TRIPS mentions that IP protection should promote a balance between technological 
innovation and transfer and dissemination of technology for social welfare. Art. 8 
stipulates that states can adopt measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their 
socio-economic and technological development, but only if they are not contrary to 
the stipulations of the rest of TRIPS. Member states aiso have the freedom to exclude 
diagnostic, therapeutic and surgi cal methods for the treatment of humans or animaIs 
from patentability (art. 27 (3) a) of TRIPS) and to award compulsory licences in 
557 For a more detailed discussion on this point, see R. L. Ostergard, Jr., supra note 379, at 169. 
558 J.H. Reichman, "From Free-Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition under the TRIPs 
Agreement", (1997) 29 N. Y. u.L.J. lnt '1. & Po/. II; C. Correa, "Pro-Competitive Measures under 
TRIPS to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countries" in P. Drahos & R. Mayne, 
Global lntellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and Development (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002); C. Correa, lntellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries, 
supra note 438. 
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limited cases (art. 31 of TRIPS).559 Moreover, the Doha Declaration is meant to 
enable developing countries to pursue certain public health objectives, and states that 
countries can interpret TRIPS so it does not work against their health policies. It also 
allows states to grant compulsory licenses, especially to promote universal access to 
medicines, if they have sufficient manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector 
(artA); for those who do not, they can look for it in other countries.560 Moreover, art. 
5 d) of the Doha Declaration, in combination with art. 6 of TRIPS, allows member 
states to decide how they wish to enforce the principle of exhaustion of rights within 
their territory. 561 
Applying these types of measures could reduce the market priee of health-related 
products and have a general positive effect on research and availability of genetic 
innovation. In reality, however, these dispositions are given the absolute minimum 
consideration by the community of people who interprets them. Developed countries 
are putting strong pressure on developing countries wanting to use TRIPS' flexibility 
and, above all, are negotiating bilateral and regional free-trade agreements (FTAs) to 
559 Compulsory licenses enable a government to license a company, government agency, or other party 
the right to use a patent without the title holder's consent under strict conditions. 
560 This has been made possible with the WTO August 30th, 2003 decision to lift TRIPS restrictions on 
compulsory licensing and allow exportation of generic medicines to countries that are not in a position 
to manufacture them themselves. WTO General Council, Decision on the Implementation of par.6 of 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, August 30th 2003, online on the WTO 
website: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/tripse/implempara6e.htm> (accessed: May 20th, 
2006). 
561 This means that countries can choose between national, regional, and international exhaustion of 
rights. An international exhaustion of patent rights means that once a patent owner or sorne authorised 
licensee has sold their patented product on a market, their rights in this product are exhausted on every 
market and they cannot prevent subsequent resale domestically or abroad. This can have important 
consequences on heaIth access, as the application of an international exhaustion of rights can allow 
countries to import patented products at lower priees than they have to pay at home when the products 
have already been placed in another country's market. Since the same patented items get sold at 
different costs in different markets, a country's interest in performing parallel importation is to import 
the goods they need at the lowest priee possible, without violating local patents. The mechanism of 
international exhaustion of rights could allow less affluent countries to get access to essential heaIth-
related products that they would not otherwise be able to afford (on their domestic market). However, 
such measure is controversial as many affluent countries fear that it could impact negatively on their 
economy if cheap products are exported back to their market and concurrence patented products. For 
an interesting paper on the issues arising with paralle\ importing see: K. E. Maskus, Parallel lmports in 
Pharmaeeuticals: Implications for Competition and Priees in Developing Countries, Final Report to 
World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, 2001, online on the website ofWIPO: 
<http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/studies/pdf/ssa maskus pi.pdt> (accessed: May 2nd, 2006). 
176 
Impose more severe and contingent IP standards than those outlined in TRIPS. 562 
This point is very weIl illustrated by the example of the lack of access to HIV / AIDS 
drugs in the developing world, as it will be discussed at length in the last chapter of 
the dissertation. Strong resistance from the most affluent countries toward any 
initiative from the developing world to take advantage of TRIPS and Doha's social 
welfare flexibility highlights the growing importance of strong and narrowly 
interpreted property rights on the global scene due to normative and political reasons. 
We will first address the normative explanation for the poor application of Doha's 
and TRIPS' flexibility clauses. Although principles of the Doha Declaration have 
been adopted by the ministerial conference, the top decision-making body of the 
WTO, they remain very general and serve more as ethical guidelines (in the sense that 
they cannot be enforced in front of the WTO dispute settlement body). In addition, 
TRIPS' flexibility clauses contain important restrictions. 563 Art. 30, for example, 
stipulates that every exception to the patentees' exclusive rights should be limited to 
ensure that they do not "unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner." 
Moreover, art. 31 establishes a long list of conditions that have to be met before 
compulsory licensing can be allowed in circumstances other than emergency and 
public non-commercial use, leaving many issues unsettled and much space for 
interpretation. As for the WTO's August 30t \ 2003 decision, it theoretically 
encourages cooperation between nations as a priority over protection of patent rights 
562 Those agreements are referred to as TRIPS plus and are explicitly condemned by the WHO 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) in its April 2006 
report: WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health, Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, Geneva, April 2006, online on the WHO website: 
<http://www.who.intlintellectualproperty/documents/thereport/CIPIHReport23032006.pdf> (accessed 
May 21, 2006), rec. 4.21 and 4.25; For more on those agreements, see: D. Vivas-Eugui, "Regional and 
Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-Plus World: The Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FT AA)" 
TRIPS Issues Papers No l, QUNO, Geneva/ Ottawa, 2003; P. Basu, "International Patent Law-Boon 
or Bane of Biotech?" (Jan. 2005) 23: 1 Nature Biotechnology 13; J. Reichman & C. Hasenzahl, "Non-
Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, 
and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA", Issue Paper No 5, UNCT ADIICTSD, 
Geneva, 2003. 
563 N. A. Bass, "Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21 st Century" (2002) 34: 1 George Washington 
International Law Review 191. 
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in certain extreme cases. However, it is associated with several conditions and many 
are expressing doubts about its practical applicability.564 
This leads us to the political explanation of why the flexibility embodied in TRIPS 
and Doha is not translated in concrete results. In fact, because of the numerous 
conditions that countries in need have to meet to benefit from TRIPS' exceptions, and 
because of the existing space for competing interpretations, bargaining power has 
become crucial in establishing the scope of these exceptions. Needless to say, this 
exercise almost always benefits the most affluent countries and powerful stakeholders, 
who tend to object strongly to the use of these exceptions, often threatening to impose 
trade sanctions against countries that express interest in engaging in them.565 More 
importantly, there is a strong tendency from developed countries to impose even 
stricter standards on developing countries with bilateral and regional free-trade 
agreements. Moreover, powerful countries and corporations not only try to prevent 
developing countries from using available flexibility in practice, but they also closely 
monitor how they construct their domestic patent laws.566 
564 For example, see J. Lanjouw, Complementarity ofmy FFL proposai and Canada's approach in its 
Pledge Legislation (C- 9): Commentsfor the CIPP Forum, Montréal, January 2005. 
565 ln fact, no generic drugs have been produced using compulsory licenses to treat patients in the last 
decade. Brazil is the only example of a country that resisted pressure and successfully used the threat 
of compulsory licensing in its price negotiations with pharmaceutical companies in the context of its 
national AlOS strategy. Brazil was in a position to do so because of its important research and 
manufacturing capabilities. However, very few countries are in this negotiating position, as appears 
from an investigation conducted in 2001 in about 70 developing countries, which found that only half 
ofthem were providing for international exhaustion of patent rights in their domestic patent legislation. 
UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 512, c. 8, at 160. See also: C. Correa, 
lntegrating Public Health Concerns lnto Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, Geneva, October 
2000, online on the South Center' website, 
<http://www.southcentre.org/publications/publichealth/publichealth.pdf> (accessed June 1 st, 2006); 
M.M. Nerozzi, "The Battle Over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Being 
'TRIPped' by Developed Countries" (2002) 47 Vi/!. L. Rev. 605; A. Attaran, "Assessing and 
Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The 
Case for Greater Flexibility and a Non-Justiciability Solution" (2003) 17:2 Emory International Law 
Review 743. 
566 This is iIlustrated by the famous 2001 law suit filed by a consortium of the biggest drug companies 
against the South African government. Those companies wanted to challenge the 1997 South African patent 
legislation (which allows the government to manufacture and import cheaper retroviral AlOS drugs), 
maintaining that it is too broad and unfair for brand name drug producers. Those major multinational 
pharmaceutical companies thus launched this law suit as part of a strategy to strongly encourage and 
pressure developing countries to adopt stricter patent protection standards. However, with worldwide public 
pressure and massive outrage raised by the consortium's action, the pharmas were left with no choice but to 
back off and drop the case. 
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AlI of this clearly illustrates Drahos' view on proprietarianism and the fact that it 
occupies a large place in how the actual IPR system works and is justified. As it 
currently stands, the world economy is based on strong property rights mainly driven 
by market forces. This results in huge power concentration in the hands of a few 
elites who can run the system and prioritise their own values and interests. As 
discussed earlier, even if it should theoretically further a balance between protection 
and diffusion other than imposing mandatory public disclosure, the IP system does 
not impose enforceable and demanding corollary obligations on IP owners in 
exchange for the rights awarded. The proponents of strong IP rights do not see any 
problem or contradiction in this, as they view the retum on investment as a means to 
promote general welfare through further investment in other research endeavours. But, 
in reality, IPRs foster the interests of patentees and the more affluent in priority, 
without worrying too much about the inequities they create and encourage, or the 
consequences they can have on the lives and health of individuals. 567 As May 
summarises, "[t]he knowledge structure ensures that, as science is commercialised, 
property based mechanisms are introduced because they are common sense in 
market transactions.,,568 
For our goal of distributive justice for global health, we would need to replace this 
proprietarianist view with instrumentalist an attitude that would support a different 
social role for IP. Intellectual Property Rights should thus be conceived as tools to 
support better and broader access to health by every individual through principles of 
global distributive justice, instead of as a fixed system controlled by a few 
companies to support their own economic interests. Ownership should not be 
available when it works to exclude individuals from accessing crucial health-related 
goods and services, to delay their availability, and, consequently, to tacitly support 
more death and illness. Our cosmopolitan focus would instead require considering 
each individual, regardless of their country of origin, as a unit of moral concem for 
567 P. Drahos, supra note 380, at 195-203. 
568 C. May, supra note 366, c. 4, at 117. 
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access to health-not leaving the result to an economlC battle between their 
government representatives and the world's most powerful agents. Until the 
international IP scheme stops functioning primarily to further innovation and cornes 
to care about ensuring that the results of such innovation are diffused so as to reach 
those who need them throughout the world, we will not be able to conclude that IP 
works to advance global distributive justice principles to further access to common 
health standards and allow real equality of opportunities. 
In this subsection, our purpose was to assess the international IPRs system through 
its effects on the availability and affordability of genetic technology, two 
elements of importance in our theory of distributive justice for global health. 
After briefly presenting different spheres of genetic access (availability of 
research tools, availability and affordability of products and services), we 
discussed the impact of IP on distributive justice in health and equality of 
opportunities. This analysis highlighted that while distributive justice in health 
focusses on securing access to health-related resources taking needs into account, the 
global IP system focusses less on equitable access and needs, and more on 
facilitating the production and the protection of innovation. This does not mean 
that IP, used differently, could not play a role in allowing, through its diffusion 
component, broader and better access to health. What our analysis says is simply 
that the IP scheme is mostly geared to a form of proprietarianism that leaves 
very little place for social welfare considerations. Indeed, we established that the 
international IPRs scheme and principles are being used and justified in a way 
that does not necessarily prioritise the elimination of socio-economic 
inequalities in health. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analysed the international normative IP system to determine 
whether its underlying philosophy, structure, and functioning adequately account for 
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the values encountered by our global distributive justice framework. Our main goal 
was to assess the patent system to find out if it can facilitate the redistribution of 
potential genetic benefits, taking health needs into consideration. 
AU through the chapter, we tested the international IP system with our benchmarks of 
justice through different access lenses. We began with the global aspect of access to 
genetic resources and realised that the application of strong and broad patent rights, 
particularly in this field, was more compatible with the reduction of the public 
commons, with the creation of sorne health gaps associated with people's capacity to 
pay, and with an international basic structure established by a few stakeholders for 
their own bene fit-and not to support principles of justice, shared global health ideals, 
or universal consideration of every human being. 
We pursued our analysis in assessing the compatibility of IP rights with access to 
genetics, this time in relation to availability and affordability of genetic products 
and services. We again noticed that the current application of most patents was 
very strict and primarily market-driven, geared towards protection more than 
diffusion, and establishing artificial shortage in inteUectual goods. Consequently, this 
analysis brought us to conc1ude that the actual IP system was not oriented toward 
access and distribution of genetic products and services essential to attain the 
level of health required to benefit from equality of opportunities. 
Our overaU analysis confirms Drahos' critique of the proprietarianist version of 
IP. In fact, we conc1ude that one of the biggest problems with the international 
IP system in relation to global access is that intellectual property rights are 
viewed as private ends in themselves rather th an as tools to further the public 
interest in accessing new knowledge and encouraging innovation. The politics of 
IP is characterised by the powerful defenders of strict and protectionist IP 
standards on one si de, and the less powerful on the other side who campaign for 
more focus on the public and social welfare aspects of the IP system. 569 The 
569 S.K. Sell, supra note 369. 
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strongest and most powerful actors, both politically and economicaIly, run the 
system now. They adopt strict enforcement strategies against the poorer 
majority, going as far as imposing more and more demanding conditions in order 
to further their economic values and interests. 570 Most of these stakeholders have 
no major interest in voluntarily getting involved in a market with poor potential 
for return, even if it could result in important human benefits. After aIl, their 
main reason to be in business is to make profit. However, it creates a vicious 
circle, as "the failure to address the health care needs of poor people is to 
permanently consign them to both illness and poverty.,,571 
This is what makes the system, as it functions now, incompatible with our global 
distributive justice framework. If the IP system were to meet our goal of global 
distributive justice for global health, it would need to adopt a totally different 
social role, more focussed on diffusion and needs than on production and 
protection of innovation, supporting broader access to health and considering 
every individual, not just the inventors, as units of moral concern. IPRs can play 
an important role through knowledge and innovation diffusion in allowing 
individuals to reach the health level they need to be able to profit from available 
opportunities. International trade and IP agreements will remain priorities for 
powerful industrialised countries but, as they currently operate, they are not 
working to ensure equitable access to health. Until there is a major change in IP 
philosophy and politics to allow social welfare concerns to be taken into 
consideration, we will not be able to conclude that IP works to advance global 
distributive justice principles towards access to common health standards. 
As more and more people come to realise that taking care of the more pressing 
global he al th issues is critical for the creation of a more just and stable world arder, 
coming up with balanced and fair IP mechanisms appears to be one of the many 
570 These agreements reproduce TRIPS-plus standards. To consult sorne of those agreements, refer to 
the website of the Office of the US Trade Representative, online: <http://www.ustr.gov/> (accessed 
May 19th, 2006). 
571 D. Richards, supra note 380, c. 6, at. 160; see also, F.M. Scherer, "The Pharmaceuticallndustry and 
World Intellectual Property Standards" (November 2000) 53:6 Vanderbilt Law Review 2245. 
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important steps in the right direction. While TRIPS cannot and will not disappear, it 
is important for developing countries to be able to take advantage of its existing 
mechanisms to help them focus on their health priorities and, most importantly, to 
present strong and coordinated opposition to expansion initiatives. Thus, the 
growing post-TRIPS involvement of international NGOs and of a strong African 
leadership on health care issues is crucial in framing IP issues differently and 
tempering the industry-dominant influence over the IP agenda. 572 
As we saw at the beginning of this dissertation, the benefits arising from genetics 
have a real potential for improving global health; much may depend on how widely 
they get distributed. This does not mean that IP protection should be aboli shed 
altogether, as it can be an important trade mechanism for managing innovation and, 
if used and balanced adequately, it can play a major role in achieving better global 
health equity.573 However, finding the right balance in the application of IP 
protection to genetics is an important challenge. Indeed, the system should, at the 
same time, prevent the more vulnerable from being left out of progress with 
diffusion while preserving a certain level of protection for inventors. Much more 
needs to be done to get to this point, either within the actual IP system or outside of 
it, and many different strategies have been proposed to this end. For example, sorne 
suggest using regime-shifting strategies to expand IP law making in other 
international legal fora to address and revise TRIPS' problematic dispositions; 
others favour the idea of a more widely coordinated initiative, a counter hegemonic 
discourse toward IP. Sorne instead favour transforming the public-realm aspect of 
IP to a role of primary consideration, to change the system accordingly, and to 
relegate the interfering private rights to a secondary rank. Others, on the contrary, 
argue for the creation of a body to work with the CUITent system and focus on the 
572 S. K. Sell, supra note 369; P. Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard Setting, UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Study Paper 8, London, 2002, at 
26. 
573 E. R. Gold et al., supra note 353, at 312. 
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problem of managing IP for global health, with existing exceptions.574 These are 
only a few examples of policy solutions that have been proposed to address sorne of 
the concerns highlighted in this chapter. We will come back to practical policy 
options in more length in the conclusion of the dissertation to set sorne basis for 
further reflection. 
The next chapter will focus on international human rights law. The purpose of this 
chapter will be to present another international normative system and to determine if 
its structure and functioning adequately account for the values encountered in our 
global distributive justice framework. 
574 L. R. Helfer, "Regime Shifting: The Trips Agreement and New Dynamics of International 
Intellectual Property Lawmaking" (Winter 2004) 29 Yale J. Int'I L. 1, at 58; D. Richards, supra note 
380, c. 6; C. May, supra note 333. 
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Chapter IV: International Human Rights Law: a Second Tool? 
Do international human rights help or hinder the realisation of benefit 
sharing? 
Introduction 
The first part of the dissertation set a theoretical framework to support equitable 
access to health, and more specifically distribution of genetic research benefits and 
resources to come. For this purpose, we argued for equal and universal consideration 
of every individual' s basic health needs in support of a rationale to secure equal 
opportunities for aIl on the global scene. The second part of the thesis is dedicated to 
the assessment of two normative systems using the parameters established by our 
theoretical framework. In the last chapter, we assessed the intellectual property law 
system. The purpose of this chapter is to determine if the basis, functioning, and 
conceptualisation of the existing international human rights legal system, especially 
socio-economic rights, helps or obstructs the realisation of global distributive justice 
in health. 
We will start with a brief introduction to the system of international human rights and 
its main philosophical foundations. The second part of this chapter will assess 
international human rights law with reference to notions of equality, global 
distribution, and justice, once again using the standard of access. To this end, we will 
first provide an analysis of the global aspect of access to health in the context of 
international human rights and evaluate the global order under which they develop. 
We will then focus on how the definition and implementation of international human 
rights take health protection and access to genetic innovations, our benchmarks of 
distributive justice, into account. Finally, in the third and last part ofthis chapter, we 
will provide an analysis ofhow human rights are conceptualised through the reality of 
the market. 
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4.1 The Field of International Human Rights Law 
4.1.1 Presentation 
The notion of human rights emerged from the need for universal respect for human 
beings' freedom, dignity, and equality. It has been translated into a common language 
and set of identified human rights. This system is the result of a long struggle to gain 
universal support for individual protection from oppression, and to give an people an 
equal chance to develop to their potential be able to take advantage of different 
opportunities. 575 Indeed, since the Enlightenment, various human rights claims 
resulted in slowly liberating individuals and communities from repressive regimes 
and institutions,576 but the human misery and atrocities that have happened during and 
following the Second World War are viewed as having been a turning point in the 
reintroduction of the modern ideal of human rights. 577 Indeed, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948 
marked a crucial step in the effort of the international community to establish a 
common standard of achievement for ail peoples and ail nations. 578 Together with the 
UDHR, the International Co venant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Co venant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
575 J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (London: Corne Il University Press, 
1989). 
576 Indeed, sorne of the most important efforts in the development of human rights in the late-
seventeenth and eighteenth century are the British Bill of Rights (1690-91), the American Declaration 
of Independence (1776), and the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1779). A. 
Eide, "Economie, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights" in A. Eide et aIs., eds., Economie, 
Social and Cultural Rights: A Texbook, 2nd ed., (London: Maartinus Nijhoff, 2001) 9; S.R.Benatar, 
supra note 2. 
577 T. Bali & R. Dagger, Ideals and Ideologies: a Reader (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004). 
578 The early 1960s was marked by a new wave of human rights activity, which led to various 
international documents, including, for example, the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Chi/d, 
the European Convention on Human Rights of 1963, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Ail Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, the International Covenant on Economie, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Po/itical Rights (opened for 
signature and ratification in 1966 and coming into force in 1976), the 1975 Declaration on the 
Rights of Disabled Persons, and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of ail Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. For international legislation on human rights, see 1. Brownlic, 
Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 
186 
form what has been called the International Bill of Human Rights. 579 The 
conception of modem human rights can be described as rights recognised for aIl 
individuals simply because he or she is a human being. Human rights aim to enhance 
people's quality of life and involve a direct link between them and their state, whose 
actions should be in conformity with the established international human rights 
regime.580 Indeed, even if hum an rights are primarily established on the international 
scene, they also have to be developed at the nationallevel, where they bec orne legally 
enforceable. 
There are two main categories of hum an rights. First, there are civil and political 
rights, including democracy, due process, and freedom of expression, which have to 
be guaranteed immediately by signatory states. Second, there is the category of 
economic, social, and cultural rights, which can be realised progressively, and which 
can include rights to social security, work, adequate food, and the highest attainable 
standard of health. Although they have not yet been accepted as legally enforceable, 
there is increasing support for an emerging third category of human rights called 
solidarity rights, asking for more equitable distribution and protection of common 
resources to benefit not only individuals, but also communities at the international 
level.581 
579 Contrary to the UDHR, the two Covenants are legally binding on the states that ratified them, who 
thus have to comply with the treaties' provisions and submit reports on concrete actions take toward 
this end. international Covenant on Civil and Po/itical Rights (ICCPR) G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); international Covenant on Economie, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXII, UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 
49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
580 J. Mann et al., Health and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 1999) c. 1, at 8; M.C. Naussbaum, 
"Capabilities, Human Rights and Universal Declaration" in B.H. Weston & S.P. Marks, eds. The 
Future of international Human Rights (Ardley: Transnational, 1999); art. 1 of the Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (part 1). 
581 This third category refers, for example, to a right to peace, to a clean environment, ta bene fit trom 
the corn mon heritage of humankind, and to development. For more on solidarity rights, refer to P. 
Alston, "A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of 
International HRlaw" (1982) 29:3 Netherlands international Law Review 307; A. Rosas, "The Right 
to Development" in A. Eide et al., eds., Economie, Social and Cultural Rights: A Texbook, 2nd ed., 
(London: Maartinus Nijhoff, 2001), c. 7, at 119 ; G. Kardos, "Right to Peace, Right to Development, 
Right to a Healthy Environment: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem" in A. Rosas & J. 
Helgesen, eds., Human Rights in a Changing East-West Perspective (New York: Pinter Publishers, 
1990) 216; J. Mann et al., supra note 580; S.R.Benatar, supra note 2. 
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As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the notion of rights is often criticised on the 
basis that rights can remain meaningless in cases where taking advantage of them is 
not a real option for the right-holders. This objection clearly highlights the need for a 
better interconnectedness between socio-economic rights and civil and political 
rights. Indeed, ev en if it seems quite easy to grant rights like the right to vote, the 
right to freedom and security, or the right to free speech, if personal health, material 
and economic conditions of the right-holders are such that it is literaIly impossible for 
them to profit from those rights, they become meaningless. As Pogge clearly states, 
"in a situation where there is formaI freedom but extreme poverty, the poor are 
in many obvious ways unfree on account of their poverty.,,582 Even if economic, 
social, and cultural rights (the human rights most frequently breached) are highly 
criticised for their lack of justiciability and conceptual precision583, it might make 
more sense to eliminate what is now a clear separation between civil and political 
rights and economic, social, and cultural rights.584 This is consistent with guideline 4 
of the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economie, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which states that "[i]t is now undisputed that aIl human rights are indivisible, 
interdependent, interrelated and of equal importance for human dignity. Therefore, 
states are as responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights as they 
are for violations of civil and political rights.,,585 Consequently, since po vert y and ill 
health are important obstacles to a satisfying human existence as established earlier, 
economic and social rights should rank alongside civil and political rights,586 and aIl 
582 T. Pogge, Realising Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), at 133; on this same point, see 
also M. Robinson, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Hope and History" (1998) 3:2 
Health and Human Rights 27. 
583 See for example B. Toebes, "Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Right to 
Health" (1999) 21 :3 Human Right Quarterly 662. 
584 The strong connection between the two categories of rights and the fact that there is no hierarchy 
between them has been specifically emphasised by the UN: United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural and Economic Rights, General Comment No. 3(1), 2002, online on the website of 
the UN: <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cescr.htm> (accessed: June 1 sr, 2006). 
585 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Guideline 4 (1998) 
20 Human Rights Quarterly 692. 
586 B. Terence & R. Dagger, Political Ideologies and the Democratie Ideal, 5th. ed. (New York: 
Addison Wesley, 2004). 
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of these rights should thus be envisioned as essential values for a better world.587 
However, although we acknowledge the indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelation among rights, it is important to note that our main focus will be on the 
content, conceptualisation, and realisation of socio-economic rights as we argue for 
global distribution and access to genetics research benefits in support of better health. 
Now, before getting to the core analytical part of the chapter, we will briefly present 
the two main discourses on which human rights are based. 
4.1.2. Theoretical and legal foundations of international human 
rights 
The existence and validity of human rights are not 
written in the stars ... [They] have been conceived and 
taught by enlightened individuals in the course of 
h· 588 lstory. 
- Albert Einstein 
The nature and underlying justification of the concept of rights have undergone 
considerable change over time. 589 As mentioned previously, the view of rights put 
forward by Hegel, Kant, and other philosophers during the 19th and the 20th centuries 
was heavily criticised for reducing the concept of rights to social constructs.590 This 
explains why rights were absent from the vocabulary of political philosophy for 
decades before coming back, after the Second World Was, in legal and philosophical 
discourse. 591 This section seeks to present briefly those two main discourses and 
understand how they sometimes complement and contradict each other while also 
giving rise to debate outside their respective frameworks. 
587 J. Waldron, supra note 259, at 7-8; G.B. Hebert, supra note 252. 
588 A.P. French, Einstein: a Centenary Va/ume (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979) 305. 
589 For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the concept ofright, see G.B. Hebert, supra note 
252. 
590J. Bentham, supra note 252; K. Marx, "Capital", in F. Engels, ed., Manisfesto of the Communist 
Party, Translated from the 3d German ed. by S. Moore & E. Aveling. Rev (Chicago: Encyclopredia 
Britannica, 1955); G.B. Hebert, supra note 252, at 277. 
591 G.B. Hebert, supra note 252, at 286. 
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4.1.2.1 The legal discourse of international human rights 
As mentioned in the previous section, an important body of international human 
rights instruments has been established on the global scene and further developed at 
the national level. This highlights an inherent conflict between, on the one hand, a 
universal and cosmopolitan way of envisioning human rights and, on the other hand, 
the notion of state sovereignty, a basic principle of international law.592 This can be 
resolved when states agree to concede sorne portion of their sovereignty by ratifying 
international norms. Human rights are often envisioned as a basis for justifying 
demands and imposing obligations. Indeed, one purpose of this legal system is to 
ensure that a right-holder can demand that the content of his or her right be 
guaranteed. Rights are meant to allow a connection between human well-being and 
related obligations. Because of the way the system is built, individuals' rights are 
directly related to the status of citizen. In other words, individuals can take advantage 
of human rights only when their states have decided to recognise and enforce those 
rights based on a sense of "justified outrage and political empowerment".593 These 
rights are included in legal instruments that serve to recognise the fundamental and 
general political values agreed to by the international community. They place 
individuals at the centre of national and international legal concerns, with a clear 
recognition of the concepts of human respect and dignity. 594 The purpose of the legal 
discourse is not to question the content, the essence, or the interests that lie behind 
these norms, but instead to recognise, cl ari fy, and enforce the general legal rules 
emerging as a product of international law (which give them a global reach). As 
Evans notes, "[t]he legal discourse focuses upon the internaI logic of the law, its 
592 State sovereignty refers to the freedom of states to establish legal norms and undertake normative 
actions within the limits oftheir borders without any intrusion from other states. 
593 K. Robinson, "False Hope or a Realizable Right? The Implementation of the Right to Shelter 
under the African National Congress' Proposed Bill of Rights for South Africa' (1993) 28 Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 505, at 517. 
594 W. Austin, "Using the Human Rights Paradigm in Health Ethics: The Problems and the 
Possibilities" (2001) 8:3 Nursing Ethics 183; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, A/53/372, September Il, 1998, New York; L.W. Sumner, "Rights", in H. LaFollette, 
ed., The Blackwell guide ta ethical theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000) 288; B. Duner, The Global 
Human Right Regime (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2002) at 21. 
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elegance, coherence, extent, and meaning, which the application of legal reason is 
said to reveal. ,,595 
Many scholars are opposed to the legal discourse of human rights for a variety of 
reasons. 596 First, many talk about the numerous deficiencies in the legal mechanisms 
needed to support such legal discourse. Indeed, solid legal infrastructures, strong 
enforcement strategies, and real sanctions are still lacking in international human 
rights law. 597 This position is clearly explained by Kennedy when he says: "[t]he 
attachment to rights as a measure of the authenticity, universality, and above aIl as the 
knowledge we have of social justice binds our professional feet, and places social 
justice issues under the governance of the least effective institutional forms 
available. ,,598 
Others are opposed to this discourse because it seems to conceal an arrogant 
assumption of what is good for people, encouraging an empty sense of entitlement on 
the part of individuals, aIl of which has the perverse effect of fostering passivity 
among individuals and communities. In other words, sorne critique the very 
institution of granting legal human rights because it can (wrongly) incite a sense of 
accomplishment in governments and stasis in individuals who theoretically have 
individual legal rights, but can hardly enforce them. For opponents of legal human 
rights, this system seems to encourage focus on complex and deficient legal dilemmas 
and institutional procedures which gives the illusion of control over human rights 
595 T. Evans, "International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge" (2005) 27:3 Human Rights 
Quarterly 1046, at 1050. 
596 There exist numerous critics of the legal approach to human rights, represented in a wide variety of 
literature. However, the purpose of this section is not to present and analyse them ail, but instead to 
highlight sorne of the major objections, sorne of which will be analysed further in the course of the 
chapter. 
597 In fact, even if sorne international UN agencies are responsible for promoting human rights, there is 
no consistent monitoring, reporting, or en forcement practice, and only very weak judicial and quasi-
judicial activities in this field. This explains the vagueness and deficient conceptual cIarity of many of 
these legal rights. For more information on this topic, refer to A.R. Chapman, "Monitoring Women's 
Right to Health Under the International Covenant on Economic Socio and Cultural Rights" (l995) 44 
Am. U. L. Rev. 1157, at 1159-1160; M. Kirby, "The Right to Health Fifty Years On: Still Sceptical? 
(1999) 4:1 Health Hum. Rights 6; W. Austin, supra note 594; Kate O'Regan's judgment in S v 
Makwarryane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para 325. 
598 D. Kennedy, "The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?" (2002) 15 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 0 l, at 140. 
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violations instead of concentrating actions and efforts on better and more inclusive 
modes of action. 599 
A third category of opposition to the legal discourse concerns the limits of legal 
positivism and the fact that it precludes any deeper analysis on what lies at the 
source of the norms encoded in the law. In fact, it can be argued that the system 
endors es a kind of realism regarding established powers-what has been called 
engagement with the realpolitik of human rights. 600 This can limit the means to 
address abuses in preventing broader political, economic, and philosophical 
analysis of right violations.601 
These criticisms highlight certain limitations of the dominant legal discourse of 
human rights and illustrate the importance of serious inquiry about the real nature 
and justification for the principles enshrined in those legal instruments. This brings 
us to a different, less legal and institutional way of envisioning human rights within a 
theoretical context. 
4.1.2.2 The moral discourse 
As highlighted by various scholars, there is a tension between the legal and moral 
discourses on rights.602 The moral discourse on human rights refers to a justification 
based on more profound and objective reasons than what the legal approach offers. 
Theoretically, we can say that human rights are recognised and understood as having 
been founded on the basic interests that individuals have in the content of those 
599 Ibid. 
600 N. Stammers, "Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights" (1999) 21:4 
Human Rights Quarterly 980, at 991. 
601 T. Evans & E. Hancock, "Doing Something Without Doing Anything: International Human 
Rights Law and the Challenge ofGlobalisation" (1998) 2:3 Int J Hum Rights 1. 
602 C. Brown, "Universal Human Rights: A Critique" in T. Dunne & N. J. Wheeler, eds, Human Rights 
in Global Po/itics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) c.3, 103; P. Jones, Rights (London: 
Macmillan, 1994) is the best single-volume survey, followed by the briefer, less substantial, but still 
useful, Michael Freemen, Rights (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991); S. Shute & S. 
Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lecture (New York: Basic Books, 1993). 
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rights. As explained earlier, an argument for a right "is an argument showing that an 
individual interest considered in itself is sufficiently important from a moral point of 
view to justify holding people to be under a dut y to promote it.,,603 Sorne criticise the 
human rights system because it seems to lack a uniform ideal of what should count as 
a human right. 604 Many different theories can act as a foundations for human rights 
claims, the most important being natural law, which focuses on neutral values like 
individual freedom, equality, and universalism.605 
Brown states that any "idea of natural law must underlie aH genuinely universal 
approaches to human rights.,,606 Natural law implies that the emerging principles are 
not relating to specific types of societies, institutions, or enforcement procedures but 
arise instead from the protection of characteristics associated with human agency or 
personhood. Features of agency have been regrouped in four categories: a) capacity to 
make life decisions without undue pressure; b) ability to acquire a certain basic level 
of education and knowledge; c) capacity to undertake sorne chosen projects; and d) 
liberty to pursue what one perceive as the good life. 607 This supports our 
cosmopolitan view that aH individuals are equal members of a single moral uni verse, 
that they aH have dignity, and that aH require fui filment of similar basic conditions to 
be able to grow and live a good and dignified life. Therefore, aH individuals have 
hum an rights because they are equal human beings, and rights serve to prote ct what 
they need to be able to create what they wish and pursue certain life goals. It does not 
603 O. O'Neill, "Hunger, Needs and Rights", supra note 88; J. Waldron, The Right to Private 
Property, supra note 259 at 3. On the interest notion see also: J. Waldron, supra note 259 at Il & 
212; J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) at 166; N. MacCormick, 
"Rights in Legislation" in P. M. S. Flacker & J. Raz, eds., Law, Morality, and Society: Essays 
in Honour of H. L. A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). 
604 For example, see J. Griffin, "Discrepancies Between the Best Philosophical Account of Human 
Rights and the International Law of H uman Rights" (2001) 101 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
1 
605The notion of naturallaw emerged long ago and has been used by many to justify individual 
rights only by reference to human nature. For more on the concept ofnatural rights, see C. Brown 
"Universal human rights", supra note 602; J. Locke, supra note 386; T. Paine, Rights of Man 
(Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 1996); T. Evans, "Universal Human Rights: As Much Round and 
Round As Ever Onward" (Winter 2003) 7:4 The International Journal of Human Rights 155; J. 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), at 23; W. Austin, supra 
note 594. 
606 C. Brown, "Universal human rights", supra note 602, at 106. 
607 J. Griffin, "First Steps in an Account ofHuman Rights" (2001) 9:3 European Journal of Philosophy 
306. 
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mean that any injustice constitutes a violation of human rights, but only that when it 
touches elements of human agency, such as health, special protection is needed to 
ensure that individuals benefit from equal treatment and access to basic requirements 
to be able to pursue personal life goals and take advantage of available 
opportunities.608 
One important step in establishing a theoretical discourse of human rights is thus to 
identify which characteristics of hum an nature deserve special protection and which 
values should be respected everywhere. Sorne argue that rights should be ranked 
according to the nature of the interest they help defend and their normative weight in 
the process of reaching a stage where individuals can function as human agents taking 
advantage of equal opportunities.609 0thers believe in the protection of basic rights 
associated with the primary necessities and preservation of human life. Such basic 
rights can emerge from the basic needs shared by every human, such as food, water, 
shelter, and health care.61O 
Sorne relativists criticise the underlying universality of the international system of 
hum an rights; they argue that there is no true universality or universal community, 
and that human nature and basic moral principles are instead constructed by external 
factors like history and culture. They argue that this would explain the existing 
important variation between moral practices around the world.611 Others criticise the 
individualistic aspect of human rights on the basis that it seems to encourage the 
construction of individuals outside any form of community and to support a 
disturbing and harmful individualism typically observed in the western world.612 
608 J. Griffin, supra note 604. 
609 O. O'Neill, "Hunger, Needs and Rights", supra note 88; P. Jones, Rights (London: MacMillan, 
1994), at 13-15. 
610 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245; O. O'Neill, supra note 82, at 155 et ss. 
611 W. Austin, supra note 594; K. Booth, "Three Tyrannies" in T. Dunne & N. Wheeler, eds. Human 
Rights in Global Po/itics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31; S. James, 
"Recognizing International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism: the Case of Female 
Circumcision" (1994) 8: 1 Bioethics 1. 
612 Since we decided to adopt a cosmopolitan focus to analyse the justice issues arising with genetic 
access for the reasons explained in the theoretical part of the dissertation, we consider that, although 
rich and fascinating, a deep analysis of the individualistic aspect ofhuman rights would be outside of 
our the main focus ofthis chapter. For more on this topic, we encourage the reader to refer to these 
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We will come back to those criticisms ln the next section when we assess the 
universalism of human rights principles. 
An important point of a moral account of human rights relates to the nature and 
content of correlative duties. As we mentioned previously in our theoretical chapter, 
sorne, like O'Neill, go as far as making the very existence of a right depend on 
correlative duties to respect and fui fi Il those rights. They consequently express 
considerable scepticism toward welfare human rights due to implementation 
challenges. In other words, for those opponents, although rights-talk is rhetorically 
powerful, it is not ethically founded because it does not deal with the powerful actors 
who could do something about international injustice. Others, like Shue and Pogge, 
differentiate between positive duties (protection and aid) and negative duties 
(avoidance). Shue ranks human rights protection and puts basic rights at the top ofhis 
list. He establishes special responsibilities to fulfill the most urgent and serious rights 
without necessarily taking responsibility for rights violation into account.613 Pogge, 
on the other hand, argues that obligations should be linked to responsibility for 
deprivation, giving rise to a dut y to avoid causing harm to others. He associates 
human rights protection with a negative dut y not to uphold an unjust international 
order, and believes that everyone who supports the unjust global structure is 
responsible for the human rights violations it causes.614 We will not say more on the 
question of correlative duties for now as they will be analysed at length later, in sub-
section 4.2.2.2, which is dedicated to hum an rights implementation and access to 
health. 
classics: J. Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilt, supra note 269; K. H. Marx, On the Jewish Question. 
(Written in 1843); G.W. Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Right. (T.M. Knox, trans.) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1964). 
613 H Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, at 52 and 118. 
614 T. W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 284; T. W. Pogge, "Symposium on 
World Poverty and Human Rights", supra note 284; N. E. Kass, "Public Health Ethics: From 
Foundations and Frameworks to Justice and Global Public Health" (2004) 32 Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics 232, at 238-239; T.Pogge, "Eradication Systematic Poverty: Brief for a Global 
Resources Dividend" (2001) 2 Journal of Human Development 59; T. W. Pogge, "Reponsabilities for 
Poverty-Related III Health" (2002) 16:2 Ethics and International AjJairs 71, at 73; C.R. Beitz, supra 
note 55; L. Doyal & 1. Gough, supra note 92. 
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A different way of envisioning a philosophical account of hum an rights, instead of 
questioning the moral foundation of the very notion of human rights, is to refer to the 
concept as part of a theory of justice. As Kymlicka clearly puts it, 'justice can be 
considered as the system of entitlements upon which people can base their demand 
for recognition of their legitimate claims for resources and opportunities.,,615 This 
allows human rights to exist without actual claims of specific duties against 
identifiable actors, as they are associated with the ideal justice values and principles 
to which we aspire globaIly.616 Rawls, for example, envisions human rights as a 
component of his theory of justice, as an important aspect of what should drive the 
interaction between different states, and also between citizens and their government. 
In fact, respect for human rights is one of the eight principles of the law of people, 
principles that should be followed by every decent society. For Rawls, human rights 
establish the limits of what should be tolerated from other societies, and are common 
to every decent society, liberal or not.617 This narrow definition justifies including 
only a few rights in the list-such as rights to life, liberty, freedom of expression and 
religion, property, and equality before the law-and excluding most equality and 
welfare rights. 618 This vision elicits much criticism, sorne of which have been 
addressed in the theoretical section. However, our goal with this brief subsection is 
not to provide a detailed analysis of how human rights have been integrated in aIl 
different justice theories. Our purpose here, instead, is to present sorne of the main 
theoretical aspects of human rights to lay the groundwork for an assessment of the 
international human rights system with our global distributive justice benchmarks in 
the remaining part ofthis chapter. 
As with the legalist approach, sorne criticise the fact that the moral discourse on 
human rights does not seem to consider the political values at the source of the 
615 W. Kyrnlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, supra note 257, at 234. 
616 A. Gewirth, supra note 279, at 330. 
617 C. R Beitz, "Hurnan Rights as a Cornrnon Concem" (2001) 95:2 American Political Science Review 
269; A. Buchanan, "Rawls's Law of Peoples" (2000) 110 Ethics 697; F. Teson, "Sorne Observations 
on John Rawls' The Law of Peoples" (1994) 88 American Society of international Law Proceedings 
18. 
618 J. Rawls, Law of People, supra note 79, at 65 and 74; C.R. Beitz, "Rawls's Law ofPeoples", supra 
note 56. 
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norms, considering instead that these rights emerge from the very humanness of 
protected individuals.619 ln fact, people in general talk more about the link between 
the moral and legal discourses, the latter referred to as a concrete display of the 
former. 62o However, there is another important factor that should inform discussions 
on human rights foundations: the political discourse. Indeed, politics is involved in 
many spheres of the human rights regime. For example we can see the influence of 
politics in the basic moral judgments leading to human rights content, in pre-
codification negotiations, and in giving key responsibilities to existing statist entities 
for enforcement of and safeguarding human rights. A political analysis highlights that 
social movements and, above aH, the forces of hegemony play a crucial practical role 
in the preservation of the human rights system. Indeed, looking at human rights with 
a political lens can help to put legal and moral values in context while emphasising 
the real interests and powers lying at the source of the very production and 
preservation of particular truths.621 ln doing so, power issues and dominant interests 
need to be identified and exposed to disturb the order already in place; this can be 
done by questioning sorne crucial elements of a system supposedly based on 
neutrality and universality. Getting a sense of the political discourse underlying 
human rights therefore appears crucial to a real and complete understanding of the 
institution of human rights and to avoiding the trap of the illusion of concord often 
wrongly associated with human rights. It does not appear appropriate to envision the 
human rights discourse as a neutral moral system with which every state and 
619M. MacDonald, "Natural Rights" in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984) 21; R.A. Wilson, Human Rights, Culture and Context (London: Pluto 
Press, 1997). 
620 K. Hessler, "Resolving Interpretive Conflicts in International Human Rights Law" (2005) 13: 1 The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 29; T. Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law", supra 
note 1; C. Brown, "Universal human rights", supra note 602; The preambles of the two 1966 
Covenants (CCPR and CSECR) also state that human rights derive from the inherent dignity of hum an 
beings. 
621 T. Evans, Us Hegemony and the Project of Univers al Human Rights (London: Macmillan 1996); J. 
A. Lindgren Alves, "The Declaration of Human Rights in Postmodernity" (2000) 22:2 Human 
Rights Quarterly 478; T. Carver, The Postmodern Marx (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1998). 
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individual agree,622 as we will see in more detail in section 4.2.3. when we discus 
human rights conceptualisation. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will ensure that these three different aspects of 
human rights are taken into account to provide a more complete and realistic account 
of the system in relation to our global distributive justice ideals. 
4.2. Distribution, Access, Justice and the International Human Rights 
System: An Assessment 
This second part of the chapter aims to assess the international human rights system 
with the benchrnarks of justice established in the theoretical part of the dissertation. 
In fact, we will compare the ideal role that international human rights should play in 
terrns of access and distribution of health and genetic advancements with the CUITent 
reality. We have already established principles of global distributive justice to guide 
us towards our goal of a more equitable distribution of genetic research benefits. As 
briefly explained in the first part of this chapter, the international human rights 
regime is very important in the larger picture of internationallaw, and includes socio-
economic rights like the right to health and the right to bene fit from the profits of 
scientific endeavours. Even if it could be seen as having an important role to play in 
fostering equitable access to genetic innovation, it appears crucial to evaluate whether 
this system is adequately constructed to accomplish such a goal. To examine these 
issues, we need to assess the human rights system with the analytical approach 
developed earlier. Our main standard to test the human rights system is universal 
access to sorne benefits of genetics to improve health while seeking the broader goal 
of equality of opportunities. This second part will be split into three main sections. 
We will beging with an evaluation of the international aspects human rights, 
discussing the notion of universalism and assessing the global order as a platforrn for 
human rights development. To this end, we will analyse the connection between 
622 A. J. Langlois, "Human Rights: The Globalization and Fragmentation of Moral Discourse" (2002) 
28 Rev. lnt" Stud 479, at 484; T. Evans, supra note 591. 
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international human rights, true cosmopolitanism, and universalism. Then, we will 
address the existing relationship between human rights, health-related duties, and 
access to health and genetics. We will conclude with a third part on human rights 
conceptualisation to assess the real importance of the market reality in the realisation 
of access to health through the application ofhuman rights. 
4.2.1. The globalluniversal aspect of access to health in the context 
of the international human rights system 
Adopting a global and international focus, we need to tirst study the compatibility of 
the IHR system with the concept of universalism to see if the system is truly geared 
towards a cosmopolitan ideal where every human being is considered as a unit of 
moral concern. To this end we will discuss universalism in relation to relativism, 
individualism and "westernalisation". We will then provide a succinct evaluation of 
the global order under which human rights developed. 
4.2.1.1. International human rights and universalism 
Different critiques of the univers al aspect of human rights have been brought forward. 
lndeed, it has been criticised for not being sensitive to cultural specificities, for 
encouraging harmful individualism, and for being unduly influenced and shaped by 
western values. We will review each of those critiques in the next few pages. 
Universality vs relativism of human rights principles 
The universal aspect ofhuman rights principles gives rise to important debates. While 
sorne endorse a universal position that transcends nationality, religion, and culture 
and from which a limited number of principles emerge, others reject such a position, 
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argumg instead for moral and cultural relativism on the basis that the common 
foundation of human nature and universal community are lacking.623 
The proponents of the latter position believe that there cannot be a single vision of 
right and wrong; it depends on traditions, geography, culture, and history. They think 
that human rights are shaped by human agents in specifie contexts and that relying on 
one version only would be inappropriate and too constraining. Relativists believe that 
even when visions and values converge across cultures, such agreement is not 
morally meaningful but only represents sorne kind of coincidence. They believe that 
the reality of the fragmented world prevents univers al acceptance of values that are 
often very contextua1.624 The only universality relativists are willing to accept is one 
that could emerge almost accidentally from a common justification of human rights 
coming from different people of various traditions adopting their own references. 
Rorty says that rights exist to "summarise our culturally influenced intuitions about 
the right thing to do in various situations, [ ... ] thereby heightening the sense of 
shared moral identity which brings us together in a moral community.,,625 This 
position implies that human rights are not a reality that we can take out of context and 
support as a universal answer, but instead are more a part of a culture endorsed by 
specifie societies and communities. 
While the language of hum an rights can be broad and neutral enough to allow respect 
and sensitivity to various cultural and contextual differences,626 this dissertation 
focuses on the idea that these rights are grounded in the equal respect that each 
human being deserves. This egalitarianism arises from human agency and from sorne 
623 On these two positions, see S. R. Benatar, A. S. Daar & P. Singer,supra note 182; K. Booth, supra 
note 611 
624 On this relativist position, see J. Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for 
Contemporary China" in J. R. Bauer & D. A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 212; B. Kausikan, "Asia's Different Standard" (1993) 
92 Foreign Pol'y 24. 
625 R. Rorty, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality" in S.Shute & S. Hurley, eds., On Human 
Rights: the Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York: Basic Books, 1993) 117. 
626 Sorne even say that human rights and their basic principles are echoed in every tradition of the 
world. For more on this view, refer to R. Coomaraswamy, "Reinventing International Law: Womens' 
Rights as Human Rights in the International Community" in P. Van Ness, ed., Debating Human 
Rights: Critical Essaysfrom the United States and Asia (London: Routhledge, 1999) 167, at 169. 
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objective features, shared by everyone, which de serve universal consideration. 627 
Sorne of those typically human characteristics refer to the capacity to think, to 
connect moraIly with others, to have a conception of the good life; to feel 
hunger, pain, and sexual desire; and to want our needs to be fulfiIled, to judge, 
to dream, etc.628 Therefore this caIls for universaIly requiring the protection of 
socio-economic rights to ensure the preservation of humans' potential for self-
realisation. These rights should not be defined or justified in relation to any 
particular legal system, state, or community. Martin is clear when he defines 
human rights as values that should be considered "reasonable by persons at 
different times or in different cultures ... principles, [that] would be thought to have 
connection with a fairly wide range of differing conventional moralities."629 
Another way to justify universal principles is to refer to shared understandings 
and conceptions of crucial elements related to the perception of human nature. 
For example, many experts from various disciplines like anthropology, 
sociology, philosophy, and the social sciences have demonstrated, with 
empirical research, that human beings often share comparable ideas of 
acceptable and unacceptable conduct and behaviour towards other individuals.63o 
It thus appears possible to reach, through a flexible and cross-cultural exchange, 
sorne sort of agreement on univers al rights we can aIl respect.631 This iIlustrates 
a sense of unit y transcending borders and cultures, the existence of a single 
moral community in certain identified spheres, and standards of social justice 
and human dignity, aIl of which support our cosmopolitan perspective. This is 
627 This position is shared by M. C. Davis, "Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over 
Human Rights and Asian Values" (1998) Il Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 109; F.R. Tes6n, "International 
Human Rights and Cultural Relativism" (1985) 25 Va. J. Int'l L. 869; A.F. Bayefsky, "Cultural 
Sovereignty, Relativism, and International Human Rights: New Excuses for Old Strategies" (1996) 9 
Ratio Juris 42. 
628 B. Parekh, "Non-Ethnocentric Universalism" in T. Dunne & N. J. Wheeler, eds, Human Rights in 
Global Po/ities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) c. 4, 128, at 143; W. Austin, supra 
note 594, at 190. 
629 R. Martin, A System of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) at 75; See also R. J. Vincent, Human 
Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) who refers to 
human rights as a lowest eommon denominator (at. 49). 
630 For more on this, refer to M. Naussbaum, "Human Functioning and Social Justice: in Defence of 
Aristotelian Essentialism" (1992) 20 Politieal Theory 222. 
631 B. Parekh, supra 628. 
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why relativism and particularism associated with specific states' actions and 
cultures should not be prioritised, as they can encourage passivity towards the 
shared universal concerns for human wrongs translated in international hum an 
rights.632 
As discussed before, although a communitarian approach can be of great relevance in 
resolving numerous justice issues, this dissertation takes a universal perspective on 
health and the role it can play in the pursuit of the good life. Indeed, health is a 
crucial factor in bringing people to the level where they can bene fit and profit from 
equality of opportunity. This is why we argue that health protection should not be left 
to different states' voluntary initiatives, but instead to more global and coordinated 
actions.633 In this sense, we consider that the "universality" aspect of the international 
human rights legal and moral discourse is appropriate for health and compatible with 
our justice framework. 
Universality of rights and individualism 
In their inclusiveness and by granting the same rights and privileges to everyone, 
univers al human rights are also criticised for allowing detachment from the 
reality in which individuals evolve. If we take this view, rights seem to be the 
cause of a deep sense of selfishness and individualism cultivated in modern 
societies. They can isolate people from one another.634 Indeed, sorne argue that 
even if international human rights are supposed to be established to ensure 
assistance from an entity that can facilitate individual prosperity, there are more 
useful ways to encourage commitment, solidarity, and accountability th an 
human rights. 635 Those who support this vision argue against the individual focus 
typical of the universal human rights language because it can have the perverse effect 
of ignoring collective responsibilities. For example, societies where the majority of 
632 K Booth, supra note 61 1. 
633 J. Mann et al. supra note 580, at 21 et ss. 
634 J. Waldron, Nonsense upon Stilts: Bentham, supra note 269, part 1; A. Renteln, International 
Human Rights: Universalism vs Relativism (Newbury Park: Sage, 1990). 
635 D. Kennedy, supra note 598. 
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wealth is controlled by a few agents while many others have rights, but still end up 
with much less than what they need, are not rare. In this sense, univers al human rights 
can be viewed as passively encouraging a social division that can prevent a true 
community from flourishing. This powerful quote from Wendy Brown exemplifies 
this argument: "[i]n the same gesture with which rights draw a circle around the 
individual, in the very same act with which the y grant her sovereign selfhood, 
the y turn back upon the individual aIl responsibility for her failures, her condition, 
her poverty, her madness-they privatise her situation and mystify the powers that 
construct, position, and buffet her." 636 In reaction to what they call the 
ethnocentric and patriarchal tone of the language of rights,637 Sen and Nussbaum 
adopt the concept of human beings' capabilities. lnstead of granting human 
beings individual rights, they argue that we should pro vide them with an 
appropriate social basis to develop their capabilities. Even if the y believe in the 
same special nature of hum an beings and in the fact that all should somehow 
bene fit from equal and univers al treatment, they do not believe that rights are 
always the appropriate tools to safeguard universal and global equality. 
In response to this critique of rights, we could say that the language of human rights 
is not at all incompatible with the concept ofhuman solidarity, but that it really exists 
to bring aIl people-regardless of their citizenship-to a level where they can enjoy 
full lives within their community and to the bene fit of their fellow community 
members.638 lndeed, the universal aspect of hum an rights by which our similarities 
are acknowledged encourages cohesion for sharing the benefits of rights and burdens 
of associated duties. In other words, rights should be seen as part of a "reciprocal 
universality" which makes it impossible to see right-holding as a totally selfish and 
individual experience. 639 Mandela, when he refers to his country's liberation, 
636 W. Brown, States of lnjury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), c.5, at 128. 
637 C. Brown, supra note 61. 
638 W. Austin, supra note 594; Len Doyal & lan Gough, supra note 92, at 136. 
639 e. Jones, supra note 78 at 80-83; A. Gerwirth, "Rights", in L.e. Becker & e. Becker, eds., 
Encyclopedia of Ethics (London: Garland, 1992) at 1108; S. Bowles & H Gintis, Democracy and 
Capitalism : Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modem Social Thought (New York: 
Basic Books, 1986) at 170. 
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highlights the importance of rights' universality in fostering a global sense of 
solidarity: "[0 ]ne of the striking features of modem times is the number of men and 
women aIl over the globe, in aIl continents, who fight violation of human rights. ,,640 
Universalism vs the influence of western values 
A common critique of the international system of human rights is directed at strong 
influence of western values and interests in the construction of this so-called 
universal structure. As discussed above, international hum an rights law mainly 
governs relations between state governments and their citizens-highlighting, 
for sorne, a strong western influence hardly compatible with human rights' 
universality. Indeed, it is argued that liberal and economic theories have greatly 
influenced the development of the dominant human rights discourses, and that 
these influences embrace a philosophy where individualism prevails and in 
which people are seen as isolated abstractions focussing on their own 
interests. 641 For DoneIly, the hum an rights system is mainly concerned with civil 
and political rights of citizens from liberal and democratic welfare states. 642 
Sorne East Asian political leaders agree, arguing that the public disputes and 
individual pursuit of private interests typicaIly associated with political and civil 
human rights are in no way universal, because they are incompatible with 
traditional Asian values of social harmony and community interests.643 Indeed, 
many more scholars from various perspectives criticise the system on the basis that it 
does not reflect universal human values but instead endors es a unique, western, 
bourgeois, liberal, and masculine way of envisioning humaneness.644 In this picture, 
640 Cited in K Booth, supra note 611 at 57. 
641 J. Mann et al., supra note 580, c. 16. 
642 J. Donnelly, "Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of "Western Universalism" in J. R. 
Bauer & D. A. Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 60, at 68. 
643 As reported in C. R Beitz, "Human Rights as a Common Concern" (2001) 95:2 American 
Po/itica/ Science Review 269. 
644 For example, see R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, "Globalization and Human Rights" 
(1999) 21:3 Human Rights Quarter/y 735, at 740;C. Brown, supra note 61, at 121; J. Slaughter, 
"The Question of Narration: A Voice in International Human Rights Law" (1997) 19 Human 
Rights Quarterly 406; P. Gabel & D. Kennedy, "Roll Over Beethoven" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1; 
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the UN is perceived as an entity whose goal is to support and promote the liberal 
values enshrined in normative documents. Those liberal human rights standards are 
often used as universal civil and political thresholds that countries must meet to 
receive support from the wealthiest. However, in most cases, these norms do not play 
a great role in actually improving countries' socio-economic reality, but instead 
accept and even encourage persistent inequalities within the existing order "where 
market efficiency, discipline and confidence, economic policy credibility and 
consistency are often awarded higher priority than issues of dignity and rights". 645 In 
response to this, sorne instead view the western influence on human rights as very 
contextual, associated with a period and context that could have been completely 
different at other times, and that could also change in the coming years with, for 
example, the as cent of Asian powers.646 The argument about the strong influence that 
western values have on hum an rights raises important concerns about the true 
universalism of human rights. We believe that it is important to differentiate between 
human rights' content and application. Indeed, even if socio-economic rights have 
been establish in a western liberal context, the values they defend-for example 
rights to health, nutrition, and work-can remain universal. In our view, the strong 
western influence has a negative impact on human rights universalism when the time 
cornes to implement and enforce those rights and nothing is done to reassure excluded 
groups about the protectiveness and inclusiveness of human rights.647 We will come 
back to the dominant political discourse that lies behind the realisation of human 
rights in section 4.2.3., when we address the conceptualisation ofhuman rights within 
the reality of the market. 
R. Pannikar, "Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?" (1982) 120 Diogenes 76; M. 
Shapiro & H. R. Alker, Challenging Boundaries: Global Flows, Territorial Identifies 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); A. Hunt, "Rights and Social Movements: 
Counter-Hegemonic Strategies" (1990) 17 J.L. & Soc'y 309. 
645 T. Evans, "Universal Human Rights", supra note 605, at 166; S. Gill, "Globalization, Market 
Civilization and Disciplinary Liberalism' (1995) 24:3 Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies; M. Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002) at 35 and c. 4. 
646 K Booth, supra note 611, at 52-53. 
647 T. Evans, supra note 645, at 166. 
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This last subsection demonstrates that the universal quality of human rights can be 
questioned on many fronts. lndeed, although the international human rights system 
appears to be based on the protection of individual interest, it can foster different 
outcomes, depending on how it is interpreted and circumscribed. In order to get a 
better idea whether and how each individual' s interests get taken into consideration 
through the application of international human rights, we need to say a few words 
about the global order in which they develop. 
4.2.1.2. Assessment of the global order under which 
international human rights develop 
Article 28 of the UDHR says that, "[ e ]veryone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and Freedoms set forth in this Declaration can 
be fully realised." As Pogge clearly explains, this article does not add new 
human rights to those already existing, but serves to establish that human rights 
are "claims on the institutional order of any comprehensive social system,,,648 
and that institutional orders should be evaluated in relation to the impact they 
have on the realisation of human rights. 
States are at the center of the human rights system. Even if, as we just saw, a strong 
argument can be made to support human rights' universality, granting, implementing, 
and enforcing rights remains the first responsibility of states in international law.649 
This can be problematic in that state sovereignty can conflict directly with the 
universality principle. lndeed, one important rule in international law is that states are 
sovereign entities and are entitled to set up their own rules and norms within their 
territorial borders.650 However, states can cede part of their sovereignty voluntarily in 
agreeing to comply with international standards like international human rights. 
648 T.W. Pogge, "Human Rights and Global HeaIth: A Research Program" (Jan. 2005) 36:1/2 
Metaphi/asaphy 182, at 196. 
649 R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, supra note 644; M. Koskenniemi, "The Future of Statehood" 
(1991) 32 Harv. J.Int'/ L. 397; R. McCorquodale, "Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach" 
(1994) 43 Int'/ & Camp. L.Q. 857. 
650 This princip le is codified in the Charter of the United Nations, 892 U.N.TS. 119, art. 2(1). 
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When they do, they become accountable for their actions in that sphere. In reality, 
however, things are not that simple; affluent states are typically reluctant to concede 
any of their sovereignty to supranational institutions. 651 Sovereignty remains an 
essential principle of international law and plays a crucial role in how states behave 
and interact with one another. The exercise of one's human rights is directly linked 
with the nature of existing national legislative and institutional mechanisms in place. 
This is especially relevant as the reference to international human rights enforcement 
mechanisms is conditional on prior exhaustion of aIl national remedies.652 This also 
means that, contrary to what universalism requires in terms of equal consideration for 
aIl human beings' interests, people can best exercise their rights as citizens as 
opposed to human beings.653 
However, the world has become so interrelated in every sphere of activity that 
individuals are increasingly linked to each other through different modes of 
interaction and dependence. As explained by Monshipouri et al., "what has happened 
through conditions of chronic globalisation is that the fate of communities throughout 
the world has become linked through complex and dynamic systems that create moral 
connections between the agents and the subjects of social action regardless of 
territorial and political boundaries.,,654 ln such a context, human rights are meant to 
assert universal daims that people can have to resources and also to the protection of 
their inherent dignity as actors in this global reality.655 This is compatible with the 
recognition, in international law, of the role of states in the protection of human 
rights-not only inside but also outside of their national borders, for the bene fit of 
non-citizens. 656 Indeed, when states agree to UN membership, they commit to 
651 E. O'Keefe & A. Scott-Samuel, "Human Rights and Wrongs: Could Health Impact Assessment 
Help?" (Winter 2002) 30:4 The Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 734. 
652 J. Mann et al., supra note 580, c. 2. 
653 C. R Beitz, "Human Rights as a Common Concem" (2001) 95:2 American Political Science Review 
269, at 274. 
654 M. Monshipouri, C.E. Welch & E.T. Kennedy, "Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of 
Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities" (2003) 25:4 Human Rights Quarterly 965, at 969. 
655 J. Mann et al., supra note 580, c. 16. 
656 For a clear exposé ofthis topic, especially on the link between states' obligations and the activities 
they undertake across borders, refer to S. Skogly & M. Gibney, "Transnational Human Rights 
Obligations" (2002) 24:3 Human Rights Quarterly 781. 
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"achieve international cooperation in solving international problems".657 AIso, when 
the ICESCR requires states to take all necessary action within their means to achieve 
the full realisation of protected rights, it really asks that they do so with their 
budgetary capacities but also with the help of technical assistance and international 
cooperation.658 ln other words, the ICESCR dearly provides a normative foundation 
for state obligations to foreigners located outside their territories, in part through their 
external trade and cooperation activities. The role of international cooperation in 
human rights enforcement has been highlighted by the former UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights when she refers to protection of the right to health, 
saying, "[ s ]pecifically, State parties should recognise the essential role of 
international cooperation and comply with their commitment to take joint and 
separate action for the full realisation of the right to health, taking into account the 
gross inequality in the health status of people, particularly between developed and 
developing countries.,,659 
The requirement to me et such extraterritorial obligations can infringe on state 
sovereignty (both on the giving and receiving end), and achieving a balance between 
human rights protection and respect for state sovereignty can be somewhat 
challenging in practice. In that sense, international human rights can contribute to 
ending the unlimited sovereignty that states traditionally have on their people's 
entitlements.660 Those changes in state sovereignty are not properly addressed by 
human rights. Indeed, although the global community has changed significantly 
over the last fifty years-with more members, more diversity, new powerful 
agents, doser ties and, at the same time, greater divisions-international human 
657 UN Charter, art.l (3), signed June 26, 1945,59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans ]]53 (entered 
into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
658ICSECR, art. 2 and 23; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No 14: The right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, Article 12 of the Covenant, May 12, 
2000, E/C. 13/2000/4, online on the website of the UNHCHR: 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En?OpenDocument> (accessed: May 
30th , 2006), par. 75. 
659 UN Economic and Social Council, "Report of the High Commissioner: The impact of the 
Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights on Human Rights", June 27, 
2001, E/CNA/Sub.2/200Il13, par. 35 
660 On the topic ofhuman rights globalisation, see Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23, 1993, part. I, art.4. 
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rights have not managed to adapt to these changes.661 For example, international 
human rights do not provide remedy for violations committed by non-state 
actors like transnational corporations, as king states to take on responsibility for 
what is happening within their territories and focussing on what the y can do to 
improve their people's well-being. Doing so, the language of international 
hum an rights does not acknowledge that states' control, freedom, management 
abilities, and flexibilities are, in reality, eroding to the bene fit of non-state actors 
who are shaping the global society 
This changing role of states due to globalisation can have important effects on 
the realisation of true univers al hum an rights. Indeed, more and more, states 
must respond to market forces and act to support the broader global order which 
favours freedom of production and appropriation. Consequently, the global 
protection of international human rights standards loses its univers al character 
and becomes a tool to further economic ends rather than being an end in itself.662 
ln other words, sorne powerful external agents involved in changing the face of 
international relations and whose actions are not easily controlled by national or 
international agencies can end up with much control over the way human rights 
are realised within the global order.663 This explains, at least in part, why most 
socio-economic rights have not been considered seriously, despite the fact that 
the universal character of hum an rights calls for their inclusion in the emerging 
global consensus. This means that state sovereignty is transforming to serve 
different, more powerful interests, a situation that brings Chimni to say that "[a]s 
things stand now, the neo-colonial third world states will continue to exist but 
essentially in the service of the TCC [transnational capitalist class] and the global 
661 A. J. Langlois, "Human Rights: the G1obalisation and Fragmentation of Moral Discourse", supra 
note 622; P. Willets, "Transnational Actors and International Organisations in Global Politics" in L. 
Baylis & S. Smith, eds., The G/obalisation of World Polities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
287. 
662 R.W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order" 
(1999) 25 Rev. lnt 'l Stud. 3; T. Evans, "International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge" (2005) 
27:3 Human Rights Quarterly 1046 
663 M. K. Addo, Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations 
(Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999); P. Alston, "The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International 
Lawyers and G1obalization" (1997) 8 Eur. J. lnt'l L. 435; R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, supra 
note 644. 
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state. The NorthenlWester state, on the other hand, will continue to shape the fonn 
and content of the emerging global state to realise Tee interests.,,664 
Another problem identified with the existing global order is that it seems to 
support institutions involved in human rights violations. In fact, international 
economic organisations with effective enforcement powers-like the WTO, the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (including the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund), as weIl as transnational corporations and other central features 
of the present global order-are often described as institutions of artificial 
global unit y that systematically contribute to the persistence of severe 
poverty.665 For example, although the World Bank has recently undertaken over 
600 judicial reform projects aimed at improving the condition of the least weIl 
off,666 it seems to be part of a larger effort to facilitate transactions, prote ct 
property rights, and establish a stable investment environment in priority.667 
Sorne respond to this criticism by saying that the international order and its 
economic institutions are just since they give an equal chance to sovereign states 
to bargain and negotiate with each other and consent to the outcome. This 
argument ignores the fact that parties do not have the same economic bargaining 
power668 and that the weakest countries almost always have to make concessions 
that go against their basic interest. 669 
664 B. S. Chimni, "International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State ln The Making" (Feb. 
2004) 15 Eur. J. Int'l L. l, at 6; see also A. Eide, "Obstacles and Golas to be Pursued" in A. Eide et al., 
eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 20d ed., (London: Maaetinus Nijhoff, 2001), 
c. 31, at 553. 
665 For example it has been reported that the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public OfficiaIs in International Business Transactions is ineffective in preventing bribery by 
companies. For more on this, refer to 'The Short Arm of the Law' (March 2, 2002) Economist 63; R. 
Baker, Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System (John 
Wiley & Sons, Hoboken: New Jersey, 2005); on this topic, see also F. Furet, Marx and the French 
Revolution (London: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
666 World Bank Legal Vice-Presidency, Legal and Judicial Reform: Strategic Directions, 2003, online 
<http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/legalr/GreyBookFinaI2003.pdt> (accessed May 28th, 2006). 
667 K. Rittich, "The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social" (Fa1l2004) 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 199, at 217. 
668 According to recent statistics, developed countries represent 15.5% of the world's population while 
controlling 80.4% of the world's income. World Bank, World Development Report 2005 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005) at 257. 
669 We refer the reader to chapter III on this matter, where we addressed this topic at length under our 
discussion of the TRIPs negotiations. See also, A. Anghie, "Time Present and Time Past: 
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Many suggestions have been put forward to transform the current world order 
and make it less burdensome for the less affluent. 670 Sorne have proposed to 
impose the same human rights standards on the activities of non-state actors-
especially transnational corporations and international economic organisations-
to support a more humane globalisation. 671 It actually seems that unless we 
proceed with this shift, the hum an rights dialogue will be designed in a way to 
disturb those powerful actors' activities as little as possible. Going one step 
further, we also have to question the real nature of the hum an rights standards 
whose application we want to extend. lndeed, as briefly mentioned above, 
today's hum an rights are viewed by sorne as inspired by cultural imperialism, 
and more specifically by western liberal values linked with the global political 
economy and aimed at protecting liberal freedoms to ensure the satisfaction of 
private interests, especially those lying in property rights.672 The content and the 
true importance of socio-economic rights need to be reaffirmed and strongly 
enforced. However, many obstacles stand in the way of such an exercise. 
This section assessed one aspect of human rights: the universal perspective of 
the international human rights discourse with a cosmopolitan standard of global 
access. Our analysis of the global aspect of access to health and human rights 
highlights a progressive weakening of the cosmopolitan approach to solidarity 
that should be fostered by the very institution of international human rights. We 
G1obalization, International Financial Institutions, and the Third World" (2000) 32 N. Y. U. J. Int'l L. & 
Pol. 243, at 274. 
670 For example, it has been suggested that third world nations be helped to become real participants in 
WTO negotiations, to reduce existing obstacles to their exportation into affluent countries, to guarantee 
developing countries sorne share in the value of the harvested seabed, to make state sovereignty 
conditional on the safeguard of sorne basic human rights, and to ask developed countries to 
compensate for the negative externalities inflicted on the poorer ones. We will revisit this topic 
when we address duties and responsibilities associated with human rights implementation under 
section 4.2.2.2. T. Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law, supra note 1. 
671 S. Picciotto, "Democratizing G1obalism" in D. Drache, The Market or the Public Domain, Global 
Governance and the Asymmetry of Power (New York: Routhledge, 2001) 335; A. Clapham, 
"G1obalization and the Rule of Law" in A. Dieng, ed., Globalization, Human Rights and the Rule of 
Law (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1999) at 31. 
672 T. Evans, supra note 645; K. Marx, "On the Jewish Question", in J. O'Walley, ed., Early Political 
Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); M. Mutua, supra note 645. 
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realised that the concept of universalism, crucial to justifying global distributive 
justice and access in health, is a morally contested notion in the field of 
international hum an rights, and also not al ways supported by the institutional 
structures and the politics of human rights. Indeed, the capitalist and 
undemocratic features of the global order seem to reduce the potential for real 
and universal global distributive justice supported by international human rights 
principles. This is illustrated by the fact that the most obvious economic 
disparities and injustices remain unnoticed and unpunished by internationallaw, 
and that the most vulnerable groups do not receive the protection the y deserve 
under the legal system. 673 ln other words, instead of fostering a universal 
application of human rights, economic globalisation supports sorne groups, 
interests, and rights over others.674 It therefore does not recognise, in practice, the 
universal importance of health for every human being. This problem is rarely 
addressed under the dominant legalist voice of the human rights discourse, 
which can be seen as eluding the real power relations lying at the core of many 
hum an rights violations. Because of the importance of this dominant discourse, 
most people ignore how hum an rights ideals have been transformed and modeled 
by external powers that often bring them, wrongly, to believe in a just world.675 
This is why it is crucial to undertake a deeper analysis of the complex global 
political reality within which the system of human rights evolves. We will come 
back on this in the third part of this section, when we discuss the 
conceptualisation of human rights within the reality of the market. 
Before doing so, now that we have assessed the international and universal 
dimensions of the human rights system, we need to evaluate whether this system is 
compatible with other benchmarks of our framework of distributive justice in health. 
To this end, we will first discuss hum an rights in connection with legal access to 
genetic products and services for health improvement to facilitate equality of 
673 For example, this appears from how the AIDS crisis has been handled so far. We will come back on 
this specifie case in the last chapter. A. Anghie, supra note 669, at 273. 
674 A. Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Pos/colonial World: The New Political Economy of 
Development (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
675 S.R.Benatar, supra note 2. 
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opportunities; secondly, we will address human rights in relation to the responsibility 
to distribute genetic technologies in order to foster real access to health improvement. 
4.2.2. Legal access to health, responsibility for distribution of 
health and human rights 
The main goal of this section is to determine how the need for health improvement 
through genetic access materialises in legal rights, entitlements, and related 
responsibilities for distribution, and whether the actual human rights system is 
working toward this goal. We will start with an assessment of socio-economic rights, 
and more specifically, health-related rights with benchmarks of distributive justice. In 
the second part, we will address the integration of these rights with the associated 
responsibility to distribute genetic technologies to promote real access to health 
improvement and equality of opportunities, within the mechanism of human rights 
implementation. 
4.2.2.1. Envisioning socio-economic rights with benchmarks 
of distributive justice 
Rights can be crucial in a theory of justice as they can impose restrictions on actions 
(civil and political rights) and obligations to undertake other actions (socio-economic 
rights). Brown states that "the language of rights has become the way in which 
humanitarian impulses are expressed in the modem international system. ,,676 If we 
take human rights as an important element of our global distributive justice theory, 
they will accordingly impose restrictions on distributive arrangements (social, 
political and economic) supported by the global order, and serve as a basis to rectify 
injustices created by unequal distribution. In this sense, just distribution will be 
achieved when individuals obtain what they are entitled to, by right, in terms of 
resources and opportunities. As briefly explained at the beginning of this chapter, our 
main focus is on the content, conceptualisation, and realisation of socio-economic 
676 C. Brown, supra note 61, at 103. 
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rights. These rights represent daims to social equality and refer to prospects and 
circumstances that can allow individuals to live as actors and enjoy a good standard 
of living.677 They are critically important with respect to health issues, to ensure that 
each individual has equal access to appropriate health care, technology, and resources 
to have a normal range of opportunities in other spheres of activities, as well as to be 
able to take advantage of other civil and political rights. One major issue with the 
enforceability of economic, social, and cultural rights is the confusion between the 
recognition of rights in themselves and the degrees of realisation of those rights in 
terms of implementation and protection. Indeed, as mentioned previously, the 
realisation of health-related rights is dependent on legal interpretation, decisions on 
resources allocation, and political convictions.678 
Definition of the right ta health 
ln the last few decades, human rights have been associated with the crucial goal of 
achieving acceptable standards of health. 679 As briefly discussed in the first part, 
rights emerge from our general the ory of global distributive justice in health. It gives 
us indications as to which kinds of daims should be viewed as rights, which needs 
should be codified as rights, and against which standards just social rules, institutions, 
and people who establish and support them should be assessed. Rights are grounded 
in the basic moral interests that individuals have in their content. Sorne associate 
basic rights-protection with primary necessities and the preservation of human life. 
Such basic rights can emerge from the basic needs shared by every human being-
677 G.A. Mower, International Cooperation for Social Justice: Global and Regional Protection of 
Economie/Social Rights (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) at 3. 
678 J.K.Mapulanga-Hulston, "Examining the Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" 
(Winter 2002) 6:4 The International Journal of Human Rights 29, at 42-43; J. Hausermann, "The 
Realisation and Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" in D.M. Hill & R. Beddards, 
eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Progress and Achievement (New York: St Martin Press, 
1992) at 49; L. London, supra note 2. 
679 For example, refer to V. A. Leary, 'The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law" 
(1994) 1 Hea/th and Human Rights 24; L. Freeman, "Reflection on Emerging Frameworks of Health 
and Human Rights" in J .M. Mann et al., eds., Hea/th and Human Rights: A Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 1999) 227. 
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such as subsistence, water, housing and health care 68°_and they can be ordered 
according to the nature of the interest they aim to protect. Shue establishes sorne 
priorities among rights, putting the fulfilment of basic rights first,68! followed by non-
basic rights, culture enrichment, and, finally, mere satisfaction of preferences. 682 
Meeting basic rights in priority is crucial in that it helps free people from oppression 
and discrimination, removes a certain degree of vulnerability that exposes them to the 
power of others, and allows them to exercise many other rights.683 Another way to 
de scribe it is to refer to the notions of "social citizenship", "personhood" or "moral 
agency," which justify demands for access to basic necessities for survival and 
potential for a good life.684 This relates to our argument for a cosmopolitan approach 
to genetic access and distribution; the superior basic human interest in health is 
shared by everyone, it represents an appropriate focus for a dut y not to harm and 
ensures that individuals are in a position to profit from equality of opportunities, plan 
for a good life, and pursue their goals. When we use the language of socio-economic 
human rights in our specific context, it can refer to the right to health (art. 12 
ICESCR) and to the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications (art. 15 (1) b) ICESCR). However, for the need to assess tangible genetic 
access and distributive justice, it appears appropriate to focus more on the right to 
health, which is a controversial and inclusive right that can coyer a wide range of 
activities, products, and technologies. The right to enjoy the benefits of science, on 
the other hand, although also relevant, appears less pertinent to our analysis. Indeed, 
this article was adopted with a somewhat different perspective, in response to the rise 
of intellectual property protection to ensure that quality scientific innovations would 
be published and made accessible to the collectivity. Much of what we are saying 
about the human right to health, aside from the content and definition, could he used 
in an analysis of other socio-economic rights. 
680 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245; O. O'Neill, supra note 82 at 155 et ss; O. O'Neill, "Hunger, 
Needs and Rights", supra note 88; P. Jones, Rights (London: MacMillan, 1994) at 13-15. 
681 Basic rights are those grounded in basic human needs and establishing the threshold under which no 
one should be entitled to faH to avoid degrading inequalities. 
682 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, c. 5, at Ill. 
683 P.D. Jacobson & S. Soliman, "Co-opting the Health and Human Rights Movement" (Winter 2002) 
30:4 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 705; A.R. Chapman, "Conceptualizing the Right to 
Health: A violation Approach" (1998) 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 389. 
684S. R. Benatar, A. S. Daar & P. Singer, supra note 182. 
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The right to health, including health care, services, and technologies, is accepted as a 
human right in regional and international law. Indeed, it has been protected by the 
WHO Constitution since 1946685 and was further enshrined in numerous other human 
rights treaties.686 The ICESCR offers the strongest and arnbitious version of the right 
to health in its article 12: 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this right shall include 
those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and 
of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the 
child; 
(b) The improvement of aIl aspects of environrnental and 
industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, 
endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to aIl 
medical service and medical attention in the event of 
sickness. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights interprets the right to health 
broadly as including the right to facilities, goods, services, education, and research 
required to achieve the highest attainable standard of health. 687 Nevertheless, 
685 Constitution of the World Health Organization, adopted by the International Health Conference, 
New York, signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States 
686For example, the right to health has been codified in: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 
25; International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 579, art.12; 
Convention on the Elimination of ail Forms of Discrimination against women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981, art.12; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, 
U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2 1990, art.24; See also, African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CABILEG/67/3 rev. 5,21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 Art. 16; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights in the Area of Economie, Social and Cultural Rights, 1988, Art. 10.1. 
687 A.R. Chapman, "The Human Rights Implications ofIntellectual Property Protection" (2002) 5 
Journal oflnt'l Eco. L. 861 at 880. 
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although the right to health is coditied in many legal instruments and is meant to be 
interpreted broadly, it nevertheless lacks "conceptual clarity.,,688 
Despite these lacunae, there seems to be sorne agreement on sorne of the essential 
elements that the right to health should include, irrespective of state resources and of 
individuals' economic situation. These elements can be divided into two categories, 
the tirst related directly to health care (including, for example, access to basic medical 
treatment and services for severe diseases, maternaI and child care, and immunisation 
against infectious diseases) and the other related to determinants of health (such as 
access to education and prevention methods, drinkable water, food, and adequate 
sanitation).689 To ensure that the right to health can be respected as much as possible, 
another important aspect of its content relates to the international obligations 
associated with preventing violations of the right, facilitating access to health-related 
products and services, and providing aid to other countries. 690 As discussed at the 
very beginning of the dissertation, the science of genetics has the potential to be used 
and developed to help address and resolve most of the essential elements included in 
the right to health. 
Nonetheless, what often happens in reality is that, when referring to health rights, 
people only include basic rights to emergency health care and subsistence, indirectly 
endorsing the fact that access to adequate and adapted health care remains reserved 
for a privileged few. 691 This is in line with the application of Rawls' difference 
principle. As already discussed in the tirst part, this position is unsatisfactory since 
688 A.E. Yamin, "Protecting and Promoting the Right to HeaIth in Latin America: Selected Experience 
from the Field" (2000) 5:1 Health and Human Rights 117; B. Toebes, "Towards an Improved 
Undertading of the International Right to HeaIth", supra note 583, at 662; P. Aiston, "Out of the 
Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights" (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 332, at 351-355. 
689Declaration of Alma-Ata, 12 Sept. 1978, repr. in Report of the International Conference on 
Primary 
Health Care (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1978), art.VII; Committee on ESCR, General 
Comment No 14, supra note 658, par. 4, Il & 12; J. Mann et aIs., supra note 580, at 8; B. 
Toebes, "The Rights to Health" in A. Eide et al.,eds., Economie, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Texbook, 20d ed., (London: Maartinus Nijhoff, 2001), c.l0, 169. 
690 Committee on ESCR, General Comment No 14, supra note 658, par. 39 and 45. 
691 S. Caney, supra note 128. 
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the scope of the underlying elements of the difference principle remains very unclear. 
It gives no precise indication as to what criteria must be met to be considered as 
belonging to the least privileged group. AIso, it does not go into detail about what is 
required to reach the greatest benefit of the least advantaged group threshold, as it 
does not impose a floor below which no one should be allowed to fall. We argue that 
focussing on the most urgent health needs of any individual or on the category of the 
absolute poorest people is far from enough, as many individuals can still be left in 
need of the benefits of genetics outside of the distribution realm. It also does not 
guarantee that people's basic needs will be met so they are in a position to enjoy other 
rights and create a good life. Indeed, respecting rights to health, health care, and 
genetic technologies (as we consider that the y could become the new standard of 
care) is essential to the broader goal of achieving equality of opportunities for aIl. In 
fact, as explained earlier in the dissertation, access to health in terms of availability 
and affordability of genetic products and services will allow people to seIze 
opportunities towards achieving rewarding lives, and this should be the ideal 
threshold for distribution. However, even if true equality of opportunities remains out 
of reach in a world where there are limited health resources for unlimited health 
needs, we believe that the interpretation of the right to health should nevertheless be 
widened so that it does not only refer to the most urgent needs or the absolute worst-
off, but instead aim at broader and more inclusive thresholds of health, like, for 
example, basic health-needs satisfaction in light of existing medical and genetic 
technology.692 
Having established a clear link between genetics and the content of the right to health, 
the next step is to determine if the human rights system is built to ensure that the 
benefits of genetics will actually reach those who need them the most. 
692 A. K. Acharya, supra note 5; L. Doyal & 1. Gough, supra note 92, at 130-135; T. Nagel, supra note 
3] 8. 
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Efficacy of the right to health in terms of justice 
In addition to issues relating to the content and validity of human rights, there is also 
the problem of true efficacy of international socio-economic rights and of the right to 
health more specifically. Many question the real justiciability of socio-economic 
rights because of their prevailing political character, the vagueness of the scope and 
content of the rights, the associated obligations of conduct (not of result), and weak 
supervision and compliance mechanisms.693 lndeed, very few countries monitor and 
gather data on their realisation ofthe right to health.694 
The Limburg Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines state that economic, social, 
and cultural rights violations can arise following both acts of commission and acts of 
omission at the national and regional levels.695 For instance, member states can be 
brought before the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) to respond to 
alleged violations of the European Social Charter (ESC) dispositions. 696 On the 
international scene, the Committee on ESCR is in charge of revising periodic reports 
submitted by State parties to monitor implementation of socio-economic rights. To 
conduct its evaluation and analysis of how the right to health is respected by member 
states, the CESCR refers to four broad categories: general issues (proportion of 
693 A. Eide, "Future Protection of Economic and Social Rights in Europe" in A. Bloed et al., eds., 
Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing Internationa Procedure and Mecanisms (Boston: 
Maartinus Nijhoff, 1993) 187; M. Scheinin, "Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights" in A. Eide 
et al., eds., Economie, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd ed. (London: Maartinus Nijhoff, 
2001) 29. 
694 A. R. Chapman, supra note 597. 
695 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation fo the International Covenant on Economie, Social 
and Cultural Rights (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 122, UN doc E/CNAI1987/17, at 131; 
Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economie, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 585. 
696 For example, in the case International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France 
(complaint no. 14/2003), the ECSR was asked to interpret art. 13 (1) of the ESC on the right to medical 
and social assistance in relation to the French Finance Amendment Act. The complaint related to 
access to medical care by iIIegal immigrants with very low income. The claimant, the International 
Federation on Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) argued that illegal immigrant status should not, in any 
case, justify denying medical assistance to individuals, and that ensuring free treatment in case of 
emergencies and life-threatening conditions was not sufficient. The French Govemment, on the other 
hand, submitted that illegal immigrants did not faU within the scope of the charter's protected 
individuals. The ECSR admitted that the practical applicability and definition of health emergencies 
and life-threatening conditions were vague, but since sorne form of medical assistance, even minimal, 
was in place, it was enough for the Committee to conclude that the French Act did not violate art. 13 of 
the ESC. 
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countries' GNP dedicated to health, public/private standards); healthcare (provision 
in rural and urban regions, availability and affordability of health care and services); 
detenninants of health (access to food, water, and sanitation); consideration of more 
vulnerable groups (indigenous population, HIV -infected individuals and 
communities).697 AIso, in its 2000 general comment on the right to health, the 
Committee established four different criteria to evaluate the achievement of the right 
to health, namely, availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality.698 We will 
come back to sorne of these criteria in the next chapter, when we discuss the 
intersection of intellectual property and human rights in health with practical 
examples. As things stand now, the Committee has no mandate to review individual 
complaints conceming violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. However, a 
draft Optional Proto col could be established to this end in the near future, depending 
on the conclusion ofthe working group in charge of evaluating this issue.699 
Our principles of distributive justice demand that, in the course of distributive 
endeavours, we consider the health needs of every individual as critically important 
and consider them as rights to the extent necessary to ensure that they have the 
capacity to take advantage of available opportunities. Sorne, like Kennedy, believe 
that rights are not the best instrument to help us achieve equitable distributive 
endeavours. In fact, he says that the very legal nature of rights does not allow us to 
prioritise and ensure equitable distribution among different right-holders-some more 
deprived, with greater and more urgent needs than others.700 Instead, he argues, it too 
often allows institutions to prote ct sorne people's preferences even when others are 
unable to enjoy any rights. 
697 UN Committee on ESCR, Guidelines on Reporting, Questions relating to art. 12 of the CESCR. UN 
doc. E/1991/23, at 88-110; B. Toebes, "Towards an Improved Understanding of the International Right 
to HeaIth", supra note 583, 666-667. 
698 Committee on ESCR, General Comment No 14, supra note 658. 
699 Economie and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Open-Ended Working 
Group to Consider Options Regarding the Elaboration of an Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economie, Social And Cultural Rights on ils First Session, E/CNA/2004/44, March 15, 
2004. 
700 D. Kennedy, supra note 598. 
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Others, like Cullet, believe that although they are universal and awarded to all, human 
rights are meant to focus on the most deprived individuals and communities. 701 
Indeed, the Committee on ESCR, in its analysis, seems to prioritise economically 
deprived people's claims over the states' limited resources.702 This is also the position 
that the European Court ofHuman Rights adopted in the case Airey v. Eire in 1979.703 
Indeed, the Court interpreted the right to a fair trial very broadly, so as to include the 
right to civil legal aid protection. In so doing, the Court gave this right sorne teeth and 
offered tangible support for the equal treatment of everyone, with a special focus on 
the least affluent individuals and communities. As Scott notes, this decision illustrates 
that "human rights protection can, and should, be a result of a contextual interpretive 
analysis of what is needed to make a right truly a right of "everyone".704 Applying 
this decision to the right to health allows us to argue for the provision of a sufficient 
and adequate amount of health care to secure equality of opportunities, regardless of 
socio-economic factors. 
This brings us to the realisation that, depending on how they are implemented, human 
rights can impact the health of both individuals and communities, replacing our 
strictly medical perspective with a broader "social good" vision of health. Indeed, the 
rights to health, health care, and related technologies, resources, and services are 
inherently valuable in their goal of protecting individual welfare, basic needs, and 
interests. In itself, it justifies their recognition as a normative foundation for justice in 
a just global structure. However, realising these rights necessarily entails correlative 
duties by identified duty-bearers against whom rights are claimed. Indeed, as rights 
can found certain socially-guaranteed claims, they can also provide a basis for related 
duties of states and other members of the global community. This second section 
seeks to address the relationship between hum an rights, correlated duties, and access 
to health. 
701 P. Cullet, supra note 449. 
702 C. Scott, "Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category ofEconomic, Social and Cultural 
Rights" (1999) 21 :3 Human Rights Quarterly 633; A. Eide et al., supra note 576. 
703 Airey v. 1reland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), reprinted in 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305 (1979). 
704 C. Scott, supra note 702, at 641. 
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4.2.2.2. Implementing the Right to Health 
ln the last subsection, we established sorne links between the existing right to health, 
the potential benefits of genetics, and the somewhat doubtful efficacy of the concept 
of rights for securing access to health-taking needs and deprivation into account. 
Another very important aspect of the right to health, which is too often forgotten, 
concems duties involved in creating the conditions necessary for ensuring practical 
right enforcement and fulfilment resulting in efficient and just distribution. Indeed, 
our very capacity to bene fit from rights is directly linked to our acceptance of 
responsibilities.705 On the importance of related duties, Shue says that "[i]t is only 
because rights may lead to demands and not something weaker that having rights 
is tied as closely as it is to human dignity.,,706 
Notion of duty 
Focussing on duties can be helpful at many levels for realising global distributive 
justice in health. It can encourage a dialogue on who has to do what, in which priority 
order, for the realisation of the right to health. It can also help to highlight sorne 
problems with the political and economic context within which human rights are 
conceptualised.707 We will discuss the former issue in the present sub-section and the 
latter will be addressed in the third and last section ofthis chapter. 
Vincent states that rights are composed of five essentials: namely the subject and the 
object of the right, the way to exercise the right, the duty-bearer and the justification 
of the right. 708 Discussions on human rights should therefore not only cover the 
705 S. Benatar, A.S. Daar & P. Singer, supra note 182. 
706 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, at 14. 
707 A. Chapman, "Reintegrating Right and Responsibilities" in K.W. Hunter & T.C. Mack, eds., 
International Rights and Responsibili.ties for the Future (Westport C T: Praeger, 1996) 3; A. 
Robertson, "Critical Reflection, on the Politics of Need: Implications for Public Health" (1998) 47 
Social Science and Medicine 1419. 
708 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986) at 8; T. Dunne & N. J. Wheeler, supra note 602. 
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essence of what should be granted, but should also deal with what is necessary to 
achieve these rights and by whom they should be respected. This is the focus of this 
section. As discussed in Part 1, rights to health and equality of opportunities give rise 
to an obligation not to harm and to take practical distributive steps towards protecting 
the interests of rights-holders. 
The UDHR and the ICESCR implicitly refer to the obligation of states to secure a 
right to health for their people and for foreigners through international cooperation, 
without any discrimination. These obligations are demanding; they require "action to 
create freedom.,,709 Other soft-Iaw initiatives have also been undertaken to establish 
and propose specifie duties for states in relation to socio-economic rights to secure a 
minimum quality of life for individuals and an adequate environment for future 
generations. 710 Duties are assigned both to countries and to the international 
community, which needs to take global inequalities between countries into account in 
the realisation of the right to health.711 Indeed, human rights cannot be respected in 
less affluent countries if the rich countries do not respect their related dut Y to refrain 
from adopting detrimental political, military, and economic strategies against them. 
However, since practical implementation is almost uniquely national, international 
supervision is very limited, as we will see in the next section. 
The right to health can give rise to three main types of obligation: the obligation to 
respect, protect, and fuI fi Il (ensure and promote) individual and community health 
needs within and across borders. 712 These, in turn, can be divided into two broad 
categories: positive duties (to perform actions toward equal access to quality health 
709 E. O'Keefe & A. Scott-Samuel, supra note 651. 
710 The Limburg Principles on the Implementationfo the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, supra note 585; Trieste Declaration of Human Duties: A Code of Ethics and 
Shared Responsibilities, 1995; Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, September 1997. 
711 UN Economic and Social Council, Report of the High Commissioner: The impact of the Agreement 
on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, June 27, 2001, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, para. 35, on line on the UNHCHR website: 
<http://www.unhchr.chlHuridocdalHuridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/5905161 04e92 
e87bcI256aa8004a819I1$FILE/GOI14345.pdi> (accessed June 4th, 2006); Committee on Economie, 
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 658. 
712 H. Shue, Basic Rights supra note 245; W. Austin, supra note 594; A. Eide, supra note 576. 
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care and against interference with this right; to assist; to promote health and disease 
prevention through legislative and policy mechanisms) and negative duties (to refrain 
from performing certain health-harming actions and from establishing institutions that 
could undermine individuals' right to health).713 
Positive dulies 
Positive duties to fulfil the right to health imply undertaking actions to secure 
sufficient amounts of goods and services to meet individuals' basic health needs with 
the help of existing medical and genetic technology. Negative duties involve refusing 
to endorse an institutional order that entails avoidable and foreseeable violation of 
those rights. 714 Proponents of positive duties believe that refraining from 
institutionally denying and undermining access to health goods and services will not 
always be enough to make a difference in helping the most vulnerable. lndeed, their 
view is that maintaining fair institutions does not necessarily ensure that severely 
disabled individuals will be able to get what they should be entitled to from those 
institutions. They also believe that basic needs and interests are so important that they 
should give rise to both institutionally grounded positive assistance duties and duties 
ofnon-interference.715 
Fulfilling positive duties to aid raises a number of questions with regard to 
availability and allocation of scarce resources across time and space, imposition of 
budgetary priorities, income distribution, public policy making, and legislative and 
judiciary powers. 716 lndeed, the limited resources (human, budgetary etc.) of states, 
the numerous unfulfilled basic health needs, and the difficulty of finding accountable 
713 J. Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988) at 57; R. Cruft, 
"Human Rights and Positive Duties", supra note 277, at 30. 
714 T.W. Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties", supra note 278, at 66-68. 
715 R. Cruft, "Human Rights and Positive Duties", supra note 277, at 35-37. 
716 M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights under the Charter" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 
257; C. Scott, "The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a 
Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights" (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall 769; H. 
Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, at 91. 
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actors and institutions can raise scepticism about the very existence of a right to 
health and thus can be seen as obstacles to the positive implementation and 
enforcement of welfare claims. 717 Nervertheless, univers al human rights, such as the 
right to health, should be appraised from a global and long-term perspective, and 
should be awarded the most resources and attention in comparison to preferences and 
other non-basic rights. As discussed in the Part l, health is of universally great 
importance. Protecting health is an essential part of the dut y not to harm, as it aims to 
bring individuals to a situation in which they are able to function, seize opportunities, 
and make the most out of them. Ensuring a certain level of good health for aIl helps 
avoiding the persistence of degrading inequalities.718 In this sense, as we explained in 
our critique of Rawls' difference principle, allowing sorne individuals to focus on 
their own preferences while denying positive duties to fulfil others' most basic needs 
is not morally justifiable. 
Although the broad language of the Covenant does not clearly establish specific 
actions states must take to fulfill the right to he al th as a means to ensure equality of 
opportunities, this right can give rise to different positive duties. For example, the 
right to health can imply a dut y to establish mechanisms to prevent deprivation and 
encourage the provision of preventive and therapeutic health products by third 
parties (regulating selling costs, establishing incentives to encourage the 
development of health products and services for specific needs, etc.). It can also 
include a dut y to provide available health products and services to those in need 
with the help the transfer of resources at affordable cost and it can require states to 
review their research priorities to take objectively serious health needs of poorer 
countries into consideration. 719 This latter dut Y to aid is often critical as it arises 
after sorne have failed in their dut y to protect and to avoid harm. Many indicators 
can be used to assess the fulfilment of positive duties vis-à-vis the right to health. 
717 R. Nozick, supra note 71; C. Wellman, An Approach ta Rights: Studies in the Philosophy of Law 
and Marals (Boston: Kluwer Publishers, 1997) at 112-114; Cranston, What are Human Rights? (New 
York: Tapling Publishing Co, 1973). 
718 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, c.5, at Ill. 
719 A. Attaran, "Human Rights and Biomedical Research Funding for the Developing World: Covering 
State Obligations Under the Right to Health" (1999) 4: 1 Health Hum Rights 26. 
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Robertson suggests five types of resources relevant to measunng human rights 
compliance: human, technological, informational, natural, and financial. 720 States are 
thus free to decide which resources they assess and in what proportion to fulfill 
specific human rights; they just have to be sufficient and diversified enough to protect 
individuals. This evaluation is undertaken by the Committee on ESCR, which has, for 
example, compared sorne states' military and health expenses to measure their 
priorities and resulting compliance with the right to health.721 
Another issue with positive duties to implement socio-economic rights relates to the 
separation of powers and respective roles of the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
branches. Sorne view these as completely independent and consider that only the 
executive can initiate changes in the law to better comply with welfare human 
rights.722 For these people, governments have a dut y to identify priorities and take 
action to bring the object of the rights to the rights-holders; the judiciary only become 
involved afterwards, to enforce already-established mechanisms. 723 This vision 
appears too limited as it does not take the potential creative role the courts can play in 
the reinvention and protection of socio-economic rights. Indeed, judicial review can 
be seen as a crucial tool for ensuring the development of the normative content of 
socio-economic rights and their full and dynamic realisation.724 
Until now, very few courts have judicially reviewed the right to health, but there have 
been a handful of cases. For example, in a matter involving the Yanomami Indians, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) concluded that the right 
to health enshrined in the American Declaration had been violated by the 
720 R. Robertson, "Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the Maximum A vailable 
Resources to Realising Economic Social and Cultural Rights" (l994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly 693, 
at 703-713; A Attaran, supra note 719. 
721 The Committee has done this in the past for Chile, UN doc. E/C.12/1988/SR.13, par. 12 and Noth 
Koream UN doc, E/C.12/1987/SR 22, p. 5 and 17; see also, B. Toebes, supra note 583. 
722 For example, see R. Calland & M. Taylor, "Parliament and the Socio-Economic Imperative -
What is the Role of the National Legislature?" (Nov. 1997) 1 Law, Democracy and Development 
193; S. Liebenberg, "Socio-Economic Rights" in M. Chaskalson et al., eds, Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1998) c. 41. 
723 N. Haysom, "Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights" (l992) 8 
SAJHR 451, at 456. 
724 S v Makwarryane and another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), at par. 325. 
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Government of Brazil. The Commission stated that in refraining from taking 
appropriate actions to prevent mining and other harmful utilisation of the rainforest, 
authorities failed to protect their people' s health and cultural traditions.725 ln reaction 
to this decision, Brazil modified its constitution and established the Yanomami 
Reserve to ensure solid protection of the community, their lands, and their health.726 
AIso, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada broadly interpreted the right to 
equality, a traditional civil right, expanding its protection to include an equal 
right to resources required to take advantage of public health services offered 
to everyone, without discrimination in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General).727 ln so doing, the Court used civil and political rights to indirectly 
protect the socio-economic right to health. More recently, in Chaoulli v. Québec 
(Attorney General)728, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Québec province's 
ban on private health insurance for services covered by the public universal system 
violates the right to life and to security protected by the Québec Charter. Indeed, it 
was decided, by a majority of four judges against three, that the right to life, liberty 
and security of pers ons protected by the Québec charter also inc1udes a right to health 
care financed by the public or the private sector.729 However, there seems to be an 
unresolved tension between the individual and the collective aspects of Canadians' 
right to health. Indeed, many are worried that this decision could end up threatening 
the integrity of the Canadian public health care system while encouraging different 
level of socio-economic rights enforcement based on ability to pay and to qualify for 
725 lACHR Res. No. 12/85, Case 7615 (Yanomami lndians v. Brazil), Mar. 5, 1985, reprinted in 
Annual Report of the lACHR 1984-85, OEA/Ser.L/V/I1.83, Doc. 14, COIT. l, at 33, Oct. l, 1985 quoted 
in B Toebes, supra note 583. 
726 S. J. Anaya & R.A. Williams, Jr., "The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights over Lands and 
Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System" (Spring 2001) 14 Harvard 
Human RighI Journal 33 
727 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, 1997 CanLII 327 (S.C.C.) ln this case, the Court held that the failure of the 
BC authorities to provide sign language interpretation to deaf patients violated the equality rights of 
disabled people to fully benefit from the medicare system. 
728 [2005] 1 SRC 791. 
729 In the later case, the private services can only be performed by "non participating" physicians who 
chose to work only in the private system and who represent less than 1 % of aIl Québec' s physicians. 
This controversial judgment has been interpreted restrictively by many experts who argue that it only 
slightly opens the door the private insurance in health while preserving the clear division between 
public and private health professionals. For an analysis of this controversial ruling, see C. M. Flood & 
T. Sullivan, "Supreme Disagreement: The Highest Court Affirms an Empty Right" (July 19, 2005) 
173:2 CJMA 142; H. Brun et al., "Privatisation des Soins de Santé au Québec- Il n'y a pas d'Ordre de 
la Cour Suprême" Le Devoir, Thursday, November 1 7th, 2006. 
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private insurance. 730 It will be interesting to follow the actions that the Québec 
governrnent will take to comply with this ruling and the longer term implication it 
will have on the future of Canadians' right to health and more generally, of public 
health care in Canada. 
Negative duties 
Limited negative duties emerge in reaction to the vagueness of human rights and 
associated unspecified obligations. Pogge is one of the main advocates of the view 
that human rights give rise to negative duties not to harm others through the 
imposition of unfair institutional orders on them. 73I For Pogge, institutional orders 
should be evaluated according to the effect they have on the fulfilment of human 
rights. This is compatible with art. 28 of the UDHR and with Darwin's statement that, 
"if the misery of our poor be caused not by laws of nature but by our own 
institutions, great is our sin." 732 Pogge therefore supports an institutional 
conception of rights that sanctions claims against institutions only, as opposed 
to an interactional conception that would accept claims against anyone capable 
of satisfying the rights. 733 
As discussed previously in section 4.2.1.2 under our assessment of the global order, 
current global institutional arrangements could be seen as a massive, collective 
infringement of hum an rights, especially socio-economic rights, by many of the 
730T. Caulfield, "Chaoulli v. Québec (Attorney General): Supreme Court of Canada Deals a Blow to 
Publicly Funded Health Care" (2006) Health Law Perspectives; F. Béland, "The Supreme Court 
Missed a Good Opportunity" (June 2005) Law and Governance; A Maioni & c. Manfredi, "When The 
Charter Trumps Health Care - A Collision OfCanadian lcons" (September 2005) Po/icy Options 52. 
731 Pogge deliberately refuses to take a stand on positive duties, even ifhe does say that he agrees with 
indirect positive duties to aid when people's basic human rights are at risk. He remains uncommitted to 
the issue of positive duties without denying them, and focusses only on negative duties. T.W. Pogge, 
"Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties", supra note 278, at 65-66. 
732 Cited in S. J. Gould, "The Moral State of Tahiti- and of Darwin" (1991) 10 Natural History 12, at 
19 and in T.W. Pogge, supra note 615. 
733 T. Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty" (October 1992) 103 Ethics 49, at 50-51; T.Pogge 
"How Should Human Rights be Conceived?" (1995) Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik 3; C.R. Beitz, 
supra note 55. 
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world's most powerful and affluent agents. 734 Indeed, governments of the most 
developed countries and important multinational corporations are the main artisans 
behind the functioning of the global order. This order, through numerous international 
treaties and agreements on trade, labour, intellectual property protection and 
investment, shapes most international economic transactions and contributes to the 
production of serious socio-economic inequalities and human rights violations.735 For 
Pogge, the governments of affluent countries, and the citizens who elect and 
empower them, share a responsibility for human rights violations that unjustly 
disadvantage less affluent countries and their people, when these disadvantages are 
foreseeable and avoidable with practicable reforms. Instead of arguing that human 
rights encourage individualism and promote western values, the proponents of 
negative duties consider associated socio-economic human rights as individual moral 
daims on coercive institutions and on those involved in upholding them. Therefore, 
even if they do not have an individual positive dut y to fulfill everyone else's basic 
rights, the emphasis on duties should encourage individuals to behave properly 
toward others and exert pressure on their representatives to respect their national and 
international duties.736 
The negative dut y not to impose and uphold an unfair institutional order can be seen 
as universal. It generates limited and definite positive obligations on the part of states 
and, sometimes on citizens. States, empowered by citizens, must create effective 
institutions (or support and preserve existing ones), undertake reforms if those 
institutions are not adequate, and compensate those whose human rights are not 
fulfilled under the existing global order. Compared to sporadic and voluntary 
donations from wealthy countries, structural and institutional reforms would 
offer long-term consistency and fairer cost division among countries. Such 
reform should be undertaken to bring the global scheme to a level of justice where 
people could not be deprived of their right to health and where prevention and 
screening of serious medical conditions would be undertaken to meet a threshold of 
734 T. Pogge, Recognized and Violated by International Law, supra, note 1. 
735 Ibid. 
736 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, at. 131; C. Brown, supra note 61. 
229 
basic health needs-all in the broader framework of an ideal of equality of 
opportunities. To this end, respect for state sovereignty should be conditional on 
those states meeting minimal compliance with the protection of universal basic 
rights.737 We will come back to the main obstacles to the efficient implementation of 
such negative duties in more length in the next section of this chapter, when we 
analyse the conceptualisation of human rights within the broader reality of the 
market. 
This subsection has highlighted the imperfect nature of the dut Y and responsibility 
components of the human rights discourse. We have seen that, although positive and 
negative duties exist and can be allocated to different agents, they often are difficult 
to comply with and to enforce on states through judicial processes. For example, a 
requirement to meet extraterritorial obligations related to human rights to health can 
infringe on state sovereignty (both on the giving and receiving end); achieving a 
balance between human rights protection and respect for state sovereignty can be 
somewhat challenging.738 This corresponds with the limited dut y to fulfill (provide 
and promote) the legal right to health, that only requires states to undertake specific 
acts (reject discrimination and enforce minimum core obligations) 739 to realise the 
right in question, to the maximum of their available resources. However, as 
mentioned earlier, even when positive duties have not yet been allocated to specific 
persons or agencies, and even when rights are hard to realise, they can still exist and 
have great influence on how things evolve.74o In other words, the imperfections of the 
duties discussed in this section should not discredit the whole human rights discourse 
but are certainly symptomatic of a greater malaise. 
In this last section, we discussed issues of access to health and distributive justice in 
connection with socio-economic human rights and related duties. We realised that 
737 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, afterwords, at 158 et ss. 
738 S.P. Marks, The Human Rights Frameworkfor Development: Five Approaches, FXB Working 
Paper Series no. 18,2003, online on the website of the FXB Center 
<http://www.hsph.harvard.edulfxbcenter!FXBC WP18--Marks.pdf-> (accessed May 30'\ 2006). 
739 Maatricht Guidelines, supra note 585, guidelines 8, 9 and 10. 
740 For an inspiring discussion on this point, see A. Sen, "Consequential Evaluation and Practical 
Reason" (2000) 17:9 The Journal of Philosophy 478, at 495-498. 
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although the system in place elevates health to the status of a universal value in 
international law and is supposedly designed and aimed at enforcing responsibilities 
in relation to this goal, things do not exactly work this way in practice. This is 
exemplified by the fact that the most deprived, health-wise, are neither protected nor 
taken in charge under this system; other, more powerful and affluent agents take 
control of the distribution of health and health-related goods and services, without 
having to acknowledge and respect the universal importance of health. 
This clearly demonstrates the importance of taking our analysis one step further 
and undertaking a deeper evaluation of the complex global political and 
economic context within which the system of socio-economic human rights 
evolves. As Shue states, "[k]nowing how to protect the right against violation, or to 
restore the right after violation, depends as weIl on historical and empirical 
understanding of the relevant social, economic, political, legal, and psychological 
factors.,,741 This will be the focus of the last section ofthis chapter. 
4.2.3. The conceptualisation of human rights within the reality of 
the market 
Rights can never be higher than the 
economic structure of society and its 
cultural development conditioned 
thereby.742 
With this last section, we aim to present a more complete and balanced understanding 
of the system reviewed in the previous sections of this chapter. Outwardly, the hum an 
rights system seems to consider health as a universal value, asking for equal treatment 
of every human being in accordance with a cosmopolitan approach, and for the 
provision of an adequate amount of health care to protect equality of opportunities, 
regardless of socio-economic factors. However, in reality, fulfillment of positive and 
741 H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245, at 158. 
742 K. Marx & F. Engels, Se/ected Works Vol. Three, 1875-1895 (Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, 1970) at 19. 
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negative duties to secure a basic level of health for aIl has not occured, raising doubts 
about true universality of human rights principles. There seem to be a gap between 
acknowledging such universal values in the form of human rights and giving them a 
real voice and impact within the economic and political reality of the world. We 
touched on sorne of those issues when we analysed the global order under which 
human rights develop, but here we go one step further and question the real nature of 
human rights-the interests lying at the basis of the system, both in term of human 
rights content and implementation. 
4.2.3.1. How is the institution of human rights shaped by 
the market and the powers in place? 
Different modes of social organisation exist, and the most important and influential in 
the CUITent world order is the market. States which adopt an ideology that considers 
the market as the best way to distribute goods and services accept to limit their 
intervention and to prioritise privatisation and economic development. 743 For Evans, 
the ideology of the market refers to a set of normative relationships that exist without 
coercion, with a global reach, supported by discourses of truth, and widely accepted 
as "common sense.,,744 Within this conceptualisation, rights like liberty, property, and 
free markets, which best contribute to secure important production and exchange, are 
often preferred to other more demanding and less economically-rewarding welfare 
rights.745 
Different theoretical and practical arguments in favour of free markets exist and have 
been put forward in the literature. Those who endorse such a vision of the world 
typically maintain that mini maIl y regulated international markets remain the best 
instruments for fostering innovation, technological development, individual freedom, 
743 S. Gill, "Market Civilisation and Disciplinary Neoliberalism" (1995) 24:3 Millennium 412. 
744 T. Evans, supra note 595, at 1055. 
745 British Medical Association, The Medical Profession and Human Rights: Handbook for a 
Changing Agenda (London: Zed Books, 2001), at 24-26; House of Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Report on UK Ethical Foreign Policy, HCIOO 4, 1997; T. Evans, ibid., at 1057. 
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democracy and optimal distribution of resources worldwide. 746 A deep analysis of 
this position is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the following sections 
demonstrate why one cannot rely on the market to attain global distributive justice in 
health and that, in fact, the market frequently leads to economic and health 
inequalities. 
The raie of giobalisation 
The key barrier to the realisation of socio-economic rights like the right to health is 
related to persistent gross economic inequalities observed within and between 
nations.747 This is exemplified by the fact that globalisation is often not managed in 
the interest of developing countries and their people. Indeed, although globalisation 
has been beneficial for sorne countries which have chosen to gradually liberalise 
trade, most developing countries do not choose their own terms of participation, but 
have to comply with what the most powerful dictate. Due to the lack of democratic 
supervision at the globallevel, and because of the type of market pursued by the most 
powerful agents, strong economic interests tend to be prioritised, and agents with 
different priorities tend to be excluded, with negative consequences for their long-
term interests.748 The neo-liberal ideology promoted by developed countries in their 
international negotiations demands that markets be driven by efficiency, which means 
that "concerns about any resulting poverty or inequality are externalised from the 
746 However, their views as to what qualifies as a minimally regulated market do not converge. For 
example, partisans of the Iibertarian school favour a strong non-interventionist policy and reject 
egalitarian redistribution of wealth whereas other economists would recommend sorne form of 
intervention through national and international regulation in certain cases. For more on different 
schools of thoughts related to the market theory see: M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); A. Smith, Adam Smith 's Wealth of Nations: a New and 
Condensed Edition (New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1904); J. E. Stiglitz & L. Squire, "International 
Development: Is It Possible?" (Spring 1998) II Foreign Policy 138; T.H. Engelhardt Jr, The 
F oundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); R. Nozick, supra note 71. 
747 A. Eide, supra note 576, at 555. 
748 A good example is taken from the Uruguay Round negotiations which, as discussed at length in 
chapter III, were undertaken and conducted on unfair terms, characterized by gross inequalities in 
bargaining powers, with an agenda that reflected those inequalities. For a more complete discussion on 
this, see J. E. Stiglitz & A. Charlton, Fair Trade for All, How Trade can Promote Development 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); J. E., Globalisation and its Discontents, supra note 
152; see also A. Anghie, supra note 669, at 274. 
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debate over markets,,749 In such a context, distributive justice in health is not a 
priority at aIl. Indeed, providing appropriate goods and services to meet a threshold of 
basic health ends up being dealt with as a matter of sporadic assistance or charity, 
constrained by other requests and available resources. Socio-economic rights are 
therefore prevented from realising social wefare improvement, and can easily bec orne 
empty provisions without effect. 750 
Sorne advocates of globalisation believe that human rights can only be realised 
through mechanisms of globalisation, as they both imply the same common language 
and associations among individuals all over the world.751 Although critical of sorne of 
the possible negative effects of globalisation, international bodies have refrained from 
condemning it altogether. 752 However, globalisation has been heavily criticised by 
many organised social groups and academics from various disciplines,753 who have 
nevertheless not succeeded in challenging and eradicating the impact that these forces 
have on the realisation of human rights. Market efficiency measured through 
protection of private property, contract enforcement, and a stable investment 
environment remains a priority and is the main factor used to assess policy 
initiatives.754 This is in part due to the power of the strong financial alliance Bhagwati 
refers to as the "Wall Street Treasury Complex," which represents a conglomeration 
of international financial institutions (IFIs), the US Treasury and State Departments, 
and Wall Street and which greatly influences globalisation with their strategic 
actions, confound their interests with the interests of the whole wOrld, and 
749 K. Rittich, "Transformed Pursuits: The Quest for Equality in G10balized Markets" (Spring 2002) 
13 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 231, at 257. 
750 Ibid. 
751 On this point, see: M. A. Warner, "G1obalization and Human Rights: An Economic Model" (1999) 
25 Brook. J. ln!'! L. 99; see also W. H. Meyer, "Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative 
Analysis" (1996) 18 Human Right Quarterly 368; M. Pendleton, "A New Human Right, The Right to 
G1obalization" (1999) 22 Fordham Int'! L.1. 2052. 
752 A good example of this is art. 14 of the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social Deve!opment, 
which notes sorne worries about globalization, but at the same time also mentions its potential positive 
effects on economic growth and progress in developing countries. 
753 R. Wade, "Japan, the World Bank and the Art ofParadigm Maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in 
Political Perspective" (1996) 217 New Left Rev. 3; J. Stiglitz, supra note 152. 
754 K. Rittich, "The Future of Law and Development" supra note 667; K. Rittich, Recharacterizing 
Restructuring: Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002). 
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consequently threaten the substance ofhuman rights.755 Baxi is clearly addressing this 
when she says: 
l believe that the paradigm of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is being steadily supplanted by a trade-related, 
market-friendly, human rights paradigm. This new paradigm 
reverses the notion that universal human rights are designed 
for the dignity and well being of human beings and insists, 
instead, upon the promotion and protection of the collective 
rights of global capital in ways that "justify" corporate well-
being and dignity over that ofhuman persons.756 
Powerful market actors and their impact on human rights 
As mentioned earlier, international human rights implementation IS almost 
exclusively national due to the relatively low priority that powerful countries award 
to other nations' human rights issues in their foreign policy agendas.757 This being 
said, even when they make domestic moves in relation to human rights, states often 
find themselves driven by a larger agenda: helping and supporting the global 
economy built on the market ideology.758 This means that the real importance given 
to the universal values enshrined in international human rights treaties mainly 
depends on their compatibility with the overall purposes of the market. In other 
words, human rights end up being defined by powerful agents who often argue for a 
narrow conception, often only inc1uding civil and political human rights.759 This way, 
the fact that socio-economic human rights violations are often caused by powerful 
market forces is not addressed in the dominant legal human rights discourse; this 
failure takes our attention away from the universal values enshrined in legal human 
755 J. Bhagwati, "The Capital My th: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars" (May-
June 1998) 77:3 Foreign Aff. 7, at 10-12; A. Anghie, supra note 669. 
756 U. Baxi, "Voices of Suffering and the Future of Human Rights" (1998) 8 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. 
Probs. 125, at 163; cited in A. Anghie, ibid., at 249; R. Bauer & D.A. Bell, eds., The East Asian 
Challenge for Human Rights (Canmbridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 241. 
757 C. Brown, supra note 602. 
758 R.W. Cox,"Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World 
Order" (1999) 25 Rev. lnt'l Stud. 3. 
759 B. S. Chimni, supra note 664, at 10. 
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rights in an insidious way.760 This can bring people to wrongly believe in ajust world 
where hum an rights are valued and respected when, in reality, so many suffer from 
serious deprivation at so many levels. 761 
Another aspect of the contemporary world order is the tremendous power of 
transnational corporations, which now affects every state's ability to control its socio-
economic agenda, even within its own borders. 762 States face strong pressure to adopt 
efficiency as their top priority and this ends up affecting different sectors of their 
activity, such as labour and trade. As Kothari puts it, "[c]apitalism is entering a new 
phase and economic processes are becoming autonomous of political authority.,,763 
There is also a growing presence of private corporations within the UN structure. The 
Global Compact, an initiative of Kofi Annan that encourages responsible corporate 
actors to get involved in finding solutions to the challenges of globalisation, 
illustrates this. 764 Moreover, increasing corporate contribution to UN financing is 
reflected in the management philosophy adopted by the organisation and, 
consequently, "reduces the possibility of UN forums being at the center of collective 
action by third world states to constrain these giant private actors." 765 Since 
transnational corporations can exert a powerful influence on the socio-economic 
framework of states and of the global order, they can have positive and negative 
effects on the realisation of human rights.766 However, most powerful transnational 
760 T. Evans, supra note 595, at 1068; T. Evans, supra note 605. 
761 M. J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (New York: Plenum Press, 
1980). 
762 T. Freidman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999). 
763 R. Kothari, "G10ba1ization: A World Adrift" (1997) 22 Alternatives 227, at 228. 
764 To learn more about the Global Compact, its functioning and its progress, refer to this website: 
<http://www.unglobaIcompact.org/> (accessed June 2nd, 2006). 
765 B. S. Chimni, supra note 664, at 15; see also J. Bennett, "Multinational Corporations, Social 
Responsibility and Conflict" (2002) 55 Journal of international Affairs 403; K. Lee, D. 
Humphreys & M. Pugh, "Privatization in the United Nations System; Patterns of Influence in 
Three Intergovernmental Organizations" (1997) 11 Global Society 339. 
766 For example, strong enforcement of corporate genetic patents can increase the priee of 
essential therapeutic products through high royalty payments, and therefore prevent compliance 
with art. 12 and 15 (1) b) of the CESCR, which aim to protect the right to health and to access the 
benefits of science. On the negative effect of transnational corporationss on human rights, see S. R. 
Ratner, "Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility" (2001) III Yale L. J. 
461; on potential positive effects of TNCs on developing countries refer to W. H. Meyer, Human 
Rights And international Political Economy In Third World Nations: Multinational Corporations, 
Foreign A id, And Repression (Westport: Praeger, 1998). 
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corporations have consistently refused to take any responsibility for the negative 
effect they may have on human rights. This is why sorne argue that they should, like 
states, be held accountable for human rights abuses not only through voluntary codes 
of conduct, but also through national and international regulations. 767 Sorne have 
proposed to establish, through international consensus, a governing body to act as a 
kind of international court to examine corporate actions. 768 However, many are 
sceptical about the practicability of such a project, at least as long as real power 
remains in the hands of a few influential corporations. They suggest focussing instead 
on civil actions and media exposure to encourage public stigmatisation of private 
economic actors, when required.769 Indeed, the expanding social movement can make 
power visible while playing an important role in questioning power structures in a 
form of "globalisation from below.,,77o As Stammer notes, "[t]here is a possibility that 
under contemporary conditions of globalisation-social movements might become 
more effective agents of global socio-cultural change in respect of human rights than 
existing nation-states and emerging supranational institutional structures.,,771 
767 G. Meintjes, "An International Human Rights Perspective on Corporate Codes" in O.F Williams, 
ed., Global Codes of Conduct: An Idea Whose Time has Come (Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2000) 83; S. R. Ratner, "Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility" 
(2001) 111 Yale L. J. 461; M. Monshipouri, C.E. Welch & E.T. Kennedy, supra note 654; A. Eide, 
supra note 576. 
768 K. T. Jackson, "A Cosmopolitan Court for Transnational Corporate Wrongdoing: Why its Time has 
Come", (May 1998) J. Bus Ethics 758; see also Monshipouri, C.E. Welch & E.T. Kennedy, supra note 
654. 
769 M. Winston, "NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility" (2002) 16 Ethics & 
Int'l Aff. 71; N. Stammer, supra note 600. 
770 This is a fascinating topic that requires much more attention, and which is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of our dissertation. To learn more about the practical and political role and influence of social 
movements, refer to A. Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society (Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1989) at 76; A. F. Chadwick, 
"Transnational Social Movements, World Politics and Global Governance" in J. Smith, C. Chatfield & 
R. Pugnucco, Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); J.L. Richardson, "Contending Liberalisms: Past and 
Present" (1997) 3 Eur. J. of Int'l Rel. 5; R. Falk, "The Global Promise of Social Movements: 
Explorations at the Edge ofTime" (1987) 12 Alternatives 173; R. Falk, "Social Movements and World 
Politics" (Winter 1997) 23:3 Millenium (Special Issue). 
771 N. Stammer, supra note 600. 
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The roie of economic deveiopment for the protection of socio-economic rights 
The most affluent and powerful agents (countries, private corporations, and 
international economic organisations) often argue that they contribute to protecting 
and fostering socio-economic rights in developing countries through their 
development and economic growth initiatives.772 However, this is not always true. In 
fact, most loans from international financial institutions are targeted to specific 
projects often unrelated to basic subsistence needs, health care, and education; when 
they are, these loans are part of "adjustment lending processes," which frequently 
target decentralising and privatising reform initiatives.773 These projects have greatly 
reduced developing nations' capacity to establish social programs compatible with 
their level of development.774 Moreover, in focussing on their main creditors' short-
term demands and interests, international financial institutions do not pay enough 
attention to the importance and role of investment in meeting basic health needs to 
improving many other sectors of economic activity, like employment. 775 Therefore, 
international financial institutions often end up acting like charitable lending 
772 In terms of industrialisation and economic growth. 
773 Indeed, many argue that structural adjustment programs established by international financial 
institutions have had negative effects on states' abilities to meet their human rights obligations. 
For more on this argument, refer to: M. Chossudovsky, The Globalisation of Poverty: Impacts of 
IMF and World Bank Reforms (London: Zed Books, 1997); M. Chossudovsky, The G1obalization 
of Poverty and the New World Order, 2nd ed, (Shanty Bay: Global Outlook, 2003); E. Carrasco & 
M. A. Kose, "Income Distribution and the Bretton-Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling 
Environment for Social Development" (1996) 6 Transnat'I L. & Contemp. Probs. 1; B. Sadasivam, 
"The Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Human Rights Agenda" 
(1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 630; see also more generally A. Anghie, supra note 659, at 
252; R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, supra note 644; S.S. Akermark, "International 
Development Finance Institutions: The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund" in A. 
Eide et aIs., eds., Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Texbook, 2nd ed., (London: Maartinus 
Nijhoff, 2001), c. 28, 515; Y. Osinbajo & O. Ajayi, "Hum an Rights and Economic Development 
in Development Countries" (1994) 28 Int '1 Law 727, at 731; M. Nzomo, "The Political Economy 
of the African Crisis: Gender Impacts and Responses" (1996) 51 In!'l J. 78; B. Sadasivam, "The 
Impact of Structural Adjustment on Women: A Governance and Human Rights Agenda" (1996) 
19 Human Rights Quarterly 630; S.A. Agbacka, "Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of African Human Rights" (Annual 2002) 5 Yale Human 
Rights and Developmenl Law Journal 177; A. E. Yamin, supra note 688. 
774 J. Braithwaite & P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); J. Levinson, 'The International Financial System: A Flawed Architecture" 
(Winter/Spring 1999) 23:1 The Fletcher Forum on World Affairs 1; J. Dohnal, "Structural 
Adjustment Programs: A Violation of Rights" (1994) 1 Austl. J. Hum. RIs. 57, at 82; 
775 Indeed, promoting employment is one of the IMF's priorities. Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. 1, para. 3, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 on the importance of 
maintaining high levels of employment. 
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organisations which have great powers of refonn but do not necessarily use them to 
invest in nations' sustainable growth. They can consequently fail to acknowledge 
(and thereby violate) sorne of the most basic human rights of the citizens of 
borrowing nations.776 This engenders and amplifies the horrible situation prevailing in 
many developing countries where children and young adults die every day of 
preventable and curable diseases partially associated with a tremendous debt 
repayment burden and a criticallack of public spending on health.777 
AIso, if we talk about private investors, given their mode of operation and their need 
for quick results, their notion of "economic growth" will not necessarily result in 
needed long-tenn infrastructure investment, the promotion of employment and 
worker safety, initiatives that ensure environmental protection, or investments that 
truly help the citizenry and contribute in building their economy.778 The initiatives 
supported by these actors, ev en if they objectively improve a state's circumstances 
with certain economic measures, will most often increase inequities and poverty 
among the vulnerable. 
This c1early demonstrates that economlC growth fostered by powerful national, 
international, and transnational agents, and often only targeted at improving 
macroeconomic variables, cannot automatically be associated with the realisation of 
776 This problem is best illustrated by what happened in Latin America in recent years. While 
those nations experienced rapid growth at the beginning of the 1990s with IMF assistance, today 
it appears that this mainly represented a "catching up" on the IMF's bad management during the 
1980s debt crisis, and was also not sustainable in that it was too risky for countries, like 
Argentina, which was still in too delicate a position to handle it. For more on this, refer to J. E. 
Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents, supra note 152; see also more generally on ESCR 
violations: J. OIoka-Onyango, "Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic 
and Social Rights in Africa" (1995) 26 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 1, at 20-26; A. Escobar & S.E. Alvarez, 
Three Making of Social Movement in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy (New 
York: HarperCollins, 1992) at 53-56. 
777 Indeed, in Africa, many countries have to spend four times more money on debt repayment than 
they do on education and health care for their people. For more discussion and statistics on this, refer 
to A. Anghie, supra note 669, at 257-258; D. Ransom, "The Dictatorship of Debt" (Oct. 1999) World 
Press Rev 6; P. Engberg-Pedersen et al., Limits of Adjustment in Africa: The Effects of Economic 
Liberalization, 1986-94 (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1996); see also Secretary-
General Pursuant to Commission on Human Right Resolution 1989/45, Question of the Realization of 
the Right to Development: Global Consultation on the Realization of the Right to Development as a 
Human Right, Geneva, 1990, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/I990/9/Rev.1. 
778 UNDP, Human Development Report 1995; R. McCorquodale & R. Fairbrother, supra note 644. 
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socio-economic rights like the right to health. 779 Economic growth is too rarely 
evaluated in terms of capability and enhancement of human choices. 780 As a result of 
intense pressure from global civil society, international tinancial institutions have 
begun to approach these issues differently in promoting the social dimension of 
development for its positive effects on economic growth.781 However, even ifwelfare 
goals are acknowledged, their reach is considerably restrained as they are detined 
within "market promoting parameters" and ranked accordingly; equity and justice are 
important as long as they contribute to economic development. Liberalisation and 
privatisation remain the main tools for securing socio-economic rights. 782 The 
ICESCR notes, however, that those who signed and ratitied the treaty have a human 
rights obligation of international assistance. Those states should therefore aIl work 
toward full implementation of the Covenant, even when they act through international 
bodies like the IMF or the World Bank.783 Although every State party to the treaty 
has this obligation,784 it can be challenging for smaller and less-affluent countries to 
get their ideas across in the process of implementing economic, social, and cultural 
rights, as international tinancial institutions use a voting scheme weighted by 
economic contribution, considerably advantaging the affluent northern nations. 
In the CUITent political world order, legal human rights end up directly supporting 
powers in place 785 while the UN represents the main actor engaged in the promotion 
779 In that sense, the Human Development Index is a much more complete indication of real growth as 
it highlights differences between economic growth and welfare. See K. Rittich, supra note 749. 
780 M. Monshipouri, C.E. Welch & E.T. Kennedy, supra note 654, at 967. 
781 For example, see World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank, Washington, 1998, at 2, online on the 
World Bank website: <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/rights/hrtext.pdt> (accessed: June 4th, 
2006); See also IMF, Guidelines on Conditionality, September 25,2002, online on the website oflMF: 
<http://www.imf.orglExtemal/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.htm> (accessed June 4th, 2006) 
aiming at promoting sustainable development and growth; see also D. Forsythe, "The United Nations, 
Human Rights, and Development" (I997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 334. 
782 FJ. Garcia, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global 
Markets: Trading Away the Human Rights Princip le" (1999) 25 Brook. J. Int'l L. 51; A. Anghie, supra 
note 669, at 262. 
783 S.S. Akermark, supra note 773. 
784 As of May 8, 2006, 153 states had ratified the CESCR, online on the website of the OHCHR, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/3.htm> (accessed May 17t\ 2006). 
785 N. Stammers, supra note 600; J. Donnelly, supra note 575, at 29. 
240 
ofthis neo-liberal agenda on the global scene.786 Although all human rights are meant 
to be equal and interrelated, in reality, respecting civil and political rights will be 
given absolute priority and socio-economic issues will only be addressed later, if they 
are addressed at aIl. 787 Aiston notes that, 
In the world of globalization, a strong reaction against ... the denial of 
primary education or health care, can often require not only showing 
that the relevant practices run counter to human rights standards but 
also a demonstration that they are offensive to the imperatives of 
economic efficiency and the functioning of the free market... [I]n 
order to be validated, a purported human right must justify its 
contribution to a broader, market-based "vision" ofa good society.788 
This last section has demonstrated that although international human rights law 
(IHRL) theoretically aims precisely to address and eliminate socio-economic 
inequities, those same inequities are caused by more dominant forces of globalisation. 
In this system, the promotion of the market is the absolute goal even if it does not 
further welfare and justice as powerful agents prefer to stay in their advantageous 
position and not loose sorne of their power. AIso, as we noted, the faults and 
weaknesses of the hum an rights system in terms of structure and functioning are not 
disconnected from the fact that the system has been put into place by those same 
forces, in this same neoliberal context. It is therefore safe to say that socio-economic 
rights enforcement has been directly influenced by the commercial and political 
agenda of the most powerful agents of the world.789 As powerfully summarised by 
Doyal and Gough: "[i]n assuming the state to be the key actor safeguarding 
human rights, the West's approach ignores the very real inequalities between 
states stemming front the political/military domination of the big powers and the 
economic dominance of the central capitalist states, financial institutions and 
corporations within the world economic order.,,790 
78& M. Mutua, supra note 645, at 35. 
787 Ibid. 
788 P. Alston, supra note 663, at 442. 
789 K. E. Smith & M.M. Light, Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
790 L. Doyal & 1. Gough, supra note 92. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analysed the international human rights system to establish 
whether its underlying discourses, scope, structure, and functioning adequately 
account for the values encountered by our global distributive justice framework. Our 
principal goal was to assess the human rights system to determine if it can be useful 
in the redistribution of potential genetic research benefits, taking health needs into 
consideration. 
After a brief introduction to international human rights, we presented and critiqued 
the legal and moral discourses at the basis of the human rights system. We realised 
that both discourses had strengths and weaknesses and identified another important 
facet of the human rights discourse: the political. Throughout the chapter, we 
evaluated the international human rights system with the benchmarks developed in 
our global distributive justice framework. We began with the international aspect of 
hum an rights, comparing the notion of universalism with other concepts in order to 
determine whether the system is truly oriented toward a cosmopolitan ideal where 
every human being is considered as a unit of moral concern. We realised that the 
universalistic character of human rights could sometimes be used as a way to keep 
real people's needs at a distance, and that it could be criticised for its strong western 
influences. Then, our assessment of the global context under which human rights 
evolve highlighted the strong capitalist roots that have led to a tolerance for economic 
disparity and injustice in health. With this section, we realised that the international 
hum an rights system, through its institutional structure and its politics, does not 
necessarily protect the cosmopolitan approach to the solidarity and true universalism 
needed to support global distributive justice and access initiatives related to health 
and genetics. 
In the second section, we studied how the human rights system deals with the 
crucial need for health and genetic-research access in terms of rights, 
entitlements, and related duties. Our goal was to envision socio-economic rights 
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with our benchmarks of distributive justice. We specifically analysed the human 
right to health in terms of validity, content, and efficacy; this led us to discuss 
associated responsibilities to undertake distribution to facilitate access to health 
and genetic innovation. We realised that the concept of a "right" was not the 
most useful in securing real access to health for the most needy and deprived, 
and that associated duties where hard to comply with and to enforce. 
The first two sections laid the foundation for a deeper political analysis of 
human rights in the third section. In this last section, we considered how hum an 
rights are conceptualised in order to understand the role of market forces in 
realising the hum an right to health and ascertained that the same inequalities that 
the hum an rights system is meant to address are generated by powerful agents 
who control the way this same system works. With this last section, we were 
brought to realise that the real problem is with the powerful interests lying at the core 
of existing political and economic institutions that undennine the realisation of 
important socio-economic rights. 791 Legal nonns therefore create "entitlements" 
without considering the broader political and economic contexts created by the 
society's structures and institutions and which greatly influence decisions on resource 
allocation. 792 We should therefore work to alter these well-established economic 
forces if we are to rebuild trust in human rights, and create just distributive 
arrangements in the field of health and genetic technology. As Fidler states, "must as 
capitalism has become a truly global dynamic, the protection and promotion of health 
must also rise to the challenge ofthe new global order.,,793 
There are considerable political challenges to any reliable and sustainable 
implementation of socio-economic rights like the right to health. Even if socio-
economic rights are legally protected, the whole context in which this happens helps 
791 K. Hossain, "G1obalisation and Human Rights: Clash ofUniversal Aspirations and Special 
Interests" in E. Burns, H. Weston & S. P Marks, eds., The Future of International Human Rights 
(Transnational Publishers: New York, 1999). 
792 K. Rittich, supra note 749, at 260; see also M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's Hidden 
Agenda" (1987) 45 The Advocate 857, at 860. 
793 D.P. Fidler, "International Law and Global Public Health" (1999) 48 Kansas Law Review 1. 
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safeguard capitalist market values, encourages passivity among the less affluent, and 
consequently discourages redistribution in health and other crucial sectors. 794 This 
highlights the enormous challenge of realising universal values of socio-economic 
equality and justice in a structure driven by a completely different agenda. This 
contributes to the lack of attention awarded to the ethical basis of socio-economic 
rights and to the false interdependence of human rights, aIl of which considerably 
weakens the practical implementation of the human right to health, as discussed 
earlier. In this sense, we have to agree with Kennedy when he says that the human 
rights movement can sometimes legitimate more injustice than it eliminates.795 
This is what makes the system, as it currently operates, incompatible with our 
global distributive justice framework. If the human rights system were to meet 
our goal of global distributive justice in terms of global health, it would need to 
adopt an entirely different mode of functioning. This would require undertaking 
institutional reforms to realise socio-economic human rights and, more specifically, 
to allow genetic technology and health-related goods and services to reach those for 
whom it can do the most good. To this end, "[w]e should not just assume that past 
forms of power will stay the same and have the same implications, nor should we 
assume that new forms of power will not arise.,,796 A fitting example of this is the 
growing social movement that has played an important role in generating pressure, 
resistance, and change in support of fairer resource distribution in various areas, 
sometimes in collaboration with international institutions and states.797 However, to 
obtain effective and lasting results, they will need considerably more economic 
794 M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights & the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson 
Educational Publishing, 1994). 
795 D. Kennedy, supra note 598, at 134. 
796 N. Stammer, supra note 600. 
797 One example ofthis is the social ecologist movement, which has been very aggressive and 
efficient in challenging power relations and structure for a better and increased protection of 
environment rights. For more on this example, refer to N. Stammer, supra note 600; see also B. 
Rajagopal, "From Resistance to Renewal: The Third World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of 
International Institutions" (2000) 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 529, at 533 & 578; R. Khan, "The Anti-
globalization Protests: Si de-show of Global Governance, or Law-making on the Streets?" (2001) 61 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law 323. 
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resources and much more political power to structure and rally a majority of people to 
their cause, particularly in the developing world.798 
As more and more people come to realise that addressing the more pressing global 
health issues is critical for the creation of a more just and stable world order, 
developing efficient and enforceable human rights mechanisms appears to be one of 
the many important steps in the right direction. However, until there is a major 
change in hum an rights politics, we will not be able to conclude that it works to 
advance global distributive justice principles in terms of access to common health 
standards. This clearly highlights the important challenge associated with bridging 
the gap between the expression of univers al values of cooperation, solidarity, and 
justice and the contingencies of modem world politics and economics.799 
Our next and last chapter will focus on introducing practical examples to illustrate the 
intersection of intellectual property and human rights. The purpose of this chapter is 
to present examples of the practical impact that these two normative systems have 
had on global access to health benefits in developing countries. It will provide us with 
an opportunity to see how both schemes analysed in depth in the last two chapters 
have performed in dealing with serious, real-life issues of access to health. 
798 B. S. Chimni, supra note 664. 
799 C. Brown, supra note 61; A. J. Langlois, "Human Rights: the Globalisation and Fragmentation of 
Moral Discourse", supra note 622. 
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Chapter V: Illustration of the Intersection of IP and Human Rights Law 
with Practical Examples Relating to Global Access to Health in 
Developing Countries 
Introduction 
As we have argued from the beginning of this dissertation, health is crucially 
important for every individual, regardless of his or her socio-economic situation and 
country of origin. Nevertheless, our analysis of two different normative frameworks 
(intellectual property and human rights) and of their political and economic contexts 
of application has demonstrated that, in practice, health is given a lower level of 
priority and importance than is appropriate within these frameworks. Indeed, we 
realised that although they have a potential to contribute to global health 
improvement, these systems instead work to prioritise efficiency, often to the 
detriment of distributive justice. Following our analysis of the relationship existing 
between access to health and genetics and the functioning of both, human rights and 
IP rights law, this chapter will study the interaction of those two systems. We will 
indeed rely on a combined perspective on IP and human right law to complement our 
analysis of chapter III and IV. To this end, we will present a few examples to 
demonstrate the practical effects of the junction of the IP and hum an right law 
regimes in scientific data-sharing, availability, and affordability of genetics research 
tools, products, and services in developing countries. This chapter will allow us to get 
a better sense of the tension that lies at the intersection of IP and human rights in 
health. Our analysis will bring us to conclude that, even when taken together and 
simultaneously applied to a same issue, the IP and human right systems do not, in 
most cases, work towards global distributive justice in health. 
It is important to specify that this chapter will not provide an exhaustive analysis of 
the topic, but will instead use a small number of practical cases to illustrate how and 
when patents and socio-economic rights can be involved in the battle for global 
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access to health. We should remember that because of the advanced scientific 
infrastructure needed, the cost of development and the price of genetic 
technologies, genetics has been mainly developed and used in the most affluent 
countries, even though it has clear potential for the developing world. In other 
words, even if genetic technologies and related patents are mostly issued in 
developed countries for the moment, developing nations that wish to benefit from 
such technologies will often be affected by those exclusive rights. Two types of 
examples illustrate this situation: first, genetics-specific examples from the 
developed world; second, a direct example from the developing world, having 
taken place in a different but somewhat similar sector: the pharmaceutical drug 
industry. Following the presentation of these examples, we will conclude this 
chapter with a brief analysis of the intersection between IP and human rights in 
health. 
5.1. Challenges in Availability and Affordability of Genetic Technologies 
Access to genetic treatments and technologies can touch on many different practical 
issues and, for the purpose of this section, we will focus on the influence of patents 
and socio-economic rights on genetic research needed to further innovation and on 
access to genetic products and services to be provided to populations. 8oo We will 
continue to refer to access in terms of availability and affordability of genetics. 
5.1.1. Genetics research 
As we know, the developments observed in genetics over the last few decades have 
arisen from important research progress in this fast-growing and promising field. The 
800 Another important aspect of availability of genetics research tools relates to data access stored in 
databases. These databases are often protected by copyrights that cali for different access mIes and 
mechanisms. While this is a fascinating and very contemporary issue, it is not our focus as we 
concentrate on patents. For more information on this particular topic, see: WHO, Genetics, Genomics 
and the Patenting of DNA: Review of Potential Implications for Health in Developing Countries, supra 
note 19. 
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availability of research tools has been cri tic al to the development of genetic 
innovation. As we saw earlier, DNA, genes, gene sequences, cell lines, SNPs, and 
genetic knowledge can aIl be considered as "genetic research tools". Because of 
the propagation of gene patents, sorne have expressed fear that these exclusive 
rights will prevent researchers from undertaking research on specific parts of the 
hum an genome, for which too many exclusive rights have been granted. 801 This 
is especially important for large-scale research endeavours like the public branch 
of the human genome project, which was simultaneously piloted by a large 
group of experts around the world acting more as a community than as 
competitors racing against each other with the results we have come to know. 
A number of existing intellectual property and human rights mechanisms exist to 
limit the potential negative effects of research tool patents. One example is the 
research exception clauses that appear to be permitted by TRIPS.802 These clauses 
can allow researchers to make use of patented tools for very specific purposes without 
having to compensate the patent holder. 803 However, this mechanism is often 
801 To this effect, Justice Michael Kirby commented on the changes that have operated in the scientific 
tradition, stating that it has been tumed "from a discipline that was open, at least in the field ofpure 
science, to one which is now significantly affected by intellectual property imperatives." M. Kirby, 
supra note 477, at. Il; see also T. Caulfield, "Sustainability and the Balancing of the Health Care" 
supra note 23 ; M.K. Cho, "Ethical and Legal Issues of the 21 st Century" in Preparing for the 
Millennium: Laboratory Medicine in the 21 st Century 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: AACC, 1998) 47; 
M. A. Helier & R. S. Eisenberg, supra note 358. 
802 Sections 30 and 8 of TRIPS presumably allow States to make use of flexibilities and provide 
restricted limitations on patent rights. 
803 Most European countries included research exception clauses of different scope and wording in 
their patent legislation. In the US, experimental-use exceptions have traditionally been very narrow, 
not covering most basic research, applying exclusively to research for amusement, to satisfY one's 
curiosity, or for philosophical investigation, as it appears from two important decisions: Madey v. Duke 
University, 307 F3d 1351 (Federal Circuit Court of Appeal 2002) and Embrex, Inc. v. Service 
Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349,55 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Ciro 2000). However, the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Merck KGAA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Inc., 2005 WL 1383624, * l, 
8 (U.S. June 13,2005) makes a distinction between the study of a "research tool" and the use of such a 
tool for research purposes. This indicates a possible broadening ofresearch exceptions in the US (for 
more details on this case, see Y. Joly, Integra v. Merck: The resurrection of the American research 
exemption? (Montreal: Centre for Intellectual Property Policy, 2005). In Canada, art. 55.2.(1) of the 
Canadian Patent Act does not expressly create a research exemption but allows use of the existing 
common law exemption. It was recently suggested to include c1ear research exceptions to allow 
investigation into the properties of patented material, research aimed at improving upon the object of 
the patent, and research aimed at discovering new patentable elements, products, and technologies 
(CBAC, Rationalizing Patent Law in the Age of Biotechnology, Ottawa, September 2004, online on 
CBAC website, 
248 
subjected to important restrictions and remains very difficult and risky to employ 
because of the vagueness often associated with the uses permitted, particularly with 
genetics research.804 This can cause uncertainty, which might push researchers to seek 
licences in any case. 
An aspect of patent rights that can influence availability of research tools relates to 
the licensing strategy adopted by patent holders when they grant licenses. A license is 
a limited authorisation for use granted by the patent holder to licensees in exchange, 
in most cases, for sorne form of compensation. Licensees therefore bec orne entitled to 
make use of the object of patents, but also have to respect the conditions established 
by the patent holder. 805 Depending on the conditions that the latter chooses to impose 
on his licensees (cost, type of license, length, conditions, etc.) it can affect further 
research.806 
The scope of gene patents can also impact genetic research. In fact, as discussed in 
chapter III, there was, until recently, a tendency for patent holders-who are 
<http://cbac-cccb.ca/epic/internet/incbac 
cccb.nsf/vwapilRationalizing Patent Law Final E.pdf/$FILE/Rationalizing Patent Law Final E.pdf 
> (accessed May 29'h, 2006) rec. 5; Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Tenn Care Genetic, Testing 
and Gene Patenting: Charting New Territory in Healthcare, Toronto, 2002, online on the Ontario 
government website: 
<http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry reports/geneticsrep02/report e.pdt> 
(accessed May 29'\ 2006) at 40. Sorne developing nations like Brazil, India and China have also 
integrated a research exception clause in their patent legislation (Brazilian Patent Law 9.279 of 1997; 
Indian Patents Act, 1970, at s. 47 (3); China Patent Law 1982, amended in 1992, at s. 62). 
804 For example, it cou1d be hard to determine if a research exception is meant to coyer aIl research 
involving the patented invention, research only aimed at investigating the properties of the patented 
genetic material, and/or genetic research that is not meant to but might result in commercial products. 
M.A. Flores & c. Campbell, "Re-examining the Research Exemption" (2005) 23:5 Nature 
Biotechnology 659; M. Rimmer, "The Freedom to Tinker: Patent Law and Experimental Use" (2005) 
15:2 Expert Opinion 167; E.R.Gold and A. Gallochat, "The European Directive: Past and Prologue" 
(2001) 7:3 European Law Journal 331, at 358; C. Correa, "Pro-Competitive Measures under TRIPS 
to Promote Technology Diffusion in Developing Countrie" in P. Drahos and R. Mayne, eds., Global 
Intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and Development (New York: Pal grave Macmillan, 
2002) 41. 
805 Countries can also intervene to regulate licensing practices with hard or soft law mechanisms. For 
an example of a recent initiative, see: National Institute of Health, "Best Practices for the Licensing of 
Genomic Inventions" (2005) 70 Federal Register 18413. 
806 For example, sorne licenses remain unavailable or very costly and can, in sorne cases, result in 
slowing down fundamental research or blocking any external research aimed at validating the 
inventor's results:J.F. Merz, "Disease Gene Patents: Overcoming Unethical Constraints on Clinical 
Laboratory Medicine" (1999) 45:3 Clinical Chemistry 324. 
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principally in affluent countries-to try to obtain broad patent rights over genes and 
gene-related processes and products807, and for the courts to interpret those patent 
rights broadly.808 Although applicants now tend to present much narrower claims and 
patent examiners have become more reluctant to award broad gene patents, the 
exclusive privileges they grant often end up covering elements, functions, and uses 
that were still unknown at the time of filing the patent claim. 809 In genetics, this 
means that a patent awarded on a gene involved in a particular disease could allow 
much control to the patent holder over all genetic research undertaken on this 
particular disease. There is, however, no evidence that gene patents have reduced the 
amount invested in research or created major hurdles for the use of existing research 
tools, except in the area of genetic diagnostics.810 
From a human right perspective, the priority is to encourage the use of existing 
research tools, patented or not, and the easy exchange of information to facilitate 
crucial discoveries. This approach supports meaningful scientific innovation to 
further the needs of the most vulnerable and therefore "goes well beyond a simple 
807 This is exactly what happened with the patent awarded on the gene coding for the CCR5 receptor 
more than 10 years ago when the standards were lower. Indeed, after the US Company Human 
Genome Sciences Inc. (HGS) had identified that CCR5 was a cell-surface receptor, it filed and 
obtained a US patent on the gene that coded for the CCR5 receptor, and on all its possible medical 
applications. Meanwhile, another research team discovered that CCR5 was also viral receptor and, 
most importantly, a key entry site for the HIV virus into the cell, something that was not known by 
HGS at the time of their filing in 1995. However, because of its initial very broad c1aim, HGS had 
exclusive rights over all medical uses of CCR5, including those discovered by others. In this specific 
example, HGS fortunately adopted a very permissive and reasonable licensing strategy that allowed 
numerous researchers to carry on with their research on CCR5 and HIV. For more on this case, see: 
UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intel/ectual Property Rights in 
Development Policy, supra note 426; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The ethics of Patenting DNA: a 
Discussion Paper, supra note 473. 
808 This tendency to provide broad judiciary interpretation of patents is weil iIIustrated in the Canadian 
case Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada Inc [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34. This matter took place in 
the field of agriculture biotechnology and concems the interpretation of a patent c1aim on a 
genetically-modified gene integrated into canola seeds to make them resistant to herbicides. In its 
decision, the Canadian Supreme Court interpreted this c1aim on the modified gene very broadly by 
extending the scope of exclusive patent rights to whole plants. For more details on this case refer to: 
E.R. Gold & d. Castle, supra note 47. 
809 This appears from a study conducted in 2003-2004 in the US in which 1000 patent c1aims on human 
genes have been analysed and more than 1/3 where qualified as problematic due to written description 
and novelty issues. For a detail of this analysis, see: J. Paradise, L.B. Andrews & T. Holbrook, 
"Patents on Human Genes: an Analysis of Scope and Claims" (March 11, 2005) 307:5715 Science 
1566. 
810 For more on this point, refer to discussion and references of note 438, chapter III. 
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economlc calculus often governmg intellectual property law."Sl1 Socio-economic 
rights are awarded with the purpose of improving human well-being and fostering the 
interests of society rather than encouraging private property rights over important 
resources and maximising economic benefits of a few wealthy agents in priority. 
Following this approach, research addressing health needs of people living in the 
poorest parts of the world should be encouraged and facilitated. A human rights 
solution might be to encourage the use of these tools in wealthy countries, where they 
can be exploited to their full potential for addressing the needs of the less affluent 
until the less affluent countries are able to act on their own behalf. This solution 
would represent cooperation with the most disadvantaged people, as required by 
internationallaw.812 
However, apart from a few recent large scale international initiatives to address 
global health crisis, very little investment is being made in R&D for the special needs 
of patients from the developing world. 813 On the private front, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies almost always prefer to invest in research dealing with 
health conditions that represent a lucrative market, like heart disease, obesity, 
impotence, etc.814 On the public front, although it would be quite simple to establish 
research programs and directives to this end, most states are passive and seem to 
adopt national public research funding policies that focus on their national health 
priorities and do not take their international human rights commitments and 
811 A. R. Chapman, "Approaching intellectual property as a human right: obligations related to Article 
15 (I)(c)" (July-Sept 2001) 35:3 Copyright Bulletin 4, at 13. 
812 art. 2 & 23 ICESCR; art. 55 & 56 Charter of the United Nations; art. 3 Declaration on the Right to 
Development.Even those who do not agree with this view because they argue it violates state 
sovereignty believe that exceptions should be accepted for health protection: L. Henkin, "Human 
Rights and State 'Sovereignty" (1995) 25: 1/2 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 
131; A. Attaran, supra note 719, at 33. 
813 The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
Initiative, both established in 2002, are two examples ofthose large scale initiatives that will be briefly 
addressed in the next section. On research on the needs of developing countries more generally, see: 
P. Cullet, supra note 449; Committee on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
no. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, supra note 658; M. MacLean et al., 
"Making Malaria Research Bite" (1997) 3:1 Nature Medicine 14; J. Anderson et al., Malaria 
Research: An Audit of International Activity (London: The Wellcome Trust, 1996); A. Attaran, supra 
note 719, at 33. 
814 After ail, they are for profit enterprises and still do not bear human rights responsibilities under 
intemationallaw. For more on this: A-M Tabor, "Recent Development: AIDS Crisis" (2001) 38 Harv. 
J. on Legis. 514. 
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obligations into account.Sl5 As clearly put by Attaran, "[i]f States are to begin to 
fui fil 1 their ICESCR obligations and animate the moribund right to health, the 
work should begin in their science ministry."SI6 
This brief discussion illustrates the importance that both IP rights and human rights can 
have on real access to genetic research by the most vulnerable, for the most vulnerable. 
It aH depends on the perspective adopted by those who control genetic research 
endeavours, both private and public, much of which is strongly influenced by profit 
considerations, political motivations, and national and international regulatory 
obligations. We will now address the practical accessibility of existing genetic 
products and services. 
5.1.2. Access to genetics products and services 
Because of their economic role in allowing investors and inventors to recoup 
their R&D investment, patents do not encourage innovation in fields with very 
little potential for profits. In fact, as mentioned above, most existing genetics 
related products and services have been developed in the industrialised world to 
815 There are exceptions to this trend. Indeed, one of the unfortunately too-rare initiatives to this end 
has taken place here, at the Montréal Genome Center and the McGiIl Centre for Host Resistance, 
where cutting edge genomics technology has been used for global health purposes. In February 
2003, Drs. Hudson, Mira, and Schurr from McGiII, leading an international research team, published 
an important breakthrough in understanding the cause of leprosy. They had managed to isolate a 
segment of a chromosome that makes individuals susceptible to leprosy. As most Canadians would 
probably assume that leprosy had been eradicated, this study drew attention to the fact that, on a 
global scale, there are still 500 000 to 700 000 new cases each year, mainly in India and Brazil. The 
next steps of this project are to identify the genetic and molecular nature of the defect and develop a 
more effective vaccine. The Canadian part of the study was directly financed by Canadian and Québec 
funding agencies. This is a c1ear example of a public research initiative that has been established using 
our expertise and technology to address issues that have little to do with the Canadian population, but 
which remains essential for improving global health with a collaborative human rights approach. For 
more on this initiative see: M.T. Mira, "Chromosome 6q25 is Linked to Susceptibility to Leprosy in a 
Vietnamese Population" (March 2003) 33 Nature Genetics 412; S. Comeau, "Genetic Key to Leprosy" 
(Feb. 2003) 35 McGill Reporter online on McGill website: 
<http://www.mcgill.ca/reporter/35/10/leprosy/> (accessed May 28th, 2006). 
816 A. Attaran, supra note 719. 
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address the needs of the industrialised world,817 due both to the high cost of 
research and to the increased possibility of financial retufll. This being said, 
genetic products and services produced in the developed world may also be 
relevant in addressing developing countries' health problems. Therefore, patents 
awarded on these products and services might influence their accessibility both 
in affluent and less-affluent countries. 
Sorne are of the view that patent rights are essential to encouraging more inventions 
and better disclosure of innovation for the benefit of societies. In this sense, they argue 
that these rights further important social goals that could not be achieved otherwise.818 
Others believe that IP rights regimes do not achieve this balance between creators' and 
society's interests, but tend instead to favour economic interests of a minority of 
powerful agents, to the detriment of broader interests in public access to useful 
innovation. This is the view of sorne researchers who have come up with 
empirical results in the specific sphere of diagnostic genetic tests. Their work 
suggests that the possibility of obtaining patent rights is not a major motivation 
for those involved in developing and producing genetic tests. 819 They, in fact, 
found that patents can instead have detrimental effects on innovation in the field 
of genetic tests, as this quote illustrates: 
We conclude that patents and licenses have a 
significant negative effect on the ability of clinical 
laboratories to continue to perform already developed 
genetic tests, and that these effects have not changed 
substantially throughout the past 3 years. Furthermore, 
the development of new genetic tests for clinical use, 
based on published data on disease-gene associations, 
and information sharing between laboratories, seemed 
to be inhibited.820 
817 World Health Organization, World Health Report 1999: Making a Difference, Geneva, 1999, online 
on the WHO website, <http://www. who.int/whr200 1 /200 1 /archives/1999/en/pdf/whr99 .pdf> (accessed 
May 28th, 2006) at 137. 
818 World Intellectual Property Organization, 1ntellectual Property Reading Material, p. 5, Geneva, 
World Intellectual Property Organization, 1995 (WIPO Publication No. 476 (E». 
819J.F. Merz et al., "Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test", supra note 436. 
820 M. K. Cho et al., "Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing 
Services" (2003) 5 Journal of Molecular Diagnostics 3, at 8. 
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Therefore, depending on their scope and on the sector of activity in which they 
are awarded, patents can grant substantial control to patent holders over the use 
of their products and services, as weIl as over the mode of analysis to be used in 
clinical environments, influencing their true availability to patients in need as 
we will see with the BRCA, heamatochromatosis, and Canavan examples. AIso, 
countries where gene patents have not been granted can theoretically buy, use, and 
produce genetic products and services. However, since many countries do not have 
the minimum basic manufacturing capacities and resources necessary to pro duce such 
items, they often have to turn to developed countries to buy the (often patented) 
genetics products, technology, and services they need. Accessibility to the latter items 
will principally depend on their affordability. We know that patent rights allow 
patent holders to temporarily exclude others from using, making, importing, or 
selling their invention in ex change for the public release. Patent holders can thus 
grant licenses with almost any condition they want and sell their patented objects at a 
price they fix, subject to applicable legislation, competition and market forces. In 
other words, the patent system allows patent holders to transfer sorne of the costs 
invested in developing their invention to the licensees and to the users of these 
products in exchange for the disclosure and use of their invention. This temporary 
legal monopoly over the co st of products can generate access barri ers for those 
who are unable to pay, and it can, consequently, engender health gaps within and 
among nations. Indeed, affordability directly impacts availability and, more 
generally, direct access to genetics in cases where no other alternative such as 
public insurance exist in the market. In such cases, potential users who are not 
capable of paying the amount required by the patent holder can end up deprived of 
access to genetic products and services. The limited ability of a population to pay 
for sorne products will also have a direct influence on their very availability in a 
given market. 
This reality do es not correspond weIl within a human rights framework that 
requires IP rights to be consistent with the realisation of other international 
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human rights, like the right to health of every individual, and, more specifically, 
of the most disadvantaged. 821 In other words, human rights require an approach to 
IP rights that supports scientific innovation and equitable access to its benefits 
evaluated in terrns of needs. 822 Human rights demand the protection of the most 
vulnerable socio-economically and in terrns of disabilities. 
The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the Doha Declaration, 
already examined in chapter III) is a hurnan rights initiative to limit patent holders' 
power over prices in the health sector, particularly with regard to essential drugs, as 
we will discuss in the next section. However, notwithstanding the special 
consideration awarded to health in the Doha Declaration, its practical impact is 
limited for now. TRIPS is based on a private property model and remains an 
international agreement applied mainly to foster the interests of intellectual property 
owners and to promote international trade. 
The next exarnples demonstrate the influence that disease-gene patent rights and 
human rights have had (or not) on availability and affordability of genetic technology 
targeted at specific disease. Although these exarnples are taken from the developed 
world, they are also likely to find application in developing countries which often 
have to rely on the sarne technology. 
BRCA 
The restrictive licensing practice adopted by Myriad Genetics for the use of patented 
BRCA 1 and BRCA2 genes and associated genetic tests is an example of the link that 
can exist between licensing practices and availability and affordability of genetic tests 
for disease. BRCAI and BRCA2 are two genes associated with hereditary breast and 
821 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights; Statement on 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Geneva, December ]4,200], E/C.]2/200l/]5, par. 8. 
822 A. R. Chapman, "A Human Rights Perspective on Intellectual Property, Scientific Progress, and 
Access to the Benefits of Science" in WIPO, Intellectual Property and Human Rights Geneva, ] 999, 
WIPO Publication No. 762 (E). 
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ovarian cancer. 823 Myriad was granted broad patents in many affluent countries, not 
just on the two genes, but also on their mutations; the diagnostic tests developed for 
screening for their existence; the therapeutic methods developed with information 
derived from them; and aIl other unforeseen applications of those two genes. 824 
Myriad developed a genetic test to detect the presence of genes. Instead of 
negotiating license agreements with potential partners and allowing them to use 
BRCA 1 and 2 in different settings, Myriad adopted a very restrictive licensing 
practice and refused to grant licenses for the use of those genes. It decided that, in 
countries where it had patent rights, it would be the only one to screen for the two 
genes and to conduct any related tests and analysis. Myriad therefore required that 
almost aIl samples be sent to its own facilities in Utah for analysis. 825 
Myriad's strategy created a difficult environment for breast and ovarian cancer 
research progress, and this probably explains why numerous challenges to Myriad's 
patents have been filed and so far almost aIl won in front of the European Patent 
Office since 2001.826 Since patents cannot be enforced during legal proceedings in 
823 Hereditary breast and ovarian cancer represent 5-10% of all breast and ovarian cancer cases. 
824 These patents have been successfully challenged by the Curie Institute and other stakeholders in 
Europe. One reason for contestation is that even if Myriad has done the final sequencing, most of the 
information on the BRCA 1 had been previously gathered by the efforts of an international public 
consortium, including numerous families with hereditary breast cancer. There is also a controversy 
over whether it was Myriad or the International Research Consortium who actually discovered the 
BRCA2 mutation. For more information, refer to: The Canadian Cancer Society, The patenting of 
BRCA 1 and BRCA2 genes facts sheet, Canada, 2002, online on the CCS website, 
<http://www.cancer.calccs/internet/standard/0.3182.31723128299532777862IangId-en.00.html> 
(accessed May 1 8th, 2006). 
825 ln November 2004, the University of Utah Research Foundation (UURF) acquired Myriad's full 
share in BRCA 1 and BRCA2 patents. Myriad is th us no longer the patent owner, but there is no 
substantial difference as it continues to hold exclusive licenses on the said patents. 
826 The challenge before the European Patent Office (EPO) to the validity of the Myriad patents on 
BRCA 1 and 2 was initiated in 2001 by the Institut Curie, the Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris, 
the Institut Gustave-Roussy and other European opponents. The challenge is based on Myriad's lack of 
inventive steps, abusive use of patent rights, and hindrance to equitable access to genetic testing. In 
May 2004, in a very important decision, the EPO revoked Myriad's European patent EP 699 754 
relating to a "method for the diagnosis of a predisposition to breast or ovarian cancer." In January 
2005, the EPO rejected the main elements of Myriad's European patent claims on BRCAI (on the gene 
and its application and on the mutations associated with breast and ovarian cancer). These decisions 
have been appealed by the UURF and the judicial developments will prove interesting. For more 
details on those opposition procedures, please refer to these very informative websites: 
<www.curie.fr> and 
<http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/myriadpatents31 0 1 05.pdt>; See also Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: a Discussion Paper, supra note 473 at par 4.6. 
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front of the EPO, the UURF and Myriad are not in a position to prevent research in 
the field of breast and ovarian cancer with BRCA 1 in Europe until a decision is made 
on the challenges and appeals. 827 They can however enforce their amended and 
limited patent on BRCA2 which was confirmed by an opposition division of the EPO 
in June 2005.828 
As well as having a negative impact on research, Myriad's restrictive practices also 
constrained availability of genetic tests to patients around the world. In fact, since 
Myriad wanted to be the only company to use and perform analysis of the patented 
genes and tests, their strategy pushed many laboratories to stop offering the genetic 
screening tests they had developed for hereditary breast cancer. Numerous patients 
have been left without options in terms of availability of breast cancer screening 
services within their geographical region, and in terms of affordability of the only 
option henceforth legally available. 
Indeed, Myriad' s patents and attitude also directly impacted on the co st of screening 
for hereditary breast cancer. Myriad and UURF's monopoly on testing and analysis 
for mutations has affected the the price of the only diagnostic test available in Canada 
and the US.829 In fact, the Myriad test is now priced at $3800, at least three times as 
827 In other words, until a final and binding decision has been reached (which can take, on average, 3.2 
years for a challenge and 2.8 years for an appeal before the EPO) the UURF's patents will remain 
unenforceable. However, if their patents are upheld, the UURF will be entitled to c1aim damages for 
the use of their exclusive rights undertaken during the opposition procedures. D. Harhoff, Legal 
Challenges to Patent Va/idity in the US and Europe, OECD Conference on IPR, innovation and 
economic performance, Munich, 2003, online on the OECD website, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/3 1/1 1728549.pdt> (accessed May 18th, 2006), slide 6. 
828 Indeed, the Opposition division of the EPO decided to maintain Myriad's BRCA2 patent in its 
amended form June 29th, 2005. This patent c1aim now only relates to one single sequence of the gene 
and is used in the diagnosis of specifie predispositions to breast cancer in Ashkenazi Jewish women. 
This decision considerably limits the scope of UURF's patent and many believe that it will likely not 
affect R&D activities in European laboratories. However, others are afraid that it could be 
discriminatory for the Ashkenazi Jewish population who could end up paying more for genetic testing. 
Again, the judiciary development in this affair will prove very interesting. For more on this last 
decision see: Human Genetic Commission, The Study of Patenting and DNA, online on the HGC 
website, <http://www.hgc.gov.uk/c1ient/Content wide.asp?ContentId=365> (accessed May 6, 2006); 
see also: http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/brca2-myriad-6-juil-05.pdf. 
829 Recall that the situation is different in Europe, where sorne of Myriad's patents have been recently 
invalidated and others are being challenged in from of the EPO. During the challenge and appeal 
procedures, Myriad and UURF cannot enforce their patents. 
257 
much as equivalent, unpatented tests developed by other groups of scientists.830 
This can have direct consequences for many patients, as it appears that 5-10% of aIl 
breast and ovarian cancer have the heritable component that has been associated 
with BRCAI and BRCA2 genes. 831 This means that UURF and Myriad's strict patent 
enforcement, coupled with the monopoly prices charged for the test, prevent many 
north American high-risk women with a clear familial history of breast and ovarian 
cancer from accessing existing diagnostic tools that could save their lives by giving 
them information needed to be in a position to make crucial preventive decisions to 
stay healthy. This is especially true for women who cannot bene fit from a universal 
health care system and who cannot afford health insurance coverage. 
One should note however that sorne stakeholders decided to resist Myriad and 
UURF's threat. In Canada, the British Columbia Cancer Agency, which had been 
testing for BRCA mutations for at least 5 years, stopped offering this service to their 
patients after receiving a cease-and-desist order letter from Myriad in 2001. They 
later resumed offering testing services by sending their patients' samples to Ontario, 
one of the provinces that decided to continue performing diagnostic testing with their 
own test, despite Myriad's patent.832 Ontario is thereby defying UURF and Myriad's 
overly-broad patent rights, something that could possibly lead to a legal battle over 
patent infringement. However, since the Ontario and federal governments have not so 
far been sued by Myriad and UURF, since they did not seek a dec1aration of 
invalidity of Myriad's patents before the federal court (s. 60, Patent Act), and did not 
apply for a compulsory license to the Patent Commissioner (s. 19, Patent Act), they 
have not yet had to defend their position before the courts. We can imagine, however, 
that the strategy these govemments would employ in a potential patent-infringement 
830 H. Kent, "BC Sidesteps Patent Claim, Transfers BRCA Gene Testing to Ontario" (January 21, 2003) 
168:2 CM4J211; L Eggesrston, "Ontario Defies US Firm's Genetic Patent, Continues Cancer 
Screening" (February 19,2002) 166:4 CMAJ 494. 
831 W. Burke et al., "Recommendations for Follow-up Care ofIndividuals with an Inherited 
Predisposition to Cancer" (1997) 277:12 Journal of the American Medical Association 997. 
832 L.Sheremeta & E.R. Gold, Creating a Patent Clearinghouse in Canada: A Solution to Problems of 
Equity and Access? poster presentation, GE3LS Winter Symposium 2003, February 6-8, 2003, 
Montreal, Quebec. 
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action would be to challenge the validity of Myriad's broad patent and enforcement 
strategy on technical grounds, as has recently been done in Europe.833 
Apart from the very few mechanisms available within the patent system to further 
health needs, legal action to enforce the human right to health is very limited in 
Canada. 834 As stated by Yazdanian when speaking about the right to health 
entrenched in the South African Bill of rights, "[i]t seems astonishing that these 
clauses have no constitutional equivalent in Canada, where access to health care is 
considered a birthright and a keystone of the national identity.,,835 
Despite this legislative lacuna, there are sorne indirect possibilities to enforce the 
right to health and health care in Canada. Indeed, since the Supreme Court of Canada 
decided, in 1999, that international law obligations should be recognised in the 
domestic statutory setting,836 it could be argued that in signing and ratifying the 
ICESCR and the UNDHR, Canada (and the provinces) have committed to providing 
adequate and affordable health care to aIl citizens. On the legislative front, the federal 
govemment should ratify specific legislation for the protection of access to health.837 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Chaoulli briefly discussed in chapter IV 
indirectly provides this broad interpretation of the right to health, but in terms of 
rapidity and efficiency of services. However, it slightly opens the door to different 
levels of access based on individuals' ability to pay and to qualify for private 
insurance.838 It will be interesting to follow the practical impact that this decision will 
have on Canadians' right to health both in the short and the longer term. 
833 In Canada, s. 59 of the Canadian Patent Act states that a patent's validity can be challenged as a 
defence to patent infringement actions. For more details on the European case, refer to note 826. 
834 The situation is very different in countries where elaborate constitutional mechanisms have been put 
into place, as we will discuss in the next section. 
835 S. Yazdanian, "Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) v South Africa (Minister of Health):Reflections 
on the Right to Health Care in Canada" (August 2004) 9:2 Canadian HIV/AIDS Policy and Law 
Review 
836 Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 SCR 817 
837 Even though health matters are provincial jurisdiction, Schneider v. The Queen [1982] SCR 112 
opened the door to federallegislative intervention to deal with national health matters. 
838 Chaoul/i v. Québec (Attorney General), supra note 728. 
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In comparison to the IP law system, the human rights system's legal mechanisms 
appear somewhat less direct, reliable, and efficient. However, what is happening now 
in Canada with Myriad's tolerance towards Ontario's strategy is symptomatic of the 
power that human rights values and considerations can have outside the legal 
framework. Equitable access to health and disease prevention are crucial social 
values.839 In the current case, we could interpret Myriad's decision not to act on its 
threats of legal action as being driven by strong public pressure and fear of further 
damage to its corporate image by open insensitivity to equity considerations. 
Haemochromatosis 
Our second example relates to the haemochromatosis gene patent. Hereditary 
haemochromatosis is a genetic disease associated with two important genetic 
mutations of the haemochromatose gene or HFE (C282Y and H63D), and it can he 
easily treated when correctly diagnosed. In 200 1, researchers conducted a survey 
and discovered that many US laboratories had already developed tests to screen 
for hereditary haemochromatosis and were administering them to their patients 
weIl before patents on the HFE gene and associated genetic test were awarded to 
Mercator Inc. in 1998.840 Mercator Inc. decided to manage its patent rights by 
granting an exclusive license to Smith Kline Beecham Clinical Laboratories (Smith 
Kline) for diagnostic testing. Although Smith Kline proposed sub-licenses to 
numerous laboratories and offered them the use of the patented tests in ex change for 
high royalty fees, more than a third of the labs surveyed refused the offer and stopped 
offering their own tests, fearing patent infringement suits. This resulted in major cost 
increases for patients in need. 
AIso, in addition to obvious effects on affordability of the newly-patented diagnostic 
test, these broad patents have had a clear negative impact on the availability of 
839 The Romanow report states that health is a right of citizenship and that access to health services 
should depend only on need, not on wealth, gender, or age, for example. R. Romanow, Building on 
Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada, Ottawa: Commission on the Future of Health Care in 
Canada, November 2002, at 48. 
840 J.F. Merz et al., "Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test", supra note 436, at 577-578; DJ. Willison & 
S.M. Macleod, supra note 6. 
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genetic testing for haemochromatosis in general. Since many laboratories stopped 
producing and performing any diagnostic tests after the patents and exclusive licenses 
were granted, sorne patients ended up with very few options. Health care institutions 
and professionals affiliated with these labs became unable to offer the same test to 
their patients and had to direct them to other labs offering another, more expensive 
test. In other words, even if patent holders made sure that a diagnostic test for 
hereditary haemochromatosis remained available in theory, crucial health information 
became out of reach and unavailable to many patients, especially the poor and the 
uninsured, because of the broad patent awarded. Patents on the HFE gene were also 
awarded in Europe in 2005. 841 Until recently, European laboratories were still 
performing diagnostic genetic testing with the unpatented tests they had developed 
for haemochromatosis screening.842 It will be interesting to follow the consequences 
the recent patents will have on tests' availability for European patients. 
Canavan Disease 
A third example of the impact of gene patents on accessibility is the genetic test 
developed for screening for Canavan disease. Canavan is an inherited, fatal, 
neurodegenerative disease that predominantly affects Ashkenazi Jewish people. 
The patent awarded in this case caused one in four US laboratories to cease their 
screening tests for the disease. As a result of this patent, many laboratories that were 
already performing sorne testing activities decided to end their practice because of the 
very strict royalty and licensing conditions that the patent holder was trying to 
841 Methods and Compositions for Diagnosis and Treatment of Iron Misregulation Diseases, 
US6849399 BI (published on February Irst 2005) and US2005090430 Al (published on April 28, 
2005), online on the EPO website, 
<http://v3.espacenet.com/family?DB=EPODOC&IDX=US2005090430&F=8&OREO=0&textdoc=TR 
UE> (accessed May 19th, 2006). 
842 For example, a genetic test for the two mutations has been developed in the Laboratory of 
Hematology of the Hôpital St-Eloi in Montpellier and was still being used in practices in March 2005, 
email exchanges with Dr. Patricia Martinez from Hopital St-Éloi, March 2005; see also P.A Martinez 
et al. "Simple and Rapid Detection of the Newly Described Mutations in the HLA-H Gene" (1997) 89 
Blood 1835. 
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impose. 843 A vailability of screening servIces decreased significantly while costs 
increased, leaving fewer options for patients. The Canavan gene patent thus impacted 
the populations around the world in terms of availability of testing and screening 
products for the patients who needed them. This is especially relevant since the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists recommended, in 1998, 
that ail Ashkenazi parents be tested for this severe progressive genetic 
disorder. 844 
As with the haemochromatosis gene patent, before the Canavan patent was granted 
to the Miami Children's Hospital (MCH), the Canavan Foundation was offering free 
genetic testing to its patients. Again, the MCH tried to impose very restrictive 
conditions and high royalty fees on labs wishing to offer the test. This time, however, 
families of children who had initiated and participated in the research that led to the 
discovery of the gene, along with the labs that had assisted in collecting tissue 
samples for research, reacted by filing a lawsuit to challenge MCH's way of 
exercising its patent rights. 845 Human rights and ethical issues regarding 
compensatory benefit sharing, justice, and equity were brought before the Court with 
a specific emphasis on the active participation of patients and their families III 
research and development activities. Parties reached a confidential settlement III 
September 2003, allowing a research exception for scientists and institutions 
interested in research endeavours aimed at finding a cure for Canavan disease. 
However, although no information on the cost oftesting services is available, MCH is 
entitled to continue licensing its exclusive rights and to collect royalty fees for 
diagnostic testing. Again, as this test has been recommended for aIl Ashkenazi parents, 
limiting its provision to individuals who are able to pay for it will have criticaI 
843 L.S Cahill, "Genetics, Commodification, and Social Justice in the G1obalisation Era" (2001) Il:3 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 221; V. Brower, "Canavan Families SIam Scientists over Test 
Patent Profits" (December 4, 2000) Biotechnology Newswtach 1. 
844 American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Screening for Canavan Disease, faet 
sheet number 2 J 2, November 1998, online on the National Tay-Sach and Allied Diseases 
website, <http://www.tay-sachs.org/medical.php> (accessed May 191\ 2006). 
845 Greenberg v. Miami Chi/dren 's Hospital Research Institute Ine 208 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. III. 
2002).121. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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health consequences for an untold number of individuals and will amplify the already 
huge health gap between the rich and the pOOf. 
These three examples raise important issues about the real impact that patents and 
license agreements on the one hand, and human rights considerations on the other, 
can have on the actual accessibility of genetic tests and services offered by different 
labs, and consequently on the standard and quality of medical care available to 
patients. We have seen that, in sorne cases, disease gene patents and licensing policies 
have been used to limit the activities of clinical laboratories and patients' access to 
diagnostic products, and that human rights have often been of limited help in 
redressing the situation.846 However, it is important to mention that since aIl three 
examples took place in the context of clinical genetics and relate more specifically to 
diagnostic tests, the result of our analysis on access to genetics products and 
services is limited to these areas and spheres of activity. 
The issues highlighted in these examples find application in both developed and 
developing countries where non-communicable diseases affect populations in similar 
ways.847 Even though patents on these genes may not yet have been filed in most 
developing nations, these nations cannot use this knowledge anyway, since they do 
not have the infrastructure capacity to advance research further, or even to make use 
of existing genetic technologies. 
5.1.3. Accessibility to genetics and countries' internai situation 
As previously discussed, access to genetic products can be influenced by applying 
legal mechanisms, including patents (such as scope, licensing strategies, and the 
846 A. Schissel, J.F. Merz and M.K. Cho, "Survey confirms fears about licensing of genetic tests" 
(1999) 402 Nature 118; J.F. Merz et al., "Disease gene patenting is a bad innovation" (1997) 2 
Molecular Diagnosis 299; DJ. Willison and S.M. Macleod, supra note 6. 
847 Non-communicable diseases have been identified as the leading cause of death in the developing 
world and are projected to become more and more prevalent in the future: Program in Applied Ethics 
and Biotechnology and Canadian Program on Genomics and Global Health (University of Toronto 
Joint Center for Bioethics), Top 10 Biotechnologies for lmproving Health in Developing Countries, 
Toronto, 2003, at 59-60; World Health Organization, Fifty Factsfrom the World Health Report 1998, 
Global health situation and trends 1955-2025, Geneva" 1998. 
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patentee's strategy), and by hum an rights values. However, many other non-legal, 
country-specific elements (such as physical infrastructure, education levels, and the 
political situation) can also pose significant hurdles to accessibility in developing 
countries. Because the focus of this dissertation lies in assessing normative systems 
with the theoretical concerns of global distributive justice, developing countries' 
internaI political and economic considerations, although very relevant, are beyond the 
scope of our main analytical focus. However, because these factors are critical to 
finding a comprehensive solution to global health issues, it appears relevant to discuss 
them briefly and give a few examples of the role they could play in a multifaceted 
solution. 
One important factor unrelated to patent that influences genetic research and innovation 
in developing countries is their critical lack of research facilities, infrastructure, and 
expertise.848 This indicates very low production of research tools and technologies by 
and for developing countries. 849 It is nearly impossible for most of them to use, 
distribute, and administer existing research instruments and technology, never mind 
genetic products and services that can be licensed or purchased from developed-
world patent holders. 85o Indeed, when they exist, most facilities are very poorly 
equipped and understaffed because of problems related to the brain drain and 
accessibility to education (basic and higher) in many developing countries. 85I ln 
addition to the lack of equipment and trained personnel, basic physical infrastructure 
like roads, power supplies, and communications are often deficient. 852 For example, 
848 L. Bernier, K. Durell & E. R. Gold, The Impact of DNA Patents on Access to Genetic Technologies 
and Services: View from Developing Countries, World Health Organization, Geneva, January 2004, at 
31 et ss. 
849 S. P. Marks, "Tying Prometheus Down: The International Law of Human Genetic Manipulation" 
(2002) 3 Chi. J. Int '1 L. 115. 
850 J.M. Spectar, "Patent Necessity: Intellectual Property Dilemmas in the Biotech Dominant 
Treatment Equity for Developing Countries" (2001) 24 Hous. J. Int'l L 227. 
851 R.N, Nwabueze, "Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the Politics of Plants' Genetic Resources" 
(2003) 11 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 585; T. Kowalski, "International Patent Rights and 
Biotechnology: Should the United States promote Technology Transfer of Developing Countries?" 
(2002) 25 Loy.L.A. Int'l. & Comp. Law Rev. 41; O. Ogbu, "African Science and Technology Day: Has 
Africa Surrendered in the Field of Science and Technology?" (2002) Science and Development in 
Africa 
852 For a more complete list of sorne of the most important infrastructures in a country' s development, 
refer to: K Davies, "Regulatory Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure and Public 
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if the basic resources required to offer genetic services and deliver them are 
insufficient in a given country or region, it can become very difficult (even 
impossible) to offer this service to the local population, even if it is available. 
One of the basic resources necessary to implement genetic servIces is electrical 
power, as illustrated by the following example. In the late 1980s, the World Health 
Organisation suggested that community-based studies be launched to remediate the 
pressing problem of sickie-cell disorder in Africa. One project, involving the use of 
genetic technologies for prenatal screening for sickle-ceIl, was undertaken in Lagos, 
Nigeria. Experienced English medical staff came to Lagos to train African c1inicians, 
but was faced with frequent daily power interruptions. Major waste resulted, as aIl 
ongoing tests had to be discarded each time the power failed, and the medical staff 
was forced to constantly repeat the test with fresh samples. The problem finally 
forced women who wished to be tested to travel to Europe instead. 853 
Similarly, if no one has been trained to administer and analyse existing genetic 
test results or offer appropriate genetic counselling in a given territory, their 
availability to the population can be greatly compromised.854 Moreover, political 
instability and corruption can seriously hinder the establishment of efficient policies 
and actions for socio-economic and scientific development. As Nwabueze c1early 
explains, "[ c ]itizens of sorne developing countries are still caught in the throes of 
their despotic leaders, who are more concerned with expanding the frontiers of their 
private economic kingdom than addressing the developmental needs of their 
countries.,,855 Corruption not only paralyses progress and growth, but also contributes 
to the withdrawal of important international aid and investment, to the extreme 
Utilities and Recent Trends: the OECD Experience", OECD India Investment Roundtable, New Delhi, 
October 19,2004, online on the OECD website: <http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/53120/33803491.pdt> 
(accessed June 1'\ 2006) at 12. 
853 For more details on this research project, refer to 0.0 Akinyanju et al. "Initiation of Prenatal 
Diagnosis of Sickie-cell Disorders" (1999) 19 Prenat. Diagn. 299; T.A. Adewoled et al. "Application 
of Polymerase Chain Reaction to the Prenatal Diagnosis of Sickle Cell Anaemia in Nigeria" (1999) 
18:3 WAJM 160. 
854 L. Heredero, "Comprehensive National Genetic Program in a Developing Country - Cuba" (1992) 
28:3 Birth Defects Original Article Series 52. 
855 R.N. Nwabueze, supra note 851, at 594. 
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disadvantage of hostage populations.856 AH of these factors contribute to harming the 
scientific and industrial capacity development required to further innovations and 
absorb what has been developed in other countries. 
Although such factors are not al ways completely independent from the IP system,857 
they are often related to domestic political and financial instability, issues to be 
addressed both internally and with external financial and educational input; in sorne 
cases in combination with, and, in others, independently of, the normative IP system.858 
In this section, we have seen that the expansion of international intellectuai property 
rights over genetic material, the application of human rights principles and values to 
redress abuses, and the presence of other socio-economic and political factors can aIl 
have consequences for accessibility in developing countries. 859 We referred to 
examples from the developed world to illustrate the potential impact that gene patents, 
and particularly disease-gene patent management, have had in developed nations. Since 
most of developing nations must rely on research progress made in affluent countries, 
856 This is an issue in many Indian and African countries. For example, Kenya possesses plenty of 
natural resources and has great economic potential, but corruption has prevailed in the country for 
years, presenting major stumbling blocks to the country's economic development. Moreover, Kenya 
has endured much political instability over the last decade or so, with the end of the single party state 
in 1992; the subsequent transition phase; and the election, in 2002, of a new government that had 
promised to fight corruption in every way possible, but who lamentably failed in the task. It does seem 
that there is still much corruption among high-Ievel officiaIs and members of the Kenyan elite. Ali of 
this resulted, at various occasions, in international outcry and withdrawal of financial assistance. For a 
deeper analysis of the political situation in Kenya and on the topic of corruption more generally, refer 
to: A. Sen. Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999) at 270 et ss.; R. Lewis-
Lettington & P. Munyi, Willingness and Ability to Use TRIPS Flexibilities: A Kenya Case Study, 
Department for International Development System Resources Centre, September 2004, at 8; African 
Studies Center - University Of Pennsylvania, "Kenya: Corruption Fight Stalling" (February 5th 2005) 
AfricaFocus Bulletin, online on the U of Penn website: 
<http://www.africa.upenn.edu/afrfocus/afrfocus021105.html> (accessed May 18th, 2006). 
857 For example, as previously discussed, intellectual property rights may influence countries' access to 
crucial research tools for building scientific and technological capacity. On this point: C. Juma and K. 
Fang, "Bridging the Genetic Divide" in M. Ruse & D. Castle, eds., Genetically Modified Foods: 
Debating Biatechnalogy (Amherst: Prometheus Press, 2002). 
858 See discussion on the debate regarding the relationship between strong intellectual property rights, 
and foreign direct investment, foreign and local research into developing countries' diseases, and 
technology transfer. Chapter III, supra note 438. 
859 P. Drahos & R. Mayne, eds., Global intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and 
Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) Introduction, at. 1; J. H. Reichman, From Free 
Traders ta Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRiPS Agreement (1997) 29 N. Y. u.J. int'l 
L. & Pol. 11, at. 24 
266 
they are equally vulnerable to the potential detrimental effects of abusive uses of 
patents. We have seen that when gene patents play a role in access, much depends on 
the patentees' strategy, attitude, and agenda, and on opposition from civil society 
agents, governments, and patient groups. Depending on how they enforce their rights, 
patentees can improve or hinder actual accessibility of genetic research tools, products, 
and testing services. As our few examples show, however, the strong private economic 
agenda often associated with gene patents tends to compromise access in the field of 
genetic diagnostic testing rather than facilitate it through permissive diffusion 
strategies. This tendency can be balanced by human rights but, as demonstrated, despite 
existing remedial mechanisms, the practical legal applications of the human rights 
system have been limited.86o 
Because the science of genetics is fairly new, complex, and expensive to develop, we 
did not find genetics-specific examples from the developing world. Though what we 
have discussed in this section applies to developing countries, it is also important to 
consider examples from the developing world. This second part of our analysis 
therefore focusses on issues emerging from the pharmaceutical sector and relating to 
developing world's access to essential drugs. 
5.2 Challenges in Availability and Affordability of Essential Drugs 
Much of the existing literature assumes a correlation between the experience of the 
genetic and pharmaceutical sectors but those two industries are different. Indeed, the 
later relies a lot more on the exclusionary nature of patent rights and on strict 
enforcement of legal monopolies than the former. 861 However, even if those two 
sectors of activity are distinct, they share sorne similarities, especially with regards to 
860 S. Leckie. "Violations of Economie, Social and Cultural Rights" in T.C. van Boven, C. Flinterman 
& l. Westendorp, eds., The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights - SIM Special No. 20. Utrecht, 1998; UNAIDS, Putting Third First: Vaccines, Access to 
Treatment & the Law, Barcelona, July 2002, online on the aidslaw website: 
<http://www.aidslaw.calbarcelona2002/treatmentpapers.doc> (accessed May 31 st, 2006). 
861 L. Bernier, K. DureIl & E. R. Gold, supra note 848, at 3-5. 
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Issues of equitable access to health by vulnerable populations, as this section 
demonstrates.862 
In this section, we will address how both human rights and IP rights have influenced 
access to essential drugs in the developing world. We will start with a presentation of 
how those two systems have been working and influencing each other in this context, 
and then focus on a specific example significant for global health: the accessibility of 
HIV / AIDS drugs in the developing world. 
5.2.1. IP rights, the human right to heaIth and access to essential 
drugs 
As mentioned above, over the last few years in many developing nations the legal 
aspect of the human right to health has evolved considerably.863 The inclusion of 
socio-economic rights like the right to health in many developing countries' 
constitutions was not an empty gesture. It highlighted the legal obligation to satisfy 
the most fundamental needs of the most vulnerable by placing real responsibilities on 
the executive and the judicial powers, "breaking down sorne of the philosophical and 
practical barriers that have been raised against the justiciability or enforceability of 
these rights.,,864 
In Latin America, various constitutional norms were established to protect the right to 
health865 and the human rights movement grew considerably with the introduction of 
862 J.H. Barton & E.J. Emmanuel, "The Patents-Based Pharmaceutical Development Process: 
Rationale, Problems and the Potential Reforms" (2005) 294:16 The Journal of the American Medical 
Association 2075; A.C. Nunnally et al., "Genetic Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Industries" (2005) 8:4 Community Genet/à 209. 
863 L. Freeman, "Reflection on Emerging Frameworks of Health and Human Rights" in J.M. Mann et 
al., eds., Health and Human Rights: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 1999) 227. 
864 J. Oloka-Onyango, "Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in an Age of G1obalisation: International 
Mechanisms, Non-State Actors and the Struggle for Peoples' Rights in Africa" (2003) 18 Am. U. Int'l 
L. Rev. 851, at 855; see also N. Haysom, "Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and Socio-
Economie Rights" (1992) 8 SAJHR 451. 
865 Argentina, Law 23.798 of 1990, which makes AIDS a matter of national interest in establishing 
mechanisms for HIV prevention, diagnosis, and treatment; Uruguay Presidential Decree of 1997 for 
the provision of HIV / AIDS drugs to people in need; Constitution of the Bo/ivarian Republic of 
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amparo suits (a category of constitutionallegal constitutional action for the protection 
of collective human rights which has prevalence over other legal procedures and has 
to be decided with urgency) 866 brought against various governments to impose 
compliance with health-related obligations. For example, as a result of an amparo 
brought on behalf of 3.5 million Argentinians, the court decided that the government 
had an obligation to manufacture and distribute a vaccine against a serious and often 
fatal form of fever in that country. 867 ln South Africa, in 1996, a new constitution 
mandated the Human Rights Commission to "promote, monitor and assess the 
observance of human rights in South Africa.,,868 The constitution provides extensive 
legal protection for socio-economic rights and for health in particular. 869 Indeed, 
section 27(1) states that "everyone has the right of access to a) health care services 
including reproductive healthcare" and 27(2) provides that states should take 
adequate measures to ensure the progressive realisation of the right to health with its 
available resources. These legislative dispositions have led to important decisions of 
the South African High and Constitutional Courts conceming the right to health. One 
was the case Soobramoney v. Minister of Health,870 which involved a 41 year-old 
patient suffering from chronic renal failure and serious heart conditions, who claimed 
Venezuela, Dec. 1999, replacing the 1961 Constitution which considers health a social right and a 
constituent part of the right to Iife. For more on the se legal instruments, see: M.A. Torres, "The Human 
Right to Health, National Courts, and Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment: A Case Study from Venezuela" 
(2002) 3: 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 105. 
866 E. Gonzalez Mac Dowell, "J uridical Action for the Protection of Collective Rights and its Legal 
Impact: A Case Study" (Winter 2002) 30:4 The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 644. 
867 Causa No. 31, Viceconte, Mariela Cecilia c/Estado NacionalMinisterio de Salud y Acciôn Social, 
s/Amparo Ley 16.986. Câmara Nacional en 10 Contencioso-Administrativo Federal, Sala IX Jun. 2, 
1998 quoted in A.E. Yamin, supra note 688. Despite the judgement, however, a motion for 
compliance was filed a year later to force the govemment to comply with the ruling, since it had not 
done so. 
868 J. Klaaren, "A Second Look at the South African Human Rights Commission, Access to 
Information, and the Promotion of Socioeconomic Rights" (May 2005) 27:2 Human Rights Quarterly 
539; see also s. 184 (1) & (2) of the South African Constitution and S. Liebenberg, "Violations of 
Socio-Economic Rights: The Role of the South African Human Rights Commission" in P. Andrews & 
S. Ellmann, eds., The Post-Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa's Basic Law 
(Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001) 405. 
869 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (adopted May 8, 1996, amended October Il, 1996), 
online: <http://www.polity.org.zalgovdocs/constitutionlsaconst.html> (accessed May 18th, 2006).; C. 
Ngwena, "Access to Health Care a Fundamental Right: The Scope and Limits of Section 27 of the 
Constitution" (2000) 25 Journal for Juridical Sciences 1; J. Sarkin, "Health and Human Rights in Post-
A~artheid South Africa" (1999) 89 South African Medical Journal 1259 . 
87 Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1997 12 BCLR 1696 
(CC) 
269 
right to long-term dialysis. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appellant's claim 
on the basis that political and medical authorities were the most competent to make 
budgetary decisions with their limited resources. Many other amparo suits and claims 
were introduced in various Latin American states and South Africa for the specific 
recognition of a collective interest in broad access to antiretroviral medicines as part 
of the right to health, as we will discuss at greater length below. 
Before doing so, however, we need to say a few words about the practical effect of 
such court decisions. Judicial recognition of specific human rights unfortunately does 
not ensure compliance with those rights. Tuming legal dispositions and decisions into 
efficient tools that meaningfully address and change the reality of the dispossessed 
can be complex and very demanding. In reality, the realisation of health rights has 
been limited by various factors, including enforcement of other legal rights 
(mainly IP rights) and lack of available resources. 871 
5.2.1.1. IP rights on drugs as an obstacle to the realisation 
of the human right to heaIth 
One of the main elements that can negatively impact access to pharmaceuticals for 
the realisation of the right to health is the strong enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. 872 Pharmaceutical companies that file drug patent claims in 
developing countries are able to prevent other providers from producing and 
supplying them at a lower priee. Drug priees can represent as much as 60% of 
871 L. London, supra note 2: J. Oloka-Onyango, supra note 864; S. C. Agakwa, "Reclaiming 
Humanity: Economie, Social, and Cultural Rights as the Comerstone of African Human Rights" 
(2002)5 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 177. 
872 It is important to specify that most essential medicines on the WHO Iist are not patented. 
However, sorne drugs that are very important to addressing developing countries' health needs have 
been patented in recent years. Our discussion will focus on the recently-patented drugs marketed to 
treat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. C. Dommen, "Raising Human Rights Concems in the 
World Trade Organisation: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies" (2002) 24 Human Rights 
Quarterly 1; R. Loewenson, "Essential Drugs in Southem Africa Need Protection from Public Health 
Safeguards under TRIPs" (Sept. 2000) 4:7 Bridges Between Trade & Sustainable Dev. 3 
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developing countries' health budgets;873 brand-name patented drugs normally cost 
more than generics and are often more expensive in developing countries,874 
rendering them almost always out of reach to uninsured populations.875 
In filing dmg patents in developing countries, patent holders want to ensure that people 
from these countries will not be in a position to buy their products more cheaply from 
other sources and to sell those same products back to agents from the developed world at 
more advantageous conditions. In addition to preventing developing countries from 
accessing affordable existing medicine for fighting the worst health crisis of the 
century, patent rights granted and enforced in developing nations can also hinder 
production of and access to cheaper generic options.876 In other words, many believe 
that patents are one of many factors that exp Iain why key patented medicines, often 
related to serious diseases of high mortality, remain out of reach from more than 40 
million people worldwide.877 
For patent holders in the pharmaceutical sector, there is a logical justification for such a 
protectionist attitude towards IP rights. As we discussed in the IP chapter, the main 
argument to justify enforcing strong patents is to argue that, since developing a 
patentable product often involves huge up-front investments in terms of time and 
873 D.B. Resnik, "Fair Drug Priees and Patent System" (2004) 12:2 Health Care Analysis 91; B-C. 
Dolmo, "Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection 
Rights: The South African Example" (2001) 7 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.13 7, at 151. 
874 D. G. McNeil Jr, "Priees for Medicine are Exorbitant in Africa, Study Says" (June 1 i h, 2000) New 
York Times 
875 A. R. Chapman, supra note II. To support her point, Chapman refers to the example of 
tuberculosis, which affects a majority of poor people who cannot afford available treatment priced at 
US$15 000 per year. 
876 L. Nelsen, "The Role of University Technology Transfer Operations in Assuring Access to 
Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries" (January 2003) III:2 Yale Journal of Health Policy 
Law and Ethics 301; G. Dutfield, intellectual Property Rights and the Life Science industries: A 
Twentieth Century History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 
877 J. Borrell & 1. Watal, impact of Patents on Access to HiV/AIDS Drugs in Developing Countries, 
Harvard University Center for International Development Working Paper, Cambridge, May 2002, 
online on the CID website: <http://www2.cid.harvard.edulcidwp/092.pdt> (accessed May ISth, 2006); 
Consumer Project on Technology, Essential Action, Oxfam, Treatment Access Campaign, and HeaIth 
Gap, Comment on the Attaran/GillespieWhite and PhRMA Surveys of Patents on Antiretroviral Drugs 
in Africa, October 16th, 2001; C. Liu & S. Basu, "Patents and Access: Another Look" (May II 2004) 
23:3 Health Affairs, electronic letter published on the Health Affairs Journal website: 
<http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/eletters/23/31155#112> (accessed May ISth, 2006). 
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capital, a company needs to recoup sorne part of this investment to be able to 
reinvest it in further innovative R&D endeavours. As mentioned at various 
occasions in the course of this dissertation, there is an ongoing debate on the 
validity of this argument, given the lack of empirical evidence to support the view 
that patents encourage or dis courage innovation.878 More specifically, it appears 
relevant to say a few words on the application of this argument to the 
pharmaceutical sector, where it needs to be nuanced on many fronts. 
As the pharmaceutical industry is known to be extremely profitable and since a very 
large proportion of its profits end up reinvested in various marketing endeavours in 
comparison to what is invested in R&D,879 it is arguable that it would be possible 
for large pharmaceutical companies to reduce the price of their medicines without 
having to touch the budget allocated to further R&D.880 Another industry trend is to 
dedicate a large portion of R&D (up to 80%) to develop "me too" drugs, which are 
very similar to existing therapies. The innovative and therapeutic value of these 
initiatives being questionable, it is hard to defend strong patent rights for their 
incentive role in creating needed innovation. 881 Moreover, pharmaceutical 
companies' R&D frequently builds on fundamental public research and is often 
partly financed through generous governmental tax deductions. With these facts in 
mind, we can at least ask about the justification, the legitimacy and the existing 
strength of patent rights systematically held by pharmaceutical companies.882 
878 See discussion on this point in chapter III. 
879 For example, Merck invested 7 346,3 million in marketing vs 4 010,2 million in R&D in 2004. For 
more figures on this company, see: Merck 2004 Annual Report, Financial Section, available online on 
Merck' website: <http://www.merck.com/finance/annualreportlar2004/pdf/Merck 2004 AR.pdt> 
(accessed June 4th, 2006) at 24. 
880 M. Ange)], "The Pharmaceutical Industry: To whom is it Accountable?" (2000) 342:25 New Eng. 1. 
Med. 1902. 
881 Although marketing initiatives can prove very use fui and efficient to generate more capital for 
further investment, the major issue here is the large proportion of profits allocated to such 
endeavours in comparison to other activities. J. Robinson, Prescription Games: Money, Ego, and 
Power Inside the Global Pharmaceutical Industry (London: Simon & Schuster, 2001); M. Angell, La 
vérité sur les Compagnies Pharmaceutiques (Montebello: Les Éditions le mieux-être, 2005); J-C St-
Onge, L'envers de la Pilule (Montréal: Les éditions Écosociété, 2004). 
882 For an enlightening discussion on the pharmaceutical industry, refer to S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 
432-434. 
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That being said, IP rights, as we know, can be nuanced with the latitude built into 
TRIPS and further confirmed by Doha. The latter declaration acknowledges 
concerns about the effect of patent rights on drug priees, and represents a 
commitment to essential-drug availability and protection of public health. In a 
way, Doha established a human rights framework to ensure that the social context 
of IP rights is properly considered and that health access concerns are treated with 
appropriate deference when enforcing IP rights. Sorne argue that Doha's 
dispositions represent TRIPS' interpretative norms under customary international 
law, and that they should be given legal value.883 However, those provisions have 
so far been implemented with reserve. The United States has openly referred to 
Doha as a political statement without any legal value, implicitly refusing to 
consider access to essential drugs a fundamental human right.884 AIso, powerful 
nations and the transnational pharmaceutical industry have pressured other 
countries to refrain from taking advantage of compulsory licensing or parallei 
importation, as weIl as from going around strict patent rights for producing 
cheaper drugs. 
A clear example of this attitude emerges from the famous South African case 
which took place before Doha but remains very relevant. 885 Indeed, in 1998, a 
group of the most powerful pharmaceutical companies decided to sue the South 
African government for its 1997 Medicines and Related Substance Control 
Amendment Act, which allows parallel imports, compels pharmacists to provide 
generic versions of off-patent medicine unless specifically requested, and requires a 
transparent drug pricing system. The pharmaceutical companies consortium argued 
883 Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty states that when interpreting a 
treaty, "any subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty's 
provisions" should be taken into account. J.T. Gathii, "The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public Health under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatis" (2002) 15 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 292; UNAIDS, Putting Third First: Vaccines, Access to 
Treatment & the Law, Barcelona, July 2002, online on the aidslaw website: 
<http://www.aidslaw.ca/barcelona2002/treatmentpapers.doc> (accessed June 2nd, 2006). 
884 J.T. Gathii, ibid.; USTR Fact Sheet Summarizing Results from WTO Doha Meeting, Nov. 15, 
200 1, online on the US embassy website: 
<http://www.usembassy.it/fiIe2001 11/alia/aIII1516.htm> (accessed June 3rd, 2006). 
885 J. E. Stiglitz & A. Charlton, Fair Tradefor Ail, How Trade can Promote Development, supra 
note 748. 
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that the flexibilities enshrined in this act were equivalent to violations of property 
rights and tried to force developing countries to implement stricter patent protection 
laws. On the other side, the South African Govemment argued that their Act was not 
only TRIPS-compliant, but also served the realisation of crucial human rights 
guaranteed by the constitution. The Consortium ended up dropping the suit after 
intense public outrage.886 
Another example relates to the trade dispute filed by the US against Brazil under the 
WTO's Dispute Settlement body to challenge a Brazilian law allowing the emission 
of compulsory licenses to local manufacturers when patent holders failed to work 
granted patents. 887 This legal disposition sought to promote the in-country 
manufacture of affordable drugs by patent holders and served as a negotiating tool to 
achieve important price discounts with brand name pharmaceutical companies. The 
Brazilian strategy led to significant decreases in infection and death rates, and the US 
ended up withdrawing its complaint, prompted, again, by fervent public protest.888 
These examples highlight the effect that drug patents owned by developed-nation 
entities and issued in developing nations can have on developing countries with 
manufacturing capacities. When strictly enforced, property rights can prevent these 
countries from relying upon their local industries to develop and sell products at a 
priee that their population and the population of other developing countries would be 
886 A. Baleta, "Drug Firms Lose Patent Rights Lawsuit Against South Africa's Government" 
(2001) 357 Lancet 1347; P. Sidley, "South African Court Battle Damages Drug Industry's 
Image" (2001) 322 BMJ 635; S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 442. 
887 WTO Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil - Measures Affecting Patent 
Protection, WTIDS 199/3 (Jan. 9, 2001); for more information on this case, see J.T. Gathii, 
supra note 883; N.A. Bass, "Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for the Developing 
Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brasil and South Africa in the 21 st Century" (2002) 
34 Geo Wash. ln!'l L. Rev 191. 
888 P. Capella, "Brazil Wins HIV Drug Concession From US: Complaint to WTO on Patent Law 
Withdrawn" (June 26, 2001) Gardian, at 18; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
U.S. and Brazil to Cooperate on HIV/AIDS and WTO Patent Dispute, press release of June 25, 
2001; Brazil, Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for the Establishment of a Panel 
by the United States, WTO Doc. No. WT/DSI99/3 (01-0093),2001. 
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able to afford. 889 There is a need for governments to take action and control 
phannaceutical companies' drug priees without jeopardising further R&D initiatives. 
In its report on the impact of TRIPS on human rights, the UN High Commissioner for 
human rights specified that states have a responsibility under international law to 
prevent non-state entities like big phannaceutical companies from violating their 
populations' right to health.890 Joseph notes that the "[fjailure to cap Big Phanna's 
prices may be an example of [states'] culpable omission.,,891 In addition to state 
responsibilities, others propose international mechanisms to address abuses by 
transnationals. This is a controversial idea.892 As previously discussed in chapter IV, 
sorne argue that transnational corporations are not built to endorse moral causes, that 
their main purpose is to make profits, and that it would not be reasonable to ask them 
to spontaneously establish and respect human rights standards. 893 Others, to the 
contrary, argue that transnationals should bear sorne responsibility in areas of crucial 
importance like access to prescription drugs, where ill consumers often represent a 
"captive market.,,894 They have proposed an international system of anti-trust laws 
and compulsory norms on restrictive business practices. 895 Although is appears 
morally right to argue that anyone, including transnational corporations, should do 
all they can to cure people and prevent death, the legal justification of this argument 
in international law, where states remain the only duty-holders, is less obvious. 
There are sorne signs that things could be changing, 896 but as Joseph states, 
889 L. Nelsen, "The Role of University Technology Transfer Operations in Assuring Access to 
Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries" (January 2003) 3:2 Yale Journal of Health 
Policy Law and Ethics 301 
890 Report of the High Commissioner--The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, par. 45, 27-58, 
Geneva, 2001, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/Sub.2/2001113 
891 S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 439. 
892 M. K. Addo, supra note 663; M. Ottaway, "Reluctant Missionaries" (July/Aug 2001) Policy 44 
893 M. Ottaway, ibid.; J. Robinson, supra note 881, at 20. 
894 S. Joseph, supra note 434. 
895 N. Deepak & J. Court, Governing Globalization : Issues and Institutions (Helsinki: United Nations 
University, 2002) 
896 Sessional working group of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations, Human Rights 
Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises June 
3rd,2002, UN Doc.E/CNA/Sub.2/2002/WG.2IWP.1/Add.2. 
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"[i]ntemationallaw has not yet evolved to the point of holding private actors, such as 
Big Pharma, responsible for their failure to take action.,,897 
5.1.2.2. A vailable resources as an obstacle to the 
realisation of the human right to health 
Another major problem with constitutionally-entrenched socio-economic rights is 
that, in addition to conflict with strong IP rights, their enforcement depends also 
on the resources that a country possesses to address the issue. In other words, the 
right to health does not guarantee concrete enforcement measures irrespective of 
available resources according to the decision in Soobramoney. 898 Developing 
nations are often characterised by a severe lack of resources and by important and 
often contradictory demands on the very limited resources available.899 
Despite judicial and political decisions ordering the development of health 
facilities in South Africa, in 2000, one out of five clinics still lacked necessary 
communication infrastructure, one out of four did not have running water, and one 
out of ten lacked electricity.90o This was due to internaI factors such as a lack of 
qualified staff, corrupt officiaIs, and lack of resources or inadequate strategies of 
resources distribution,901 as discussed above. 
897 S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 437; see also J.Oloka-Onyango, "Reinforcing Marginalised Rights in 
an Age ofGlobalisation: International Mechanisms, Non-State Actors and the Struggle for Peoples' 
Rights in Africa" (2003) 18 Am. U. lnt '1 L. Rev. 851, at 911. 
898 G.J. Annas, "The Right to Health and the Nevirapine Case in South Africa" (Feb. 20,2003) 348:8 
N. Engl. J. Med. 750 
899 J. T. Gathii, "Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global Aids Pandemic" (2002) 14 Fla. J. lnt'l L. 
261; J. Klaaren, supra note 868. 
900 D. van Rensburg et al., "Primary Health Care Facilities Survey" in A. Ntuli et al., eds., South 
African Health Review 2000 (Durban: Health Systems Trust, 2001) 3-50 survey quoted in L. 
London,supra note 2. 
901 W.O. Oyugi, "Service Provision in Rural Kenya: Who Benefits?" in J. Semboja & O. Therkeldsen, 
Service Provision under Stress in East Africa (Copenhague: Center for Development Research, 1995) 
121, at 124 et ss. on the priority that the Kenyan Government awards wealthy citizens living in urban 
areas compared to those living in rural areas (who often end up neglected with regards to property 
rights and resources allocation). 
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When they exist, local funds do not always get distributed in a way that respects 
the right to health. In Nigeria recently, the government spent $350 million to 
construct an Olympic Stadium, while the nation's doctors and professors where 
not receiving their paycheques-a clear example of mismanagement of available 
funds. 902 
In the face of institutional and economic limits and sometimes doubtful priorities, 
sorne have proposed reliance on a minimum core obligation that would be 
enforced by the Court and could require states to dedicate all of their available 
resources to the fulfilment of the "minimum essential levels of a right. ,,903 Such an 
approach could help justify a focus on individuals' basic health needs and the 
achievement of a minimum level of health for all. It would complement our ideal 
proposaI in favour of resource distribution to achieve the level of health necessary to 
bene fit from equality of opportunities. Up to now, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa has not relied on the concept of minimum core obligation to impose a real, 
progressive realisation of the right to health with clear indications as to what 
governments should prioritise.904 
Now that we have a better idea of the legal context under which drug accessibility 
issues arise in the developing world, it is relevant to refer to one last practical 
example demonstrating the intersection of human rights and intellectual property: the 
accessibility of life-saving HIV / AIDS drugs in the developing world. 
902 S.A. Agbacka,supra note 773; S Udeala, "NLC FauIts FG over N38bn Abuja Stadium Contract" 
(July 192001) VANGUARD (Lagos) online: 
<http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/200 1 /July/ 1907200 lib 119070 l.htrn> (accessed: June 
4th, 2006); U.N. Comm. on ESCR, Concluding Observations of the Report of Nigeria, at para. 28, 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/l/Add.23 (1998); more generally on funds allocation, see J. T. Gathii, supra note 
883. 
903 However, this would give considerable power to the judicial, something that would not be 
compatible with every political system. For more on the minimal core obligation see: D. Bilchitz, 
"Placing Basic Needs at the Centre of Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence" (March 2003) 4: 1 Socio-
Economie Rights Projeet; S. Liebenberg, "The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of 
Grootboom" (2001) 1:7 S. Afr. J. of Hum. RIs. 232; J. Klaaren, supra note 868. 
904 D. Bilchitz, ibid. 
277 
5.2.2. Accessibility of HIV / AIDS drugs 
This exarnple is very relevant in illustrating the effect of the patent and the human rights 
systems on health accessibility in developing countries. As Michael Kirby has stated in 
reference to HIV / AIDS drugs, "although these are not genomic drugs, as such, they 
illustrate vividly the kinds of developments that will occur as tests and therapies are 
produced as a result of genomic research.,,905 
Over the last 20 years, the HIV virus and AIDS disease have grown in magnitude 
both in developed and developing countries.906 In fact, AIDS is still the infectious 
disease that kills the most people every year, even though many drugs have been 
developed to slow down the progression of the disease, control the virus, prevent 
mother-to-foetus transmission, and improve patients' lives. Since 1996, reliable anti-
retroviral medicines have been available to control the disease. As an HIV cocktail 
regimen can cost between US$IO 000 and US$15 000 per year, the prognosis for 
individuals infected with HIV in the developed and in the developing world is very 
different.907 In a developing nation, a pers on infected with HIV and left untreated will 
likely die within 2 years of the onset of full-blown AIDS; in the western world, 
HIV / AIDS is a serious and chronic disease that can be controlled with anti-retroviral 
therapy for a lifetime. The difference is, quite literally, life and death. Indeed, as it 
appears from the statistics, although the disease's progression has been appreciably 
controlled in industrialised countries (which represent a huge market for HIV / AIDS 
drugs), the situation is still critical in developing nations, where the pandemic kills 
millions each year. Poverty is the main indicator of vulnerability to HIV. 908 For 
905 M. Kirby, supra 477. 
906 In fact, according to UNAIDS, in 2004, there were approximately 40 million of people infected 
with HIV/AIDS worldwide, 26 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and 7 million in East and South East 
Asia. Between 1981 and 2003, AIDS killed about 20 million of people worldwide. In 2004 alone, more 
than 3 million died from the disease. This obviously has had (and is expected to continue to have) 
tremendous impact on the most affected countries, especially in terms of labour forces and economic 
potential. For more details and figures, refer to: UNAIDS/ WHO, Aids Epidemie Update, Geneva, 
December 2004. 
907 L. C. Fentiman, "AIDS as a Chronic IIIness: A Cautionary Tale for the End of the Twentieth 
Century" (1998) 61 A/h. L. Rev. 989. 
908 G. Stine, AIDS Update 2000 (Upper Saddle River, NJ.: Prentice Hall, 2000) at 11. 
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example, about 70% of the world's HIV-positive adults and 80% of the world's HIV-
positive children live in Sub-Saharan Africa; 95% of aH HIV -positive people live in 
less-affluent nations.909 
Sorne have tried to explain problems with accessibility to HIV / AIDS drugs by 
cultural differences, arguing that sorne populations' cultural values are incompatible 
with strict compliance with complex anti-retroviral cocktails and a precise dosing 
schedule.9 \O However, studies have clearly refuted this argument, showing successful 
use of anti-retroviral regimens in Haiti, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Brazil, where 
successful prevention and treatment strategies have been put in place.911 
Despite sporadic initiatives by pharmaceutical companies to provide patented HIV 
medicines to sorne developing nations at a fraction of the priee (and sometimes even 
for free), access remains very limited. It has been argued that such initiatives are 
inadequate for establishing any form of sustainable global health strategy, and that 
they are used more as a public relations and marketing exercise than anything else.912 
909 The situation is so critical in sorne parts of the world that sorne mothers infected with HIV / AIDS 
are forced to choose between breastfeeding their newborn babies (exposing them to the disease) or 
bottle-feeding with contaminated water (exposing them to other dangerous infections). For more facts 
on the epidemic, see: P.G. Harris & P. Siplon, "International Obligation and Human Health: Evolving 
Policy Responses to H1V / AIDS" (2001) 15:2 Ethics and International AfJairs 1; G. Stine, ibid; R.P. 
Petchesky, "Rights and Needs: Rethinking the Connections in Debates over Reproductive and Sexual 
Rights" (2000) 4:2 Health and Human Rights 17; K. Siverstein, "Millions for Viagra, Pennies for 
Diseases of the Poor" (19 July 1999) The Nation 13. 
910 For a detailed explanation of this argument see: P. Marshall and B. Koenig, "Accounting for 
Culture in a Globalized Bioethics" (Summer 2004) 32:2 The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 252. 
911 J. Mukherjee, "HIV-l Care in Resource-Poor Settings: A View from Haiti" (2003) 362 Lancet 994; 
P. Farmer et al., "Community-Based Approaches to HIV Treatment in Resource-Poor Settings" 
(August 4, 2001) 358:9279 Lancet 404; A. D. Harries et al., "Preventing Antiretroviral Anarchy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa" (August 4, 2001) 358: 9279 Lancet 410; for more on the critic of the cultural 
argument see: P.G. Harris & P. Siplon, supra note 909; P. Farmer, "On Suffering and Social Violence: 
A View from Below" in A. Kleinman, V. Das & M. Lock, eds., Social SufJering (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1997) 278. 
912 This is due, in part, to the strict conditions attached to the agreements, to their precariousness, and 
to the type of discounts (which are generally not competitive with what generic companies can offer). 
For more on these agreements, see: S. Joseph, supra note 434; B. Brubaker, "The Limits of $100 
Million; Epidemic's Complexities Curb Impact of Bristol-Myers's Initiative" (Dec. 29, 2000) Wash. 
Post, at AI; Oxfam, Generic Competition, Prices and Access to Medicines: The Case of 
Antiretrovirals in Uganda, Briefing Paper 26, 10 July 2002, online on the Oxfam website: 
<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatwedo/issues/health/bp26generic.htm> (accessed May 30th, 2006). 
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The widespread lack of access to affordable medicine is thus the mam reason 
proposed to explain the critical situation. This shortage of available and affordable 
HIV / AIDS drugs can be explained by several important factors. 
5.2.2.1. Human rights and accessibility to HIV/AIDS 
drugs 
Access to medication is important for the progressive realisation of the hum an right to 
health, and there have been a number of initiatives to try and secure better access to 
HIV/AIDS drugS.913 To this effect, "[s]tates are called upon to pursue policies which 
would promote the availability, accessibility and affordability for all without 
discrimination of scientifically appropriate and good quality pharmaceuticals and 
medical technologies used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.,,914 
Human right arguments have been crucial for framing the reactions of South 
American and South African governments and activists to the HIV/AIDS crisis.915 
They have allowed the identification of common and collective interests needed for 
an adequate and sensitive response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.916 For example, in 
Latin America, strong advocacy and legal action have been undertaken. This has 
brought a number of nations in the region to acknowledge the right to health, as well 
as to antiretroviral drug therapy, through court rulings and administrative decisions 
on health policy.917 For example, in Argentina, after three years of legal proceedings, 
913 For example, see: UN Commission on Human Right, Access to Medication in the Context of 
Pandemies such as HIV/AIDS Resolution 2001/33, Geneva, 23 April 2001, UN Doc. E12001/ 
23-E/CN.4/2001li67; World Health Assembly, HIV/AIDS: Confronting the Epidemie, Resolution 
WHA 53:14, Geneva, 2000; UNHCHR and UNAIDS, HIV/AIDS and Human Rights: International 
Guidelines, New York and Geneva: UN, 1998, UN Publication no. HRiPUB/98/ 1. 
914 WHO, "25 Questions on Hea1th and Human Rights" (Ju1y 2002) 1 Health and Human Rights 
Publication Series, online on the WHO website, <http://www.who.intlhhr/NEW37871 OMSOK.pdf> 
(accessed June 2nd, 2006), question 22, at 25; S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 441-442. 
915L. London, supra note 2; S. Harrison & M. Qose, "Health Legislation" in A. Ntuli, ed., South 
African Health Review 1998 (Durban: Health Systems Trust, 1999) 17. 
916 J .M. Mann, "Human Rights and AIDS: The Future of the Pandemic", in J. M. Mann et ais., eds., 
Health and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 1999) c. 15. 
917 E. Gonzalez Mac Dowell, "Juridical action for the protection of collective rights and its legal 
impact: A case study" (Winter 2002) 30:4 The Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 644 
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the Supreme Court released an important decision in 2000, guaranteeing access to 
HIV treatment and rejecting the argument that the judiciary should refrain from 
intruding in the executive competence to make budgetary decisions. 918 AIso, in 
Bermudez et al v. Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia SOcial,919 the Venezuela 
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to health includes access to anti-retrovirals 
for those in need. The Court ordered the Minister to find money to ensure an 
adequate supply of these therapies and of drugs to coyer associated infections, and to 
undertake research on HIV / AIDS for better treatment and prevention of the disease. 
Instead of limiting the effect of its decision to the petitioners, the Court went as far as 
extending it to aU patients in need. 
In South Africa, foUowing strong activism from NGOs, the right to access anti-
retroviral therapies was also included in the right to health and acknowledged by the 
courts. The recent decision of the Constitutional Court in Health v. Treatment Action 
Campaign920 provides an interesting example. While the manufacturer of Nevirapine 
(an anti-retroviral drug that greatly reduces the risk of mother-to-child HIV 
transmission921 ) had agreed to provide it for free to the South African govemment for 
a period of five years, the govemment adopted a policy that restricted its availability 
to only 18 research centers involved in a pilot study. On July st\ 2002, the 
Constitutional Court affirmed a Trial Court's decision 922 and ruled that the 
918 XXXv. Ministry ofHealth, Supreme Court of Argentina, June 1,2000 as cited in E. Gonzalez Mac 
Dowell, ibid., at 646. Despite this decision, however, HIV drug-delivery ceased 1 \Ii years later, and a 
new decision was rendered in 2002 to order the Ministry of Health to continue distributing treatment to 
people in need (Civil Federal Court decision of April 26, 2002); see also M. Bianco et al., Human 
Rights and Access ta Treatment for HIV/AIDS in Argentina (Buenos Aires: FEIM/ LACCASO, 1999) 
online: <http://www.laccaso.org/pdfs/argeng.pdf>(accessedMay29th.2006).at.15. 
919 Bermudez et al v Ministerio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social, 15 July 1999, Supreme Court of Justice 
of Venezuela, Case No. 15.789, Decision No. 916; for more details on this case, see UNAIDS, Putting 
Third First: Vaccines, Access ta Treatment & the Law, Barcelona, July 2002, online on the website of 
AIOSLAW: 
<http://www.aidslaw.calbarcelona2002/treatmentpapers.doc>(accessedMay28th.2006).at 33-34. 
920 2002 (5) SALR 721 (CC) 
921 L.A. Guay et aIs. "Intrapartum and Neonatal Single-Dose Nevirapine Compared with Zidovudine 
for Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV-l in Kampala, Uganda: HIVNET 012 
Randomised Trial" (1999) 354 lancet 795; B. Hirschel & P. Francioli, "Progress and Problems in the 
Fight Against AlOS" (1998) 338 New Eng. J. Med. 906; E. M. Mckenna, "The Mandatory Testing of 
Newboms for HIV: Too Much, Too Little, Too Late" (1997) 13 N. Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 307. 
922 Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health, High Court of South Africa, Transvaal 
Provincial Div., 2002 (4) BCL 356M, Dec. 12,2001. 
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government's policy decision was unreasonable and violated women's and children's 
right to health (s. 27 & 28 of the constitution). The Court ordered that Nevirapine be 
distributed broadly and without delay in the public health institutions where 
counselling and testing services are available.923 
In aH these cases, governments moved slowly in implementing the court orders. 
Although recognised in many important legal documents,924 socio-economic human 
rights of poor individuals infected with HIV are not always given the priority they 
deserve. As discussed in the human rights chapter, many obstacles stand in the way of 
efficient implementation of those rights. In sorne cases, like the Nevirapine situation, 
lack of drug accessibility is not caused by strong IP rights, but by government laxity; 
by its failure to take the right to health seriously; and by a shortage of human and 
infrastructure resources necessary for wide dispensation of available life-saving 
drugS.925 In other cases, IP is one factor that influences HIV -drug affordability and 
the realisation of the hum an right to health. 
5.2.2.2. IP rights and accessibility of HIV/AIDS drugs 
There are a growing number of patents in areas connected to fundamental needs.926 
Because most of the existing HIV / AIDS medicines are patented in numerous 
923 In fact, the court ordered the govemment to perform four specific actions detailed in G.J. Annas, 
"The Right to Health and the Nevirapine Case in South Africa" (Feb. 20, 2003) 348:8 N. Engl. J Med 
750. 
924 For example, see United Nations General Assembly, 26th Special Session, Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS, A/Res/S-26/2, June 27, 2001; UNAIDS, The African Consensus and Plan 
of Action: Leadership to Overcome HIV/AIDS, December 7,2000; see also L. London, supra note 2; 
G.J. Annas, "The Impact of Health Policies on Human Rights: AIDS and TB Control" in J.M. Mann et 
al., eds., Health and Human Rights: A Reader (New York: Routledge, 1999) 374. 
925 For example, the South African govemment has always been very reluctant to qualify HIY as a high 
health priority, even expressing doubts about the very safety of Neverapine. The govemment went so 
far as to request a revision of the drug approval by the Medicines Control Council. For more on this, 
see: A.S. Baleta, "Africa Soaks up Pressure to Change HIY/AIDS policy" (2002) Lancet 360; see also 
D. Bilchitz, "South Africa: Right to Health and Access to HIY / AIDS Drug Treatment" (2003) 1:3 
International Journal ofConstitutional Law 524. 
926 Commission on Human Rights, Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemies such as 
HIV/AIDS, Resolution 2001133, in Report on the 57th Session, 19 March-27 April 2001, UN 
Doc. E/2001/ 23-E/CN.4/2001/i67. 
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developed and developing countries, their prices are affected by licensing fees that 
can have direct negative impacts on drug affordability and on the production of 
cheaper generic options. Many researchers have analysed the effects of patents on the 
costs of HIV lAIDS drugs. Sorne have found that market exclusivity greatly increases 
the priee of patented products and that, while patents seem to promote availability of 
HIV lAIDS drugs to patients who can pay for them, they also hinder access for the 
ones who cannot afford to pay high prices.927 Other researchers, analysing the cost of 
ten essential drugs in eight countries, observed that the co st of HIV lAIDS drug is as 
much as 82% cheaper in countries with access to generic versions of the unpatented 
drugS. 928 The price of fluconazole, for example, a drug used to treat HIV 1 AIDS-
infected patients, costs $20 a day in Kenya (where it is patented); the generic version 
produeed in Thailand (and unavailable in the Kenyan market) would co st $0.70 a 
day.929 Similarly, many generic medicine combinations can be produced for 
approximately $500 per year, but are not widely available to patients from 
developing nations because of patents on drugs like 3TC, AZT, and Nevirapine.930 
A more encouraging (but unique) example is the Brazilian program of using generic 
drugs to deliver affordable and reliable treatment to the population. This initiative 
succeeded in considerably reducing HIV infections and AIDS deaths, and lowering 
costs for hospitalisation and medical care. 931 This was made possible because of 
Brazil's strong manufacturing capacity and its 1996 patent law, stipulating that 
medicines commercialised before May 14, 1997 would remain off-patent in the 
country. Because of the way it handled the AIDS crisis in producing generic anti-
retrovirals locally, Brazil became a model in the fight against this epidemic. This is, 
927 J. Borrell & J. Watal, supra note 877. 
928 C. Perez-Casas et al, HI V/A IDS Medicines Pricing Report. Setting Objectives: is there a Po/itical 
Will?, Médecins Sans Frontières, July 6, 2000; C. Perez-Casas et al, Accessing ARVs: Untangling the 
Web of Price Reductionsfor Developing Countries, Campaignfor Access to Essential Medicines, 
Médecins Sans Frontières, October 5, 2001; H. E. Kettler & C. Collins, supra note 438. 
929 V. Hoffman, "Health Groups Say Poor Nations Need Access to Generic Drugs" (27 November 
1999) Boston Globe, at A 15; D.G. Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism, 
supra note 32 at 154. 
930 Consumer Project on Technology et al., supra note 877. 
931 UNDP, Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty, Human 
Development Report 2003 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), at 158-160; S. Buckley, Brazil 
Becomes Model in Fight Against AIDS, (Sept. 17,2000) Wash Post A22. 
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however, a partial victory; Brazil cannot use this same strategy to produce generic 
versions of new, potentially more efficient and reliable products commercialised 
since May 1997. 
It is important to repeat, at this point, that the view that patents play an important role 
in hindering access to affordable important life-saving HIV / AIDS drugs is not 
universal. In fact, sorne scholars (and most transnational pharmaceutical companies) 
argue that patents are not the cause of inequitable access to essential medicines, and that 
the problem originates instead ±rom poverty and too little spending on health care.932 
Sorne also believe that even if priees might increase with patent protection, this is a 
necessary, temporary consequence to promoting innovation and scientific progress, and 
to fund further R&D.933 Others believe that accessibility ofHIV drugs is more an issue of 
social welfare policy than a question of IP rights, and that it is governments' 
responsibility to provide these drugs to their population. This is a weak argument, as it 
does not take the governments' economic capacities into account and implicitly demands 
that the public sector unconditionaUy subsidise private pharmaceutical companies' 
932 The accessibility to AIDS treatment in India, where even massive generic production of low-cost 
AIDS therapy has not permitted the drugs to reach the majority of the Indian population is often cited 
to support this view. So does a study conducted in 53 African nations, which found that 15 HIV drugs 
were not patented in most of these countries. This study was severely criticised, as it did not incIude 
several important combinations of patented AIDS drugs. For more on this, see: International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Associations, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, and Developing 
Countries: Implications for Health Care Access, Drug Quality, and Drug Development, Geneva, 2000; 
International Intellectual Property Institute, Patent Protection and Access to HIV/AIDS 
Pharmaceuticals in Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, D.C., 2000; A. Attaran, "How Do Patents And 
Economic Policies Affect Access To Essential Medicines ln Developing Countries?" (March-April 
2004) 23:3 Health Affairs 155; A. Attaran & L. Gillespie-White, "Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs 
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?" (October 17,2001) 286:15 Journal of the American 
Medical Association 1886; L. Gillespie-White, "What did Doha accomplish?" November 19,2001, 
International Intellectual Property Institute, online on the IPRs online website, 
<http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.htm> (accessed May 20th,2006). 
933 However, this argument is not very convincing in the case ofHIV/AIDS drugs. ln fact, as the most 
affected developing nations represent less than 1 % of the global drug market, lowering prices would 
not have significant effects on drug companies' profits and further innovation. Moreover, in an 
international health emergency situation Iike the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the issue should not be 
prioritising tomorrow's lives over today's lives. The strategy of the most affluent aims instead at 
preventing subsequent parallel importation from lower-price markets to more affluent markets. C. 
Barry & K. Raworth, supra note 294; H.E. BaIe, "The Conflict Between Parallel Trade and Product 
Access and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals" (1998) 1:4 Journal of International Economie 
Law 637; D. B. Resnik, supra note 354. 
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activities and profits rather than controlling them. 934 In other words, this argument 
removes aH sense of responsibility from the private sector, while "the state is put in the 
bizarre circumstance of providing financial assistance to people who cannot afford 
medicines because the state granted the firm a monopoly on the production of the 
medicine.,,935 Another argument proposed is that the patent system allows an appropriate 
level of flexibility to address and solve important access issues when necessary. This last 
idea requires more development. 
As discussed above, there is sorne flexibility built into TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, 
and the August 30, 2003 decision of the WTO member states, and these mechanisms 
could allow developing countries to take a stand and work around cri tic al HIV / AIDS 
drug-access problems towards realisation of the human right to health.936 With those 
tools and possibilities at their disposaI, one could expect developing nations, 
especially those most severely affected by the HIV / AIDS epidemic, to do more to 
limit the negative effects that patents can have on availability and affordability of 
essential drugs. It seems that these nations would simply need to declare a national 
health emergency, grant licenses to local manufacturers for the production of life-
934 For an interesting discussion on this point, see: R. L. Ostergard, Jr., "Intellectual Property: A 
Universal Human Right?" supra note 379, at 169-170. 
935 Idem, at 170. 
936 Although we have already discussed sorne ofthese normative dispositions under 3.3.2.2, it appears 
relevant to repeat sorne of them here, in relation to the specific problem of access to HIV / AIDS drugs. 
Art. 27(3) a) of TRIPS stipulates that govemments can decide to exclude sorne pharmaceuticals from 
patent protection if it appears essential for the protection of public health. Compulsory licensing is 
authorised by art. 31 of TRIPS, which allows govemments to grant limited authorisation to use the 
object of a patent without the patent holder's consent under strict conditions, including national 
emergency and other circumstances of extreme urgency. Moreover, art. 6 of TRIPS and par. 5 d) of the 
Doha Declaration leave it to the member states to decide how they wish to apply the princip le of 
exhaustion of rights within their territory. This choice can have important consequences on 
affordability, and could allow less affluent countries to access essential health-related products like 
HIV/AIDS drugs that they wouldn't otherwise be able to afford (on their domestic market). 
Furthermore, par. 4 of the Doha Declaration specifically states that TRIPS should not prevent states 
from taking steps to prote ct public health and should be interpreted and implemented so as to allow 
member states to promote access to medicines for aIl. Par. 5 (3) also specifies that every country 
should be entitled to decide what constitutes a national health emergency, including those related to 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other epidemics. Finally, the August 30, 2003 decision allows exportation of 
products made under compulsory licenses to countries who do not have sufficient manufacturing and 
production capacity, and who need help dealing with serious public health problems. This requires 
amending TRIPS, something that was decided by the WHO members on December 6, 2005, when they 
agreed to transform the August 2003 waiver into a permanent amendment to TRIPS. For more details 
on this decision, refer to: WTO, Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, Decision of 6 December 2005, 
Geneva, WTIL/641, December 8, 2005). 
285 
saving generic medicines at a fraction of the price, and adopt a broad strategy of 
parallel importation. 937 However, this has not been happening for economic and 
political reasons highlighted at many occasions in the course of this dissertation. It is 
safe to say that the most affluent countries have instead often hindered developing 
nations' efforts to address the HIV / AIDS epidemic with the resources they have, in the 
most economically efficient way.938 
Consequently, regardless of the seriousness of the global health crisis resulting from 
HIV/AIDS and in spite of the existing theoretical normative flexibility, it is not 
surprising that "apparently no African country has issued a compulsory license for 
any medicine.,,939 Indeed, we saw that the South African government has even been 
sued by private pharmaceutical firms for enacting legislation allowing compulsory 
licensing and parallel imports, an example which is characteristic of the attitude of 
the most affluent states towards less-developed states' socio-economic 
development.940 Even with the enactment of Doha, the real value of such flexibility 
has been principally in its potential as a negotiating too1. In other words, "[t]he 
practical value of the existence of compulsory license provisions in the Patent Law is 
that the threat of its use usually induces the grant of contractual licenses on 
reasonable terms, and thus the objective of actually working the invention is 
accomplished." 941 This is at the heart of a global system that accepts and even 
937 D.G. Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism, supra note 32, at 141-166. 
938 P.G. Harris & P. Siplon, supra note 909. 
939 J. Love, "Access to Medicine and Compliance with WHO TRIPS Accord" in P. Drahos & R. 
Mayne, eds., Global Intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, Access and Development (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 74, at 87. 
940 S.A. Agbacka, supra note 773: see also H. Guisse, The Realization of Economie, Social and 
Cultural Rights: Final Report on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations, 1997, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/Sub.211997/8. 
941 S. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks and Related Rights- National and International Protection 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975) at 427. Despite a forced reticence by developing 
countries toward legal flexibility, we have observed a growing number of initiatives by generic 
companies and civil society groups over the last few years to compel pharmaceutical companies to 
license their exclusive rights on brand name ARVs drugs. For example, Cipla-Medpro (a joint venture 
between an Indian generic company and its South African partner) and the NGO Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) fiIed a complaint before the South African Competition Commission in June, 2002 
to protest the attitude of G1axoSmithKline (GSK) and other brand-name pharmaceutical companies. 
They argued that these drug companies were charging excessively for their patented products and were 
abusing their dominant position at a time where cooperation was key in the fight against the worst 
heaIth crisis ever encountered. With this initiative, Cipla-Medpro wanted to obtain a compulsory 
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encourages major access inequalities in key sectors influencing health, life, and death-
even at a time when the worst pandemie in history is ravaging a whole continent. 
To conclude, it is important to mention that, again, many factors unrelated to patents are 
Iikely to influence accessibility ofHIV/AIDS treatments. As we have seen, sorne ofthese 
issues relate to nations' international and domestic financial resources, the physical 
infrastructure in place,942 and the prevailing political climate. Moreover, the growing 
number of AIDS orphans in developing countries is another factor influencing national 
stability. Most will unfortunately end up lacking the "formaI education, parental role 
modelling, or significant skills development" necessary for satisfactory professional 
and personal development.943 ludicial cases for enforcing hum an rights also clearly 
highlight the limits of relying on legal tools for addressing a complex health tragedy 
like the HIV/AIDS epidemic at times when amasingly high poverty rates, illiteracy, 
and widespread ignorance still prevail. As we have discussed throughout this 
dissertation, global health issues need to be addressed through a comprehensive 
license to market ARVs at a fraction of the price charged by brand-name pharmas. In December 2004, 
in exchange for the withdrawal of the complaint, GSK agreed to grant licenses to Cipla-Medpro and 
other generic drug companies for the importation and sale of generic ARVs in South Africa. For more 
on this case, see: S.A. Singham, "Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and 
the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry" (2000) 26 
Brook. J. In!,1 L. 363; J. T. Gathii, "Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy 
Consistency with Facilitating Access to Affordable AlOS Drugs to Low-End Consumers" (2001) 53 
Fla. L. Rev. 727, at 769; UNAIOS, supra note 860; GSK Grants License to Cipla in Accordance with 
Competition Commission Settlement (December 14, 2004) TAC Electronic Newsletter online on the 
TAC website: <http://www.tac.org.zal> (accessed on June 4th, 2006); More generally on contractual 
licenses see: F-K Beier, "Exclusive Rights, Statutory Licenses and Compulsory Licenses in Patent and 
Utility Model Law" (1999) 30:3 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 251 ; 
C. Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns Into Patent Legislation in Developing Countries, South 
Center, Geneva, October 2000, online on the netamericas website 
<http://www.netamericas.net/Researchpapers/Documents/CcorreaiCcorreal.pdf> (accessed June 2nd, 
2006). 
942 However, while the importance of infrastructure is not questioned, it has been demonstrated that 
many HIV-related technical interventions, like testing and treatment services, can be performed in 
infrastructure-poor environments. Better HIV -drug accessibility can also be used as a tool to improve 
and extend infrastructure. For an enlightening discussion on this point, refer to L. London, supra note 
2; R. Loewenson & A. Whiteside, United Nations Development Programme, HN/AIOS: Implications 
for Poverty Reduction (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2001); P.G. Harris & P. 
Siplon, supra note 909. 
943 P.G. Harris & P. Siplon, supra note 909; S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 433. 
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strategy that should include education, nutrition, prevention, capacity-building, and 
kn Id ~ .... 944 ow e ge-transler InItIatIves. 
Regardless of who or what is to blame for affordability and availability problems in 
developing countries, Cooper Ramo's shocking statement remains prescient: 
"[ w ]hat's going on in Africa right now is a crime. When the history of our times is 
written, future generations will be astonished that we watched the death of 40 million 
people-at least half of which we could have prevented-and did nothing.,,945 There 
are, however, signs that things are slowly changing. In this respect, it appears relevant 
to say a few words on an international initiative undertaken to address neglected 
diseases affecting the most-vulnerable and less-affluent of the world: the Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This fund is an independent public-private 
partnership between govemments, international organisations, companies, activists, 
and communities seeking to raising money and improve resources available to 
eradicate these diseases. This fund was launched by the G8 in January 2002, 
following a forceful calI by Kofi Annan. It represents an original approach to health 
funding, as it operates through a grant application system that can serve different 
purposes, including the production and delivery of drugs, training programs, and 
prevention campaigns. After an encouraging start, the fund now seems to be in a 
critical position in terms of funding commitments from its partners, something that, 
unfortunately, highlights the inherent weakness of such a voluntary, charitable 
initiative. Depending on the future success rate of this endeavour, this scheme "could 
challenge the economic orthodoxy which deems that profits and therefore patents are 
necessary to foster useful R&D.,,946 It will be interesting to follow the progress made 
in fighting these diseases in the next few years. 
The last two sections sought to give us a better, more concrete idea about the practical 
role that intellectual property and human rights can play in terms of accessibility of 
944 K.M. De Cock, D. Mbori-Ngacha & E. Marum, "Shadow on the Continent: Public Health and 
HIV/AIDS in Africa in the 2lst century" (2002) 360 Lance! 67. 
945 J.C. Ramo "The Real price for Fighting AIDS" (July 9, 2001) rime Magazine at 5. 
946 S. Joseph, supra note 434, at 435. 
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genetic research and essential drugs in the developing world. We realised that 
existing legal mechanisms to ensure more equitable distribution of health-related 
resources are applied inconsistently, not always in the best interest of the most 
vulnerable people they are meant to prote ct. The next section provides a brief analysis 
of the intersection of intellectual property and human rights in health. 
5.3 Analysis of the Intersection Between IP and Human Rights in 
Health 
However useful saying "that's my right" is in 
extracting things from the state, if is not good for 
extracting things trom the economy, unless you are a 
property holder. 9 7 
Implementing a human right to health and to scientific benefits can obviously impose 
limits on the realisation of other rights, like the right to private property. Related to 
this topic, Chapman says that "many libertarian theorists interpret the provision of a 
right to health or health care through public financing as amounting to an 
unwarranted seizure of private property and an intrusion on a property owner's 
freedom to dispose of his own goods.,,948 The liberal tradition is grounded in the 
importance of private property, which can conflict with the realisation of economic 
and social rights.949 
The UDHR recognises the right to property (arts. 17 and 27), and the ICESCR 
acknowledges a right to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author 
(art. IS( 1 )c)). Theoretically elevating intellectual property to the rank of a human 
947 D. Kennedy, supra note 598, at 117. 
948 A. R. Chapman, "Conceptualizing the Right to Health", supra note 683. 
949 R. Nozick, supra note 71; C.B. Macpherson, Democratie Theory: Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973); E. O'Keefe & A. Scott-Samuel, supra note 651. 
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right has not attracted much attention, and when it did, there was sorne scepticism.950 
Conceiving IP as a human right means balancing inventors' rights with the positive 
impact that IP should have on the public in terms of useful innovation and disclosure. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, IP rights however prote ct the economic interest 
of inventors first and foremost in practice. 
Private property rights, protected by an independent normative system, are 
aggressively defended and implemented by powerful economic agents. Sorne, like 
Pettersmann, adopt a liberal and individual perspective on trade and property rights, 
arguing for unrestrained questing for economic benefit through total individual 
economic liberty.95\ This position presupposes that everyone is in a position to pursue 
his individual interests through economic means, and ignores the destructive 
consequences that such rights can have on the vulnerable and less-affluent.952 
There is an ongoing debate on the scope that should be granted to property and 
intellectual property rights, especially when they affect the realisation of other basic 
health rights, such as access to drugS.953 These two types of rights can conflict, and 
this can engender serious consequences for the less-affluent individuals, as illustrated 
by the practical examples presented above. In the face of competing rights such as, 
950 R. L. Ostergard, Jr., "Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right?", supra note 379. at 175-
176; P. Cullet, supra note 449, at 145-147. 
951 E.-U. Petersmann, "National Constitutions and International Economic Law", supra note 532; E.-
U. Petersmann, "How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of 
Civil Society?" (1998) 20 Michigan Journal of International Law 1; E.-U. Petersmann, "The WTO 
Constitution and Human Rights", supra note 532. 
952 A persuasive example of the priority often awarded to private property can be found in the South 
African constitution, which institutionalises the right to property while simultaneously reducing the 
possibility of important land reform that could help building a more equitable society: T. Evans, 
"Universal Human Rights", supra note 605: M. Mutua, supra note 645, at 151; more generally on the 
effect of private property rights on other rights, refer to J. Donnelly, "The Social Construction of 
International Human Rights" in T. Dunne & N. J. Wheeler, eds, Human Rights in Global Polilics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 71; S. Picciotto, "Defending the Public Interest in 
TRIPS and WTO" in P. Drahos & R. Mayne, eds., Global Intellectual Property Rights, Knowledge, 
Access and Development (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 224, at 236. 
953 C. Krause, "The Right to Property" in A. Eide et aIs., eds., Economie, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
Texbook (Maartinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed., 2001) at 191-192; P. Cullet, supra note 449: see also the UK 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights in Development 
Poliey, supra note 47, which states that the scope of IP protection should never interfere with the 
realisation of the most fundamental human rights. 
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for example, inventors' intellectuai property rights on the one side, and patients' 
human right to health when they cannot afford patented health goods and services on 
the other, treaty law asks that states attempt to reconcile aIl their international 
obligations. 954 Our theoretical framework for global distributive justice in health 
demands that we first pay special attention to bringing people to a certain health level 
where they can profit from available opportunities and have a chance to build a good 
life. Protecting access to health with access to screening and therapeutic tools can be 
compatible with property rights protection, if the latter is viewed as having a strong 
social role to play and are implemented accordingly.955 Sorne refer to this as a human 
rights approach to IP, which would be geared toward the importance of the common 
good in the evaluation and application of science. This vision necessarily implies a 
broad interpretation and application of TRIPS' flexibilities and asks for a better and 
more explicit recognition of people's right to enjoy the benefits of science and right 
to health in IP rights enforcement, which is somewhat unlikely in the CUITent political 
and economic context.956 
In reality, the very architecture of international policy-making in intellectuai property 
revolves around trade officiaIs. Health, labour, and welfare ministers are not invited 
to WTO or IMF negotiation sessions, even iftheir sectors of activity are often directly 
and profoundly affected by the decisions made in those fora. 957 The interests at stake 
and the meaning of things are not the same in the trade and hum an rights arenas. 
Therefore, when we deal with issues likely to have major repercussions in both 
sectors, conflicting interests should be represented and voiced.958 As the normative IP 
system can affect many sectors of activity and can profoundly impact the realisation 
of vital human rights (including accessibility to health and health care), it appears 
unacceptable that this system be shaped by trade officiaIs only. 
954 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, May 23, 1969, art. 26. 
955 C. Krause, supra note 953; H. Shue, Basic Rights, supra note 245. 
956 As discussed in the last chapter, although these objectives are not completely incompatible with the 
overall purpose and philosophy of IP rights, the politics and economics of IP do not generally allow 
the implementation ofa strong social vision ofIP. P. Cullet, supra note 449. 
957 On this topic, see J. E. Stiglitz, Globalisation and its Discontents. supra note 152 
958 F. Abbott, "The Enduring Enigma of TRIPs" (Dec. 1998) 1 Journal of International Economic 
Law 506. 
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To this effect, many propositions have been put forward to ensure better protection of 
the indivisibility of all human rights, particularly socio-economic human rights, 
against the forces of neo-liberal globalisation and private property. Indeed, the 
ICESCR Committee has issued many interpretative statements giving direction on 
how to interpret the covenant in relation to IP issues.959 One of the most important for 
us remains the 2000 General Comment 14 on the Right ta the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health. 960 It co vers the provision of essential drugs and is not opposed to 
a broad interpretation of the covenant so as to ensure access to patented drugs, even if 
it implies possible violation of TRIPS. In 200 1, the Committee acknowledged a 
potential conflict between the ICESCR and TRIPS and specified that "any intellectual 
property regime that makes it more difficult for a State party to comply with its core 
obligations in relation to health, [ ... ] is inconsistent with the legally binding 
obligations of the State party.,,961 Many similar initiatives and resolutions have been 
undertaken and adopted.962 These proposaIs can be characterised as "soft law" and 
willlikely remain non-binding on state parties. They could, however, serve as tools 
for developing countries in the course of further TRIPS negotiations or in dealing 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, for example.963 
959 M. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on 
its Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
960 Committee on ESCR, General Comment No 14, supra note 658. 
961 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economie, Social and Cultural Rights; Statement on 
Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Geneva, December 14,2001, E/C.12/2001/15, par.12; see 
also United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights, Intelleetual property and human rights, 
Resolution 2001/21, Geneva, 200 1, UN Doc. E/CN .4/Sub.2/RES/200 1 121, par. 3 & 5. 
962 For example, the UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Geneva, 2000, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200017; Economic and Social Council Committee on Human Rights, Economic and 
Social Council Resolution (ESCOR) res. 2000/7 on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, 
52d Sess., Geneva, 2000, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/20001L.20; Report of the High Commissioner--The 
Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intelleetual Property Rights on Human Rights, 
52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, paras. 10-15, 27-58, Geneva, 2001, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.212001/13 (2001); J. O. Onyango & D. Udagama, Globalization and Its Impact on the 
Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 53d Sess., Provisional Agenda 
Item 4, paras. 19-34, Geneva, 2001, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (2001). 
963 L. R. Helfer, supra note 574, at 49-52. 
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Other important initiatives for better human rights protection emerge from civil 
society, grassroots, and activist movements, which, over the last decade, have become 
increasingly organised, articulate, and powerful. They have been the source of 
various highly-publicised initiatives and campaigns for better human rights 
protection, including the national and international battles for affordable HIV / AIDS 
drugs and well-orchestrated resistance to international institution and big 
pharmaceutical companies' actions.964 For example, human rights activists lobbied 
for the consideration of the health needs of the most vulnerable at the 2001 
ministerial meeting in Doha. 965 In this case, however, most developing nations 
unfortunately remained "spectators in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration.,,966 
Nevertheless, the important place that property and intellectual property rights occupy 
both on the national and international scenes, the powerful interests they serve, and 
the fact that they remain for the most part unsupervised, continue to have negative 
consequences on the implementation and realisation of human rights.967 As Rittich 
states, "where hard and soft strategies are deployed at the same time in respect of the 
same field or issue, or where hard rights are available to advance the interests of one 
of the parties involved in a dispute, while the other relies on soft norms to further its 
case," it is impossible to expect the same normative efficiency from the two 
systems. 968 Despite such disparity, sorne argue that, since human rights and 
intellectual property rights norms are based on the same moral principles, respecting 
them simultaneously should naturally lead to improving individual welfare 
worldwide. 969 We have seen, however, that the reality is different. There is great 
tension between those two systems both in terms of philosophy and concrete 
964 B. Rajagopal, supra note 797; B. Gellman, An Unequal Caleulus of Life and Death; As Millions 
Perished in Pandemie, Firms Debated Aecess ta Drugs; Players in the Debate Over Drug Availability 
and Prieing (Dec. 27, 2000) Wash. Post, at Al. 
965 A.R. Chapman, "The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection", supra note 
687, at 881. 
966 B. S. Chimni, supra note 664, at 20; See also F. Jawara & A. Kwa, Behind the Scenes at The WTO 
: The Real World of International Trade Negotiations (London; New York: Zed Books, 2003). 
967 C. Krause, supra note 953. 
968 K. Rittich, 'The Future of Law and Development", supra note 667, at 240. 
969 E-U. Petersmann, "The WTO Constitution and Human Rights" supra note 532. 
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application. The connection between the two arises less in terms of how they can 
complement each other, and more in terms of how one negatively impacts on the 
other.97o 
This tension can be explained by that fact that, above aH, states rely on IP tools to 
improve their economic competitive advantages on the global scene. 971 This 
economic focus results in a considerable advantage for the most powerful and 
wealthy agents, like major transnational corporations, instead of protecting individual 
and community access to crucial knowledge and productS. 972 This focus appears 
indefensible, at least in the field of drug development and genetic diagnostic testing, 
where, to say the least, the level and innovative quality of R&D are not optimal. In 
other words, despite the fact that the WTO pre amble refers to concepts of sustainable 
development and improved living standards, most of its supporters believe that the 
global trade system is independent from the system of public international law and is 
meant to address freedom of trade, not inequities between countries and individuals, 
equitable distribution, or protection of the most vulnerable.973 
As discussed throughout the dissertation, the broader global order under which 
these two normative systems evolve plays an important role in the situation just 
described. Many factors-inc1uding paternalistic western attitudes and policies, 
colonialism, the interests of the most powerful agents (defended by international 
monetary institutions through structural-adjustment programs), the burdensome 
debt loads of developing countries, the priority of efficiency vs equity, and major 
bargaining power differences-aH play an important role in preserving the CUITent 
970 C. Dommen, supra note, 872, at 40-45. 
971 A. R. Chapman, " The Human Rights Implications ofIntellectual Property Protection", supra note 
687. 
972 S. Shulman, Owning the Future, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999); Keith Aoki, "The Stakes of 
Intellectual Property Law" in D. Kairys, The PoUties of Law: A Progressive Critique (New 
York: Basic Books, 1998) at 271. 
973 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,1947, art. XX, 4 T.I.A.S. 669, 55 U.N.T.S. 262; 
C. Dommen, supra note 872, at 46; J. L. Dunoff, "The Death of the Trade Regime" (1999) 10 Eur. J. 
In!'{ L. 733; J. T. Gathii, supra note 883, at 302-303; on the opposite view that the WTO must be 
analysed in a public internationallaw context, see: D. Palmeter & P. C. Mavriodis, "The WTO 
Legal System: Sources of Law" (1998) 92 Am. J. Int'L L. 398. 
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situation.974 This broad, neo-liberal framework is rarely questioned or analysed 
properly, and "[v]iolations of the right to health-whether caused by poverty-
related conditions or by lack of access to health care--continue to be invisible, 
accepted as part of the natural order of things.,,975 However, as Mandela pointed 
out: 
The unavailability of food, jobs, water and shelter, education, 
health care and a healthy environment is not a preordained result 
of the forces of nature or the product of a curse of the deities. 
[ .. .I]t is the consequence of decisions which men and women take 
or refuse to take, aIl of whom will not hesitate to pledge their 
devoted support for the Univers al Declaration of Human 
Rights.976 
It is difficult to admit that freedom of trade can overwhelm crucial human needs and 
that the system in place does not guarantee access to basic health necessities to those 
in need.977 An effective hum an rights approach requires that we analyse, question, 
and criticise the very economic power constructions that create, accept, and ev en 
endorse patterns of poverty and ill-health.978 Achieving goals related to the right to 
health will not be possible without major changes in the capitalist world economy. 
Therefore, "[ u ]nless human-rights advocates provide an effective intellectual and 
organisational counterweight to economlC interests, the intellectual property 
landscape will be reshaped in the years ahead without adequate consideration of the 
impact on human rights. ,,979 
974 We refer the reader to the relevant sections of the previous chapters for further discussion on 
this issue, as weIl as to enlightening discussions by T.W. Pogge, World Poverty and Human 
Rights, supra note 284; C.R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, supra note 64; 
C. Thomas, "International Financial Institutions and Social and Economic Human Rights: An 
Exploration" in T. Evans, ed., Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998) 165; P.G. Harris & P. Siplon, supra note 909. 
975 A.E. Yamin, supra note 688; see also G. A. Cohen, "Capitalism, the Proletarian and Freedom" in A. 
Ryan, ed., The Idea of Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) at 14 quoted in C. Barry 
& K. Raworth, supra note 294. 
976 N. Mandela, Address at the 53rd United nations General Assembly, New York, 21 September 1998 
quoted in M. Heywood & D. Altman, "Confronting AIDS: Human Rights, Law and Social 
Transformation" (2000) 5:1 Health and Human Rights 149. 
977 R. L. Ostergard, Jr., "Intellectual Property: A Universal Human Right?", supra note 379, at 170. 
978 A.E. Yamin, supra note 688. 
979 A. R. Chapman, "The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual Property Protection", supra note 
687,atI5. 
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Conclusion 
This last chapter provided examples of how genes (mostly disease genes) and 
pharmaceutical patents have hindered accessibility to research tools and therapeutic 
and diagnostic products and services. Since little information is available on the level 
of gene patenting in developing nations, it is difficult to measure their actual effects 
on accessibility. We thus used analogies with genetics cases having arisen in 
developed nations and with accessibility in the pharmaceutical sector. We have se en 
that access to health and genetics can be influenced by the functioning of the patent 
and the hum an rights systems. This brief analysis demonstrates that global health 
needs, which are not expressed by purchasing power on the market, are often not 
taken into consideration by those frameworks. 980 For example, the normative 
exceptions to strong patent rights are often of very limited practical utility because 
of the numerous and burdensome conditions to be met, and because of the 
pressure exercised by the most affluent on the less powerful. Moreover, the 
system entitles patent-holders to adopt astringent proprietarianist attitude in 
relation to the object of their rights, even in cases where it can influence access to 
essentials and satisfaction of individuals' basic needs and human rights. 
The examples presented in this section mainly referred to access to disease genes and 
essential drugs, and this brief reflection does not allow us to make any general 
conclusions regarding the effect of patents and human rights on the overall availability 
and affordability of genetic benefits in developing nations. At present, there is no clear 
evidence that these systems have had such an impact. However, with the way the 
actual IP and human rights systems have been working lately, we can safely conclude 
that extensive patent rights, licensing strategies, and human rights enforcement 
980 This ability will depend on various factors. For example, sorne countries, like Canada, provide 
universal health insurance for certain products and services; many countries do not. Depending on 
whether the patented product is covered by an insurance pro gram, each individual may have to assume 
health-related costs. D.G Richards, lntellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism, supra note 32, 
at 25-38. 
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problems refered to in this dissertation will not be resolved easily. As long as the 
global capitalist system and its neo-liberal institutions allow and endorse such 
attitudes, there is a definite possibility that the IP normative system will continue to 
negatively influence availability and affordability of genetics, and that human rights 
will be of very limited help in redressing situations where individuals' health and 
their chance to realise their full potential is injeopardy. 
This last chapter concludes the second part of our dissertation, which has been 
dedicated to the assessment of the normative systems of intellectual property rights 
and human rights, with both the benchmarks established in our theoretical framework 
and a few practical examples. At the very beginning of this dissertation, we 
presented evidence that benefits arising from genetic science have real potential for 
improving global health. In the first part, we argued that justice demands a broad 
redistribution of the benefits of genetics. We defended the equal and universal 
consideration of every individual' s basic health needs to further a broader ideal of 
equal opportunity for aIl on the global scene. The analysis of the last three chapters 
reveals that the two main normative international systems meant to go vern global 
access to scientific innovation and knowledge as weIl as distribution in health and 
genetic technology do not operate to advance equitable distributive justice ideals in 
global health. Our analysis has brought to light the magnitude of the gap between the 
normative expression of universal ideals of justice, equality, and solidarity, and the 
reallimits imposed by the global world order's politics and economics. 
As they currently function, the IP and human rights systems, taken both alone and 
together, do not allow adequate consideration ofhuman welfare concerns. Despite the 
numerous positive law mechanisms in place, the philosophy and politics underlying 
these legal schemes hinder genetic-benefit redistribution and therefore prevent the 
realisation of global distributive justice ideals to broaden access to common health 
standards. This, however, does not mean that these normative systems should be 
completely abolished or replaced. They have definite potential, both individually 
and in concert, to contribute to global health improvement and allow individuals to 
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profit from available opportunities. However, significant changes will have to 
occur in order to find sorne balance in applying these normative standards. 
Establishing detailed solutions and practical policy options is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. In conclusion, however, we will say a few words about avenues 
that could be explored further, to set the basis for further discussion. 
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Conclusion 
The primacy of human rights over trade 
liberalization is consistent with the trade regime 
on its own terms. The institutions that are the 
official guardians of trade law pose formidable 
barriers to the proper and full realization of this 
. . h 981 znSlg t. 
As significant progress is being made in the field of human genetics, physicians, 
researchers and governments increasingly recognise that genetic technology, research 
tools, and therapeutic and preventive services are crucial for the improvement of 
global health. In particular, there is significant evidence that genetics will play an 
increasing role in medicine and public health in the coming years, and that it could 
consequently also have far-reaching impact on the health of developing countries' 
populations. However, less affluent countries often do not have the financial, 
technological, and human resources to take advantage of these potential benefits and 
tailor them to their specifie health care needs. Even with an increasing, globally 
accessible body of scientific and technological knowledge and constant medical 
progress and discoveries, the condition ofhuman health in many developing countries 
continues to dec1ine. 982 Disparity in access to products and services arising from 
genetics is an important issue for the contemporary international policy agenda, and a 
specifie challenge is to find ways to hamess genetic knowledge so that it can 
contribute to global health equity through collaborative efforts. This topic has 
recently attracted a great deal of attention in many fora, especially in light of the 
widely-used concept of genetic-benefit sharing. Beyond outrage and intuitive feelings 
of injustice, however, the debate surrounding the global health and genetics divide 
981 R. Howse & M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy Challenges for the World 
Trade Organization, Montréal, 2000, online on the website of Law and Democracy, 
<http://www.ichrdd.calenglish/commdoc/publications/globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html> (accessed 
May 2Sth, 2006) 
982 C. Juma & L. Yee-Cheong, "Reinventing Global Health: the Role of Science, Technology and 
Innovation" (March 1 9th, 2005) 365 The Lancet 1105. 
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needs to be brought one step further, through a deep analysis of the theoretical, legal, 
normative, socio-economic, and political factors involved in global inequalities. 
This dissertation contributes to the debate about what has been called the genetics 
divide. In the face of the existing powerful market-oriented distribution mechanisms 
and the conceptual and normative weaknesses of the notion of compensatory bene fit 
sharing, we adopted a different lens through which to analyse and reinvent the 
concept in relation to global health equity. We focussed on a global way of 
envisioning benefit sharing to realise distributive justice in health. To this end, we 
based our reasoning on the idea that justice demands the protection of the most 
vulnerable individuals to ensure that they bene fit from equality of opportunities, an 
essential element for achieving justice. 
The theoretical framework we built covers many different aspects. We first 
established that an acceptable conception of justice in health should necessarily 
transcend boundaries. lndeed, while groups and communities are certainly very 
important units of consideration in many spheres of activity, we determined that we 
should de al with basic health and genetic needs using individuals as the ultimate unit 
of moral concem. This discussion resulted in the adoption of a cosmopolitan 
framework based on a global scheme of cooperation as the basis of our analysis. This 
globallens established a reference for assessing institutions that could be involved in 
the distribution of genetic benefits. 
Following the establishment of our parameters ofreference, we worked on a thorough 
analysis of the specificity of health to justify the elaboration of a particular 
framework of distributive justice in this area. Building on the work of Daniels and 
Rawls, this exercise highlighted the crucial importance of health and genetics for 
normal functioning, and the need to ensure a fair distribution of goods and services in 
this field because of the role normal functioning plays in individuals' ability to profit 
from available opportunities. We then saw the links between ill health, lack of access 
to genetics, and a reduced range of opportunities and realised, even more, the specifie 
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and universal importance of health. This framework provided us a basis for equal 
consideration of every person's health, for requiring equality of opportunities and, 
consequently, for the use of distributive justice schemes to solve avoidable health 
inequalities and encourage equitable access to the benefits arising from genetics. In 
other words, our theoretical analysis led us to adopt normative landmarks linked to 
needs in our assessment of the distribution of benefits arising from genetics rather 
than continuing to rely on market-based distributive mechanisms. 
Following this theoretical analysis, we moved to the second goal of this thesis: 
assessing the compatibility of two important international legal systems concerned 
with distribution issues - intellectual property law and human rights law - with our 
framing principles. Our investigation of the underlying philosophy, principles, 
structure and operation of these two legal frameworks led us to several conclusions. 
First, we realised that, although the intellectual property and the human right systems 
incorporate positive law dispositions relating to human welfare, knowledge diffusion 
and access, equity, and justice, neither system operates to advance equitable 
distributive justice ideals in terms of global health. We are faced with the conclusion 
that both structures, though quite different in their underlying rationales, are 
nevertheless similar in that they are both driven by powerful interests and market 
considerations in what we know as the global economy. In other words, although the 
content of both the international intellectual property and the human rights systems 
show strong potential for global health improvement, their tacit focus on market 
efficiency and their tolerance of significant economic and health inequalities 
represent important obstacles to achieving real access to genetics by people in 
need. The practical examples discussed in the last chapter confirmed this 
understanding. 
Our work off ers a significant contribution to the evaluation and analysis of this 
situation, beginning with the widely-used notion of bene fit sharing, and questioning 
and restructuring it in such a way as to address and prevent a genetics divide. Doing 
so, we have produced strong and original normative landmarks that can be used to 
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justify relying on a cosmopolitan approach to global justice based on health needs and 
opportunities in the face of major social, political, economic and legal pressure 
resulting from commercialisation of the fast growing field of genetics. Our overall 
analysis resulted, however, in the identification of a clear gap between the framework 
we constructed to give theoretical relevance to global benefit sharing obligations and 
the legal and political constraints that the application of two major and influential 
legal systems impose on global bene fit sharing. Indeed, we realised that as actually 
implemented, neither intellectual property nor international human rights guarantee 
that the benefits of health-related genetics research will be distributed equitably. For 
each legal system, we faced two kinds of deficit. First, we identified inherent legal 
(procedural and structural) problems that can impair the realisation of equitable 
distribution of genetic benefits. Second, we confronted broad, subtle, and major 
socio-economic and political problems affecting the functioning ofthe global order. 
These findings represent the groundwork needed to initiate policy discussions and to 
eventually undertake concrete changes to achieve an international redistribution of 
resources emerging from genetics, and likely for other promising technologies with 
potential for global health improvement. With this grounding, we can begin to 
consider whether there exists any short and middle-term policy solutions that we 
could implement within the actual global architecture. More generally, we can start to 
think about how to approach the greater challenge of limiting hegemonic forces and 
powers that lie at the basis of this same global architecture to allow global distributive 
justice in health. Although establishing detailed solutions and practical policy 
options is not the aim of this work, by way of conclusion to this thesis, we will, 
however, say a few words about tensions that would need to be resolved and 
avenues that could be explored further in the short and longer term, to lay sorne 
foundation for further discussion. 
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Policy options to explore within the existing global structure 
Policy makers could have an important role to play in the redistribution of the 
resources emerging from genetics in terms of global health equity. lndeed, sorne of 
the access and justice issues highlighted in this dissertation can be addressed by 
adapting existing legal structures using built-in flexibilities and proposing changes to 
the systems. The literature has proposed various means to decrease and eliminate the 
existing health gap between developed and developing countries. We will briefly 
address sorne of these. 
Concerning the human rights system, alternative measures could be established 
within the existing legal structure to address the poor level of enforcement and 
justiciability of socio-economic rights. For example, one author has proposed a 
"concerted and integrated approach,,983 under which socio-economic human rights 
could be indirectly enforced though the application of civil and political human rights, 
or be considered as a specific social or ethical dimension of those same civil and 
political rights, given the clear link existing between the two types of rights and the 
better justiciability of the latter. 984 This strategy would only emphasise and give 
concrete expression to the already well-recognised principles of indivisibility and 
inter-relatedness of rights. Another way of envisioning socio-economic rights 
implementation has been to argue for their progressive realisation through a 
"minimum threshold approach." This approach would justify compelling 
govemments to defend their priorities and require that they pro vide the minimum 
level of enjoyment of the whole range of basic human rights before prioritising any 
sector of economic activity.985 Such an approach could be more effective with the 
983 S.A. Agbacka, supra note 773. 
984 As was done by the European Court of Human Rights in Airey v. Ireland, supra note 703, which 
enforced the right to legal aid through the right to a fair trial and by the European Commission on 
Human Rights in Tavares v. France, App. No. 16593/90, Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. (Sept. 12, 
1991) which enforced the right to health through the right to life; on the topic, see also C. Scott & P. 
Macklem, "Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South 
African Constitution" (1992) 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 at29. 
985 A. Bard-Anders et al., "Assessing Human Rights Performance in Developing Countries: The Case 
for a Minimal Threshold Approach to Economic and Social Rights" in A. Bard-Anders & E. Asbjom, 
eds., Human Rights in Developing Countries (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1988) at 333.; 
S.A.Agbacka, supra note 773 
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establishment of specific indicators against which we could assess compliance with a 
minimum level of socio-economic rights.986 
In terms of changing the patent system, patent pools have been proposed as a 
response to the potential negative effects of patents on fundamental research and 
access to technology. A patent pool arises when patent-holders mutually agree to 
license their patents to each other and to third parties. It has been suggested that the 
application of patent pools in the area of diagnostic genetics may work to provide 
greater access to genetics technology and to encourage collaboration between 
different agents involved in this sphere of activity who share the same goal of 
developing accurate, safe, and reliable testing methods for given polygenic diseases. 
However, industry may be reluctant to share their patents via a pool, preferring 
instead to pursue their research alone with the hope of bigger financial retums.987 To 
solve this dilemma and encourage the formation of patent pools in genetics, inventive 
and attractive licensing and financial redistribution schemes could be set up to 
encourage industry to appreciate and acknowledge the financial and social advantages 
of a patent pools.988 Nevertheless, many other challenges remain to the feasibility of 
patent pools in genetics. More research and a more thorough analysis than cannot be 
offered here would be needed to assess whether, in the end, patent pools offer any 
real hope of addressing access concems. 
lnnovative licensing strategies could also play an important role in securing access to 
genetics by developing countries.989 lndeed, when licensing fees become prohibitive 
in terms of affordability of innovations, developing countries should think about other 
modes of securing access to patented technologies. As discussed briefly in the course 
986 P. Hunt, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Hum an Rights on the Right 
of Everyone ta Enjoy the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 117(c). 
A/58/427, 10 Oct. 2003. 
987 A.K. Rai, supra note 422. 
988 T.J. Ebersole, M. C. Guthrie & J. A. Goldstein, "Patent Pools as a Solution to the Licensing 
Problems of Diagnostic Genetics" (Jan. 2005) 17: 1 Intelleetual Property & Teehnology Law Journal 
6, at Il. 
989 L. Nelsen, "The Role of University Technology Transfer Operations in Assuring Access to 
Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries" (January 2003) 111:2 Yale Journal of Health Policy 
Law and Ethies 301. 
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of this dissertation, one solution is to allow compulsory licensing within national 
patent systems, as permitted by TRIPS under the heading not only of "national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency" but also of "public non-
commercial use" (art.31 TRIPS).990 Sorne are of the view that these last-resort 
restrictions are very limiting and suggest that the scope of compulsory licenses should 
be extended to help provide access to genetic tools and technologies for prevention 
purposes, for example.991 We instead believe that the problem is not with the rights 
themselves but with how sorne countries are afraid to use and enforce them out of 
fear of retaliation from the most powerful countries. Another solution would be for 
governments to use mechanisms to encourage different industry sectors to agree on 
consistent and uniform advantageous licensing practices when dealing with 
developing nations. Such an agreement could create "ethical business leadership" 
while helping countries to meet their international cooperation obligations and would 
likely not affect private profits substantially. 992 Apart from licensing, other 
mechanisms exist in IP law to facilitate access and are also widely debated and 
discussed on the international scene.993 
In addition to these system-specifie initiatives, more effort could be expended to 
better ensure compatibility and connection between human rights and intellectual 
property rights. The gap that makes them evolve on separate tracks could be bridged, 
at least partially, using different strategies, such as working towards a more organised 
990 E. R. Gold & D. Lam, "Balancing Trade in Patents: Public Non-Commercial Use and Compulsory 
Licensing" (2003) 6 The Journal of World Intellectual Property 5. The WTO's General Council 
adopted a decision in August 30th, 2003 in Cancun, which allows countries without manufacturing 
capacity to also use compulsory licensing for importation rather than production. 
991 C. M Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for 
Developing Countries, Working Paper for the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. 
992 A. Attaran & L. Gillespie-White, "Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS 
Treatment in Africa?, supra note 932. 
993 We are referring, for example, to differential pricing and price control depending on the market and 
the consumers' ability to pay, imposing local working of patented products following their 
introduction in a given market, allowing R&D of generic products before the patent expires with Bolar 
provision, and allowing paraIIeI imports of patented products. For an extensive discussion on those 
mechanisms, refer to H. E. Kettler & c. Collins, supra note 438; J. Watal, Pharmaceutical Patents, 
Prices and Welfare Losses: Policy Options for India Under the WTO TRIPS Agreement (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000); J.H. Barton, Dijferentiated Pricing of Patented Products, Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health Working Paper Series, Paper No. WG4:2, July 2001. 
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and concerted action and strategy from different branches of the civil society; 
improving the dialogue between policy makers and governmental officiaIs of the two 
sectors on the national and international scene; and focussing on the social role of IP 
rights, on their compatibility with human rights and on their related capacity to 
protect access to a certain level of health in priority. For example, in response to the 
major normative and political obstacles they face with TRIPS' application, sorne 
developing countries, assisted by international NGOs and intergovernmental 
organizations, are now trying to further their interests in other fora, adopting 
strategies of regime-shifting. These initiatives aim to exp and IP lawmaking in other 
regimes like biodiversity, public health, and human rights to address the social aim 
of IP and challenge and revise sorne of TRIPS' problematic dispositions and 
associated practices. 994 This can result in conflicting and contradictory legal 
obligations, and the results will depend on the nature of the emerging documents, 
binding or non-binding; their enforcement mechanisms; and the authority, mandate, 
and resources of the organisation in charge of implementing them. 
As weIl as legal mechanisms, new types of business strategies and partnerships could 
also be explored and adopted to complement the hum an rights and the intellectual 
property rights systems. For example, in reaction to global health inequalities 
induced by market forces, sorne have proposed reliance on new ways to finance R&D 
in genetics, especially for neglected conditions, involving key players though public 
private partnerships (ppp).995 As an alternative to PPP, sorne have instead proposed a 
994 L. R. Helfer, supra note 574. 
995 Such a strategy aims to get funds from the private sector to further R&D for global health issues 
with the ultimate purpose of providing affordable and adapted goods to populations from the 
developing world. To this end, IP arrangements have to be negotiated creatively to ensure that private 
companies have enough commercial incentive to invest and that IP can also be used as a tool in the 
pursuit of social objectives. Such an initiative has taken place in many spheres, including malaria, 
tuberculosis, and AIDS research with the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. They 
can achieve rapid and quality results and crucial social goals but can also be perceived negatively by 
sorne companies who are not willing to take the risk ofbeing limited in the way they can use IP rights. 
Up to now, results achieved by ppp have been mitigated. For more on PPP, see: E. Ziemba, Public-
Private Partnerships of Projects Development: Financial, Scientific and Managerial Issues as 
Challenges for the Future, CIPIH Research Report, Geneva, 2005, online on the WHO website: 
<http://www. who.intlintellectualproperty/studies/Ziemba.pdf> (accessed May 21, 2006); H. 
Thorsteinsdottir et al. "Genomics, a Global Public Good?" (2003) 361 Lancet 891, at 892; H. E. 
306 
mandatory global need fax mechanism, which would be applicable to the profits of 
private agents in certain high-profile spheres of activity and subsequently redirected 
toward the needs of developing countries.996 Another option is a Global Resources 
Dividend, requiring agents who exploit natural resources to compensate those who do 
not have the opportunity to make use and profit from the same resources.997 Another 
possibility would be to establish an international regime overseeing the pursuit of 
research and development activities and the distribution of benefits in the area of 
human genetics.998 Instead of being exclusively driven by IP law, this system could 
be a stand-alone mechanism and be viewed both as an alternative and a complement 
to the present regime.999 An additional area where attention could be focussed is the 
improvement of public, govemment, media, and health professional awareness of the 
medical potential of genetics, the functioning of the IP system, and important 
international negotiations on complex technological and normative issues. This could 
take the form of a global network of different agents involved in the field with a 
strong presence of people from developing countries and the civil society. 1000 
Kettler & c. Collins, supra note 438 at 26; P. Trouiller et aIs., "Drug Development for neglected 
Diseases: A deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure" (June 2002) 359 :9324 Lancet 2188. 
996 D.G Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Capitalism, supra note 32, at, 141; L. Doyal 
& 1. Gough, supra note 92. 
997 T. Pogge, "Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties", supra note 278; T.W. Pogge, World 
Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, supra note 159; T.W. Pogge, 
"A Global Resources Dividend", supra note 331 in D. Crocker & T. Linden, eds., Ethics of 
Consumption (Totowa, NJ: Roman and Littlefield, 1999) 501; T. Hayward, 'Thomas Pogge's Global 
Resources Dividend: A Critique and an Alternative" (2005) 2:3 Journal of Moral Philosophy 317. 
998 It could follow the distribution model established in the recent International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture F AO, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture, supra note 43. To this end, an international organisation could be in charge of the 
regime, collecting royalty fees from the use of the human genetic pool and setting up redistribution 
mechanisms on the basis of the impact of inventions on global health, for example. For more on what 
those systems could look like, refer to: T.W. Pogge, supra note 3; A. Motoc, Specific Human Rights 
Issues, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, UN Economic and Social 
Council, Geneva, 2002, doc.E/CNA/sub.2/2002/37, par. 13-15; WHO, Genetics, genomics, supra note 
19. 
999 For example, it could include terms consistent with section 67 of TRIPS, which provides a basis for 
cooperation between affluent and less affluent countries while concurrently ensuring transfer of a 
portion of patent royalty fees to the researchers involved. 
1000 It could be similar to the latest regional initiative of the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEP AD) or the Global Genomics Initiative proposed by the Joint Centre for Bioethics recently. For 
more information on these, see NEP AD and African Institute for Capacity Development (AI CAD), 
Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on Capacity Development and Poverty Reduction in 
Africa, Kenya, November 4th, 2005; and Joint Center for Bioethics, Genomics and World Health, 
Toronto, 2004, at 42-44. 
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This being said, even if sorne negative consequences of socio-economic and health 
inequalities could theoretically be addressed through human rights law and 
intellectuai property law built-in flexibilities and complementary policy and business 
strategies, it has become c1ear, in the course of the thesis, that neither system is 
currently working very effectively in equitably distributing benefits. Socio-economic 
rights are often perceived as "feel good window dressing" rather than real, 
enforceable norms,IOOI and IP flexibilities are frequently of very limited practical 
utility. This is not a problem, however, with the systems per se, but is instead 
symptomatic of the larger, troubling economic and political global reality analysed in 
the dissertation. 
Indeed, the patent system is intended, in part, to provide incentive for innovation, 
disc10sure of invention, and, ultimately, increase public knowledge. IP law is not 
static, and if we go back to its roots and emphasise its role in greater knowledge 
diffusion and access, it can contribute to improving the social good. In fact, the basis 
of the global trade system was established as part of a broader objective of global 
peace and security following the World War II. This is c1early evident from art. XX 
of the GA TT on the primary importance of protecting public morals and human life, 
and from the Preamble of the Agreement Establishing the WTO, which states that the 
purpose of the system is not free trade at aIl costs, but also "allowing for the optimal 
use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development.,,1002 As suggested by May, the public access and social utility aspects 
of IP should therefore be emphasised and elevated to the rank of primary 
consideration, while relegating the private characteristics to the status of privilege. 1003 
Similarly, the human rights system aims to address, limit, and solve different types of 
inequalities with the ultimate ideal of attaining universal respect for human beings' 
freedom, dignity, and equality. It is therefore important to emphasise, again, that 
equity and access problems are not created by the systems of IP rights and human 
1001 M. Darrow & T. Amparo, "Power, Capture and Conflict: A CalI for Human Rights Accountability 
in Develoment Cooperation" (May 2005) 27:2 Human Rights Quarterly 471, at 479. 
1002 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Geneva, April 15, 1994. 
1003 C. May, "Unacceptable Costs: The Consequences of Making Knowledge Property in a Global 
Society" (2002) 16:2 Global Society 123. 
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rights per se, but partly by how they are manipulated by external agents driven by 
powerful economic and political interests. 
Policy changes and isolated business strategies like those just addressed could 
certainly tackle problems arising with the application of human right and IP law and 
improve global access to health and genetic benefits temporarily. However, limits to 
access and obstacles to distributive justice in health are bigger than intellectual 
property and human rights law and policy. In fact, we have been faced, at many 
occasions in the course of this dissertation, with the limits of analysing legal 
processes independently of other social, political, and economical factors. Even if 
clear legal dispositions or court orders aiming at improving individual health through 
better access exist, their practical and real impact often depends on broader political 
and economic factors and struggles which originate in the very construction and 
functioning of the global order under which normative systems evolve. 
Broader long-term and inclusive options 
Actions outside of the system of rights, at the level of global governance and 
international architecture, will be needed if we are to expect any significant, inclusive, 
and sustainable solutions to limit hegemonic forces, to include the most vulnerable 
and change the way human rights and intellectual property princip les are translated 
into reality. Institutional changes of many kinds can be envisioned and new 
influential actors of the global political picture, like international non-govemmental 
organisations and transnational corporations, need to be involved. 
We will need to reflect on establishing innovative strategies to give more space and 
authority to developing nations in international institutions. 1 004 This is an important 
challenge, due to the tremendous financial control that sorne powerful states operate 
on the policy positions, priorities, and initiatives of those institutions. As Richards 
1004 A. Kwa, Power Politics in the WTO, Focus on the Global South (second edition), January 
2003, online on the Focus on the Global South website, 
<http://www . focus web .org/publications/Books/power-politics-in-the-WTO .pd t> (accessed Apri 1 
] l, 2006); B. S. Chimni, supra note 664; J .E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, supra 
note ]52, at 225. 
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states, "insofar then as nation-state governments themselves are dominated by global 
capitalist interests, the difficulties of creating and financing transnational regulatory 
agencies that are autonomous of these same interests are magnified.,,1005 To this end, 
attention could therefore be focussed on the role and capacity of NGOs to influence 
the behaviour of the most powerful agents of the world and to change their 
established dynamic. At many occasions, NGOs of various regions and different 
social sectors have had a positive social impact through public awareness initiatives 
and widely-publicied opposition to hum an rights violations and injustices committed 
by the world's most powerful stakeholders. 1006 Their capacity to "investigate, expose 
and shame" 1007 is their main strength. Unfortunately, the concrete results of their 
actions are often limited, given their restricted resources to further their social and 
political agenda and to network with other similar groups to establish concerted 
actions and have a voice in the international dialogue. 
AIso, in the face of the immense and growing economic power of transnational 
corporations in this same global picture, another avenue could be to increase 
corporate social responsibility. Sorne oppose additional responsitiblities, arguing that 
the first dut Y of transnational corporations (TNes) is to make profit for their 
shareholders' bene fit, while respecting the law of the states in which they operate. 1008 
However, the perception and the role of TNes is gradually changing. Indeed, they are 
more and more regarded as social organisations with social duties towards their 
employees, the environment, and the society at large. TNes themselves seem to be 
inclined toward sorne social role, as most of them are now voluntarily adopting 
corporate codes of ethical conduct. Given this changing reality, insisting on TNes' 
accountability for human rights violations and persisting inequities could contribute 
to gradually changing the actual global architecture and its troubling focus on the 
1005 D. G Richards, supra note 380, c. 6, at 147. 
1006 For an interesting overview of sorne successful NGO actions and strategies, refer to R. Khan, "The 
Anti-Globalization Portests: Side-show of Global Governance, or Law-Making in the Streets?" supra 
note 797. 
1007 K. Roth, "Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an 
International Human Rights Organization" (2004) 26 Human Right Quarterly 63, at 67. 
1008 P. T. Muchlinski, "Human Rights and Multinationals: Is There a Problem?" (2001) 77: 1 
International AjJairs 31. 
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needs of its more powerful and wealthy agents. 1009 One strategy could be to insit on 
the market value of a positive public image and on the effect that respect for human 
rights could have on a company's economic value. 
Again, however, such reforms have to arise from a real and shared conviction that 
global health gaps and hum an rights deficits should be eliminated in priority, even if 
it means direct and coordinated contributions, changes in the distribution of benefits, 
and opportunity costs for the most affluent. It has to gain support from governments, 
corporations, and the public at large. In the actual global order, resolving the 
inequitable power distribution arising in the social, economic, and political arenas 
appears very challenging, since the most affluent are almost always the most 
powerful politically. 
The CUITent patterns of inequality created by the tremendous influence of powerful 
states and TNCs on the global order are neither natural nor unavoidable, but are the 
result of political choices driven by powerful socio-economic concerns for which no 
one seems to be held accountable. As highlighted by Howse and Mutua, the United 
Nations, WTO, and international financial institutions are actually in place and 
represent the institutional foundation needed to arrive at sorne agreement on complex 
issues touching on human rights, economics, and trade. These organisations are not 
incompatible with one another and could work in a collaborative way instead of 
evolving independently and inconsistently, as they often do. Institutional evolution, 
more accountability for non-state actors, and a broader perspective on trade law's 
implications are needed if we expect to bridge the gap existing between human rights 
and economic institutions. Such reorganisation will likely only happen through a 
reallocation of political authority, a very complex and long-term global project. 
1009 One example of such a proposaI is the UN Global Compact discussed previously, where 
corporations agree to promote human rights in their spheres of activity. For a comprehensive 
discussion on the social responsibility of TNCs, refer to J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and 
Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); J. Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); B. S. Chimni, supra note 664, P.T. Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995) at 93-95; UNCTAD, 
The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 
1999). 
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Sorne, inspired by the recent successful grassroots environmental movement, suggest 
starting with a re-evaluation and valorisation of the public realm to rationalise 
. . . h lOlO 1 f h . . restnctIOns on property ng ts. n any case, a sense 0 t e common mterest m 
health has to develop across different and disparate groups to move toward global 
distributive justice in health. 
Agents from civil society and leaders from developing world governmental agencies 
are already in place, trying to coordinate their work to this end against inequalities 
and in furtherance of justice in distribution and access. They need to be empowered if 
we want them to effectively contribute to breaking the CUITent health inequality 
cycle. 1011 To this end, coalitions and strategie alliances between countries and 
organisations with the same distributive justice vision need to be established, and 
important reforms have to be envisioned. This can build on the ethical vision and 
international social purposes slowly spreading as a result of globalisation, what has 
been referred to as the "social dimensions of globalization.,,1012 Such a strategy has 
not been very successful on the international scene up to now because of widespread 
resistance from sorne affluent nations to renouncing any of their sovereignty in favour 
of a more equitable global negotiation process. In response to this international 
deficit, countries and organisations with similar problems and visions could aim to 
form strong alliances at the regional level, for example, as a way to bec orne less 
isolated, stronger, and more coordinated in their opposition to the commodification of 
health and genetics. This could be a first step in the process of gradually reforming 
the hegemonic international order to make it more accountable in the long-term, not 
just in the health and genetic sphere, but in many other areas where technological 
1010 C. May, "Unacceptable Costs: The Consequences of Making Knowledge Property in a Global 
Society" (2002) 16:2 Global Society 123, at 144; J. Boyle, "A Politics ofIntellectual Property: 
Environmentalism for the Net?" (1997) 47: 1 Duke Law Journal 89. 
1011 M. Darrow & A. Tomas, supra note 1001; F. Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (New 
York: Free Press, 1992); M. Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2002); F. Zakaria, The Future ofFreedom (New York: Norton, 2003). 
1012 J .A.Ocampo, "Rethinking the Development Agenda" (2002) 26:3 Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 393; J. Martin, Globalization and Development: A Latin American and Caribbean 
Perspective (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
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development is likely to give rise to socio-economic inequalities and exclusions due 
to powerful market demands. 1013 
More research and analysis should be invested in exploring such a strategy further, 
especially on how alternative political forces could be used and manipulated 
differently to ensure sorne sort of social control over knowledge, products and 
services access and distribution. For example, it will be interesting to study how 
existing political and social powers both from the developed and the developing 
world could mobilise, build a consensus and join together in their action to influence 
the international distributive scheme. AIso, strategies will be needed to translate the 
cosmopolitan notion of global citizenship and the widespread refusaI of health 
inequalities in the global dialogue and make them strong enough to resist market 
liberalisation and national political forces. More generally, it will be essential to 
continue thinking about the most equitable and realistic way to envi sion a 
redistribution of authority, governance and related institutional reforms at the global 
level. 
Bridging the genetics divide requires more than an injection of money into innovative 
research projects and products relevant for the needs of developing countries. In this 
dissertation, our approach has been focused principally on the normative responses 
and deficit in approaching the genetics divide but we have quickly realised that a 
broader vision is required if we want to tackle the major issues of health inequalities. 
Achieving justice in health and more equitable distribution of the benefits emerging 
from genetics to further human life and health improvement is of public interest and 
is within our capacity. It requires collective action towards building functioning 
innovation systems in developing countries and addressing local deficits including 
education, scientific capacity building, infrastructure improvement, corruption 
eradication. Ultimately, it mostly requires questioning the established global order 
1013 For more on what has been called "open regionalism," refer to J. A. Ocampo, "Globalization, 
Development and Democracy" (2005) 5:3 Items and Issues, online on the website of Yale Global, 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/pdfs/ocampo.pdf> (accessed June 2nd, 2006). 
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and working towards reducing and eliminating persisting social inequalities using 
national and global political and economical forces into place in a different way. 
As a global community with resources, knowledge and technology to reduce and even 
eliminate the majority of existing global health issues, we have a responsibility to act 
to prevent radical inequalities. 
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Glossary of Acronyms 
AIDS: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 
CBD: Convention on Biological Diversity 
CIPP: Center for Intellectual Property Policy 
CF: Cystic Fibrosis 
EMBO: European Molecular Biology Organization 
ESC: European Social Charter 
ESTs: Expressed Sequence Tags 
F AO: Food and Agriculture Organization 
FT As: Free-Trade Agreements 
FTAAs: Free Trade Areas of the Americas 
GA TT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCP: Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice 
GNP: Gross National Product 
HGP: Human Genome Project 
HUGO: Human Genome Organization 
IBC: International Committee on Bioethics 
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ICH: International Conference on Harmonisation 
IFIs: International Financial Institutions 
Int J Hum Rights: International Journal of Human Rights 
InCl L.: International Law 
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IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IP: Intellectual Property 
IPRs: Intellectual Property Rights 
ITPGRF A: International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals 
MRC: Medical Research Council 
R&D: Research & Development 
SNPs: Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms 
TNCs: Transnational Corporations 
TCC: Transnational Capitalist Class 
TRIPS: Trade Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property 
UDHR: Univers al Declaration of Human Rights 
UN: United Nations 
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund 
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
WHO: World Health Organization 
WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization 
WMA: World Medical Association 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
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